TELOS

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INTRODUCTION

Contrary to most Marxists' uncritical assumptions, today there is no adequate political, juridical and economic model of a non-authoritarian alternative to capitalist or bureaucratic centralist societies. The critique of capitalism in the name of redistributive economic equality, substantive "revolutionary" law and central planning generally culminates in statism, while the critique of Eastern European societies from the viewpoint of political equality, formal law and self-regulating markets implies the restoration of capitalism. On the basis of their Eastern European experience, Heller and Feher undertake a critique of both alternatives in favor of a third model—yet to be fully developed—through an analysis of the concept of equality and a critique of egalitarian movements that entail the impoverishment and the authoritarian regulation of the structure of human needs. They further attempt to detach both the emancipatory meaning of formal law from all particularistic instrumentalizations, and the cybernetic calculatory function of markets from commodity fetishism. In terms of their third alternative, they assign critical monitoring functions to future egalitarian movements.

The next essay, by Helmut Dahmer, analyzes psychoanalysis through fairly orthodox Marxist lenses and indicates to what extent Freud and Marx can be regarded as parallels. Whether this parallelism is desirable or even necessary remains to be seen. In fact, the whole effort to ground Marxism by means of psychoanalysis—as the first generation of critical theorists did—is very questionable and raises more problems than it solves. At any rate, Dahmer makes the case for a position still in need of considerable exploration.

An effort in the latter direction is provided by the article that follows. Having in the past published several articles reiterating critical theory's appropriation of orthodox psychoanalysis, it is now time to seriously consider the alternative position that this appropriation was never critical enough. Jessica Benjamin argues that Adorno's, Horkheimer's and Marcuse's utilization of Freud deprived their theories of an adequate conception of intersubjectivity. This, in turn, led to the pessimistic negative philosophy of history in which the process of civilization and socialization as such *represent the triumph of instrumental reason. Benjamin not only contests the well-known Frankfurt theses of the decline of the ego and the disintegration of the family, but also attempts to provide some clues to an alternative social psychology, free of Freud's naturalistic theory of instincts and of his monadological concept of the ego. Although the article is not entirely successful in presenting an alternative positive program, it does throw some much-needed light on the theoretical reasons for the resigned, pessimistic outcome of the first formulation of critical theory.*

Further elaborating themes dealing with art and popular culture, this issue includes a translation of Adorno's essay "Music and Technique," with an introduction by Wes Blomster. Using Benjamin's theory of the decline of aura

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and Adorno's stress on the "technicity" of advanced post-auratic art, Blomster nevertheless comes up with an evaluation of electronic music that disregards both Adorno's warning that not all technological advances incorporate critique and Benjamin's position that only open, exoteric *works that restore dialogue by relativizing the distance between* creator *and* receptor *are political in the emancipatory sense. Yet Blomster does contribute toward the overcoming of some of the unfortunate self-imposed isolation of the critical theory of art in the face of recent cultural developments.*

Although the journal has devoted considerable space to the early Marxism of Georg Lukács, it has tended to neglect his interesting and important pre-Marxist period which, despite its brevity, was Lukács's richest in successful works. György Markus, friend and student of Lukács and the editor of Lukács's two Heidelberg aesthetics, helps to remedy this situation with his essay "The Soul and Life." Concentrating on several unpublished and Hungarian manuscripts, Markus gives a far more balanced picture of the young Lukács than anything yet published. In particular, he revises the one-sided interpretations of Goldmann, Asor-Rosa, Lichtheim, Kettler and Wattnick that neglect the historical-sociological side of the young Lukács, organically connected to an early but creative reading of Marx. The Lukács that emerges from Markus's pages is the progenitor of a critical theory of culture in ways up until now generally unsuspected—especially by historians of the Frankfurt School.

While on the subject of Frankfurt School historians, it is only fitting to point out that the following article by Martin Jay was originally rejected by every single Telos *editor who had read it. The occasion now for our publishing it is Jay's otherwise inexplicable (given their diametrically opposed politics) defense of Anderson's* Considerations on Western Marxism. *The new alliance receives its substance through Jay's philologically untenable and self-contradictory marriage of Adorno and Althusser against Lukácsian concepts of totality. The short reply to it reveals some of the reasons for the earlier disagreements with Jay's piece and attempts to demonstrate that* both *Anderson and Jay suppress precisely those historical moments of "Western Marxism" and "Critical Theory" that are the most important clues to both the current crisis and the chances of renewal of the whole critical project in social theory.*

The Notes and Commentary section begins with some comments by Gramsci on journalism. Because Gramsci presupposed both a potentially revolutionary working class and a viable party structure, most of his comments cannot apply to our present historical context. Yet, they do provoke reflection on the function of the radical journal. If it is not a catalytic and pedagogical means to the formation of radical consciousness, what is it? Leninist answers that would salvage the "mandarinism" by restricting it to party functionaries certainly will not do for Telos, *which long ago exposed the authoritarian, repressive and fraudulent character of all efforts in this*

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direction. Likewise, the answer of traditional critical theory will not do. While critical theory holds that the safeguarding of truth is possible only by intensifying the obscurity of theoretical discourse, which thus ends up entrusted to a few intellectuals in our "totally administered society," it altogether fails to indicate how the truth salvaged in this manner can ever be effective again. Further, critical theory tends to address a readership so restricted that printing *a journal becomes pointless: carbon paper alone is adequate to reproduce sufficient amounts of whatever is written to supply the demands of the readership. In the present situation, when* all *academic fields find themselves in serious crisis, a "critical-historical-bibliographic" journal in Gramsci's sense becomes the theoretical conscience of increasingly instrumentalized, positivized and bureaucratized disciplines. Given the growing need for internal renewal, the cultural aim of radical journals should be to vindicate the emancipatory moment in theoretical discourse—a moment whose elimination is the main reason of that very crisis. Thus, the more modest political goal (with respect to Gramsci's) is to stimulate the growth of a critical intelligentsia able to engage in this type of discourse and thus able to provide potentially emancipatory solutions to the particular crises. In a situation typified by declining internal opposition, growing bourgeois world hegemony and the total lack of a viable socialist model, this is one of the few projects that can still be viably undertaken. Gramsci's notes provide the starting point for a critical reconsideration of the political function of non-Leninist radical intellectuals.*

Also included in the Notes and Commentary section is an interview with Michel Foucault, who outlines his forthcoming massive study on the history of sexuality; Lipsitz's evaluation of Biberman's life-work, Layton's survey of Latin American films, an exchange on "Western Marxism," and a report on the most recent Telos *Conference. The last two items are particularly significant since they indicate some of the issues now being discussed, which are likely to become the journal's focus in the immediate future.*

In accordance with the new policy of expanding the Book Review section, this issue includes an extensive analysis of Gouldner's latest work by Morrow, Zipes's devastating critique of Bettelheim's book on fairy tales, Davidson's preliminary evaluation of the critical edition of Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, *Boggs's criticism of the Spanish Communist Party, Luke's review of Clark's recent book on Gramsci, and a lengthy report on Loevinger's ego-developmental psychology.*

Andrew Arato
Paul Piccone

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FORMS OF EQUALITY*

by Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller

I

A spectre haunts the industrialized world—the spectre of egalitarianism. Demands to equalize the First and Third Worlds or to reduce needs to bring about social equality are articulated by movements and theories which keep "social equality" on the agenda. But, as we will try to show, a consistently implemented egalitarianism is a myth. All attempts to realize it as a general principle of social organization in a context of even minimal industrialization lead to a decline of wealth. Yet, recurring egalitarian tendencies constitute an *indispensable* social monitoring system. They always point to concrete inequalities that threaten to become permanent and therefore must be opposed. That is why theories and movements that point out inequality and seek to eliminate it must be recognized as socially valuable.

To characterize egalitarianism as a social movement incorporating specific principles, it is necessary to study the main types of human equality. These fall into two basic types: equality with respect to ownership of property and equality in the evaluation of men as individuals.

1. *Equality in Ownership*

One interpretation of this calls for the equal distribution of social goods—i.e., an "equal share" of property, an equal distribution of the land, or equal ownership of the means of production. This view is generally connected with obsolescent conditions of production or agrarian societies, especially if the equal distribution of social goods also means equal divisions. But this concept of equality can also refer to equality of needs or to an equal level of the satisfaction of needs. Usually, when this demand claims to be a general principle of social organization, it is tied to a play for the simultaneous redistribution of property. But when it is directed only at small groups, it may refer solely to consumption. Lastly, this conception can mean equality in the allocation and control of social goods. This can mean that all have control over their own, equally apportioned property, or that all have an equal say in matters of politics, management, etc.[1]

But the demand for equal property is never made where the economy has not yet developed into an independent sphere, i.e., where reciprocity is

*Translated from the German by David J. Parent. This is a slightly abridged version.

1. This latter program holds that, simply because their property is equal, all individuals should have an equal vote in social matters. This sort of egalitarianism stems from the particular equilibrium of agricultural societies—based as they are on community property or land already divided into separate parcels. Consequently, this program was the one most closely connected with movements aiming to equalize property ownership. But today, in the midst of hyper-industrialization, we are witnessing the revival of such demands for equal disposition over property—even in regard to its use.

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subordinate to kinship or social custom, where the latter serves as the "natural" means for the equalization of goods; and where redistribution is carried out through personal, "face-to-face" relations which guarantee equality. In short, this demand can never arise where redistribution and reciprocity remain on the level of a quasi-natural homeostasis.[2] Rather, this demand appears only in a limited form under conditions of undeveloped commodity production, where the goal of relative equality of wealth is to create and preserve the material basis for equality in making political decisions.

In general, the concept and demand for equal ownership are responses to the generalization of commodity production and the independence of the economy from other social areas. These demands thus appear when the system of redistribution through kinship bonds and social customs breaks down. The equal exchange in the self-regulating market then becomes the sole form of reciprocity or symmetry in the economic sphere, i.e., when the main task of the new, profit-oriented production and redistribution is to conserve existing inequalities resulting from the market and to create new inequalities. Thus, with developed commodity production, economic inequality becomes the basis of general social inequality. This results in a divergence between constantly developing needs—growing in both quantity and quality—and their satifaction, and growing antagonisms between the "haves" and the "have-nots." The classical form here is the relation between bourgeoisie and proletariat in 19th century *laissez-faire* capitalism. Egalitarianism thus appears as a universal ideology wherever inequality becomes a recognized and accepted social condition (i.e., where there is inequality in property ownership, the satisfaction of needs, or the ability to make decisions).[3]

2. We have borrowed the concepts "reciprocity" and "redistribution" from Karl Polanyi. But we use them in a specific sense relating to conditions of developed commodity production and industrialization.

3. Here Polanyi and Sahlins do not mean by "reciprocity," "redistribution," and "market mechanism" the different forms of economic transactions, but three bsaic types of economic organization. According to Sahlins: "Pooling is socially a *within* relation, the collective action of a group. Reciprocity is a *between* relation, the action and reaction of two parties. Thus pooling is the complement of social unity and, in Polanyi's term, 'centricity'; whereas reciprocity is a social duality and 'symmetry.' Pooling stipulates a social center where goods meet and hence flow outwards, and a social boundary too, within which persons (or subgroups) are cooperatively related. But reciprocity stipulates two sides, two distinct social-economic interests." In Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago and New York, 1972), pp. 188-189. According to Polanyi and Sahlins, societies can be regarded as organized on the basis of reciprocity if their economic, social and moral spheres are not fully differentiated, and if exchange is not based on market relations.

Of course, there are "pure" economic systems—i.e., built exclusively on reciprocity or redistribution—which exclude the competitive, price regulating market of buyers and sellers. But larger economic integrations cannot be pure: they entail economic transactions such as redistribution. Polanyi concurs with this: it is demonstrated precisely by him that the self-regulating market was only an economic utopia of the 19th century. Moreover, in the same work, his preference is given to a society in which market economy ceases to exist without the abolition of the market: "Also the end of market society means in no way the absence of markets. These continue, in various fashions, to ensure the freedom of the consumer, to indicate the shifting of demand, to influence producer's income and to serve as an instrument of accounting, while

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2. *Equality of Men as Individuals*

This concept of equality arose with the concept of humanity. In its original formulation, it is perhaps only the blurred reflex of the process by which mankind attains self-consciousness. In essence, it holds that we are all human beings and as such are equals. This idea first appeared in Christianity and was perfected with the codification of equality before the law. The basic principle here (never fully realized, but also never in principle denied) is the abstraction of person and deed from property and from social rank (from the place occupied in the division of labor).

II.

Ever since the revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries seeking *liberté, egalité, fraternité*, almost all social systems regard equality in some sense as a positive value. But there are two opposing models. One considers equality as a partial principle within prevailing inequality, while the other seeks to generalize equality as the basic social principle. The first model is characterized by the possibility of unlimited acquisition of property and the conscious acceptance of inequality. Supporters of this model see exchange in the self-regulating market as the only conceivable form of reciprocity, entailing inequality in needs and consumption, and in the social hierarchy.[4] Of course, various groups most affected by inequality and whose needs are least satisfied demand a more equitable distribution. Thus, today the ideologies of inequality increasingly employ a social game theory to investigate the role of such pressure groups within the model. Here, however, a more equitable redistribution is possible only in the area of consumption. Decision-making is not redistributed, and the "will of all" has nothing to say about this. At best, it only chooses those who will.

Within this model of inequality, two forms of equality are generally recognized. First there is equality before the law, which has never been more than an ideal inasmuch as it is in constant conflict with the inequality of property. To remedy this contradiction, the independence of judicial power is usually built into the model as a partial guarantee. Ideally, the judicial arm is

ceasing altogether to be an organ of economic self-regulation." *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1967), p. 252. It is in this sense that we introduce the concept of redistribution into our argument as one of the regulative channels, but by no means the only one.

There is, however, a crucial similarity between the reciprocity of economic anthropology and the market mechanisms of buyers and sellers: both presupposed *symmetrical* relations (in contrast to redistribution), and include symmetrical, dual transactions. These relations always have an *economic* function, since they are social channels for the satisfaction of needs (primarily material ones). No modern, dynamic society is possible without symmetrical economic relations: they cannot be replaced by redistribution. Thus, we call all symmetrical economic transactions "reciprocity," in contrast with asymmetrical redistribution, or "centrality." Only a social balance—albeit conflict-laden—of symmetrical and asymmetrical economic transactions can guarantee the functioning of an optimal economic decision-making model that satisfies the needs of individuals in modern society.

4. This is not affected by the fact that even the staunchest supporters of this model, especially since the 1920s, admit the need for a ceiling on property acquisition for the sake of the "ideal owner," i.e., of capital as a whole, to guarantee the viability of the model.

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independent of the executive or legislative arm, but it can never avoid the underlying principle of inequality. Although within this model all constitutions guarantee men's equal rights, these rights can be realized only negatively: by forbidding certain actions. Anatole France's *aperçu* is more profound than first appears: equality negatively defined only increases actual inequality. Furthermore, all those 18th and 19th century liberal utopias that sought to complement the negative code of law with a positive and rewarding part, turned out to be naive and unfulfillable because they lacked a supporting social mechanism.

The second type of equality within the capitalist model is that of equal opportunity. This is a relatively recent development and is connected with the increasing influence of pressure groups. This principle abstracts from the place occupied in the division of labor as well as from other factors, such as sex, race, or religion. A prime example of this is the demand for equal opportunities for men and women. As a widespread social postulate—a kind of social "domino theory" according to which the prevalent system of inequality can be broken at any point—the principle of equal opportunity is an excellent substitute for genuine equality. Although its role cannot be underestimated in as far as it challenges centuries-old inequalities, it is far more illusory than the idea of equality before the law, since it is *positively* formulated and as such contradicts the basic principle of property ownership and power influence. Its latent function, in fact, is to assure the optimal "distribution" of individuals in the social hierarchy. The constant struggle between this principle of equal opportunity and the underlying inequality is part of the model and contributes to its functioning (e.g., in the form of constant struggles for educational reforms, social and political opportunities, etc.).

The second basic model, that of egalitarianism, is opposed to the capitalist model and always comes about in response to it. Marx called this "primitive communism," the "negative abolition of private property." According to him, communism is "1. In its first form only a *generalization* and *consummation* of this relationship [i.e., private property]. As such it appears in a twofold form: on the one hand, the dominion of *material* property bulks so large that it wants to destroy everything which is not capable of being possessed by all as *private property*. It wants to do away *by force* with talent, etc. For it the sole purpose of life and existence is direct, physical *possession*. The task of the *laborer* is not done away with, but extended to all men. The relationship of private property persists as the relationship of the community to the world of things... In negating the *personality* of man in every sphere, this type of communism is really nothing but the logical expression of private property, which is its negation. General *envy* constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which *greed* reestablishes itself and satisfies itself, only in *another* way. The thought of every piece of private property—inherent in each piece as such—is *at least* turned against all *wealthier* private property in the form of envy and

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the urge to reduce things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition. The crude communism is only the culmination of this envy and of this leveling-down proceeding from the *preconceived* minimum. It has a *definite, limited* standard. How little this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization, the regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the *poor and undemanding* man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but in fact has not yet even reached it."[5]

The first model is distinctly capitalist. Property as ownership is the source and at the same time the limit of appropriation, i.e., appropriation is subsumed to ownership. This fusion is also accepted in the second model, that of primitive communism, as the "negative abolition of private property." The difference between the two models is not in that unequal ownership is regarded by the latter as the source of unequal appropriation, but in that it regards theoretically equal ownership as the source of the likewise equal appropriation. As Marx described it, ownership as the essential expression of private property is "universalized" and "developed" in primitive communism.

Thus, the second model is characterized by the following traits: First, strong limitations on ownership. One way to do this is to divide a society's material forces into "equal portions." Today, however, this is purely utopian and, even in princple, is incoherent (e.g., how can raw materials and energy be divided into "equal portions"?). Another way is through the state's confiscation of all property. As Marx concludes, the model of "primitive communism" in its pure form can be either democratic (and thus it is mixed with self-deception; or despotic (as in the latter case).

The second general characteristic of the primitive communism model is the equalization of needs. Since modern individuals are violently outraged by egalitarian conceptions (public opinion is so strong here that people are seldom candid on this subject), to evaluate this proposal, we must turn to the classics. In *Conspiration pour l'Egalité*, Buonarotti—one of the main historians of the Babeuf movement—speaks with naive candor: "The natural equality that we envisage is this unity of *needs and feelings* which are born with us or develop by the first use we make of our senses and organs. The need to eat and reproduce; self-love; pity, the ability to feel, think, desire, communicate one's ideas and understand those of our fellow men, and to conform our actions to the rule; hatred of constraint and love of liberty exist *to about the same degree* among all healthy and well constituted men. *Such is the law of nature*, from which the same natural rights emanate for all men."[6]

The naiveté of this passage reveals social intentions more clearly than the scholarly epigone's complicated mental constructions. When Buonarotti—

5. Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, edited with an Introduction by Dirk J. Struik, trans. Martin Miligan (New York, 1964), pp. 132-134.

6. Buonarotti, *Conspiration pour l'Egalité* (Paris, 1957), vol. 1, p. 29. Italics added.

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and, in retrospect, Babeuf—speak of the *uniformity* of needs and feelings (e.g., "to about the same degree"), it is clear that they apply purely quantitative criteria to essentially unquantifiable human expressions. Thus, the result is a social movement as impractical as it is radical. Instead of reviving the system of social inequality, it suggests that we ignore the heterogeneity of all our feelings and needs, and sacrifice personality—one of the most significant developments of human culture.

Ideologies of this type contrapose "natural" to "artificial" needs.[7] This polarity is inevitable in all egalitarian ideologies that call for a leveling of needs, since, in order to do so, the "right" structure of needs has to be determined. The reason is evident: where reciprocity and redistribution balance out in an almost natural fashion, there are no right or wrong needs, since there is no alternative to the status quo. The problem arises only with the generalization of commodity production, where the inequality of needs and consumption is already a fact, i.e., wherever the prevalent structure can and should be confronted with an alternative.

Thus, the two recurrent features of ideologies calling for the leveling of needs are, first, the "right" structure of needs is always determined in contrast to something, and thus narrows the world of human wealth. Furthermore, this demand is always authoritarian since it abstracts from what people regard as their own needs, or else regards them as a "delusion" to be eliminated. Of course, a critique of the predominant structure of needs based on chosen values is by no means impossible or *ipso facto* authoritarian. But the leveling of all needs to a single exclusive model is inevitably tyrannical. What, then, are the functions of the egalitarian model and what are its chances of success?

The *democratic model of egalitarianism*, which seeks to divide ownership into "equal parts," is utopian not only for industrial societies, but furthermore in all societies where redistribution centers cannot function independently of world commerce. Moreover, it is a *regressive* utopia since it would reduce and undermine the material resources of society. All redistribution centers would break down, along with mechanisms that regulate commodity exchange. It would bring about a system of *haphazard exchange* whose only real redistribution would be the redistribution of poverty. Again, this utopia is condemned as regressive from the viewpoint of our value preference based on Marx: from the preference of man rich in needs.

Before going further, it is necessary to establish whether Marx's *man rich in needs* is identical with *homo oeconomicus*, i.e. whether he can his enrichment

7. This polarity can take on quite different forms, according to various ideological points of departure: real needs versus those that are only imagined or which are aimed at prestige, natural needs versus luxuries, etc. Yet, they all lump cultural needs (especially those indispensable for creation and reception of advanced culture) into the category of imagined needs, luxuries, etc. As Marx writes, primitive communism "wants to do away *by force* with talent, etc.," and is "the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization."

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can be distinguished from the all-consuming, all-repressive development of human needs in bourgeois society. As an empirical historical product, *homo oeconomicus* arises along with *man rich in needs* as the promise of a free species. *Homo oeconomicus*' growth of needs is based on universal quantification. Its perfection is industrial production hypostasized to infinity. Its faith is in the transcendence of technological progress, in the "future," in industrial production "yet to be achieved." *Man rich in needs* also opts for social dynamism, but for him it does not consist just in the increase of quantifiable needs. Although he sides with industrial development (accepting the continued development of the domination of nature, the growth in world trade, etc.), *man rich in needs* still subjugates the economic sphere to ecological limits and to the recognition that the birth of new, qualitative needs is also a new enrichment—one, moreover, that is opposed to linear growth.[8]

The *"despotic model" of egalitarianism* is enforced by the state as the "representative of public interests." It carries out the confiscation of the private ownership of everything simply by defining private property, or be setting the quantitative upper limit on ownership. Of course, it can always redefine these limits either in an authoritarian way or under the influence of pressure groups. In this model, all decisions are centralized in the state, which is not only the most important executive organ of redistribution but also its only center. This is further guaranteed by the fact that the state not only has unlimited power to redistribute material goods and energy resources, but can also redistribute the work force. Symmetrical market relations vanish for the simple reason that the state has no partner. At the same time, the state regards all free activities as dysfunctional and eliminates them. Therefore, the elimination of symmetrical market mechanisms cannot be supplanted by the revival of reciprocity in the form of "gifts," which is the form assumed by the redistribution carried out by the state. In this way, the authoritative character of the "equalizing" center is further strengthened.

This model—"despotic" in the Marxian sense—is an illusion and at the same time a destructive character trait in regard to our value preference. It is illusory in its belief that equality can be attained by fixing an upper limit on ownership. Since to achieve the reduction of needs the model requires an authoritarian state, over-centralization of redistribution, and the degradation of symmetrical mechanisms, a new inequality comes to permeate all of social life: i.e., that between those who distribute and those who are distributed. Marx has already indicated the destructive nature of this new inequality: it is the complete negation of personality by the "representatives of the common

8. Our standpoint is radically different from that of the *homo oeconomicus* of bourgeois society and, insofar as it is evolutionary, also from Polanyi's, however much we may have drawn from hism. Polanyi's anti-evolutionism is a result of his hatred of "free market society" and of capitalism's quest for universality. We are evolutionists from a specifically Marxian standpoint that sees "free market society" as the creator of world trade, and thus as the origin of the possibility of *man rich in needs.*

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interests" and the negation of the entire world of civilization and culture. While this model does not absolutely exclude dynamism, it does preclude the *qualitative needs* of personalities and a plurality of life styles. Furthermore, even though this central determination of needs cannot bring about uniformity for the simple reason that not all needs are quantifiable), it nonetheless brings about the impoverishment of the permitted life-styles.[9]

But even the embittered confrontation between the capitalist and primitive communist models cannot transcend the bourgeois era. Both subordinate appropriation to ownership or else incorporate the former into the latter. The first model represents the world of private property, while the other model represents the world of universalized private property, to use Marx's terms. In the former, ownership is both the source and the limit of the origin and satisfaction of needs and participation in decisions. In the latter, ownership is by allocation: a centrally determined amount of goods is "allocated" for the disposition of individuals as consumers.

Both models seek to further the "common interest," but in different ways. Marx's statement that "The general interest is precisely the generality of self-seeking interests"[10] applies to the first model. The "general interest" is thus constituted in the struggle of particular forces and is nothing but the *generalization* of the strongest particular interest operating "behind men's backs." In the second model, if the general interest is centrally determined, those other interests and needs that crop up at various social points are denounced as particular (i.e., excludable and negligible) when compared with the centrally-determined ones. Thus, the centrally determined "general interest" will prevail over "particular" onces. The majority of individuals does not participate in real decision-making processes in either model. Reified forces decide on personal needs and possible actions. Thus, both models become reified and alienated structures, though in different ways and for different reasons.

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9. Inasmuch as Europe here is taken in the broad sense, referring to all regions where industrialization has been achieved or has begun to develop in a way that determines all of society, then our study can be said to be "Euro-centered." Our rejection of the despotic model of egalitarianism derives from this framework. In these industrialized areas, attempts to realize the despotic model either produce nothing new and progressive or they lead to results that could just as well be achieved democratically. But in either case, they entail the destruction of the above-mentioned values. Only by starting from a "Euro-centric" position can one question the fact that capitalism—either directly through colonial rule or indirectly through the influence of world commerce—has destroyed in many regions the old regulatory mechanisms and communities while failing to homogenize the societies in a new, functional unity. Consequently, it has so undermined the social homeostasis that great masses of people cannot even assure their biological reproduction. In several places, in fact, the dilemma is the exact reverse of the European one: it consists in what Myrdal has called the "weakness of the state," i.e., in the incapacity of the centers to assure even the elementary continuity of redistribution. But even in closed societies, the democratic model of egalitarianism can shape society "more openly to the future" than other models.

10. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London, 1973), p. 245.

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III

Is there an alternative, *third* model? Is it possible to transcend the first model by a non-egalitarian one which takes egalitarianism into account as a "social monitoring system" and incorporates into its structure its "negatively valid" truths? These are real questions which, like all theoretically responsible questions, are at the same time *postulates*. More precisely, the question is: *can the two factors of property—ownership and appropriation be separated* in modern society? In other words, can the *process* of abolishing alienation begin in modern society while *preserving* social dynamism, considering the relativity of wealth and the constant recurrence of "scarcity?"

A solution to this is possible only by clearing up two further questions. First of all, why and under what conditions do we, following Marx, regard ownership and appropriation as two different aspects of property? Second, why do we regard their separation and simultaneous social "encounter" as the starting point for the abolition of alienation?[11]

As to the first question, we equate ownership with possession. As an abstraction, this means the ownership of one—or the ownership of some people, where all others are excluded from its use, from the satisfaction derived from it and from the disposition over it. Of course, this is only a theoretical abstraction, since the particular, exclusive satisfaction of needs, just as the exclusive disposition over them, goes beyond ownership in the direction of appropriation. Furthermore, it is abstract inasmuch as modern society creates a duality among all working people: they are both producers as well as consumers. Only in an abstract model can one picture a producer who completely satisfies his needs from what he exclusively owns (even though he might share this ownership with several others). Lastly, it is an abstraction, since "exclusive ownership" cannot be understood in the sense of one's omnipotence over property: in simple terms, the more complicated a society is, the more regulations it has, and the less the individual can do as he wishes with what he owns. But whenever he can do something, *he alone can do it, and not someone else*. For this reason, ownership is exclusive.

Appropriation, the other aspect of property, entails the satisfaction of needs connected with production, a hand in decisions pertaining to production, distribution, and consumption, and the determination of their preconditions. Two groups of production-related needs must be distinguished. First, there is the need for activity, i.e., the need to express and realize one's personality, the development of one's abilities through work and socially vital activities. Secondly, there are the requirements for consumption of immediately produced goods, be they material or non-material (e.g., cultural products, medical services, etc.) whose precondition is production.

By definition, there can be no ownership without appropriation, for the very purpose of ownership is in appropriation. I only want to own

11. Our analysis of the various aspects of property parallels Andras Hegedüs's study, "Adalékok a tulajdonviszonyok szociologiai elemzéséhez" ("Contributions to the Sociological Investigation of Property Relations"), *Magyar Filosofiai Szemle*, 6 (1969).

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something—and at the same time exclude others from this ownership—when the property secures a particular field of appropriation for me. But this does not mean that one's ownership is the source of all that one appropriates. On the contrary, the process of appropriation always goes beyond ownership.

The excellent feature of capitalist society is that in it, the amount of goods appropriated is completely determined by ownership, while the "location" of the goods appropriated, when compared with previous societies, is least of all one's ownership. The specific feature of bourgeois private property is the unity of the contradiction between social production and individual expropriation. The limit to satisfaction of needs is determined by ownership; the more one owns, the more one can satisfy needs of activity *and* consumption. Furthermore, participation in decision-making also grows in direct proportion to ownership. You are what you have. Human conditions appear as conditions of things. At the same time, the need-satisfying quality of ownership is subordinated to social production; only at the point of possession can it be the source of need satisfaction. Thus, appropriation is a category of the conditions of property; and ownership and appropriation are separate aspects, even though their object is the same: i.e., they are reciprocal determinations.

The answer to the second question, then, is that capitalism is the exemplary alienated society. In its fully developed forms, ownership determines not only the limit of appropriation, but it also strives for its universal subjugation. This condition is enhanced by the fact that capitalism is a universal money society, "free" of the bonds of caste or kinship systems, etc. Consequently, the means exist for universal quantification; hence, the dominant striving to compare what is incommensurable and to reduce qualitative needs to quantitative ones. But the limit on ownership—i.e., that it can only *strive* for universal subjugation of appropriation—is important.[12] The complete homogenization of the two basic aspects of property is thus revealed to be a myth believed by both supporters as wel as the staunchest detractors of liberal capitalism.

Despite all these qualifications, the analyses of ownership are accurate: i.e., one *is* what one *has* and the needs that can be satisfied or the social conditions one can dispose over, depend purely on wealth. Ownership dominated the appropriation process by transforming its entire environment into the universe of quantifiable needs, and by establishing ownership as the

12. Two examples suffice to show the limits of homogenization. One is the revolt of the propertyless against the injustices of appropriation, from the Luddites to the labor union movements at the end of the 19th century. However one labels them—"anarchist" or "reformist"—it is difficult to deny that these movements have influenced the appropriation of surplus value since they have reduced the "extension" of capitalist ownership, even when they did not question its "propriety." In so doing, however, they demonstrated the practical possibility to separate the two aspects right in the midst of the supposed universal homogenization. The second example, which was repeatedly analyzed by Marx, is that, even at the height of *laissez-faire* capitalism, the bourgeoisie had to delegate a considerable degree of control, in part because the administration of ownership and the regulation of the process of appropriation seldom could be carried out by one person: the complete surveillance of the process of appropriation by the owner was usually only an ideal.

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exclusive standard for disposition—again a quantitative principle. The simultaneous development of these two aspects creates the world of bourgeois private property.

The positive abolition of private property is not identical with the simple "abolition of all ownership." This socially nonsensical objective cannot be seriously entertained, even in its most extremely egalitarian form. Moreover, the development of *man rich in needs* presupposes the expansion of ownership of things used to satisfy needs, and the directions that this expansion may take can be blocked or rechanneled only as a result of a consensus reached through discussions and social conflicts.

The positive abolition of private property means that ownership will no longer be the focus of social dynamics; that appropriation gradually will be freed from the ownership that suppresses it; and that essential human forces will increasingly be realized in the process of appropriation as the origin and satisfaction of new, qualitative needs and as disposition over its objective preconditions and results—or, in broader terms: appropriation as the mastery of the world's objective wealth. Thus, this process can be the real sphere of the human appropriation of the world, i.e., of the positive abolition of private property, because here "taking possession" is *not* necessarily an exclusive act but *presupposes* a similar activity by other men. Our model thus presupposes two parallel series: the increase in the amount of delimited, separate property (the expansion of needs), even though certain directions of expansion may be blocked, and the gradual "emancipation" of appropriaton from the domination of ownership. These two tendencies comprise the process of the positive abolition of private property. But is this model practical? In other words, is a responsible experiment to realize it in a modern, dynamic world possible? To answer this, we must re-examine the meaning of reciprocity and redistribution.

Modern society is a commodity-producing society; thus, the point of departure for a model purporting to be a "third way" is the recognition of the existence of commodity exchange as an economic necessity. Commodity exchange, i.e., the market, is the only form of symmetrical economic relations in existence.[13] It functions as the basis of calculation for all stable industrialized societies. In a twofold sense: first, it is this basis that provides the terms to assess social wealth. Its rival could only by a system of entirely arbitrary central decisions or a "simulated market," a totally superfluous detour either to the market or to the above mentioned subjectivistic model. Further, it is the market that allows a society to calculate scarcity and shortages where scarcity means the finiteness of natural energy sources at a given historical moment and the finiteness of working time available in a concrete social context. This means that it is impossible to abolish property as ownership in a concrete social dimension. The property holder appears in the

13. Much of what follows is derived from the unpublished manuscript of György Bence, Janos Kis and György Markus, *Is A Critical Economy Possible?*

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market as an "owner:" the subject of reciprocity in exchange relation. All sorts of property can enter into symmetrical market realtions: private, exclusively owned property, collective property (owned by a group of stock holders, or a workers-owned factory), nationalized enterprises with independent economic authority, etc. In our model, the predominant place will be accupied by the property held by democratic groups and by state property authorized to take independent economic initiative. Although we presuppose a society where these two forms of collective ownership prevail, we are still operating within a world of symmetrical market relations, since the market remains as the basis of economic calculation.

Thus, *ownership cannot cease to be a factor in determining appropriation.* The positive value of ownership in a *socialist* model is based on two factors which have proven to be lasting achievements of mankind transcending the pre-capitalist and capitalist periods: the rational administration of property as the source of the rational satisfaction of needs, and the *direct* relation of decision-making to ownership. This applies not only in economics—such as the planning of personal accumulation and consumption, or in the affairs of a small community (e.g., the family)—but also to "personal life strategies." It is easy to see how significant this is for the growth of all people and how far it extends beyond the sphere of ownership. The control learned in the disposition of ownership develops the abilities for rationally sharing in the process of appropriation as it becomes emancipated from ownership.

Appropriation is freed from ownership in yet another decisive respect, i.e., in *redistribution.* The existence of need structures pointing beyond the scope of ownership is the precondition for appropriation as more than mere "appropriaton" of whatever consumer goods one may own. Here appropriation as redistribution is not only the redistribution of socially produced goods, but also the determination of overall social strategy: a constant redistribution of all of society's material and spiritual resources through a general consensus. The precondition for this is the equal possibility of deciding on redistribution for all. This is one constituent of the process of appropriation *not* connected with ownership or with symmetrical market relations. Equal participation in redistribution is not just the only rational significance of the equal opportunity to articulate needs emancipated from ownership, but is also the essential reinterpretation of the concept of property. What remains of the concept of ownership is the basic act of personal satisfaction of needs and the social basis of calculation constituted in the act of exchange.

As the process of appropriation (presupposing a new structure of needs), becomes predominant, the world's objective wealth, which is in principle appropriated by all in order to develop, becomes human property. But this can be achieved primarily by *communal* acts which, by definition, have no exclusive character.

What, then, is required so that redistribution becomes increasingly more

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What, then, is required so that redistribution becomes increasingly determined by appropriation and decreasingly by ownership? As already mentioned, the increased expansion of ownership—as the enrichment of needs—does not rule out limiting some possible directions of expansion. On a broad social level, this means placing limitations on those private groups and collective properties which, because of their monopoly situation, can disproportionately influence redistribution, thus subverting equality in decision-making. Thus, the old call for socialization and nationalization reappears within this model. But this call today is not followed by the traditional argument of planning versus anarchy. It is ridiculous to think that the liquidation of the basis for calculation carried out in the elimination of symmetrical market relations would in any way promote the cause of purposive rationality. Thus, two limits must be set on the realization of these preconditions. First, from the standpoint of purposive rationality, nationalization becomes mustified only when the amount of property has reached or exceeded the point where a centralized administration is the only viable economic alternative. The second limit is dictated by two principles of value rationality: one, there should be no income without work as a constant basis of self-preservation and two, the state's control of ownership must never become such that it would tend to destroy values in the previously described manner.

The second precondition for democratic redistribution is just the reformulation of the previous one in a different way. The development of a broad scale of ownership by groups, communities and the state which makes possible symmetrical market relations creates a situation where the state can and should be the administrative organ of redistribution, while still not extending over all social life. The state will be the "representative of general interests" and not "generality" itself. This model strives only for a dynamic equilibrium, i.e., the model does not know or recognize a panacea for every possible dysfunction. Yet, even assuming the purely democratic character of ownership groups, there is always the danger that the symmetrical market relations once agian become dominant and the state loses influence as the administrative organ of redistribution.

Another precondition for equality in redistribution is equality in decision-making. But what does this mean?[14] First of all, subjects should have a growing competence in all areas (i.e., all areas should equally be areas of decision). Second, individuals should have the opportunity to equally participate in decision-making. Within such a framework the idea of "equal opportunity" is no substitute for equality, but is a real mechanism in equalization. To decide one must have the ability and competence to decide.

14. Here we need to mention recent untenable views of egalitarianism developed during the great social conflicts of the last decade. They can be briefly summarized as follows: since all men are equally competent to make the most varied decisions, hierarchic orders are conscious mystifications that can be abolished by the revolution. This disregard of the division of labor creates illusions that are still with us today.

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This can never be the equal competence of *all* men in *every* single question, but all men are competent in *some* socially relevant question. Moreover, an individual's competence can grow. But in order for this to take place, it is necessary that individuals be assured equal opportunity, which means equality of the unequal. While original differences in abilities can and should be diminished, they can never be completely eliminated.

Finally, there is the question of equality of income. Today, those who accept the egalitarian standpoint are concerned with the principle of equal income. At first, this idea seems so plausible that all other interpretations seem artificial or insincere. Why, then, do we reject it?

The idea of equality of income is popular because it is plausible; it offers a quantifiable and clear criterion and fully corresponds to the spirit of bourgeois society, which measures only in terms of ownership. Thus, it does not correspond to our model.

To clarify this point, it is helpful to discuss the relation of ownership and income in the two previous models. In the case of the first model, the relation of income to ownership is clear. Income either stems from ownership (as revenue) or from the sale of labor power (as wage). In the despotic model of egalitarianism, however, the central authority allots an equal income to the whole population on the basis of its estimate of social wealth. When ownership is distinguished from appropriation, however, it becomes evident that both models separate property from income. In the first model, no wage worker can ever directly influence the process of social appropriation, while in the second case the central authority converts the whole society into an ensemble of wage workers. Even if a perfectly equal distribution could be achieved, with the representatives of the central authority receiving only as much as wage workers, a new inequality would still result between those who determine income and those whose incomes is determined. Only those completely imbued with the bourgeois spirit can consider this inequality to be secondary with regard to income inequality.

In our model, wage labor is abolished and collective owners themselves decide their income. Of course, there would be upper and lower income limits reached through free discussion and social decisions made by those concerned. The lower limit must enable the satisfaction of all needs within the given cultural context so to allow individuals to participate freely in the appropriation process. By this participation, he also satisfies a whole series of other needs not expressible in quantitative terms. The upper limit on income would prevent any one person from gaining power over others, especially over entire groups of people.

At the same time, efforts to equalize income must not disregard the actual plurality of needs. It is argued that, if needs are allowed to develop unchecked, men will always want more, thus leading to extremes of wealth and poverty. Therefore, a central authority is necessary, since the fact that one person possesses more than another is already a cause of alienation.

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Despotic egalitarianism—which adheres proudly to the materialist standpoint—in fact represents the materialism of bourgeois society since it can think only in terms of quantitative needs: given a finite amount of goods, one person's needs can be satisfied only at the expense of another's. Despite the oppositional attitude, the spirit of ownership or of univeresalized private property prevails here, and the resulting alienation is the morality of collective envy. But if we envision the future as a world where the free process of appropriation is the collective form of satisfying qualitatively different needs, and if we regard the qualitative needs that can be satisfied only collectively as fundamental from the viewpoint of the freely developing personality, then we must recognize the plurality of needs. The ethic of alienation should then itself be alienating for us as the spirit of collective envy, which we want to leave behind.

It is especially important to recognize the plurality of needs in work. Our model regards one's work as the basis for satisfying quantifiable needs and condemns parasitism. Moreover, the reproduction of social life always requires a certain amount of human labor which individuals must somehow divide among themselves. But here also we reject the pattern of despotic egalitarianism where not only is the same income ideally allotted to all members of society as wage laborers, but the quantity and quality of work are centrally determined as well. Labor becomes compulsory with no chance for an individual to select his or her life strategy. In this model, decisions are not the personal expression of free, communal individuals concerning their destiny, but are external and alien powers opposed to them. Of course, there will always be possible conflict so long as some have "more" while others have "less." But the awareness of these conflicts and efforts to solve them are natural parts of the process of human self-liberation.

As the central question of industrialized society, the extension of decision-making in the area of production—i.e., "workers' democracy" or "self-management"—is extremely important. Although in the industrial world everyone is affected by wrong directions in technological development, the warning signs for this and the need to redirect it can first be articulated by those closest to it. Of course, such a redirection has limits, but human control of technology is an integral part of the process of appropriation.

The *form* of participation in determining society's overall strategy of redistribution is, to use Habermas's terminology, "undistorted communication." Its regulative principle, the "ideal speech situation"—i.e., the open public character that plays so important a role in our model—is described by Habermas as follows: "An interchangeability of dialogue-roles is possible, and not just in principle. Furthermore, there is also an effective equality of opportunity in the perception of these roles, i.e., in the choice and performance of speech acts... In the ideal speech situation, the only genuine speakers are those who have *equal opportunities to act* or to make use of representatives; for only reciprocal coordination in individual expression...

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guarantees that subjects are candid with each other concerning what they really do and mean and, if necessary, can translate their extra-verbal expressions into verbal ones. This mutuality of unimpaired self-depiction implies, further, a reciprocity of behavior-expectations and excludes privileges in the sense of onesidedly binding norms of action."[15]

The public sphere analyzed by Habermas and presupposed by our model is more than a formal principle. It speaks not only of the "interchangeability of dialogue-roles," but also of the equality of the "speakers" as active people and excludes "onesidedly binding norms." This principle of public life corresponds to our process of appropriation, which includes the free possibility of formal, "verbal acts," but which does not remain on the level of this formality, inasmuch as it is embodied in both institutionalized and spontaneous forms.

The last precondition for our model is that the total social learning process become an organic part of the process of appropriation. Today education is caught between those who see it essentially as the hierarchic training of specialists, and those who regard the whole hierarchy of technical knowledge as mere mystification created by the division of labor. Both approaches identify education and instruction with the accumulation of knowledge and they see schools as the only place where this can be done. We reject both. The concept of instruction as the training of specialists is functional, but it ultimately cripples men. Yet, to deny the need for technical knowledge and all social differences that this implies is illusory. The competence to make decisions is necessary for the expansion and equalization of the decision-making process. Consequently, education is not merely a preparation for social activities, but is achieved in the actual carrying-out of these activities, in the very process of making decisions. Without this, the new model of redistribution is impossible. Instruction is not merely the acquisition of knowledge, but prepares people to make decisions: *school cannot be its only setting.*

To guarantee appropriation, culture should gradually be withdrawn from the context of reciprocity underlying commodity exchange. Of course, it is impossible to be more specific than this: it is the task of undistorted value-building communication of the public sphere to decide what the commodity "can" and "wants" to provide for culture. But, at the same time, this is inadequate. Certainly, the infrastructure must also be withdrawn from market controls in order to create a "cultured environment." The gradual rollback of market regulation in the area of culture entails that, in

15. Jürgen Habermas, 'Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz," in Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie* (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 137-138. Here Habermas speaks of "reciprocity" and "symmetry" in reference to equality attained as a result of communication. This appears to contradict our account where communication is regarded as the underlying determination of the process of redistribution, *detached* from reciprocity. But the contradiction is only apparent, as will become clear later.

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determining the proportion of resources allocated to cultural development, no market interest can constitute the predominant viewpoint. Rather, only the promotion of a new type of appropriation process is relevant (i.e., the development of *man rich in needs*). Within a framework of this type of redistribution, the proportion allocated to culture cannot be a function of ownership (i.e., all individuals must have "equal opportunity").

The appropriation process outlined here does not call for the abolition of the market, but the separation of its functions that *laissez-faire* capitalism sought to homogenize. We have already described the first of these functions (the market as the basis of calculation): its existence is necessary for society's purposive rationality, and it does not make sense to speak either of its expansion or contraction. As to the second function, we agree with Polanyi: the market as a general reference system will gradually recede, the autocracy of "having" will be abolished, and Marx's great postulate—the subjugation of the economic sphere to the totality of the social life process—will be realized. Equality in this model gradually becomes identical with the equality of decision-making possibilities both in reference to ownership and in the sense of the gradual separation of appropriation from ownership.

While we reject any guarantees for our model, we still must take into consideration the question of its possibilities for realization. In our model, conflict is no evil, but one of the principles that makes the system workable—so long as it does not reach the point where it destroys the ability of the model to reproduce itself. The most important conflicts are between ownership and appropriation; between the "solvent needs" articulated on the basis of calculation and the need-correcting principle of the public sphere in the decision-making process (a conflict that results either in the attempt to subject fundamental areas of the appropriation process to a narrow profit-centeredness or in the threat posed by exalted utopian plans for "undistroted communication" to the functioning of the calculation basis); and between institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of the public sphere concerning limitations of property and investments. All these conflicts are reminders that our model is not overly optimistic.

The possibilities for the model can be located, first of all, in a social need (in the form of dysfunctions, conflicts, etc.) that the model addresses. Yet, presently, there are social forces moving in just this direction. The best chance for our proposal, however, lies in the fact that, while it takes account of the existence of nation-states, it has *mankind* as its reference system. The universalization of the first model implies that the "weak" are downtrodden

16. All we have said about "undistorted communication" as the desired form of public life and about the equalization of decision-making leads, among other things, to a new and complementary model of the determination of needs. Marx opposed the market model of need determination with a completely different model which, however, turns out to be self-contradictory. Should it ever be adopted, it would certainly be more expensive and uncertain than the market model it replaced, entailing as it does the destruction of the basis of calculation and a questionable book-keeping on the general social level. Furthermore, it would endanger the dynamism which, even for Marx, was a fundamental value.

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by the "strong," while the universalization of the second model means that the sphere of need determination is turned over to a world government, a chimera that *eliminates* all particular interest groups, need structures, and national cultural traditions—in short, it eliminates reciprocity and forcibly quantifies qualitative difference of needs.

Mankind as the frame of reference for our model is determined by a basic necessity: for economic planning to work, it requires that all of mankind's energy sources and means at its disposal be considered, at least if we want to preserve the dynamism of needs and production. From this stems the very possibility of our model.

All this shows that, with respect to the broadest degree of openness of mankind, the dynamics of the self-regulating market cannot be a universal reference system. Thus, the outlined model is no naive wish, but stems from real needs. Of course, we do not intend to formulate new economic fantasies: the world's energy sources and supplies are a fact that must be accepted. Consequently, symmetrical market relations will remain in force. But since the universalization of the market's self-regulation into a universal reference system threatens to break down and thus make all calculation impossible, another form of reciprocity will appear more and more frequently: gift-reciprocity. This will not be detached completely from symmetrical market relations since its limits are determined by interests embodied in the basis of calculation and because the continued existence of world trade is also an "interest." It can be easily imagined that a gift-reciprocity implemented in the interest of the "stronger" party's expansion or following the goals of a new "need-determining" world center is degraded into a pseudo-gift.

But if gift-reciprocity develops true to form and becomes a main channel for world trade, it would bring about a situation independent of property ownership and determined by the above-described appropriation process. Thus, a new type of redistribution would be the precondition of gift-reciprocity and at the same time would be confirmed by it. For gift-reciprocity is a form of redistribution *sui generis*: it entails a redistribution of forces and wealth, and—if the gift is not to degenerate into a pseudo-gift—such a question can only be decided in the "ideal speech situation," i.e., through the equal disposition over it by groups of people.

IV.

So far, we have considered primarily the first form of the principle of equality—i.e., that related to property. This form, as the exchange of equal values elaborated in the Marx quotation, plays an important role in

17. Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* demonstrated that the idea of the linear progress of the industrialization of the world, the myth of the self-regulating market, is the "negative utopia" of liberal capitalism. It runs into the insurmountable resistance of numerous social structures that cannot be modernized but can only be abolished, and also leads to the systematic waste of the world's resources as well as to the unleashing of a whole series of ecological catastrophies, which the industrial world is no longer capable of controlling.

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symmetrical market relations, but not the only one. Gift-reciprocity between the integrations is not equal, because it doesn't follow the principle of symmetrical market relations. A "gift" that promotes the development of backward areas or that seeks to avoid ecological disaster is "reciprocal" in the most elementary meaning of the word, since the recipient responds to this gift by participating in world trade or by being smoothly integrated in production processes, etc.—although this "return service" cannot be qualitatively regulated. Here, for the first time, we encounter the social meaning of the concept "incommensurability," while at the same time a rationally comprehensible meaning of equality develops in the area of disposition (decision-making). In the process of appropriation, only equality of decision has social significance.

The second form of the principle was characterized by its abstraction from ownership. This form is prevalent in the model of equality before the law. In the model we are proposing, the idea of legal equality retains absolutely its validity as the social scale of judgment. Nothing can replace its social function. Even so, there have been attempts to revise it or to replace it by a system of *ad hoc* decisions dictated by "general interests" from whose viewpoint this model is too inflexible. Or else it has been seen as excessively formal compared with the multidimensional wealth and totality of human individuality, thus requiring replacement by an uncodifiable *moral propriety*. But these two principles, often interwoven, would only produce arbitrariness and consequently the violation of human equality. Whenever a social structure endorses a formal principle of equality, the standard of equality before the law is inevitable and irreplaceable. Hence, violations of the formal principle of equality before the law in the name of some *raison d'etat* cannot be condoned, especially in our model, where the state is not the exclusive embodiment of the "general interest" but merely its executive organ.

There is a growing network of communities based on the principle of equality abstracted from property—a network that creates a series of symmetrical reciprocal mechanisms, preserves equality, but also transcends it in the direction of incommensurability. These communities can grow out of radical needs generated in the production process, or out of new needs of those "drop-outs" who turn their backs on production. Of course, this is not to say that there are no problems with these movements. One objection frequently raised against the "drop-outs" seems to be particularly justified: the criticism that they deceive themselves in thinking that they have stepped outside of industrial civilization, while vegetating in its midst and allowing themselves to be nourished by it; they oppose industrialization, while using its technical advantages, etc. Their anti-work theory and practice is especially dangerous, since it seeks to replace productive life and self-realization (including objectification) with an artificially-induced permanent euphoria. Yet, despite these deformations, without the broad development of such

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movements (and the gradual eradication of the parasitical, destructive ideologies of some of them), it would be impossible to realize either the subject of our appropriation process or the subject of worldwide gift-reciprocity. Thus, it is not the generalizable (and pluralistic) new subject of these communities who is utopian, but the rigidly rationalist idea that dares to hypostasize a world condition out of the mere insight of people living private and isolated lives. This transformation presents a number of psychological dilemmas. But it is no more impossible than it was for the free citizen of antiquity to regard slaves or barbarians as his equals in the eyes of God, or no more impossible than the idea of universal equality before the law for men of feudal epochs. While historical analogies have limited value for future-oriented models, there is little doubt that the *new* regulation of human production can develop only in conjunction with the subordination of the economic sphere to the totality of social life processes and the development of new life-styles.

What are the advantages of such a network of pluralistically developed communal life styles? Their pluralistic nature is determined by the various qualitative structures of needs and by the different relations which produced them. The basic principle of such communal life styles is suited from the start for developing many reciprocal-symmetrical situations that can encompass the whole of everyday life. Thus, it is unimportant whether these communities may be transitory and constitute only an educational phase or may turn out to be permanent life-styles for certain groups of individuals; whether they grow out of the needs generated by the appropriation process or represent a transitory opposition to the world of production; whether they form "ideal communities" or encompass the greatest part of vital activities. Even the *community as an end in itself* points beyond itself, precisely by its situation oriented away from interests that create gift-reciprocity. Furthermore, these communities are the best means of education for the ideal speech situation as the form of public life necessary for the new model of redistribution. A worldwide network of communal life-styles is the precondition for public communication where rational discussion is the accepted norm. The development of the entire spectrum of qualitative-radical needs is thinkable only in communities of this type, not because these communities suppress quantitative needs, but because the pillars of this community—the associated individuals—will develop their personalities and the "gifts" themselves will become fundamental qualitative needs.

These reciprocal-symmetrical communities differ from those resulting from the restructuring of life-styles during previous historical periods, where it was undertaken as a society-constitutive endeavor in the direct sense of the word. It suffices here to refer to the role of friendship in the Greek *polis* or to the function of the intimate family circle in bourgeois public life as analyzed by Habermas. Because of the complicated nature of modern society, these communities are not state-constitutive but citizen-constitutive. They contain

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one of the most important nuances of meaning for the principle of equality: the equality of personal contacts embodied in "face-to-face" relations abstracted from property.

The last question for our model is this: if we expect the future to bring about this incommensurability based on equality but transcending it, have we really abstracted from property?

The answer is yes. The realization of incommensurability in the network of personal contacts is based on this abstraction. In a broader sense, however, this abstraction can always be only *relative*. The precondition for our model is the emancipation of appropriation from ownership. Therefore, it is more than a moral utopia.

But the process of the abolition of alienation is essentially a Kantian "regulative practical idea," presupposing an infinite progression—i.e., a process whose limits we cannot conceive, owing to contemporary industrial civilization and our own value assumptions. The concept of infinite progression is consciously contrasted with Hegel's conception of the "return of the world spirit," because the "moment of returning home" as the clear and final ending of alienation is a crypto-theological concept—not because of philosophical, but because of sociological reasons. Our model is based on the ever possible conflict between ownership and appropriation, between reciprocity and redistribution. It recognizes no cure-all in the form of ideal institutional configurations and takes into account recurrent inequalities and the constant process of equalizing them in the gradual (and practically infinite) task of achieving equality in decision-making.

The aim of our model, then, is not *equality*, but constant *equalization* always restructured in social movements and institutions in response to concrete inequalities; not the abolition of ownership, but its purposive, value-rational restriction and the gradual emancipation of appropriation from ownership; not the reduction of needs nor the constant growth of the needs of *homo oeconomicus*, but the creation of a human being *rich in needs* whose needs-dynamic is not only or even primarily limited by scarcity, but who is directed to other, heterogeneous qualitative needs, to needs oriented toward the wealth of human contacts. No longer will the role of purposive rationality be autocratically dominant and monopolistic, but purposive-rationality will be acceptable only together with informal, non-quantifiable principles of value rationality.

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PSYCHOANALYSIS AS SOCIAL THEORY

by Helmut Dahmer

To present psychoanalysis as social theory is unusual. Psychology and sociology seem far apart, and especially in the bourgeois age they appear to belong to opposite dimensions. In the struggle of "world views" the tendency is to regard humanly relevant reality as constituted *either* by inner drives *or* by capital use and class war. Anything between the two is rejected. In the following I will argue that, first, Freud's psychology, the core of which is a biographical theory of neurotic disturbance, necessarily implies a theory of society; second, that Freud, thirty years after his decisive psychological discoveries, also explicitly developed this latent social theory (1927); third and finally, that Freud's therapeutic procedure is homologous with the (critical) theory of natural socialization—the dialectic of alienation and assimilation.

"Culture as the Matrix of Life Histories

The specific achievement of Freud's enlightenment was to decipher widespread somatic illnesses without organic cause, which contemporary medicine considered to be pretense or "imagination," i.e., neurotic disturbances of the hysterical type. He deciphered these as "social ailments"[1] acquired from distorted acculturation processes and possibly curable by an organized conversation-therapy homologous with acculturation. In a hypnotic state, patients who underwent the cathartic treatment developed by Breuer and Freud experienced the repetition of shocking scenes from their earlier life: scenes of social humiliation and hurt peculiarly intermingled with scenes of sexual provocation and seduction. The procedure of "free" association, also developed by Freud, dealt with the cognitive-affective reproduction, communication and mental processing of unmastered traumatic scenes of adulthood and childhood, buried under cryptic memories and associated with experiences of childhood and infancy. The neurotic symptom is extinguished by revealing its "meaning," i.e., by reconstructing that infantile event (or sequence of events) whose memory the symptom represses and whose pleasure or suffering is bound up in it. If the tic, fit, impotence, hysterical lameness or blindness—the respective "cause"—is related to the whole life history, and thus the censored episode is relocated within the censored biography, then the symbol loses its strength. The fact that the narrator-patient's ego could not deal with that episode gave the ego

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1. Ferenczi characterized neuroses in general as "societal illnesses" in his "Psychoanalyse und Pädagogik" (1908), in *Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse* (Bern, 1964), vol. III, p. 22. He characterized repression as "a social phenomenon" in "Ueber den Lehrgang des Psychoanalytikers" (1928), in *ibid.*, p. 426.

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power to disturb his later life, subjecting it to a compulsion to repeat the episode in an "eternal" recurrence. Certain—complex-related—stimuli shut off his rational, investigatory action and examination of reality thus causing him automatically to reproduce a schematic, unpurposeful, disproportionate defensive behavior. Neurosis exists in the life history. It is the socially organized process of formation of a self-identity mediating between luxuriating drive-wishes, traditional-internalized behavioral norms, and situation-specific demands—a self-identity which succeeds, or cumulatively fails, in solving phase-conflicts from one state in life to the next, conflicts imbedded in a social matrix of increasing differentiation and heterogeneity. The theory of "drive-experiences," in life and of the typical crises of that "drive experience" is the background for the psychoanalytical theory of neurosis. The psychic apparatus, among whose regulating principles are the securing of self-preservation and the quest for a good life, first matures ontogenetically before it becomes, to a certain extent, the "producer" of its life history. Biographically oriented psychology always implies an understanding of the social constellations in the framework of which the individual life history takes place. This implication, however, is the element of truth in Freud's psychologistic formula stating that sociology is only applied psychology.[2]

Freud's attention focused on the "psychic end of this world," on what our culture makes of men, its residue in individual life histories. Society, therefore, first appears only as the clouded horizon of the theory of neurosis, as the culturally remodeled natural "environment" from which the psychic apparatus receives its stamp and by which it must prove itself. Biographically oriented psychology always implied an understanding of the social constellations in whose framework the individual life-history takes place. Even Freud's earliest psychoanalytical publications, therefore, go beyond descriptions of disease syndromes, etiologies and therapeutic procedures. They aim both at a model of the psychic apparatus, whose structure and function must be deduced from the mechanisms at work in the process of symptom-formation, as well as at a model of the cultural process, which as (homologous) macrocosm contains the microcosm of the individual psychic life. "Culture" is seen from the perspective of its "psychic end." This predesignates the limits and the critical nature of the psychoanalytic understanding of present-day society.

As Freud's understanding of the formative history of individuals (and of the mode of functioning of their psychic "apparatus") became more differentiated, the shadow-image of culture, illuminated from the perspective of its psychic end, also gained sharper profile. The critique of cultural shaped sexual morality (1908), the interpretation of totemism and the incest taboo (1912-13) and the clarification of mass psychology (1921) formed the most important stages of the functionalist theory of social institutions sketched in

2. See "Moses and Monotheism" in *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition*, ed. James Strachey, vol. 23, p. 88. All page numbers refer to the *Standard Edition*.

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the framework of the critique of religion, *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), which was complemented in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) and in *Moses and Monotheism* (1937-39).[3] The development of civilization appears to us as a peculiar process which mankind undergoes, and in which several things strike us as familiar."[4]

This process is familiar to the psychologist from the psycho-sexual development of individuals—ontogenesis—which recapitulates phylogenesis. This cultural process is essentially one of renunciation, a process of self domestication, in the course of which the human race progressively works its way out of bondage to nature and distances itself from its own animality. Cultural theory explicates the social preconditions of psychoanalytic clarification and reveals its objective function in the actual crisis of social evolution.

What stamps Freud's theory of culture as critical is that, as a psychological theory, it measures cultural institutions by the suffering they inflict on individuals. It does not socially repress the perennial conflict between human nature (libido) and the forms of adaptation to society (as do Durkheim and his successors). It does not ideologically repeat the violation of individuals or sanctify the culture that causes their downfall, but instead it sides with involuntarily acculturated men. Psychoanalytical theory seeks to understand their unhappiness: their discontent in culture. Thus the psychologistic prejudice protects Freud's theory from the idolization of existing cultural society and allows it to see through the crisis.

This prejudice is, of course, also constitutive of the ideological limits of his theory. Freud, like other social philosophers of the bourgeois epoch, understands existing society as an "atomic system." The connection between the isolated individuals is primarily understood as one constituted by goal-frustrated drive-strivings and political power, not by an economic connection (division of labor and distribution of the means of production) which first makes possible the isolation of the individuals and regulates the anarchy of their production behind their backs with an "invisible hand" (Adam Smith). Individuals' objective dependence which in the bourgeois era replaced the personal, master-servant relationship and remains beyond the range of their everyday awareness, also has no place in Freud's theory. Ignoring the historical specificity of the capitalist form of socialization, i.e., the domination by autonomous conditions of production over the individuals of a class, he replaces the objective dependence with a libidinous one. Instead of an historically specific dependence, he chooses an anthropological relation. This gives his theory of culture its chimerical generality.

Cultural Institutions and Mass Cohesion

Cultural institutions defend acculturated men against hostile external nature and asocial inner (human) nature at historically varying levels of

3. See "The Future of an Illusion," vol. 21, pp. 5-56; "Civilization and Its Discontents," vol. 21, pp. 64-145; "Moses and Monotheism," *op.cit.*

4. "Civilization and Its Discontents," *op.cit.*, p. 96.

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domination of nature and self. Freud distinguishes first those social institutions which regulate the relations of society to external nature (institutions of goods-acquisitions) from those that regulate the social interrelations of the acculturated individuals (institutions of the unequal distribution of goods). But "the two trends of civilization are not independent of each other: firstly, because the mutual relations of men are profoundly influenced by the amount of instinctual satisfaction which the existing wealth makes possible; secondly, because an individual man can himself come to function as wealth in relation to another one, in so far as the other person makes use of his capacity for work or chooses him as a sexual object; and thirdly, moreover, because every individual is virtually an enemy of civilization..."[5]

External nature is not the only object of human domination. Men also take other men as objects, making them work for them and using them as their sexual objects. Men can thus serve as goods (means). Moreover, the mode of relations within society is determined by the relations—themselves variable—of society to the natural environment. The more inhospitable the natural basis and the less developed the technico-organizational means to reshape it for the satisfaction of historically developing human needs, then the more barbaric a form the inner societal conditions of domination assume. "Culture," the entirety of measures men have taken in the sequence of generations and social formations as a defence against external nature, to process and develop that nature as well as to repress (or historically modify) their own nature, is the result of a self-domestication imposed on resisting majorities by privileged minorities, the proponents of asceticism (of the type of Moses, who imposed the one, abstract God on the Jewish shepherd tribe instead of the many local gods). The heart of "culture," according to Freud, is not acquired tools, but "cultural ideals": the memory of the epoch-making achievements of renunciation of animal pleasure (originally achieved and prefigured by "great men"), a memory kept alive in ritual and as an acculturating factor in the sequence of generations. The culture-bearing minorities who invent new procurements of direct drive-pleasure, the real subjects of "culture," are supported by the work of the majority (nourished out of the social surplus product). The innovative drive-renunciation is made easier for them because they are exempt from the torment of compulsory labor. Their drive-renunciations are actually refined, prolonged satisfactions. (Nonetheless, these renunciations leave behind a latent hostility to culture, which is evidenced in the barbaric acts of self-defense committed by ruling classes threatened with destruction.) The culture-promoting minorities enjoy a greater measure of real satisfaction and draw more intense illusory compensations from art and religion than do the masses, whom they seek to burden with new drive-renunciations beyond the suffering of work. In the minority, the distancing from animality follows the type of *sublimation*: the drive is permitted only in a socially useful, culturally valuable form. The

5. "The Future of an Illusion," *op.cit.*, p. 6.

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subjugated majority, however, is the involuntary bearer of the master culture, which it actually makes possible by its work. The sublimation-achievement of the masters can here be attained only scantily, through raw reaction-formations, by breaking the drive and reversing it into its opposite. (So aggressive cruelty is reversed into forebearance and finally into "love" for the members of the coercive community, and the suppressed rage and endured injustice is now unleashed only at dissidents and strangers, while pleasurable submission in relation to the rulers replaces social hatred.) "If we turn to those restrictions that apply only to certain classes of society, we meet with a state of things which is flagrant and which has always been recognized. It is to be expected that these underprivileged classes will envy the favored ones their privileges and will do all they can to free themselves from their own surplus of privation. Where this is not possible, a permanent measure of discontent will persist within the culture concerned and this can lead to dangerous revolts. If, however, the culture has not got beyond the point at which the satisfaction of one portion of its participants depends upon the suppression of another, and perhaps larger, portion—and this is the case in all present-day cultures—it is understandable that the suppressed people should develop an intense hostility towards cultures whose existence they make possible by their work, but in whose wealth they have too small a share."[6]

The system of social institutions continues to function because of motivations produced in acculturation processes, motivations which cause men to love asceticism and so assure the continuity of the culture. Culture is appropriated by identifications (first with the parents who represent the existing "culture" to the new generation—"culture," of course, specified according to respective class positions and individual experiences—and then with the extra-familial bearers of culture and power), and the luxuriating libidinous-aggressive drives of the individuals are blocked by the culture's ideals. The satisfaction of drives is restricted to socially legitimated patterns which determine who (or what) is to be loved or hated, how and what one must do without, what one must forget, and what one may dream. The process of acculturation establishes a moral bond between the members of the cultural society, unites the group beyond the real political and economic inequality, in solidarity against heretics and barbarians, who either refuse to stay within the community or do not belong to it. Only such a morally united community of renunciation can be ruled by the sword. The unfree and unequal majority's attachment to the cultural ideals lacks plausibility. It needs constant external support from fetishes of cultural power. It requires the display of force and splendor of the ideals, the sacrificed dissidents and self-glorification of the believers. The pseudo-harmony of those involuntarily acculturated is one of formal equality: the members of a culture are equal both in regard to the ideals and their representatives, and likewise to the non-members (the "enemies of the people" and of the culture). The more obvious the perception of the real inequality becomes, the more

6. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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fanatically the resentment, the diverted desire to rebel, leads to a manic insistence on the bad equality before the altars of cultural power. The maintenance of the illusion demands its victims.

The cohesion of class societies is bought at the price of disenfranchising the majority of their members. The unequal condition requires illusions, and this entanglement in illusions is disenfranchisement: "The narcissistic satisfaction provided by the cultural ideal is also among the forces which are successful in combating the hostility to culture within the cultural unit. This satisfaction can be shared in not only by the favored classes, which enjoy the benefitis of the culture, but also by the suppressed ones, since the right to despise the people outside it compensates them for the wrongs they suffer within their own unit. No doubt one is a wretched plebeian, harassed by debts and military service; but, to make up for it, one is a Roman citizen, one has one's share in the task of ruling other nations and dictating their laws. This identification of the suppressed classes with the class who rules and exploits them is, however, only part of a larger whole. For, on the other hand, the suppressed classes can be emotionally attached to their masters; in spite of their hostility to them they may see in them their ideals; unless such relations of a fundamentally satisfying kind subsisted, it would be impossible to understand how a number of civilizations have survived so long in spite of the justifiable hostility of large human masses."[7]

Wherever the reasonable perception of the individual or class interests collides with the preservation of the pseudo-harmony of the greater community, the internalized social power in individuals, their common self-ideal and social conscience, intervenes and blocks their critical ideas through the release of social anxiety—it breaks down the idea that stands in the service of the repressed drive and examines reality in terms of the possibility of realizing its wish.

Class societies are societies of unequal and unfree men, held together by morality and coercion. The illusory identification of mass-individuals with the ruling minorities, with their "leaders," always required renewed confirmation through wars against other involutarily socialized collectivities and through the persecution of opposition elements within society. The illusory, compulsory equality of the mass-individuals before the cultural ideal and its personification in God or the leader is, as Freud recognized, fed by xenophobic eros. Heterosexual love tends to dissolve mass attachment and lead to individuation; only if suppressed and restricted is it capable of supporting general social ties. The more society withdraws from original promiscuity by sexual restrictions, the more it rewards the (goal-frustrated) homosexual drive. The homosexual partial-drive leads men to hate the strange and seek the similar; it is even capable of unifying the dissimilar under a pseudo-similarity. "In the great artificial groups, the Church and the army, there is no room for woman as a sexual object. The love relation between men and women remains outside these organizations. Even where

7. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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groups are formed which are composed of both men and women, the distinction between the sexes plays no part... Even in a person who has in other respects become absorbed in a group, the directly sexual impulsions preserve a little of his individual activity. If they become too strong they disintegrate every group formation. The Catholic Church had the best of motives for recommending its followers to remain unmarried and for imposing celibacy upon its priests; but falling in love has often driven even priests to leave the Church. In the same way love for women breaks through the group ties of race, of national divisions, and of the social class system, and it thus produces important effects as a factor in civilization. It seems certain that homosexual love is far more compatible with group ties, even when it takes the shape of uninhibited sexual impulsions—a remarkable fact, the explanation of which might carry us far."[8]

Culture is a cumulative process of renunciation. The task of acculturation of every class society can be outlined as follows: it must place the great majority of its citizens in a position that will not break down under the burden of the general cultural prohibitions against murder, cannibalism and incest, which are easier or harder to bear depending on the social situation, and to remain fit for work and pleasure; it must provide means of power and select groups of people to frighten the great majority from breaking out of the morality of renunciation and to strike down possible revolts as examples; it must provide an arsenal of compensations as a festive supplement to the cultural prohibitions and means of repression in order to provide illusory compensation to the great majority and for their real denials (and to terminate the endlessly prolonged chain of delays in satisfaction in a realistically depicted future), so that they need not resort to private religions (neuroses, psychoses).

Possible forms of deviant social behavior for the socialized are the escapes to private religion (mental illness) and to criminality; both solutions remain without social effects.

The means of work, domination and solace constitute the cultural arsenal. The main part of the latter, the "psychic inventory" of culture, is religion. Along with art, it reconciles men with renunciation and suffering by expression their suffering and anticipating the compensation. Religion feeds on the helplessness and dependence endured by every new generation. The gods are projected into heaven as almighty, gigantic parents from whom the disenfranchised masses hope for help and solace from the horrors of nature and society. As rational knowledge of nature progresses, religion loses its function as a comprehensive explanation of the world, while its social and moral function, i.e., its role as illusory compensation for avoidable social suffering, comes to the fore.

The Cultural Crisis and its Solution

The coordinated system of inequality, illusory compensation and power is

8. "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (1920), vol. 18, p. 141.

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undermined by advances in the domination of nature. The privileged minorities, which bear culture more easily and have internalized it more strongly in every class society, exemplify the historically achievable surplus of freedom and happiness. The majority, pressed into culture, orient themselves in accordance with the minority's cultural ideals. For a long time the identification between the rulers and the exploited in the name of common cultural ideals keeps the class conflict latent. When, as a result of increasing social wealth, the discrepancy between the social classes' situations in life increases, and whatever compensations, real or unreal, lag behind the imposed renunciations and burdens, aggression is released. Latent contents of the (ambivalent) cultural tradition are mobilized to help express the new (recently acknowledged) needs. Along with the regression to the natural condition (criminality) and to madness (private religion), to the extent that traditional justifications can no longer bridge the real contradiction between misery and wealth, impotence and power, there arises a real possibility of changing social reality, which the Freudian tradition paraphrases as "regression to the service of the self" (Ernst Kris). In his analysis of jokes, Freud himself elaborated the model of such "regression" as a return to needs repressed and prohibited by cultural progress serving to overcome the misery of the actual situation. His psycho-analytical theory of "inspiration" and its aesthetic effect is transparent for a theory of social revolution: "The prevention of invective or of insulting rejoinders by external circumstances is such a common case that tendentious jokes are especially favored in order to make aggressiveness or criticism possible against persons in exalted positions who claim to exercise authority. The joke then represents a rebellion against that authority, a liberation from its pressure... If we look back once more at the three separate groups of joke-techniques, we see that the first and third of these groups—the replacement of thing-associations by word-associations and the use of absurdity—can be brought together as re-establishing old liberties and getting rid of the burden of intellectual upbringing; they are psychical reliefs which can, in a sense, be contrasted with the economizing which constitutes the technique of the second group. Relief from psychical expenditure that is already there and economizing in psychical expenditure that is only about to be called for—from these two principles all the techniques of jokes, and accordingly all pleasure from these techniques, are derived... A pre-conscious thought is given over for a moment to unconscious revision and the outcome of this is at once grasped by conscious perception."[9]

The possibilities of social development repressed by prevalent reality correspond to the prohibited drive-wishes of the individuals (expressed in heretical traditions). What could not be expressed and developed within the framework of the *status quo* becomes, in social fantasy, a "revolutionary myth," the anticipation of a better form of life. In view of the disproportion between renunciation and compensation, to the exploited majority

9. 'Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious" (1905), vol. 8, pp. 104-105.

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generalized criminal action seems like a solution whose risks are no longer frightening. The balance of renunciation and compensation which has become historically untenable yields to a new reality principle. Thus social progress is realized as a result of "twilights of the gods" and "liberating misdeeds."

Culture's cumulative process of renunciation has now, according to Freud, brought mankind to the threshold of a golden age. In view of the created social wealth, the immensely intensified productivity of labor, the renunciations required of the majority can no longer be justified. On the basis of accumulated drive-renunciations, instrumental reason has developed into technical mastery of nature. It has decisively weakened religious traditions, which legitimate both culture in general and the current social inequality and domination. Freud fears that the fall of the ancient religious legitimation of social norms could result in a reversion to the natural state. He therefore advocates that a timely opportunity be seized to relegitimate the prohibitions at the basis of culture by an appeal to the rational insight of all men. A solution to the crisis of culture seems to him possible only in opposition to religion. "If the sole reason why you must not kill your neighbor is because God has forbidden it and will severely punish you for it in this or the next life —then, when you learn that there is no God and that you need not fear His punishment, you will certainly kill your neighbor without hesitation, and you can only be prevented from doing so by mundane force. Thus either these dangerous masses must be held down most severely and kept most carefully away from any chance of intellectual awakening, or else the relationship between civilization and religion must undergo a fundamental revision."[10]

The cultural process, as it reaches its end, reproduces the danger, whose defense set it in motion. The species succumbs to hostile natural forces, this time located in man's own inner nature, whose destructive potential became greater with increasing mastery over external nature. Intensified renunciation-demands and lessened compensations produce a mounting aggressive potential in the individuals, which can be discharged socially either progressively or regressively. "It goes without saying that a civilization which leaves so large a number of its participants unsatisfied and drives them in to revolt neither has nor deserves the prospect of a lasting existence."[11]

Freud sees the rationalization of social morality (which is anachronistically based on religion) as the alternative to a self-abolishing history of culture leading to new barbarism. Pedagogically oriented, collective renunciation of (religious) illusions can replace superstitious fear and coerced obedience with insight into social necessity and so prevent regression into barbarity. The legitimation of social relations within the group by religion is a "cultural lag" compared with the primacy of instrumental reason in the field of inter-group relations. But social inequality, or class society, is irreligious and cannot be "saved" rationally. "Since it is an awkward task to separate what God Himself

10. "The Future of an Illusion," *op.cit.*, p. 39.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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has demanded from what can be traced to the authority of an all-powerful parliament or a high judiciary, it would be an undoubted advantage if we were to leave God out altogether and to honestly admit the purely human origin of all the regulations and precepts of civilization. Along with their pretended sanctity, these commandments and laws would lose their rigidity and unchangeableness as well. People could understand that they are made not so much to rule them as, on the contrary, to serve their interests; and they would adopt a more friendly attitude to them, and instead of aiming at their abolition, would aim only at their improvement. This would be an important advance along the road which leads to becoming reconciled to the burden of civilization... We may foresee, but hardly regret, that such a process of remolding will not stop at renouncing the solemn transfiguration of cultural precepts, but that a general revision of them will result in many of them being done away with."[12]

The pedagogically organized collective rejection of illusions will inevitably result in the abolition of non-rationally legitimated social inequality, the escape out of unfree socialization (mass cohesion), and consequently a reconciliation of (human) nature and culture. Reviving Feuerbach's critique of religion, Freud writes: "By withdrawing their expectations from the other world and concentrating all their liberated energies into their life on earth, [men] will probably succeed in achieving a state of things in which life will become tolerable for everyone and civilization no longer oppressive to anyone."[13] The achieved level of social wealth makes exploitation superfluous; domination over men can be replaced by management of things. A free association of individuals of equal rank no longer needs the social cement of suppressed sexuality. Libidinously satisfied men will be able to live without religious solace, for their social reality is attractive enough to disarm aggressive desires (resolution of the vital drives under the mounting pressure of the renunciation-culture) and the regressive death-wish.

Therapeutic Critique of Pseudo-Nature

Freud's "anthropology," his description of the structure and functions of the psychic apparatus, is unmistakably historical. The "ego," the life-preserving central authority in the "apparatus of stimuli-mastery," works according to the maxims of a realistically modified pleasure-principle. It keeps a life-long cost-benefit budget, and yet must ultimately fail. Freud's *homo psychologicus*, like *homo oeconomicus*, has a "mercantile soul" (Max Weber). As the autonomy of bourgeois individuals is rooted in authority and leads to it, so the "ego" of Freud's *homo psychologicus* serves two masters and hides its impotence by pretending to lead powers which push it ahead of themselves. Freud calls it a "clown" who, when pushed over, pretends that it wanted to fall all along. Of course, the clown, who even in distress maintains the illusion of being the originator of his misfortune, is the only reflexive

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 44.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

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authority in the power-play of psychic forces. Uncontrolled (or deformed) nature and social tradition are the poles within which it finds its scope. It can set itself off only partially from its supports. So the ego is, in Freud, both the authority of truth (of examining reality) and of falsehood (censorship).

On closer examination, central concepts of his psychology turn out to be concepts whose content cannot be grasped psychologically, boundary concepts between psychology and sociology. The impossibility of determining "ego-weakness," the *sine qua non* of all neuroses, and even its opposite, "ego strength" (which was attempted by Hermann Nunberg and Otto Fenichel, among others), shows that their content can be grasped only metaphysically, socio-historically. The owls of Minerva begin their flight only at dusk when a life-form has aged, Hegel says. So the psychoanalytical theory of man grasps the psychological corollary to a conception of social life just at the point when it has already become a cultural lag as a result of decisive changes. In this situation, in the transition of advanced capitalism to its imperialistic phase, the psychological after-image of the bourgeois reality of life enters into cultural tradition by mediation of psycho-analytical reality—the Utopian potential of this form of life is freed. Freud's psychology, however, pronounces the verdict on the bourgeois age by transmitting that reality to posterity only as an internal fantasy. That is the meaning of Marcuse's designation of psychoanalysis as an "obsolete" conception[14] whose theory of man can now serve as a corrective to current practice. Psychoanalytical therapy is still trying to put the unfortunate victims of culture on the road to the golden age, a road on which an author unaware of himself is made conscious of his authorship and revises past actions.

The theories that reflect bourgeois society are theories of natural growth; a social condition produced by individual and collective actors who are unaware of the real conditions of their behavior, so that the results of their actions as a rule do not correspond to their intentions. Therefore the social world, self-created or created by former generations, finished and existing before appears to them to be an alien coercive system which foils their intentions. The historical world seems natural to them; it is, however, only pseudo-natural, and must be revised. If the unconscious producers of the social conditions attained the "enormous awareness" (Marx) of their authorship, they would be able to continue their natural acculturation on a planned basis. The pseudo-natural alien character of the social world is the point conveying the "antinomous of bourgeois thought."[15] The revolutionary solution of the antinomies of is and ought, of ideas and reality, was elaborated by the great idealistic dialecticians: "If philosophy starts with a fact, it thus places itself into the world of reality and finiteness and it will find it hard to find its way from this to the infinite and supersensory; if it starts with a human action, then it stands precisely at the point where the two worlds join,

14. See Herbert Marcuse, "Das Veralten der Psychoanalyse," in *Kultur und Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt, 1965), vol. 2, pp. 85-106.

15. See Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 83-222.

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the point from which they can both be surveyed at a glance."[16]

According to Fichte, human nature is constituted disharmoniously: the extra-uterine experience opens an extended biological childhood phase; the unsynchronized drive development and body growth, luxuriating, unspecialized motives, and a delayed sexual maturity force the development of a tradition-supported inhibitive organ, the psychic apparatus, which gives the ability for cogitative, trial-and-error action. The norms of action and socially defined reality as a whole are recognized as valid and interiorized in the process of acculturation. Ego-strength or weakness decides on whether and to what extent internalized norms later are capable of a situation-specific relativization. Social progress, seen in terms of individual psychology, depends on this opportunity to retract precarious balances between drive-deterence and *ersatz* satisfaction. However, acculturation—intensifying historical-specifically the trans-historical risks of the species, which endanger every ontogenesis—in the natural society apparently leads to the formation of automatic defense actions which entangle countless individuals in forms of unfreedom (private religions) far exceeding the historically inevitable level (moderate, universal misery). The symptoms, pseudo-natural documents of unsuccessful acculturation are the ontogenetic corollaries of social institutions which have become independent of their bearers.

After the resigned transition from a theory of history to a theory of nature, typical of the nineteenth century,[17] the dialectics of alienation and association returned in the form of a therapeutics. Confronted with hysterical diseases, Freud—contrary to his physicalistic research program—went over to the critical theory of a practice represented only inadequately in the awareness of the actors.

Psychoanalysis can be conceived as a conversation between two persons in order to permit each to cross limits encountered in their everyday understanding of one another.[18] This therapeutic discussion has a certain similarity with detective work. A detective must check a suspect's alibi and convict the delinquent of the hidden truth, based on contradictions and clues. The psychoanalytic therapist also tries, based on the patient's statements, to discover the truth about his hidden problems in life. But here the situation is more complex. The patient does not know this truth himself. Yet he is the only person who can corroborate it, by accepting it once the analyst has reconstructed it—based on "indications."

A psychic disturbance of the neurotic type, which generally can be paraphrased as an incapacity for work and enjoyment, is expressed in the failure of certain psycho-physical functions, in fears, compulsive actions, etc. The neurotic symptoms are experienced by the patient as alien to the self, not

16. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, "Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre," in *Ausgewalte Werke in sechs Bänden*, ed. Medicus (Darmstadt, 1962), vol. 3, p. 52.

17. See Odo Marquard, *Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt, 1973), pp. 85-106.

18. See Siegfried Bernfeld, "The Facts of Observation in Psychoanalysis," *The Journal of Psychology*, vol. 12, pp. 289-305.

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really belonging to him, and by his fellow men as strange and irrational. Free of societal controls, in the slightly structured, micro-social experimental situation of the psychoanalytical cure, modeled on the two-person constellation of early childhood acculturation (the dyad), those puzzling modes of behavior can be allowed to develop fully. The actual situation here becomes the stage for ego-alien reactions which disturb the patient's everyday life. The work of psychoanalytic understanding begins with these objective expressions of illness in the therapeutic situation.

The patient's (involuntary) self-depiction in the therapeutic situation is complemented by ideas and memories of his life history, which he is supposed to communicate uncensored. The sequence of "scenes" he presents becomes the documentation for a journey back into the patient's life history. Finally, an overpowering shock in the drive-control system (or its later versions) which occurred at a certain stage of development (early childhood) is uncovered by the therapist and confirmed by the patient's memories as the "cause" of his current disturbances. The psychoanalytic reconstruction traces a chain of related traumatic events back to distorted interactions and events which were so shocking to the growing child's personality that the shock effects and the feelings induced no longer could be coped with, but were denied. The traumatic scenes themselves were forgotten in a defensive process, the ideas connected with them were reinterpreted in a private language, and the feelings were converted into fear. This (inconclusive) process of repression serves to disguise the motives which entangled the patient in the traumatic events, i.e., that element in the damaged subject which corresponded and responded to the "danger." The psychic disturbance is, accordingly, conditioned by a peril from the "outside," stemming from others; it is a social suffering. It consists in the reactive, compulsive renunciation of the excessively weakened ego, to deal mentally with the dangerous situation. The ego, by denying the real conflict and undoing it, must separate and alienate a part of itself, i.e., the part that was entangled in the conflict. Whatever is a later reminder of the repressed conflict therefore appears to the awareness as a danger from the outside. What was once a (threatening) motive now appears as "cause" of the disturbance—in the patient's experience and in the hypothetical reconstruction of the ailment's etiology by the therapist.

The therapist, as a specialist in disturbed formative processes, has a model (distilled from case histories) of development phases and crisis points, a theory of phase-specific disturbances and their effects in the life history. Starting from his patient's current symptoms, he uses this knowledge of typical connections of cause and effect of illness in order, by means of these "laws," to trace back from the known effects to the still unknown initial conditions of the disease process. The hidden determinants of the life history must then be extracted from memory piece by piece in difficult cooperation with the patient, who can allow himself to remember only at the risk of a breakdown.

The neurotic's ego (the authority of knowledge and censorship) has partly lost, in the sphere of the repressed conflict, the ability to perceive problematic situations realistically, to remember them, to repeat them in mental and

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emotional experiments, and thus to prepare for solutions to conflicts appropriate for his age and reality. The problematic, fear-permeated contents are withdrawn from the inner monologue and from possible communication. But such denial does not free the ego, but binds it to conflict situations and their affective-symbolic appurtenances as to alien, external forces. Everything connected with the prohibited contents automatically releases ego-alien reactions—psychic disturbance. The ideas and feelings expelled from memory have attained the quality of stimuli that compel specific reactions in a fixed pattern. In the general area of the symbolically mediated trauma, ego-controlled action is replaced by short-circuited, compulsive reaction to certain triggering factors, a compulsive reaction totally outside the range of symbolic refraction.

For the therapist the connection between the (suspected) trauma and the (present) symptom is presented first as that between cause and effect. This causal nexus cannot be understood or re-experienced by the patient; it lies beyond the range of his (self-)understanding. The neurotic functional disturbance, a somatically manifested suffering without organic cause, at first reveals nothing about its genesis from repressed, unrecognizable motives. It appears somatized in the form of a (pseudo-)natural illness that resists therapeutic treatment with drugs or scalpel. This "causal" explanation, which the therapist has in mind as a guideline for his procedure, is adequate to the pseudo-natural connection between trauma and symptoms. But it leads to a cure only to the extent that—by means of the patient's semi-voluntary statements—it gradually loses its abstractness and is replaced by an initially fragmentary understanding of the concrete biographical context. The explanatory hypothesis can ultimately be "verified" (admitted) only by the patient himself, i.e., by the object of investigation. If he recognizes his own life in the therapist's reconstructions, he can accept his hypothetical attempts at an understanding and recognize the causality of his sick reactions as involuntary and subconsciously self-induced—then and only then does a revision of the subconsciously inculcated neurotic pattern of behavior become possible for him. The patient now no longer needs to describe the remembered and understood life-conflict subconsciously and strangely; he can understand it and revise the infantile escape-and-denial solution.

Thus psychoanalytic therapy aims, on the basis of everyday understanding, to provoke the patient into understanding himself as the involuntary author of his incomprehensible neurotic productions. It frees him from the neurotic repetition-compulsion by forcing him to recognize repressively effective motives as his own and to reassume the effort to cope with them that had been traumatically interrupted in early childhood. The object whose behavior is being *explained* hypothetically changes in the course of the therapeutic process into a partner of dialogue, into a subject who *understands* his behavior. Apel rightly designates such interpenetration of explanation and understanding by the term "critique of ideology."[19]

19. Karl-Otto Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 96-127.

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The psychoanalytic theory of acculturation reproduces the critical theory of natural incorporation into society, the dialectic of alienation and assimilation—in the medium of psychology. An important difference between the critique of economics and the critique of ideology in the strict sense must thus be kept in mind: psychoanalysis aims essentially to make the repressed key scenes of the patient's life history again capable of consciousness, i.e., experienceable and processable. Repression withdrew them from memory by cutting the (colloquial) link between thing-memories and word-memories, displacing complex-connected meanings in reference to the common language and misconnecting the respective emotions. The prohibited contents were thus withdrawn equally from the internal monologue and from communication and conversation with others. (This is the social function of "repression.") Therapy's authority of appeal is the colloquial language; the object of critique is its distortion in a private language. The critique of ideology, however, has the everyday forms of false awareness as its object, for instance the colloquial reversal of the employee-employer relation or the talk of the "work wage" which conceals the exploitative relationship, by letting all accomplished work (instead of only necessary work) appear to be "paid for."

This difference between the critique of economics and ideology also makes it possible to determine the scope of psychoanalytic therapy: it works against self-censorship, by which the weakened individuals help social power to victory over their own dreams of a better life. It attacks the *status quo* by freeing men from conformistic automatic behavior, by striving to broaden their inner scope, and by making them aware of alternatives to the prevalent social reality-principle. Recognition of reality is the psycho-therapeutic immediate goal, i.e., the recognition of the colloquial language and the surrender of the intersubjectively invalid private language, the achievement of the ability to distinguish between the real situation and projection (illusory misconception of reality), between fact and fantasy. But the differentiating scrutiny, aimed at distinguishing between the reality of the outside world and the drive-wish, also leads to a clearer recognition of the drive-wish. The strengthened sense of realtiy not only relativizes socially constituted reality, but also implies the collapse of internalized social power, the relativization of the superego. Here psychoanalysis merges into a critique of the socially necessary false awareness; but this also marks the end of the therapist's traditional task. The result of therapy remains open: the resulting shift in the power ratio of the intra-psychic authorities awaits ratification by a change of the constellation of social forces corresponding to them in social reality. Whether psychoanalysis is only a psycho-technique which opens up additional inner space for privileged groups or whether it works for a general change of the principle of social reality, is decided not in treatment, but in the arena of social struggles.

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THE END OF INTERNALIZATION: ADORNO'S SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

by Jessica Benjamin

I.

Analytic psychology contains the realization that human beings affect one another, particularly in the process of child rearing, and therefore that what appear to be innate or natural *properties* of a person are actually the result of social interaction and human agency. In this sense, the psychoanalytic perspective represented a profound demystification comparable to Marx's analysis, which revealed the origins of commodity values in the human labor performed in social production. Despite this parallel, the task of synthesizing the work of Marx and Freud is more difficult than it may at first appear. When Adorno and Horkheimer began to systematically synthesize Freud's theory of society they were already dissatisfied by the efforts of Fromm and Reich to achieve this integration.[1] For critical theory the attempt to understand how people become accomplices in their own subjugation—"how domination is anchored in the hearts of the dominated"—it had to focus on the idea of internalization. Following Freud, critical theory used the idea to show how a tension between compliance and resistance occurs within the individual's relation to authority.

Yet, at the center of critical theory's analysis of modern capitalism is a paradox about the nature of resistance to domination. Those aspects of consciousness where this resistance might be located—critical reason, individuation, integrity and ultimately resistance itself—are tied to the process of internalizing authority. As a result, the rejection of authority can only take place through its prior acceptance. Even though the subjective dimension of domination is found to be in the way authority is internalized, the only possible resistance to authority is located in the same process of internalization. If reason, reflection and individuation are historically tied to the process of internalizing authority, is not the result that authority is in some sense seen as necessary or even vindicated? Or is this paradox only surmountable through an alternative not considered by critical theory: that the

1. For an account of the differences between the Frankfurt theorists and Erich Fromm in particular, see Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (Boston, 1973). Reich's *Mass Psychology of Fascism*, published in 1933 and Fromm's social-psychological portion of *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (Paris, 1936) presented similar hypotheses about the origins of authoritarianism in the relationship to the father. Although Fromm's analysis of the 'sado-masochistic character' was accepted by Horkheimer, his later rejection of Freud's patrocentric theory was not. Horkheimer's own portion of the Studies contains only one direct reference to "depth psychology," although it shows some influence by the idea of the Oedipus complex. I date the real integration of Freud into critical theory as occurring in the 1940s, and most definitively in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944). Although a great deal of psychoanalytic study went into the *Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1969), its analyses often run counter to the general statements about contemporary psychological development in Horkheimer and Adorno's work.

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possibility of resisting authority need not be grounded in that aspect of the subject which once accepted authority, but instead in that aspect which seeks mutuality? Could not the potential for emancipation be grounded in an intersubjective theory of personality, rather than an individual psychology of internalization?

This possibility would call into question one of the major themes of critical theory's acceptance of Freudian theory: that ultimately it is our natural impulses, our 'human nature,' including love and desire, which betray us. The malleable, asocial, regressive core of human nature—what Freud termed the id—makes the control of inner nature through civilization and reason necessary. Reason is then constituted as control and becomes a repressive and destructive force—a second nature which can be held in check by no other power. In this way reason, the very possibility of resistance, is implicated in domination. Whereas Freud drew the consequence from the destructive potential of the instincts that civilization was justified, Adorno accepts the idea that "an unconquerable piece of nature" [2] underlies civilization, while resisting the consequence that authority and civilization are thereby legitimated. But, since Adorno finds no possibility of a reconciliation between reason and nature, the struggle between them results in an impasse from which authority emerges triumphant.

The impasse of authority grounded in the antinomy of reason and nature is central to critical theory's analysis of modern culture. Internalization, even as it perpetuates authority, is necessary for the constitution of reason which alone can oppose authority. This impasse comes to be formulated in a number of paradoxes, of which the critical theorists themselves often give the best expression: while autonomy and acceptance of authority are opposed, the same process of internalization and individuation underlies them; while the autonomy of the individual in capitalism has been shown to be a mask of isolation and powerlessness, the dissolution of individuality leads to a more seamless conformity; while critical or emancipatory reason must be developed to counter instrumental or dominating reason, they both emerge out of a conflict with inner and outer nature; and finally, despite the fact that the ego which embodies cognition can only grow out of a victorious struggle against the instincts, the repression of instincts itself includes the repression of cognition itself.

The distinction between rational control of the instincts and simple repression becomes crucial—but in an "irrational society" the ego can only fulfill the demand to tame the instincts by acting irrationally or unconsciously. The hope for rational self-control is utopian; it presupposes a rational social order whose realization is not in sight. If the present social

2. See Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (New York, 1962), p. 33: "As regards the third source, the social source of suffering...when we consider how unsuccessful we have been in precisely this field of prevention of suffering, a suspicion dawns on us that here, too, a piece of unconquerable nature may be behind—this time a piece of our own psychical constitution."

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order undermines the capacity for rational self-control, reason is doomed to be purely an instrument of domination rather than of liberation. In the present epoch the critical theorists find that authority is directly exercised over individuals rather than internalized—thereby eliminating the potential for critique or revolt. As a result, the possibility for the formation of a revolutionary subject is foreclosed. In the face of this situation the critical theorists look backward to the form of instinctual control which was the basis for ego development and reason in the past—individual internalization—and argue that only it contained a potential for the formation of a critique of domination. This is the impasse which I refer to as the "end of internalization."

Freud distinguished the internalization process from the simple fear of an outside authority and saw it as an advancement in ego development. When the ego internalizes, it takes 'inside' a relationship in which it was once dominated from without, in such a way that one part of the ego acts as the agent of the authority toward the other part. This can be variously understood as the ego reproducing the relationship between self and other, or the ego identifying with the authority. The authority's commands are experienced as autonomous directives, appearing to emanate from within: conscience or super-ego. The response of the ego to this split is the feeling of guilt, which is fear of punishment by the super-ego. The process of internalization assumes the prior individuation, or differentiation of self and other. That which is taken in was only "outside" by virtue of an earlier process of exclusion, in which the ego formed a boundary separating a domain of self.[3]

According to the critical theorists, the historical conditions of familial life which fostered the process of internalization and individuation as Freud knew it have been eclipsed. The increasing depersonalization of social relations in late capitalism, the decline of the entrepreneurial, individualist father, has undermined the familial organization on which internalization of authority was based.[4] Internalization is replaced by direct conformity to external

3. Sigmund Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," in *General Psychological Theory* (New York, 1963), p. 99.

4. Max Horkheimer, "Authoritarianism and the Family Today," in *The Family: Its Function and Destiny* (New York, 1949), pp. 359-369. The main point of this article is that authority is increasingly depersonalized. Because it is located outside of the personal parent figure, it cannot become part of the internal psychic make-up. In this discussion, Horkheimer is explicitly using the Freudian concept of ego development based on successful resolution of the Oedipal complex, a model explicitly based on socialization of the male child. The child comes to replace the desire to act as the father does toward the mother in the hope of being able, in the future, to possess a similar object. The child relinquishes the immediate desire for possession, because of either fear of castration or loss of love—in any case, a personal relationship with the father. He takes the paternal authority inside as super-ego. This scheme posits a one-shot development of conscience, and largely ignores early stages of identification, especially with the mother. It is therefore patrocentic, and the conclusion that Marcuse (*Five Lectures* [Boston, 1970], p. 50) as well as Horkheimer and others have erroneously drawn is that the lack of a strong father does not provide a basis for children who can resist authority. The peer group is considered invariably

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pressure. Similarly, the lack of opportunity to identify with effective and loving parental figures leads to a failure of ego development. In this way the critical theorists establish the criteria for analyzing the current psychological state of the subject by reference to that historical moment when the family was still intact. In 1936 Horkheimer had argued that the family was a means of socializing the individual to accept authority, that it taught the child to be "reasonable" in conforming to uncontrollable social reality.[5] But in 1949 he stressed that the family had once defended the individual against society—a point he made earlier—and that the lack of parental effectiveness today delivers children even earlier into the hands of state institutions and mass media.

Now that impersonal, extra-familial forms of authority hold sway over the individual, "the mediating agency of the ego" is unnecessary to insure compliance. Rather, they argue, the direct manipulation of unconscious drives by external forces perpetuates social domination. Adorno explained both the fascist movement in Germany and conformist culture in America as "the appropriation of mass psychology by the oppressors": the replacement of the conflict between the ego and id by direct manipulation of the id. Given the persistence of individual isolation and competitiveness in late capitalism, an external semblance of individuality and "automated ego" remains—but this is understood as "individualism without the individual." This verdict must be seen, however, in its historical context: the failure of that class to revolt whose collective identity was to end bourgeois individualism while realizing its unfulfilled promise of individual autonomy. Because this moment of historical possibility failed, this form of individuality remains the last preserve of critical opposition and consciousness—a form which is dying out.[6] Despite their own exhaustive critique of liberal individualism, Adorno and Horkheimer now return to the individual, if only as an explanatory concept for their *post mortem*. The ideal of individual consciousness upheld by liberalism presents us with the missing sources of resistance. Internalization, although in collusion with authority, was also a source of ego autonomy without which the struggle for emancipation cannot be waged.

It cannot be stated too often that the critical theorists were themselves aware of the way in which this impasse had grown out of specific conditions of bourgeois society. They themselves had criticized the assumptions underlying

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conformist. This is actually contradicted by the data in "Liberal-democratic personality" in *The Authoritarian Personality* despite Horkheimer's attempt to enlist the data for his thesis. Furthermore, it ignores the role of maternal authority and pre-Oedipal development as well as the difference in female child development, and therefore the possibility that women will oppose paternal authority, perhaps based on identification with strong mothers and without the support of men who have strong egos.

5. Max Horkheimer, "Authority and the Family," in *Critical Theory*, trans. M. O'Connell (New York, 1972).

6. The empirical credibility of the thesis that the individual is declining is dubious even from the standpoint of Adorno's own empirical results in *The Authoritarian Personality*. The "liberal-democratic personality" rooted in the modified nuclear family was not on the wane.

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the hope of opposing individual reason to authority. Nonetheless, the unwillingness to abandon certain assumptions of liberal rationalism lead them inexorably into resigning themselves to the very impasse they had identified. It is necessary to return to these assumptions about human nature and the constitution of reason, which they shared with Freud, in order to explain why they were forced into the paradoxical opposition between reason and authority: an impasse from which they could not escape.

II.

As idle as it may appear to be to attempt to subtract all that is "social" from our behavior in order to determine that the residue is the truth of human nature, it is perhaps still more difficult to completely avoid all such assumptions about human nature. The danger, however, is that social relations may be fetishized and seen as belonging to nature, so that the results of a process appear ultimately as the cause. Freud himself was not loathe to speculate about the nature of the basic human drives. He posited the id as the unconscious locus of the primitive, unsocialized instincts—the sometimes dangerous impulses motivated by the aim of reducing tension or the pleasure principle. In the case of the id the fetishism occurs when the ego's dominance is seen as a response to rather than as a cause of the primitive nature of the id.[7] While Adorno and Horkheimer propose in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that the ego's efforts to master a frightening nature actually increase the antagonism between the two, they do not direct this proposition to the understanding of the id. Rather, they propose that the id's innate destructiveness emerges when it is no longer restrained by the internalizing ego. The ego, which is unable to protect itself from its internal impulses, projects them outwards "pathologically."[8] It appears in this formulation that self-control, domination of internal nature, was actually justified because in its absence the innate core of aggression would emerge.

This position implies an unacknowledged reversal of their argument that the ego creates an increasingly hostile world through its exercise of domination and control. The objectified id appears in their theory as the only source of conflict through which the ego can develop. They lack a basis for examining the extent or way in which socially mediated antagonisms produce, rather than express, destructiveness. This requires an examination of the way in which certain sets of impulses become split off or alienated from

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7. "Mimesis imitates the environment, but false projection makes the environment like itself," Max Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. J. Cummings (New York, 1972), p. 183. The exposition of the way in which objectifying thought gradually severs the subject's connection to the world of objects must be seen as their attempt to discuss the formation of the ego alienated from the id. However, they themselves never consciously include the id in these considerations, just as they never explicitly draw the parallel between formal instrumental reason and the ego based on the performance principle.

8. *Dialectic of Enlightenment, op.cit.*, p. 193. Here the critical theorists are not reluctant to posit the nature of the subject. The a-social character of the id is not the least of their empirically unsubstantiated propositions.

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the original ego, and take on the character of a powerful or destructive internal nature.

The apparent necessity of ego development through opposition to the external world and internal nature could be countered by the supposition of the subjective need for mutual recognition. The mutual recognition of subjectivity implies that the world to which the subject stands opposed can be demystified as the creation of other subjects who are continually acting upon one another. What appears to be internal nature can be grasped as the alienated form of the need for recognition, distorted through an inter-subjective process of objectification. In fact, it is precisely in this alienated mode of denying the basic need for recognition that the interdependency of subjects is most visible. The denial of this universal mutual need is integral to the struggle around any concrete particular need through which power relations are consolidated. Thus, the understanding of domination requires the investigation of the social process of alienating this need in earliest childhood, examining the interaction from the viewpoint of the *socializer* as well as the socialized.

The psychoanalytic perspective known as "object relations theory"[9] in which ego development is explained through the interaction with other subjects is particularly appropriate to such an investigation. The object-relations perspective sees the libido as directed toward the other, the libidinal drives as "object-seeking." That is, the subjective motive of an interaction, even where partial, sexual drives are brought into play, is the connection to the object as another subjective being. The ultimate need is not for the breast, or milk, but mother. This perspective suggests that the instrumentalization of the other for the satisfaction of partial sexual urges, while apparently natural, actually represents a deterioration of object relations. Thus the pleasure principle, which in Freud's view governs the id, constitutes a degeneration of object relations which must first be explained *through* the development of those relations.

In this context, the analysis of ego development need not assume that human beings are blank slates upon which society imprints itself, that they have no unconscious drives nor potential for destructiveness. Rather, society must be seen as a creation of such human beings in which they externalize their nature. We need not assume that this externalizing process proceeds without distortion. The problem lies not in the *what* but the *way* human nature is externalized. This insight emerges repeatedly in critical theory, but finally founders on their acceptance of instinct theory, their demonization of second nature as nature.

The relation between ego and inner nature in critical theory closely parallels their construction of the relation between reason or ego and external

9. The object relations theory on which much of this account is based is expressed most coherently in H. Guntrip, *Personality Structure and Human Interaction* (New York, 1961), and W.R.D. Fairbairn, *An Object Relations Theory of Personality* (London, 1952).

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nature. In their analysis of the conflict between ego and outside world they, like Freud, never state exactly what the external world is composed of. It is not clear when the term designates the social world and when the natural, when it refers to other subjects and when to objectified social processes or institutions. Horkheimer and Adorno see reason as a universal historical, ontologized process developing out of the opposition to nature.[10] In a parallel way, Freud explained the evolution of the ego out of the id as a result of the pressure of necessity and the stimulus of the external world. For Adorno and Horkheimer the struggle between ego and outside world, reason and nature is transposed within the subject as a process of controlling her or his own nature. Goal rationality begins as the social relation to nature which becomes internalized as self-control over internal nature.[11]

As an orientation to nature, reason always contained *both* goal rationality or control, and the aspect of enlightenment or liberation from fear. Adorno and Horkheimer wanted to show how the drive for mastery over nature, that is, for self-preservation, was inextricably intertwined with the development of reason. By the same token, the basis of ego development is always self-preservation, the reaction to the external world. Hence, the degree of consciousness and quality of rationality which could develop depend on the social requirements of survival. These requirements are consolidated in socio-historical forms which mediate the form of the ego. Thus, Adorno and Horkheimer believe that what history has brought forth it can also eliminate.

Ego, for critical theory, is a purely social or secondary formation. At the same time, it is welded to individual self-preservation (as Freud also believed), to the principle of individual self-interest. They consistently state that ego and rationality both come to an end when interest no longer demands them. Of course, the principle of self-interest was understood in bourgeois society as an individual rather than a collective principle. The possibility of a different form of ego, based not on individual self-interest but on social membership and mutuality of interest is not wholly unrecognized in critical theory. But only the principle of individual interest, that is, individual self-preservation, is raised to a category of endopsychic process, of nature.[12] Furthermore, only

10. Freud mentions this in a number of expositions, e.g., *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Part of the function of the ego is to project against these stimuli, to ward them off because the nervous system would "if this were feasible, maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition." See Freud, "Instincts . . .," *op.cit.*, p. 86. The ego is thus seen as a secondary formation which only comes into being in order to serve the pleasure principle—the principle of reduction of tension—because an individual is impinged upon. The function of judgment, accepting the reality principle, is to ascertain what is good or bad and whether it is inside or outside. See Freud, "Negation," *General Psychological Theory, op.cit.*

11. The extent to which goal rationality is a life-form was never fully appreciated in Critical Theory. Eike Gebhardt points this out in "Identity as a Total Institution," *International Journal of Sociology*, 5:1 (Spring 1975), pp. 3-46. Marcuse's formulation of the Performance Principle (in *Eros and Civilization*) also lacks a more phenomenal description of the search for approval and calculation of use. The full implications of the Protestant Ethic as a psychological phenomenon have yet to be developed.

12. *Dialectic of Enlightenment, op.cit.*, p. 189. They repeat the depletion of the ego within their theory—by analyzing the "outside world" as an abstract category, the subject also loses con-

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the struggle against nature, rather than an impulse to satisfy a desire for the other—sociability—can ultimately elicit the human potential for conscious social existence.

The crucial problem in both this conception of the ego and of nature is therefore the lack of a concept of intersubjectivity—of subject to subject relations or societal interaction.[13] Consciousness appears to be a property of the individual monad. The world is not conceived of as an intersubjective realm in which the objects encountered are really themselves subjects who have the capacity to act and be affected by another's actions. In their use of the abstract category "outside world," in their analysis of reason itself in terms of ego and outside, subject and object, they are unable to overcome the subject-object dualism from which, in their view, domination ultimately springs. The source of their objectification of the outside world, as well as their inability to transcend the reason which objectifies, is the development of the categories of reflection and self-reflection solely out of the relation between subject and object.

This is precisely the idealist position of which Adorno and Horkheimer are themselves critical. In his early discussions of authority, Horkheimer had shown how the thinking individual, the autonomous subject of bourgeois philosophy is actually socially powerless. The opposition of individual reason to authority, really signified his aloneness in the world, leaving him no alternative but to adapt himself. Horkheimer argued that the split between subject and object arose because the origins of the external world in human practical activity are obscured. By confronting a world in which the subject cannot recognize his own doing, that world then appears objective. It becomes an object of contemplation, a world in which the object is separated by a gap which can only be bridged by knowledge, not action. In this view, the premise for *individual* ego development, the existence of a boundary between subject and object which allows the external to become internal, is actually the *intersubjective* process of alienation.

The recognition of this intersubjective process is not maintained by Adorno and Horkheimer when they derive the opposition between the reasoning ego and internal nature from the nature of the id.[14] Their reversion to the ideal of individual consciousness, after having revealed its origins in the fetishism of the market, is founded in an inadequate theory of object relations, and a

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creteness, specifically the potential for liberation. The problem results from blurring the distinction between control, appropriation and transformation of nature—the distinction between individual and social appropriation is absent altogether. The maintenance of boundaries of the individual ego achievement is not placed in the historically specific context of private property. "Possession" is noticeably absent from their discussion.

13. The lack of intersubjective perspective in Critical Theory has also been pointed out by Paul Piccone, "From Tragedy to Farce: The Return of Critical Theory," *New German Critique*, 7 (Winter 1976), pp. 91-105. Habermas has consistently attempted to establish a concept of intersubjectivity, but his location of the category of self-reflection in Freud and his denial of it in the Marxian categories of cooperation and praxis are problematic.

14. *Dialectic of Enlightenment, op.cit.*, p. 183.

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concomitant acceptance of the objectified id. These assumptions, in turn, rest on their difficulty in accepting the conception of an intersubjective world.

III.

For critical theory, no matter how reason becomes a force of domination, or ego becomes an agency of authority, these remain the last embattled forces against mass society through which nature takes its revenge. Consequently, the instrumentalization of reason and the automation of the ego mean nothing short of the defeat of subjectivity itself. The process of objectification prevails in a dual sense: the world becomes increasingly reified and reason becomes increasingly incapable of reflecting upon the ends it serves, becoming subordinated to these objective processes.[15] The verdict of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, then, is that reason, which once embodied a tension between reflection and repression, has itself eliminated the contradiction in favor of the repressive side. The analysis of this paradox of reason in its various forms and evolution is the backdrop for comprehending the present dilemma, the end of internalization.

Internalization always implied a process of differentiation, of separating what is self from what is outside, and thus of conscious individuation. The separation of self from object—the subject-object dualism—is the precondition for reflection upon the object. More important, the self can now become an object of reflection.[16] This means that the subject can hold in check his tendency to objectify the world through reflection by reflecting upon his own tendency toward objectification. The solution to the problem of reason is more reason. That which has become part of the self through the process of internalization can still be criticized, externalized, even rejected. Having taken what is outside into its own domain, the subject is free to reconsider it as its "own." In this sense internalization is the basis of the ego's autonomy and self-consciousness.

The activity of the ego has always contained the element of dominating the object, however, and internalization always meant self-domination. In psychological terms, the ego's increasing domination of the subject's own internal nature brings forth a contradiction: internalization as reflexivity but also as the destruction of reasoning consciousness.[17] While the rational ego is brought forth by the drive for self-preservation, it is also the victim of it. Self-control, the principle of worldly asceticism, is in collusion with the social relations of domination which, although they encourage rationality, nonetheless subordinate it. As this control becomes objectified in the social relations themselves, even self-control becomes obsolete.

Since the development of capitalism has eliminated the necessity for individual decision-making or rational self-control, it dissolves the functions

15. *Ibid.* Horkheimer also explicates the theme of the depletion of the ego in a more cogent form in *Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1974).
16. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-194.

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of the ego it once cultivated: "There is no object left for the conscience because the responsibility of the individual for himself and his family is replaced by his contribution to the apparatus. Even if the old moral assumptions are retained, there is no longer an internal, instinctive, or motivational conflict to form a basis for the development of the tribunal of conscience. Instead of the internalization of the social command, which not only made it more binding and at the same time more open...and even turned it against society, there is an immediate and direct identification with stereotyped value scales."[18] Further, they maintain that it is no longer the responsibility of the ego "to hold the psychological drives within the limits of self-preservation," to control instinct. The "system of mass culture which takes over the last inward impulses of individuals" makes ego control unnecessary. "The committees and stars serve as the ego and super-ego," a form of instinctual control more inescapable than internalization, which embodied the capacity for reflection on the aims of control.[19] Thus, contemporary society witnesses the end of that intrapsychic conflict between ego and instinct which, in their view, made internalization a source of critical opposition.

The end of this conflict has meant the end of all possibility for opposition. Adorno wrote in 1954: "A brutal standardizing society arrests all differentiation, and to this end it exploits the primitive core of the unconscious. Both conspire to annihilate the mediating ego; the triumphant archaic impulses, the victory of id over ego, harmonize with the triumph of society over the individual."[20] This statement suggests that, in accordance with their assumptions about human nature, both ego and id are infinitely malleable. While Adorno attacks the analytic revisionists for tracing the nature of the unconscious to social influences,[21] he himself argues that the id can be wholly instrumentalized and manipulated by social forces. If not a blank slate, still this id is conveniently composed of only such energy as the bourgeois economy can absorb at any given time. Further, since the ego only differentiates from the id under external pressure and can be completely instrumentalized, it too has no power to resist. Thus, the impasse is complete: an infinitely manipulable id and an ego based upon individual self-interest deliver the subject passively into the grip of external social forces.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
20. T.W. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," *New Left Review*, 46-47, p. 95.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 75. Adorno's argument of reductionism seems far more aptly leveled at Parsons, who maintains that the id is the sediment of object relations, just as are the ego and super-ego. This is reductionist because it implies that human beings can be shaped at will, without protest, and hence denies the fundamental analytic insight that the repression of basic impulses cannot really succeed and leads to neurotic conflict. However, the revisionists do not hold that id content is created by social relations so much as affected by them. The real issue here is what really are the fundamental impulses, and whether they are correctly understood as sexual. Despite Adorno's assertion that the revisionists deny the importance of sexuality, he never integrates it into his theories about the ego.
Adorno's position is reiterated in Russell Jacoby, *Social Amnesia* (Boston, 1975).

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In the face of this impasse, Adorno chooses to be a partisan of the defeated ego, and maintains that the id is victorious.[22] He ultimately makes this commitment after numerous vacillations, because the ego represents consciousness—and consciousness, not instinct, is the real oppositional forces whose casualty we suffer. Conscious control represents the transcendence of mere repression, and is thus comparable to the capacity to reflect upon ends or values as the transcendence of instrumental reason. Conscious control of inner nature distinguished the critical ego from the undifferentiated automated ego which only represses.[23] The distinction between conscious self-control and repression is absolutely central to the Freudian analysis of the ego. It expresses the difference between repression of the instincts which result in unconscious guilt and aggression, and the rational acceptance of necessity.

In capitalism, according to critical theory, this distinction between repression and rational self-control becomes obsolete. The rational ego which it once fostered to meet the demands of self-preservation is now suppressed by it—or else it would question the necessity of self-control. The objective basis for rationality is lost as renunciation becomes objectively unnecessary; self-control is no longer necessary to keep the productive system going. In view of the development of the productive forces and the increased possibilities for satisfaction, the ego cannot rationally sacrifice in order to survive, preserve itself, perform competitively. Even the rationality of self-interest is eroded, leaving only the skeleton of calculation behind: "In an irrational society the ego cannot perform at all adequately the function allotted to it by that society. To be able to assert itself in reality, the ego has to understand reality and operate consciously. But to enable the individual to effect the often senseless renunciations imposed on him, the ego has to set up unconscious prohibitions and to remain largely confined to the unconscious...the rational ego...is unequal to its task. It has to become unconscious, part of the instinctual dynamic it is still, however, supposed to transcend. The ego's cognitive activity, performed in the interests of self-preservation, has to be constantly reversed in the interests of self-preservation."[24]

At this juncture Adorno attempts to relocate the problem of compliance from the repression of instinct, to the repression of the ego. He suggests that it is the ego itself that is in conflict, pulled both in the direction of conscious activity on the one hand, and the suppression of rational cognition by the social demands of survival on the other. Marcuse later developed this idea that the present epoch is distinguished by repression of the ego. "The defense consists chiefly in a strengthening of controls not so much over the instincts as over consciousness, which, if left free, might recognize the work of repression

22. Jürgen Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," *Telos*, 24 (Summer 1975), pp. 42-43. According to Habermas, "the critical theory of society still holds fast to the concept of the autonomous ego even when it makes the gloomy prediction that this ego loses its basis."
23. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," *op.cit.*, p. 87.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 88. See also Marcuse, *Five Lectures, op.cit.*

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in the bigger and better satisfaction of needs." [25] The instincts, however, are palliated and enlisted in compliance by a kind of pseudo-gratification which Marcuse termed "repressive desublimation." [26]

This is a highly significant attempt to formulate the social psychology of conformity in a society which has abolished scarcity for many of its members. What both Marcuse and Adorno seem to be driving at is the idea that repression of perception or cognition is as vital to domination as repression of desire. According to this view, the source of compliance is no longer repression *per se*, unless repression refers not to wishes but to perceptions. Indeed, they are ambiguous about whether cognition would not flourish by virtue of instinctual repression more than by satisfaction.

Adorno also developed the idea that the unconscious ego, the narcissistic impulses and defense mechanisms, is an important starting point for the analysis of contemporary culture. He suggests that the ego itself is in conflict, pulled both in the direction of consciousness and the suppression of awareness by the social demands of survival. The ego, as Freud's later theory developed, could be seen as *both* the repressing agency and the repressed content.[27] This contradiction, Adorno thinks, reflects the real situation of the ego. It develops a certain amount of rationality for the sake of self-preservation, but not enough to challenge the system. The ego represents psychologically the conflict between the two forms or rationality—instrumental and emancipatory—in its dual position as conscious and unconscious. However, in Adorno's view, both of these tendencies are responses to outside pressure, secondary formations. He therefore does not develop his analysis of the ego, or of the repression of perception and cognition, beyond the point of stating that social forces have eliminated the emancipatory tendency.

While Adorno remained less optimistic about the id than Marcuse, who attempted to find within it or within libido a potential for going beyond the pleasure principle, he did continue to carefully scrutinize the complicity of the ego in domination.[28] This is particularly important in his analysis of fascism which reveals some of the most troublesome aspects of critical theory's approach to the conflict between reason and nature. The issues of power and helplessness, of the intersubjective conditions of social control, and the unresolved question as to whether cognition must necessarily be based on

25. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (New York, 1962), p. 85.

26. Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964), pp. 56-84.

27. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," *op.cit.*, Part II, p. 87. Adorno writes: "Freud's immanent statements about the ego involuntarily contradict one another and disrupt the closed system he strives to establish," and "the ego, while encompassing the activities of consciousness, is itself conceived to be essentially unconscious."

28. Marcuse, on the other hand, sought at least a vision of human striving toward liberation which could not be expunged. He argued that the prevailing reality principle which takes the form of the performance principle (demanding instrumental achievement) could be superceded by a truly sociable, spontaneous orientation to reality. The ego could thus become sociable rather than instrumental. Marcuse was able to formulate a utopian vision in which reason and nature are reconciled. But he was not able to find within our present society a force for critical consciousness because he continued to uphold the notion of the ego as secondary.

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instinctual repression or repressed along with instinct, are all raised but not truly clarified. Adorno is unable to distinguish between conscience and consciousness, super-ego and ego, social control and self-control.[29]

Adorno argues that fascism, like mass culture in advanced capitalism, results from a failure of internalization: individuals remain at the stage in which fear of external authority is the primary motivation. In fascism, the archaic id impulses are exploited by the leaders, "the appropriation of mass psychology by the oppressors." He maintains that the super-ego or conscience declines, allowing for greater impulsivity. These id impulses have the tendency to repersonalize and idealize the authority figures which have lost the aura such figures had in the past. The progressive depersonalization of authority, in fact the rationalization of all social relations, are compensated for by mass irrationality. The fascist leader supplies the missing object for these unsatisfied desires for authority.[30] Here the theme of the "revolt of nature" as Horkheimer termed the betrayal by innate destructive drives, is paramount.

On the other hand, Adorno suggests that fascist behavior does not simply express instinctually rooted aggression, but is motivated by narcissism.

For Adorno, narcissism is a weakness of the ego, a diminution of its conscious cognitive side which replaces internalization as the cause of compliance. In "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda," Adorno elucidates the exploitation of narcissistic identification and narcissistic injury in fascist movements. He argues that narcissistic afflictions of the ego are more characteristic in the present period which "for socio-economic reasons witnesses the decline of the individual and his subsequent weaknesses."[31] Similarly, he asserted in "Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda" that the "ego plays much too large a role in fascist irrationality to admit of an interpretation of the supposed ecstasy as a mere manifestation of the unconscious."[32] Presumably what he means is that fascist behavior does

29. See Herbert Marcuse, "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," *Five Lectures, op.cit.*, p. 50. "But the regression of the ego shows forth...above all in the weakening of the 'critical' mental faculties: consciousness and conscience. They are interrelated: no conscience without developed knowledge...of good and evil." Typically, Marcuse confuses moral judgment and awareness of domination, which can be compltely obfuscated by moral categories.

30. T.W. Adorno, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda," *Gesammelte Werke, Soziologische Schriften I* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 416. The "repersonalization thesis" is extremely important in light of critical theory's argument that depersonalization has robbed individuals of the opportunity to develop an ego. Essentially, the thesis expresses the idea that people now develop a 'false ego' and that once the ego was real because it had, within a circumscribed area, a real opportunity to exercise judgment. However, here the very weakness of the entire discussion of fascism becomes evident: was the depersonalization process really so far advanced in Germany, or is Adorno really referring to American society, especially to the culture industry, and simply collapsing the two social formations? Cf. Piccone, "From Tragedy to Farce," *op.cit.*

31. T.W. Adorno, "Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda," *Gesammelte Werke, Soziologische Schriften I* (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 411. Originally published in 1951.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 400.

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not simply express aggression which is instinctually rooted in the id, but is motivated by an affliction of or conflict within the ego. This, he says, fits in with the fact that the participation in fascist movements has a "phony" quality, that people "perform" it rather than feel or believe it.[33]

The narcissistic impulse to satisfy the ego's own ideal is thus the basis for identification with fascist leaders. Narcissistic individuals have highly rational ego ideals and demand of themselves a high degree of self-control, which in fact they cannot fulfill, resulting in an injury to their sense of self-control. The leader's control corresponds precisely to the demand the followers cannot meet in themselves.[34] Rational demands, or the demand for rationality become the basis for compliance.[35] What the fascist participant seeks is the illusion of control in order to redress his sense of powerlessness.

Underlying these somewhat conflicting interpretations of fascism is a common judgment—the desire for power or authority which is expressed in fascism as *primary formations*, rather than the *secondary expressions* of needs which have become alienated and distorted through social interaction. There is a further reason for Adorno's suggestion of two contradictory explanations of mass psychology—either the end of internalization, or the reaction of a weak ego to a strong ego ideal.[36] He tends to use the concept of internalization confusingly to signify two different but related phenomena, the development of the ego and the super-ego.[37] The identification with parental *authority* as super-ego is collapsed into the identification with parental *competence* or the reality of childhood *autonomy* as ego formation. In fact, the claims of the ego and super-ego are more likely to be opposed to one another.

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33. Adorno, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda," *op.cit.*, p. 432.

34. *Ibid.* See also Anson Rabinbach, "Marxistische Faschismustheorien: Ein Ueberblick," *Aesthetik und Kommunikation*, 26 (December, 1976), p. 10. "The stress on leadership as the basic relationship which consolidates fascism is an oversimplified approach both to the problems of culture and of authority, whether, as in Reich's case...the emphasis is put on a rigid and mechanical theory of instinctual repression...or in Adorno's on a relatively simple idea of the relation between psychic regression asnd manipulatory technique." The other difficulty is Adorno's tendency either to separate psychoanalysis and sociology or to deny the explanatory power of psychoanalysis altogether. Either he asserts that "psychological processes...have ceased to appear as the determining forces of the social process" or he argues that "fascism is not a psychological issue," and any attempt to understand it as such is ideological. Actually, a dual approach is necessary, which analyzes the origins of the objective crisis to which individuals responded psychologically, the emergence of fascism as a response to definite historical conditions. Feelings of terror and abandonment in response to social crises must still be grasped as psychological, and the way in which fascism organized these emotions is a crucial part of its politics. But feelings of terror are conspicuously absent from the discussion of fascism in Adorno's writings.

35. Adorno, "Freudian Theory...," *op.cit.*, pp. 417-418.

36. The way in which the two explanations may be unravelled is suggested by the efforts to distinguish the historical formations.

37. Fromm had already pointed out the difficulty of distinguishing super-ego and ego in *Authority and the Family, op.cit.* The difficulty of distinguishing conscience and consciousness, super-ego and ego is apparent in Horkheimer's arguments in favor of a strong father. The difficulty stems largely from the patrocentric viewpoint, which ignores the power of the mother.

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If the current pattern of socialization fails to produce a super-ego ("autonomous conscience") and thus permits the "desublimation" of violent, archaic id impulses in fascist movements, then it might be valid to say that manipulation has replaced internalization. But the absence of a conscious ego, which Adorno calls narcissism, is hardly identical with the lack of super-ego or ego ideal—in fact, the opposite is more likely. A strong super-ego accompanies and encourages a weak ego. The reason Adorno equates lack of internalization (weak super-ego) with narcissistic identification (weak ego) may be found in an important category underlying his analysis: differentiation. While incorporative identification is opposed to differentiation, eliminating boundaries and differences, the internalization of authority as we have seen is a process of individuation. It both presupposes and establishes boundaries and difference.

The problem is that Adorno sees the principle of self-control and responsibility which underly individuation in this society as constituting real autonomy. He therefore persists in seeing internalization as a vehicle for consciousness rather than the unconscious acceptance of authority. More important, he does not see that the loss of internalized conscience is not the same as the lack of conscious rational control over the environment which an autonomous ego could exert. Finally, Adorno does not discriminate between individuation which is imposed from without and that which develops spontaneously, between living up to the standards of a powerful parent and independence which comes from parental recognition of self-activity. There is no basis for distinction between the performance principle and another reality principle, between obedience and spontaneity.

IV.

Many of the antinomies and assumptions of critical theory's appropriation of Freud are accounted for in the object relations perspective of psychoanalysis. Object relations theory sees the early process of ego identification as a basis for what is called super-ego. The ego was once whole—what is called id are the parts which are split off in early infancy. Ego development is a process of further splitting, in which successively threatening parts of the object are internalized in an effort to control them. At each point the part of the ego which relates to that object undergoes repression. But internalization as defense has a major drawback—one now has the threat inside oneself. Therefore, it becomes necessary to defend against the internal bad objects by internalizing the good as well. This internalized good object is the moral defense, or super-ego. Thus the formation of the super-ego is predicated upon early and drastic splitting of the ego in the course of pre-Oedipal object relations. The good ego, often conscious, is that part which relates to the internalized good object and desires to remain in its good graces. It is the well-behaved child who conforms to the performance

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principle, the parental demand for achievement and conformity.[38] Its real purpose, however, is to deny the reality of the bad object which is connected with early terror and helplessness.

Because the moral defense represents a denial of the real terror, not of the super-ego but of the early bad object, the motivation for compliance to authority, for conformity to reality, has a cognitive as well as an affective aspect. Goal rationality and reasonableness, the virtues of the well-socialized bourgeois child, are based upon an underlying irrationality: the perception of parental violence and childish helplessness must be repressed, even at the cost of blaming oneself for disobedience. "It is better to be a sinner in a world ruled by God than a saint in a world ruled by the devil."[39] In contrasting internalization as a force of differentiation with early incorporative identification, Adorno is actually making a case for the moral defense, imagining that the "good ego" would be anti-fascist. He is then logically forced to affirm the performance principle and instrumental rationality as well, vitiating his concept of autonomy. Thus he returns to the ideal of self-control, denying the terror of having once been subjected to the control of others. In so doing, he fails to see how the reversal of consciousness, the desire not to know, is motivated by early experience of helplessness and terror.

Adorno does come very close to accepting Fromm's analysis of the phenomena of powerlessness,[40] but he tries to assert that real experience is an inadequate basis for psychological understanding: "But experiences of *real* helplessness are anything but *irrational*—and they are actually *hardly psychological.* On their own they might be expected to prompt resistance... What people *know* about their helplessness in society belongs to their ego—understood not merely as the fully conscious faculty of judgment but as the whole web of its social relations. But as soon as the experience is turned into the 'feeling of helplessness' the specifically psychological element has entered in, the fact that individuals precisely, cannot experience or confront their helplessness... They have to convert the experience of helplessness into a

38. The crucial difference between obedience to the performance principle and self-activity is that the former is a response to approval, the latter to recognition. The "good" and the "bad" mother or father are equally coercive, hooking the child on either approval or the fear of negative judgment. Both inspire an instrumental relation to activity where it is turned into a means of gaining security. Internalization of judgment or approval must therefore be distinguished from ego development based on recognition—which cannot be internalized. For recognition is mutual and requires neither defense nor helpless assertions of independence. Yet, it has the quality of "being with" rather than "standing outside."

39. W.R.D Fairbairn, *An Object Relations Theory of Personality, op.cit.,* pp. 60-70. The whole import of self-blame is that it serves to cover up and deny that which is frightening. The covering up of helplessness in the face of domination is as crucial as the mystification of domination itself.

40. In 1937, Fromm published an article in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (Vol. 6, 1937) entited "On the Feeling of Powerlessness" ("Das Gefühl der Ohnmacht"). In it, he examined the way in which adults who were unable to act upon their knowledge or who were unable to believe that they could have an effect upon anyone had been made to feel utterly ineffectual as children. Perhaps in only the subtlest and most culturally "normal" ways their communications, wishes, and desires to decide for themselves had not been taken seriously.

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'feeling'...in order not to think beyond it. It is the age-old pattern of the *internalization* of social sanctions...the ego has hardly any other choice than either to *change reality* or *withdraw back into the id.*"[41] In this statement, Adorno has inadvertently defined how internalization really works, how a relation of domination is perpetuated by making something real outside into a feeling which no longer has validity as knowledge. By prefacing this passage with a critique of the analytic revisionists for ignoring the import of early experience, he obscures his affinity with their contention that real experience is the basis of psychology, that is, of what becomes endopsychic reality.

The relation Adorno draws between knowledge and feelings is particularly important. On the one hand, knowledge derives from the conscious rational faculty—but it is not only that. A "whole network of social relations" is a component of knowledge, equally important though not conscious. But knowledge turns into a feeling because it is impossible to maintain cognition as an individual who is unable to act. Implicitly Adorno recognizes that the experience of helplessness is one which can only be *known* when it is confronted by its opposite—the experience of power or mastery, of an alternative of way out. At other times, critical theory had argued that this alternative could be preserved in consciousness despite the impossibility of realizing it. But here Adorno himself reminds us that consciousness can only preserve that which has reality in experience or is objectified in practice.

There is another sense in which individuals are helpless—they require the validation and recognition of others in order to experience the truth of their own perceptions. The feeling into which the helpless person retreats is a response to an accurate perception which has no chance of being externalized in action.[42] Thus rationality and consciousness, dependent upon inter-subjective relations, cannot oppose powerlessness on an individual level. Even knowledge cannot be identified with the individual thinking subject, but rather with the collective acting subject.

Furthermore, the inability or impermissibility of knowing has inevitable consequences for feeling. Adorno points out how the repression of knowledge creates a particular feeling, rather than attributing distortion of consciousenss to the unconscious wish. Unwittingly this formulation revises Freud. For Freud, guilt persists and the individual blames himself because the unconscious desire for the forbidden persists.[43] But the real source of guilt

41. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," Part II, *op.cit.*, pp. 86-89. Italics added.

42. There is, however, no necessary antagonism between feeling and action—an assumption for which E. Schachtel has aptly criticized Freud. Cf. *Metamorphosis* (New York, 1959). Rather, he points out, certain affects are connected to an active, creative attitude toward the social world. Furthermore, the *expression* of feeling, communication, is one of the most important ways we act and interact or affect others. Consensually validated communication is a precondition for collective praxis.

43. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents, op.cit.*, pp. 74-76. Freud also states that the child is "obliged to renounce the satisfaction of the revengeful aggressiveness" against the authority as if this were a matter of instinctual renunciation. More likely, it is a matter of sanity or madness when one's perception of reality is made impossible by a threat of punishment. Therapeutic

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and self-blame is the persistent awareness of being treated unjustly, the denial of the authority's rectitude and right. "I am not to blame," is the feeling for which the victim continues to be punished, the feeling that turns powerlessness into an internal struggle.

Thus the acquiescence in the feeling of helplessness, the motivation for emotional submission to authority, is connected to the *repression of what is actually known,* a repression based on fear. Awareness of one's lack of power, of one's complicity in identifying with the powerful to whom one submits, and the knowledge that one's individuality and integrity are a fiction—this is the repressed which threatens to return. This threat to the forces of domination, the liberation of the perception of injustice, is never wholly annihilated. It can be called forth by any opportunity, however momentary, that suggests the possibility of acting to overcome powerlessness. Adorno does not venture so far in his argument as to recognize this possibility explicitly, but it is not inconsistent with his analysis.

Here, Adorno does bring together the two elements of the authority relation which diverge in his earlier analysis of fascism: the cognitive and the affective. In his two explanations of fascism, he had separated the cognitive and affective aspects along lines similar to Freud's structural topography of the psyche. Cognitive consciousness was seen as the restraining element, while the unconscious ego or the id provided the emotional basis for authoritarianism. But in this discussion, Adorno shows how within consciousness itself, self-control leads to authoritarian behavior. The restraint of feeling and action in the situation of helplessness subvert consciousness, undo knowledge. The individualism and self-control which are seen as the way in which ego differentiates from id are the very base of repressing awareness. The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* theme finds its most convincing presentation in Adorno's analysis of powerlessness as a psychological phenomena.

Nonetheless, Adorno finally does reject the conclusion that the withdrawal of the ego into the unconscious is an outgrowth of real experiences of powerlessness. As a result, the question of the source of irrationality, or even the criteria of it, is never satisfactorily resolved. He might have questioned, as Fromm did, the idea that the inevitable path of ego development is the internalization of the father figure as the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Destructive and regressive impulses which Adorno sees as the result of poor self-control, the lack of restraining authority to channel inner nature, may actually be the attempt to reassert control. They result from a social authority which induces helplessness and uncontrollable subordination. Again, what he identified as a regressive form of identification, resulting from a failure to resolve Oedipal conflict, could be understood as precisely those feelings which develop in the face of real helplessness. Conversely, the absence of authority and power, rather than identification with a powerful father, would form the

practice shows that anger is connected to the lack of validation for one's perception, while the desire to express anger is the desire for recognition, of which "revenge" is an alienated form.

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basis for autonomous ego development. Rather than assuming innate regressive tendencies which must be counteracted by outside pressure, we could imagine that some form of development toward sociability would occur in the presence of other subjects who do not exercise coercion. In this case, the deterioration of paternal authority as the foce of cohesion in the family might be viewed with greater optimism than was the case for critical theory.[44]

The presupposition for such a viewpoint, however, is the abandonment of precisely that aspect of Freud's theory to which the critical theorists cling most tenaciously. The supposition that the id serves the pleasure principle, seeking homeostasis, and that therefore the ego only emerges from it because of external pressure, posits a deep-rooted tendency to regression. Despite Adorno's suspicion that the timelessness and imperviousness to society which characterize the id are only an appearance, despite his own tendency to see the ego as withdrawing into and interacting with the id, he finally posits the id as *innately* aggressive and regressive.

For Adorno, the id becomes at times the demonic force of nature which takes its revenge. The id is opposed to "the large sensitivity to difference which is the hallmark of the truly humane."[45] This characterization of the unconscious, coupled with the insistence that the ego emerges as a response to the struggle for self-preservation, has two important consequences. The social individual is rooted in the biological individual—that is, the social form of individuality which emerges through a complicated intersubjective process is seen as a natural and universal form of ego development.[46] Individuation only occurs because "civilization" forces the individual out of attachment to primitive, symbiotic unity. In the same way that the father forces the child's separation from the mother, society first enforces or gives individuation. Critical theory is consistent in maintaining that the individual is not naturally social, and conversely, that real individuality (autonomous ego development) is only social, an artificial product. The rift between nature and society is absolute; some form of domination, a relationship of instrumentality, is therefore unavoidable. The impossibility of escaping instinctual repression and renunciation also follow from these assumptions about human nature; society is inevitably founded on the domination of internal nature. Hence critical theory does not escape Freud's impasse in which socialization leads to its own destruction.[47]

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44. Christopher Lasch, "The Weak Modern Family," *New York Review of Books*, November 27, 1975. The basic flaw in Lasch's argument is his failure to recognize that the mother who is no longer dominated provides the first opportunity in history for the freedom of *daughters*. Although he comes close, Marcuse also misses the fact that if, in the metaphor of revolt, the sons continually reinstitute the father's authority (Freud's primal horde theory), it is because they never alter the domination-possession-exclusion of women.

45. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," Part II, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

46. See Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, *Aspects of Sociology* (Boston, 1972), originally *Soziologische Exkurse* (Frankfurt, 1954).

47. This is the basic theme of *Civilization and Its Discontents:* the more socialization, the more instincts are suppressed, the more aggression builds, the more guilt, and therefore the more

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But Adorno finds this impasse, like so many others, a necessary and fruitful one. In an essay on "The Revised Psychoanalysis," he argues, "the greatness of Freud consists, like all radical bourgeois thinkers, in letting such contradictions remain unresolved and disdaining to pretend a systematic harmony when the subject itself is torn."[48] The contradiction which is constitutive of psychoanalysis is that "on the one hand the libido is considered the actual psychic reality; gratification is positive, renunciation negative, because it leads to illness. On the other hand it accepts civilization, which compels renunciation, if not uncritically then at least resignedly."[49] This resignation infuses the heart of critical theory itself. Only a position of pessimism about human nature, with its concomitant resignation to the necessity of authortiy, allows a position from which authority can be criticized. Any position of optimism can be co-opted as apology for the repressive social order.[50] The less pessimistic suppositions about human nature upon which the neo-Freudians based their theory actually lead them, Adorno writes, to a false optimism about society.

The pessimistic thinker, who may even be "cold" and "misanthropic" as Freud was accused of being, is the only one able to retain a "negative" perspective. He can grasp reality uncompromisingly in order not to be stupefied by it.[51] The parallel between these assertions and Adorno's theory of socialization should be obvious: only the hard, judging father can make the child fit for struggle in the world, teach the child to abandon the illusory hope of an easy life. But Adorno's own authoritarianism studies show that harsh fathers do not produce critical children; rather their judgment is internalized and their authority accepted.

Adorno does not differentiate between judgment and love, or when he does, he defends the former. He thus defends Freud's analytic coldness against the analysts who argue that one should love the patient. He also cites Freud's statement that "A love that does not discriminate seems to me to forfeit a part of its own value, by doing an injustice to its object. . . not all men are worthy of love." When he states that it "makes a mockery of everything analysis stood for" to "demand that one should love a repulsively aggressive child,"[52] he seems to imply that love and compassion are blind, that only the

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renunciation. Thus, the conquest of nature, freeing humanity of so many dangers, has actually decreased the prospects for happiness.

48. T.W. Adorno, "Die revidierte Psychoanalyse," *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 8 (Frankfurt, 1972), p. 40. Originally published in 1952.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

50. *Ibid.* "If one asked the revisionists what they fundamentally held against their teacher, they would probably say, he lacks love. . . no advanced thinker or artist escapes this accusation. Because he is bitterly in earnest about utopia and its realization, he is no utopian." This position expresses the idea that Adorno was to later make central in his aesthetics and cultural theory: the further the artist is alienated from her or his real audience, the more she or he is expressing the radical truth of society. This idea informs his notion of politics as well. This position has been recently reformulated in Jacoby's defense of Freud, *Social Amnesia, op.cit.*

51. Adorno, "Die revidierte Psychanalyse," *op. cit.*

52. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," Part II, *op.cit.*, pp. 94-95.

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cold intellect can grasp the truth. Love can certainly be understood as recognition of another's need, sharing of another's pain, rather than recognition of their value, or worth. Such a recognition of need and suffering in another helpless being need not blind to the severity of the problem or the societal contradictions which have brought it forth. Rather it can grasp the subjective experience of powerlessness from the inside as well as the effect of human action upon the helpless subject as an objective social phenomena. Furthermore, love as recognition means the awareness that manifest aggression is itself the expression of alienated need. Adorno's denial of the efficacy of compassion in the therapeutic relationship goes hand in hand with his denial of psychoanalytic theory's ability to grasp social relations. The possibility of overcoming the split between feeling and cognition, of combining compassion and criticism, did not occur to Adorno.

The separation of love and reason, feeling and cognition, implicit in Adorno's thinking, corresponds to aspects of Freud's metapsychology. While love, for Freud, is essentially the abrogation of boundaries between persons, the ego is the great maintainer of boundaries. The ego, which alone is capable of recognizing difference, must emerge out of enforced individuation and denial. It grows through the experience of seeking pleasure, reducing tension, avoiding pain. Later differentiation also progresses through mastery, the discrimination of the controllable and uncontrollable aspects of the environment. The ego's motives are possession, control and security. Love places one's destiny in the hands of another, threatening security and control.[53] Thus the ego, and reason, grow in opposition to love. But the id, with its limited quantity of energy and its striving to reduce tension, provides Freud with an equally powerful argument against the possibility of universal love. Instrumental reason is therefore the necessary glue of society, self-interest the only available social principle.

Indeed, Freud always maintained that the reality principle is only a modification of the pleasure principle. In his late metapsychology he eliminated the contradiction between self-preservative drives and libido. He thus recognized that the two principles are not really opposed. Critical theory's notion of harmony between ego and id, or repressive desublimation, is already implicit in Freud's theory. Both the ego and the id, the reality principle and the pleasure principle, correspond to the historical reality of possessive individualism. What is lacking is a principle to oppose the performance principle, a principle based on the need for the other. In Freud's theory there is no opposition to the performance principle, no innate striving for intersubjective development that transcends usefulness to the monadic self. The requirement is always instrumental, gratification always expressed as particular, e.g., the baby needs the milk or breast, but not the mother as a whole.[54] Thus there is no basis for differentiating the helplessness of natural

53. *Civilization and Its Discontents, op.cit.* Cf. also "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," *op.cit.*

54. Cf. J. Bowlby, "The Child's Tie to its Mother," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis,*

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infantile dependency from that helplessness which comes from lack of social recognition. The pessimism of Freud's position proceeds from such lack of differentiation between natural and social relations. Contrary to Adorno's contention, it obfuscates social causation and places the blame squarely on nature.

The analytic power of the pessimistic position is therefore questionable. Adorno argues against the revisionists because they give up the idea of castration. Indeed, castration may be a more adequate metaphor for the violence underlying fascism than the formulation of the inferiority complex. But neither explains the historical development of fascism nor the specific object relations which create such violence. As Adorno himself noted, "the relations between humans develop...(not) out of their instincts, but from social and economic laws."[55] A theory of internalization is necessary which explains how the ego is formed through social interaction such that human beings come to comply with these laws rather than attempt to change them. Such a theory must recognize that internalization is a defense against unbearable reality, not a natural mode of constituting consciousness, necessitated by the opposition of the instincts. The idea of instincts has a role to play in the sense that the "libido is the actual reality," if we understand the libido as essentially object-seeking. Denial of this striving leads not only to illness but to compliance with authority, acceptance of helplessness. The way in which the striving for recognition is denied must be understood in the context of societal interaction rather than conceived as an eternal form of the ego. Adorno shies away from this conclusion—even though he often approaches it—because for him what is so powerful could never be simply social behavior. It does not do justice to the severity of fascist genocide, he argues, to comprehend it as "purely social behavior" rather than the expression of sexual drives. What Adorno misses about sexuality is that people's deepest needs can be distorted and turned against them, not that the needs or drives themselves are hostile.[56] That sexual drives take on the peculiar distorted form they displayed in fascism precisely because of a social process of alienation does not seem possible. The implication of this thinking is that human beings cannot, in one lifetime, produce such behavior or impulses in one another. It denies the basic insight of analytic psychology, that individuals are not monads, but rather that human interaction has a lasting effect. It denies the power of society, of objectified forms of interaction, to reproduce a split at the core of human being—between mind and body.

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39 (1958), pp. 350-368, for a discussion of the lack of a category of an innate drive for the object in Freud and Bowlby's own data confirming its existence.

55. "Die revidierte Psychanalyse," *op.cit.*, p. 32.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33. The problem of emphasizing sexuality as motivation or innate drive is the confusion of form and content. Sexuality, like language, may be the most highly expressive form of a content which, nonetheless, can be understood as intersubjectively—i.e., socially—rooted.

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Instead, behavior must derive from some "piece of unconquerable nature," an immutable core within the individual. Thus Adorno, like Freud, can stress the absence of an ego which practices rational self-control as the cause of destructive behavior. The complicity of the ego need not be faced. For to place the blame on the rational, controlling ego is to violate individual integrity in its most essential core and its last stronghold—the reasoning mind. As Freud himself showed, the rational mind cannot rule without exacting a terrible toll. Perhaps it is this narcissistic injury to theory which Adorno hopes to avoid, but which becomes inescapable in the absence of collective practice. The overriding fact of individual helplessness in our society cannot be overcome by theory alone.

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ELECTRONIC MUSIC*

by Wes Blomster

Electronic music, in the sense of composition employing sounds synthetically produced through generators, evoked enthusiastic interest during its period of early maturity in the 1950s. Activity in electronic composition in the 1960s seemed somewhat pale by comparison and toward the end of the decade, a public characterized by pronounced social commitment was unable to overlook the isolation of this music from the centers of greatest concern with contemporary issues. The 1970s have been marked by a new breakthrough of electronic composition within modern music. Although much has been written on music and technology during these decades, the major perspective of investigation has been directed toward the opportunities offered the composer by advanced technology; only since 1970 has an interest developed in the sociological implications of electronics in music.

It is both astonishing and significant that the three writers on sociological aspects of electronic music upon whom I draw in this essay all find the point of departure for their work in Walter Benjamin's study, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," published originally in the fifth volume of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in 1936.[1] Wolfgang Martin Stroh states that his work—the only book-length study in the field to date—is to be viewed as a further development of Benjamin's program opposing the aestheticization of political life, expressed in the Epilogue to the essay.[2] When Benjamin formulated his thoughts on mechanical reproduction, the only phenomenon of musical life which offered itself for his consideration was the grammophone record—at that time yet enjoying sophisticated adolescence a decade and a half removed from the introduction of the long-playing disc. Benjamin says very little about music in his treatise; its primary importance to present-day writers in the field of sociology of music, however, underscores the universality of that mind which met its fate on the Franco-Spanish border in 1940. For Benjamin designed a framework for the sociological study of electronic music at a time in which the possibility of such practices was at best the nocturnal vision of far-sighted engineers—or perhaps of the Franco-American composer, Edgard Varèse (1883-1965).

*Only after completing this study did I discover Konrad Böhmer's severe indictment, "Karlheinz Stockhausen oder: Der Imperialismus als höchstes Stadium des kapitalistischen Avant-gardismus," *Musik und Gesellschaft* (East Berlin), 22:3 (1972), pp. 137-150. Although many will find Böhmer's views extreme, he has carefully and thoroughly developed a perspective on Stockhausen which must be considered.

1. For this study the translation of Benjamin's essay by Harry Zohn has been used. It is published in Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. with an Introduction by Hannah Arendt (New York, 1969), pp. 217-251.

2. *Zur Soziologie der elektronischen Musik* (Zurich, 1975), p. 162.

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Theodor Adorno, on the other hand, lived well into the age of electronic composition. Occasional remarks on the subject—disparaging, for the most part—are found in his later writings and there were public discussions between him and Karlheinz Stockhausen, German *Wunderkind* of the early years of the movement. On a whole, however, electronic music was alien to Adorno, a factor—along with his negative attitude toward all forms of popular music and his general distaste for the music of socialist realism in the Eastern bloc—which led the New Left of the late 1960s to reject him as a bourgeois reactionary. "Music and Technique" (1958) is Adorno's only publication that offers itself for consideration within socio-musicological investigation of electronic music.

Walter Benjamin presents the concept of authenticity as follows: "Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be... The presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity... The whole sphere of authenticity is outside technical—and, of course, not only technical—reproducibility.... The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced." It is at this early juncture, however, that difficulties develop in the application of Benjamin's theses to music. His essay is concerned almost exclusively with visual art, marked by developments from the woodcut, engraving and etching down to lithography and photography in the 19th century and the motion picture in the 20th. In each of these practices, a tangible, material work of art provides concrete orientation for discussion. But in music, does authenticity lie in the composition itself or is it rather present in the realization of the score in performance? The essential differences in creative media should be of particular concern to us at a time when great emphasis is placed upon interdisciplinary efforts; serious shortcomings lie in the often superficial parallels established between the verbal and visual arts and music. Perhaps one great need of our day is for a modern Lessing who, in a new *Laokoön*, will define the boundaries of creative expression.

A point of departure in responding to my question can be found through a comparative glance at a painting. Regardless of the medium used by the painter, there is and ever can be only one original possessed of authenticity. Every reproduction, from the one executed with painful effort by an artist working before the original with the means of the master himself to the most sophisticated product of modern color printing, will lack the authenticity of which Benjamin speaks. Turn then to the work of literature. Extreme as the view might seem, I should venture the thesis that even a badly-tattered paperback edition of Lowe-Porter's often woefully inadequate translation of Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain* retains the essentials of that authenticity

3. *Illuminations, op.cit.*, pp. 220-221.

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with which the author and time have vested the original manuscript. An opposing view would insist that literature since the invention of printing is dependent upon mechanical reproduction and, consequently, manifests the same waning of authenticity witnessed in lithography or photography.

But music? Traditionally, music depends upon performance for realization; the original creation of the composer must be re-created—indeed re-produced—each time it is experienced by listeners. Without such reproduction there is no reception of music. Hardly anyone would dispute this view. Yet, behind Adorno's "Music and Technique" lies a conception which calls this process into question. Adorno envisions a course of development not immediately obvious to the uninitiated. Perhaps his thought can be summarized best by a passage from Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus* (1947), a novel to which Adorno greatly contributed. The composer-hero has just outlined to the narrator his scheme for strictly-ordered composition in the manner of Schoenberg's method of composition with twelve tones; the narrator questions whether it will be possible to "hear" all this. The hero refers back to an early lecture given by his teacher on "Music and the Eye": "We say of course that music 'addresses itself to the ear'; but it does so only in a qualified way, only in so far, namely, as the hearing, like the other senses, is the deputy, the instrument, and the receiver of the mind. Perhaps...it was music's deepest wish not to be heard at all, nor even seen, nor yet felt; but only—if that were possible—in some Beyond, the other side of sense and sentiment, to be perceived and contemplated as pure mind, pure spirit. But bound as she was to the world of sense, music must ever strive after the strongest, yes, the most seductive sensuous realization..."[4] Adorno, in the essay at hand, refers to Bach, "in whose case a certain arbitrariness regarding instrumental realization in relationship to the score of a composition prevails."[5] Adorno has in mind, in most concrete terms, the monumental late works, *The Musical Offering* and *The Art of the Fugue*, in which the autograph offers no suggestion regarding the instrumentation for performance. This has led some to feel that Bach had no desire that these works

4. *Doctor Faustus*, trans. H.T. Lowe-Porter (New York, 1965), p. 61. Mann consulted frequently with Adorno during the writing of this novel, at which time both men resided in the Los Angeles area. Mann had the manuscript of Adorno's *Philosophy of New Music* at his disposal at this time. Adorno's total impact upon the novel is yet to be defined. I once wrote Adorno with various questions about the novel; he replied that what he had to say about his role in its composition would be said in his memoirs after his death. At that time, he "had no desire to get into the position of a general who, in a film about the war, played himself." Letter of March 9, 1959.

5. All statements by Adorno not otherwise identified in this study are from "Music and Technique," published in this issue of *Telos*. For the sake of the non-musician, it should be pointed out at this early juncture that the electronic composer normally does not produce a score of his work. The great exception here is Stockhausen; the first published score of electronic music was his *Elektronische Studie II*, which appeared two years after the first realization of the piece in 1954. He now publishes scores with some regularity; these will enable a later generation to re-realize totally one of his works. Obviously, an entirely new notation was necessary and the innocent eye would never realize that it is looking upon music. Other composers offer at most a spectrogram made upon completion of the composition which is of value for study and analysis.

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should be performed. Less marked evidence for Adórno's theory—but along the same line—is found in movements for which Bach provided no tempo designation; the perplexed performer must decide for something in the wide range between *allegro* and *adagio*. In the *Well-Tempered Clavier* Bach gave no indication of dynamics. (In modern editions, such information has been supplied by editors.) This further explains that one work by Bach can be performed with equal validity by a violin or a wind instrument. It would thus be possible to assert that the autograph itself *is* the absolute realization of the work and consequently the instance of authenticity—every performance would be but a footnote of indifferent irrelevance. This autograph incarnates the "pure mind, pure spirit" of which Mann's hero speaks. I wish to underscore this possibility, for it will be seen that electronic composition offers the modern achievement of a similar authenticity; indeed, it might make possible the transcendence of the dichotomy of pure spirit and sensual realization defined by Mann.

The antithesis to the Bach manuscript Adorno finds in the music of the later 19th century: "Performance, the vehicle of realization, took primacy over that which it actually was intended to serve: over the composition itself." He speaks of the age of Berlioz, Liszt and Wagner and of the sovereign individual whose personality came to dominate musical life, a life in which "pure spirit" decreased markedly in value. However, this must not be viewed solely in negative terms: this is the epoch in which the whole concept of interpretation came into being; it was the period which produced the present-day concept of the conductor, the first example of whom is commonly seen in Gustav Mahler. (Beethoven as conductor, it is recalled, sat in the midst of his orchestra as little more than a living metronome.) In the hands of these modern composer-performers, however, the score was transformed into nothing more than a guide to performance and without realization through performance it is of little interest. This development marks for Adorno, however, the disintegration of the work of art; the composition is no longer that masterpiece of organization, the structure of which stands in direct and positive relationship to the social order of the day. To speak here of authenticity is difficult, perhaps impossible.

Adorno locates the development that marks the reversal of this trend in the work of Arnold Schoenberg, in his abandonment of tonality and his perfection of the method of serial composition with twelve-tones. In the strict organization of the Schoenberg composition lies rigid control over performance; the score in its self-contained determination of order again approaches the absolute once beheld in the manuscripts of Bach. The Schoenberg autograph, consequently, is again the abode of authenticity; furthermore, because of the factor of control over performance present in the score, every performance of the music might also offer authenticity.[6]

6. Stroh underscores that in Cologne, the center of early electronic music in Germany through the presence in the studio there of Herbert Eimert and Karlheinz Stockhausen, only serial composition was looked upon as electronic music in the true sense: "In Cologne the effort

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The link between Schoenberg and his New Viennese School and the electronic composers of the period following 1950 is defined by Stroh when he characterizes avant-garde music of the first half of the 20th century in terms of "a consequent increase in control exercised by the technique of composition over musical material"[7]—material which, through excesses of sensuality and emotionality and emphasis upon effect, had gotten badly out of hand in late Romanticism. Adorno also sees Schoenberg's great service in the reintroduction of order into chaos through the control of material established in serial composition; this was at the same time an emancipatory act by which it becomes possible for music to transcend the dead-ended course of development in which it found itself in the final hours of the 19th century.

By mid-century, the new compositional technique felt sufficiently secure in its control over material that it became possible to consider the aggrandizement of musical material itself. Indeed, as Stockhausen saw it, compositional technique and material must necessarily develop together: "The idea of new form cannot be brought into agreement with the restrictions of old material. Consequently, a new material must be sought."[8] This "new material" was offered by sound produced through electronic means. Just as the manual musical instrument—string or keyboard—had once presented the composer with technical sophistication far surpassing the capabilities of the human voice, so does the equipment of the electronic studio reduce the violin—or even the grand piano—to a vehicle of sound production of comparative primitive restrictions. Stroh can conclude, therefore, that the present-day command of the composer over technique and material now approximates an absolute. This "omnipotence in the techniques of composition" is, however, sadly countered by what Stroh defines as the equally absolute "social

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was to derive the claim of electronic music to universal validity from the fact that this music was the result of an act of serial organization. Every designation of non-serial music was regarded as terminological confusion..." Stroh, *op.cit.*, p. 71.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

8. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 101. The enthusiast of electronic music finds a certain irony in the fact that traditional music—both in terms of production and reproduction—remains today pre-industrial, pre-technological and pre-capitalistic. The Marxist readily detects here the enchainment of productive forces through the conditions of production; the possibility of their emancipation through electronics will be indicated later. The manual instruments for which music is written and upon which it is performed still today remain essentially what they were in the Renaissance. As Adorno points out: "In chamber music we can accordingly speak rather of an antagonism between productive forces and productive conditions," in *Introduction to the Sociology of Music* (New York, 1976), p. 91. He has in mind the impossible problems encountered when the string quartet moves from its native domicile in the salon into the modern concert hall. Technology is not able to effect a satisfactory adjustment of the quartet to this environment. Today it would be possible to say that a work such as George Crumb's *Black Angels, for Electronic String Quartet* (1970) achieves such adjustment. In Crumb's composition for the traditional four instruments of the string quartet, each instrument is electronically amplified through the attachment of a microphone near the instrument's bridge. In contrast to the standard use of a microphone placed on the stage to amplify the "natural" sound of instruments, Crumb's practice results in the revelation of new sonic dimensions; sound undergoes a processing transformation tantamount to the development of new material.

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impotence" of the composer.[9] This dilemma can be resolved only through a change in the function of music—and of all art—in today's world. I shall return later to this problem, which is also central in Benjamin's essay.

Within this framework of seemingly propitious developments, the next significant step taken by the composer of electronic music involves the reduction of the triadic activity seen by Adorno in "composition, notation, and realization" into a single action. For Adorno, a highly dynamic tension presided over the inter-relationship of these three processes: the composer engaged in a tremendous struggle to bring the abstract image of a composition from the inspired reaches of pure spirit onto staff paper; just as this autograph falls short of the vision which gave rise to it, the performer, in turn, will never realize totally everything concealed in the score. In electronic composition, notation is by-passed; the composer in his studio works in the manner of the painter before his canvas; the compositional intention is realized in the very act of composition. Production and reproduction merge into a single action.[10] This, it seems to me, is the most unique aspect of electronic music. The entire realm of interpretation is eliminated. It is as though Beethoven—rather than committing himself to posterity through the manuscript of his final piano sonata, opus 111, which will ever remain the victim of the inadequacy of keyboard performance—had been in a position to offer one single aural realization of this work which would exist for all time, never subject to repeated interpretive performance. Thus, he might have guaranteed the authenticity of his work. The abyss between intention and realization is eliminated; a work is created of which there is only one realization and all who experience the work will encounter it in this single imprint.

It would appear that a musical work has now been achieved which is vested with the same authenticity as the original oil painting. However, how does Benjamin's thought on mechanical reproduction reflect upon this work? The electronic composer, it seems, has even surpassed the painter in his creation of a work which can be reproduced infinitely—indeed, a work designed for mechanical reproduction and capable of reproduction only mechanically—with no loss of authenticity through reproduction. It might be asserted that the same claims can be made by lithograph or photograph. In these cases, however, the single original plate or negative remains, an equivalent of which is totally lacking in the electronic composition. Allowing all possible optimism, electronic music might restore to art the authenticity, the loss of which Benjamin traces through increased mechanical reproduction. Precisely because the electronic composition experiences absolute re-realization in each playing of the tape, this authenticity could be of highly positive consequences for the relation of art to society in the technological age.[11]

9. Stroh, *op.cit.*, p. 105. This basic dialectic runs throughout Stroh's book.

10. Konrad Böhmer, *Zwischen Reihe und Pop, Musik und Klassengesellschaft* (Vienna and Munich, 1970), p. 134.

11. Behind this process is sensed the visionary wisdom of Benjamin when he said: "To an ever

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A shade of sobriety is called for at this juncture in the discussion: what has been said above is true of "pure" electronic composition. That electronic music in which the sociologist takes the greatest interest is, however, rather a hybrid product in which an electronically-prepared tape is combined with "live" performers, as in the operas of Luigi Nono, *Intolleranza* and *La fabrica illuminata*, of which more will be said later. Why has the composer, given the powers here defined, chosen to include in his work sounds produced in a traditional manner, requiring traditional compositional practices? The opponent of electronic music will immediately point to the "gimmickry" of this endeavor and its necessarily consequent "sterility," lacking the dynamics of personality involved in individual interpretation. A more reserved opinion would point to positive qualities gained through the juxtaposition of human and technological resources. Most positively, it could be stated that the composer, through the electronic portion of his composition, guarantees all necessary control over performance; all danger of regression into the age of Berlioz is overcome.

The next aspect of electronic composition which demands investigation is Benjamin's concept of "aura" which might be viewed as the somewhat more external imprint of authenticity. In his essay, Benjamin, having finished for the moment his discussion of authenticity, turns to aura: "One might subsume the eliminated element [of authenticity] in the term 'aura' and go on to say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art.... One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence."[12] A page later he states: "We define the aura...as the unique phenomenon of distance, however close it may be."[13] Aura involves a consciousness of history and of tradition; the moment it becomes possible to possess a reproduction of a work of art within the proximity of one's home or office, this distance and consciousness are lost. Mechanical reproduction results in the reproduced work meeting "the beholder or listener in his own particular situation...,"[14] within which aura is no longer of concern to the recipient. This destruction of aura further removes the work of art from its contextual integration which "found its expression in cult."[15] Here Benjamin cast an eye backward to the origin of art in the service of a ritual, first magical

greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility." *Op.cit.*, p. 224. This is an advantageous point at which to inject Leonardo's comparative evaluation of painting and music, quoted by Benjamin in a footnote to his essay: "Painting is superior to music because, unlike unfortunate music, it does not have to die as soon as it is born... Music which is consumed in the very act of its birth is inferior to painting which the use of varnish has rendered eternal." *Ibid.*, p. 249. This evaluation, however, can now be reversed: the electronic composition is repeatedly reborn in a state of complete maturity; it is rendered eternal not by varnish, but by sophisticated technology.

12. *Op.cit.*, p. 221.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 221.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

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and later religious. The turning point toward secular art he locates in the Renaissance, at which time the direction of coming centuries was determined. Benjamin summarizes: "...The unique value of the 'authentic' work of art has its basis in ritual even in the most profane forms of the cult of beauty. The secular cult of beauty...clearly showed that ritualistic basis in its decline and the first deep crisis which befell it."[16]

Although Benjamin's basic thought is clear, assistance is needed in developing it within this study. Help is found in a recent essay by Ferdinand Zellwecker. Benjamin states: "With the emancipation of the various art practices from ritual go increasing opportunities for the exhibition of their products."[17] Zellwecker elucidates this statement with the example of a work by Bach intended originally for divine worship—a cantata or one of the passions—which is removed from the church and performed in the more modern age in the concert hall. He determines that "the prevailing conditions of production prescribe a definite ritual and, in so doing, influence the creation and, at the same time, the manner of existence of a musical work. That is to say, the conditions of production define the scope of musical productive forces."[18] Zellwecker's conviction is that the Bach work in question suffers—through its displacement into secular musical life—total loss of cult value, acquiring in its stead the value of an object on exhibition: "The old singularity is transformed into a new singularity, even if this is already flawed."[19] This new singularity—or uniqueness—is fetishized in a reactionary manner. This is to be seen above all in the preservation of 19th century performance practices—including the dress of musicians—down to the present day: "The storm of new means and techniques of production which threatens to liberate productive forces is anachronistically kept in control and suppressed by force through the prevailing conditions of production."[20] Zellwecker feels that electronic music at present is subject to manipulation through this same ritualization; the eventual emancipation of productive forces within electronic music is not, however, to be withheld permanently.

The presence of the concepts aura, cult and ritual in this discussion raises a complex question with which I am unable to come to terms. I should like, therefore, to sketch at this point the problem which I see here, for it involves a sociological aspect of music, particularly crucial in purely electronic composition—that aspect of art, namely, which Benjamin labels "the simultaneous collective experience."[21] In my mind, this is the most significant sociological factor in music, for the experience is more readily available in music than in the product of any other artistic genre. A statement of Adorno's underscores this perspective: "All music—even that which in terms of style is

16. *Ibid.*, p. 224.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
18. "Einige Ueberlegungen über die Musik, ihre elektronische Reproduzierbarkeit und Produzierbarkeit," *Materialien zur Musiksoziologie* (Vienna and Munich, 1972), p. 30.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
10. *Ibid.*
21. *Op.cit.*, p. 234.

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the most highly individualistic—is indisputably vested with a collective content; every single sound says 'we'."[22]

The first image which comes to mind of such collective experience in music in the modern Western world is the Catholic mass or the Protestant cantata—phenomena pleasantly simple to deal with through their obvious combination of ritual and cult within divine service. With Zellwecker's "displacement" motif still in view, I should like to concentrate upon the nature and validity of the "aura" which has continued to surround concert conventions from the early bourgeois age down to the present. It is evident to me that a ritual survives in the concert hall, embracing not only those works once sacred in function. I frequently ask, particularly when confronted by an excellent performance of late Romantic music—Brahms, or even Bruch—what factor is involved, making this music the basis of a collective experience. (In my own vocabulary I seek a mythic foundation or common denominator in it.) This is obviously music of highly affirmative character. But what is affirmed by it in its own late 19th century and—more obscure still—in our own age? Capitalism? Or have I been taken in by a masterful exercise in false consciousness? Is this music nothing more than "the opium of the good citizen," to borrow a phrase from George Steiner?[23] Does this music continue the celebration of heroic individualism once experienced—or imagined, at least—in the works of Beethoven, an ideal—an ideology?—now degenerated to the level of noble sentiment? The matter seems simpler in the early 19th century: there is little doubt regarding the heraldic posture of such works by Beethoven as the overtures to *Coriolan* or *Egmont*. It is easy to assume that everyone in an audience of that day would have shared these sentiments totally—at least during the performance itself. It is precisely the collective element which would have made this experience so positive.[24] But to return to the question regarding Brahms: must the conclusion be that only false consciousness and manipulation is involved? Brahms, after all, is viewed by traditional musicology as an arch-conservative; Arnold Schoenberg, on the other hand, entitled his major essay on the composer "Brahms the

22. "Ideen zur Musiksoziologie," *Klangfiguren*, *op.cit.*, p. 23. Böhmer detects in much contemporary music an illusory "we": "Entertainment music is marked by a reactionary characteristic, expressed in its configurations: it imputes a super-individual agreement with the status quo and appeals to a *we*, with which individuals identify, although it actually signifies their liquidation... In Stockhausen's *Hymnen* the appeal to that super-individual instance is very strongly expressed,...[it is] an appeal to that historically pre-individual *we*, to which popular music owes its appeal." *Op.cit.*, pp. 138-139.

23. *In Bluebeard's Castle* (New Haven, 1971), p. 121.

24. Zellwecker takes a totally opposing view: "The call for freedom was naturally meant as the call for free production and free exchange of goods, for the elimination of feudalistic conditions of production which stood in the way of the development of early capitalism. In the same way, capitalism today, artificially hindering new conditions of production, needs the affirmation of freedom and the musical culture intertwined with it all the more." *Op.cit.*, p. 33. A very worthwhile exercise which might shed some light on this problem would be the application of Herbert Marcuse's "The Affirmative Character of Culture" to musical life from Mozart on through the 19th century. It is contained in *Negations* (Boston, 1968), pp. 88-133. Like Benjamin's essay discussed here, it also appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, in this case, in 1937.

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Progressive." (Schoenberg, by the way, defined himself as "a conservative who was forced to become revolutionary.")

I doubt very much that the musical experience can be totally separated from ritualistic phenomena; even if the composer consciously works against such reception, it might well lie in the nature of music to create this dimension out of itself. It is regrettable that Benjamin did not reflect upon this "simultaneous collective experience" in music, rather than pointing to the film as the main source of such experience in the modern world.

It further seems to me that mechanical reproduction is responsible for a certain ironic development in the collective experience of music. The 19th century made the direct experience of live music available to anyone who could afford a ticket; in the course of the epoch mammoth musical forces complied with the demands of concert halls of increasing capacity. In today's world—with the exception of various summer outdoor festivals where amplification is used to bring live music to gargantuan audiences—the collective experience of music is probably encountered far more frequently in the stadium concert than in the domain of serious music.[25] This is a phenomenon in need of intense sociological study, for it involves factors more complex than those present in the conventional concert hall or among the masses manipulated into seeing artistry in the work of Arthur Fiedler. The sociologist who studies the rock concert must necessarily deal with matters of consciousness and drugs as well as music.

Mechanical reproduction, on the other hand, has made music in many cases a totally individual experience. Steiner again comes to mind: "We now tend to employ the great modes...as if they were background. If we so choose, we can put on [Beethoven's] Opus 131 while eating the breakfast cereal. We can play the *St. Matthew Passion* any hour or day of the week. Again, the effects are ambiguous: there can be an unprecedented intimacy, but also a devaluation (*désacralization*). A Muzak of the sublime envelops us."[26] Through the recording the loss of distance and aura defined by Benjamin enters into music. Stroh goes so far as to maintain that the principle value of the live concert in today's world is as advertising designed to sell records.[27]

Pure electronic music evades the entire question of "live" performance and consequent collective experience through the merging, indicated above, of production and reproduction. Little is to be gained from watching a tape move through a synthesizer; a piano roll moving through a player piano would perhaps offer a more exciting visual experience. I have asked musicians about concerts of pure electronic music and have not yet encountered anyone

25. I know that the use of "seroius" here is an insult to the rock musician and apologize for it. The linguistic dilemma underscores the complexity of music today. Traditional categories of "classic" vs. "light" or "popular" music no longer work. The Germans have settled for "ernste Musik"—"serious music"—opposed to "Unterhaltungsmusik"—"entertainment music"; this is now so widely accepted that most Germans speak only of "E-Musik" and "U-Musik."

26. *Op.cit.*, p. 119.

27. *Op.cit.*, p. 40.

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who has attended one. Small groups listen together to such music, largely for study and discussion purposes. Radio is considered an excellent medium for electronic music. A positive view would be to assert that this is a form of art which has finally liberated itself from all markings of cult and ritual; consequently, it can never be the subject of manipulation so often exercised upon traditional music. It can never be employed for the aestheticization of politics against which Benjamin warns in the Epilogue of his essay. But the nagging question continues: can music which dispenses with these factors fulfill a social role? Can the experience of music be divorced from the simultaneous collective experience? Is the "we" heard by Adorno in all music meaningfully audible to the isolated individual in the privacy of his personal domain?

Within the complex sketched here I am troubled not only by my own inability to come to terms with this important sociological aspect of music, but also by a certain absence of finite statement upon the problem by Benjamin in his essay and in the work of those who apply his thought to music. He states, as indicated above, that "the value of the 'authentic' work of art has its basis in ritual," and further asserts that "this ritualistic basis, however remote, is still recognizable as secularized ritual even in the most profane forms of the cult of beauty."[28] Perhaps Benjamin answers here the question which I posed above regarding Brahms. It does not seem that he views the profane cult of beauty as necessarily negative or even as a necessarily evil component of the aesthetic experience; furthermore, in the same passage he does speak pejoratively of Mallarmé's *poésie pure* and of late 19th century practices of *l'art pour l'art* because of their lack of social function. In the Epilogue he locates the continuation of these tendencies in Marinetti and in Fascism. I do not wish to suggest that Benjamin equates "autonomy" and "authenticity" on a one-to-one basis, but it does appear that one concept is not possible without the other. It is perhaps necessary to conclude that the autonomous work of art, embedded in secular ritual, is not the magnificent product as which Adorno sees it; perhaps it is precisely this autonomy which has made it the victim of manipulation and the vehicle for false consciousness. Benjamin's most crucial statment demands emphasis here: "But the instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice—politics."[29] That Benjamin accepts this reversal of function affirmatively is clear from the final paragraph of the Epilogue; he speaks out against the aestheticization of politics in Fascism—one wonders whether he saw Leni Riefenstahl's films on the Berlin Olympics and the Nuremberg Party Congress—and concludes: "Communism responds by politicizing art."[30] Perhaps the final conclusion is that in the modern world authenticity and autonomy must necessarily be replaced by engagement and commitment.

28. *Op.cit.*, p. 224.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

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Consideration of the possible social function of electronic music in a political role concludes this study. The discussion is necessarily brief, for detail would demand analysis of individual works totally unknown in the United States—indeed, they are not even available here as recordings. Before turning to this subject, however, the perspective must be broadened. I have spoken only of pure electronic music as a strictly aural phenomenon. Two practices in electronic music, perhaps more dominant today than the pure composition discussed heretofore, bring this music back into the auditorium of public performance. The outstanding example in this country of the one development is found in the close collaboration between Merce Cunningham and his dance company with the composer John Cage; still more common is the second practice which brings electronic music into an alliance with visual art in the light show. Parallel to this are numerous art exhibits which employ electronic "background" music. I find it difficult to endorse these later practices as an embodiment of valid consciousness. There is too much of the "happening" in such presentations, moving them in the general direction of the stadium rock concert. Perhaps the composite work of art—the Wagnerian *Gesamtkunstwerk*—has now been achieved; serious investigation must be done, however, before enthusiastic welcome is possible.[31]

In this final section of my study, I shall focus upon the efforts of the Italian Communist composer Luigi Nono and the high praise which he receives from German sociologists. Nono has employed electronics along with traditional musical material in works which prove, in Stroh's eyes, that "the electronic studio can be transformed into the site of critical-artistic confrontation with social reality," placing electronic composition in the service of "a critical musical realism."[32] In *La fabrica illuminata* (1964), Nono presents a report on the life of Italian metal workers, employing original noises from the factory along with quotations from the speech of workers. The inclusion of sounds extracted from reality and their processing through electronics give Nono's work a direct relationship to reality; at the same time this reality is alienated in actual stage performance, forcing the listener into a reflective and critical attitude toward it. Thus develops the dialogue which Nono hopes to achieve. The opportunity for the development of consciousness through music is greatly enhanced.

Through his musico-sociological writings, Adorno exercised a dialectic constructed upon the juxtaposition of Schoenberg and Stravinsky. Today's sociologists find the basis of a more modern dialectic in the work of Stockhausen, on the one hand, and Nono, on the other. Stroh criticizes Stockhausen for his avant-garde formalism, within the limits of which he is concerned with technology only in its relation to music and not with the possible effect which it might have upon society. Because of this, Stockhausen

31. A local electronic composer of youthful enthusiasm recently made plans for an underwater concert with submerged speakers in the university swimming pool. Danger of electrocution changed his mind.

32. *Op.cit.*, p. 15. Nono, born in 1927, is married to Schoenberg's daughter Nuria.

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becomes guilty of a fetishism of material without social consequence. The necessary perspective was defined by Hanns Eisler in 1931: "For history teaches us that every new musical style does not have its origin in an aesthetically new standpoint—i.e., it does not merely portray a revolution of material—history teaches rather that the change of material is necessarily conditioned by a historically necessary change in the entire function of music in society as a whole."[33]

What are the markings of this change in function? Insofar as the experience of music today involves communication at all, it is a one-way process, involving passive acceptance on the part of the listener. The listener is not called upon to react in any critical or productive manner which might make his experience two-dimensional. When Nono's original version of the opera *Intolleranza* had its premiere in Cologne in 1962, official critical reception was enthusiastically positive, but only in terms of "understanding" and "acceptance" of the work. Reviewers failed to see the work as an admonition to political action. Nono felt, therefore, that his basic intentions were not realized in the work in this version.

When Nono offered the revised *Intolleranza* to a Nuremberg audience in 1970, he saw the performance as only one component of a comprehensive demonstration against American involvement in Vietnam. Following the performance, Nono issued an invitation to a street demonstration on the following morning.

Again the eyebrow is involutarily raised. If music can convey the sentiments which Nono wishes to communicate, should not the opera in itself be sufficient? Is a public demonstration on the heels of such a work not pathetically anti-climactic? An unimpressed spectator—and perhaps one must ask whether this concept of art admits only participants rather than spectators—might see in such machinations a confession of the social impotence of which Stroh repeatedly speaks. A major thesis of Stroh's study, however, is that art alone "is not capable of an immanent solution to the contradiction immanent within art itself."[34] What music can offer from within its own resources is an openness providing the point of departure for political action. It can provide the basis for dialogue and discussion which will result in action. It can arouse consciousness and awaken interests not possible through avant-garde formalism. Music can lead to significant social change; it can indeed effect change in the base upon which musical life is constructed.

The effort and the achievement of the electronic composer is evident; obvious also is the fact that electronic music has not yet gained wide public acceptance. The situation, as I have indicated here, remains complex. Shades of the industrial revolution are at times visible upon the electronic scene. A television advertisement which might have required dozens of studio musicians working on union pay scales twenty years ago can now be executed

33. Quoted in Stroh, *op.cit.*, p. 44. The best discussion of the function of music available in English is the chapter on that subject in Adorno's *Sociology, op.cit.*, pp. 39-54.
34. *Op.cit.*, p. 105.

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by one man at the Moog synthesizer. Peter Schneider has asserted: "Electronic music offers the very height of alienated music. Following the maiming and destruction of human productive forces in capitalism by machines, the development of these forces is now left to machines."[35] Ned Ludd might well be seen lurking in the wings.

Nonetheless, the theories of the composers, their many extremely well-wrought compositions, and the endeavors of the sociologists to gain more for this music than mere understanding or reception stand before us. Particularly promising is the fact that several of the best writers upon the sociological aspects of electronic music are themselves composers. But then, Adorno also composed; the combination of professions is in itself no guarantee of future achievement. That electronic composition will continue on an increasing scale is certain; careful observation by the sociologist is indicated.

A conclusion of provocative promise is found in a response elicited in a mammoth empirical study on the apperception of electronic music in Czechoslovakia in 1966. A thirty-year-old whose formal education ended with secondary school recorded the following reaction: "It was as if musicians were improvising and discovering unknown worlds. I have the feeling of being an explorer. Through music I perceive something newly discovered which cannot yet be precisely defined—something not yet restricted by any canon, prescription, arrangement or regulation. In the face of this new land all those who would lay claim to determining the point of view towards it or what one should take possession of within it are impotent. Before this unknown region the powerful cannot immediately know whether Lenin would have found it in order or not and for that reason they are silent... When I hear music like this, I begin to hope that tomorrow or in one or two years this new discovery—perhaps through the mediation of cosmonauts—will become reality, and, in so doing, further influence our daily life...and perhaps then the kingdom of humanity and reason will arrive sooner than hoped for. Art must move ahead of life and indicate the direction which life is to take. Music such as this—as in the case of all modern art—affirms that this is possible even in the 20th century."[36] It would seem that electronic music has moved at least one listener a step towards realization of the visionary prophecy of the Expressionist painter Franc Marc, written only weeks before he fell in the Battle of Verdun in 1914: "In the 20th century we shall live amongst strange faces, new pictures, and unheard-of sounds. Many who are not filled with an inner passion will freeze and withdraw to the remnants of their memories. Woe to the demagogues who try to drag them out. Everything has its season, and the world has time."[37]

35. Quoted by Zellwecker, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

36. Vladimir Karbusicky, *Empirische Musiksoziologie* (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp. 101-102. The music used in this experiment was excerpted from Herbert Eimert's *Epitaph für Aikichi Kuboyama*. Karbusicky, trained in the Prague Structuralist School by Jan Mukarovsky and now Professor of Musicology at the University of Hamburg, has written here one of the most significant boks in the sociology of music.

37. *The Blue Rider Group*, catalogue of an exposition at the Tate Gallery in 1960, p. 25.

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MUSIC AND TECHNIQUE*

by Theodor W. Adorno

The meaning of the Greek word *techne* from which both "technique" and "technology" are derived offers an indication of the unity of this concept with art. If art is the external representation of something internal, the concept of technique embraces everything which pertains to the realization of that interior substance. In the case of music, not only the realization of spiritual substance in notes is involved, but the transformation which makes these notes accessible to sensory perception as well. In short, both production and reproduction are involved. Musical technique embraces the totality of all musical means: the organization of the substance itself and its transformation into a physical phenomenon. In this process, the word technique calls to mind the man-made factor of this context of meaning; the word calls forth the image of a subject, regardless of its constitution and, at the same time, it evokes a feeling of the impetus of ability, success and function which are the purpose and goal of the organization involved in such a structure as the musical composition. In the final analysis, this organization sublimates itself to the objectivity of this impetus and to a lawfulness which, throughout the struggle on the subjective plane, lends to this force an aspect of

*"Musik und Technik" first appeared in *Gravesaner Blätter*, 4:11-12 (1958). This essay was translated from the German version that appeared in *Klangfiguren* (Frankfurt am Main, 1959), by Wes Blomster. The brief section on "techné" in J.J. Pollitt, *The Ancient View of Greek Art* (New Haven and London, 1974), pp. 32-37, offers a precise definition of Adorno's point of departure. Pollitt states: "Our distinction between art or fine art...on the one hand and craft...on the other did not exist in antiquity. Both were expressed by the Greek word *techné*, which might be translated as 'organized knowledge and procedure applied for the purpose of producing a specific preconceived result,' or simply 'rational production.' The end product of *techné* could be physical objects..., an active performance..., or a certain condition in men (e.g., a state of health achieved through the practice of medicine) or in animals (e.g., horse training)" (p. 32). Three definitions are offered here for the reader unfamiliar with the vocabulary of 20th century music: *Twelve-tone technique*: "A 20th-century method of musical composition devised by Schoenberg (c. 1920) as a means of motivic construction and unification within the general framework of atonal music, replacing traditional principles of melody, harmony, and totality... Every composition is based on a so-called tone series or tone row, containing all the twelve chromatic tones in a succession chosen by the composer. The chosen order of tones remains unchanged throughout the composition... The entire composition, therefore, consists of nothing but restatements of the series..." (*Harvard Brief Dictionary of Music* [New York, 1961], p. 318). *Parameter:* "A basic aspect of sound or of composition. The term came into use among musicians in the early 1950s along with the rise of electronic music, in which the separate aspects of sound are usually independently controlled, and serialism with its independent serial ordering of values within such parameters as pitch class, loudness (also called intensity), duration, timbre, articulation, and position in space. The term is borrowed from mathematics where, however, it is not used as a synonym for dimension but indicates a place-holder for a constant (as in 'sine nx,' where n would be termed a parameter)" (*Dictionary of Contemporary Music*, ed. John Vinton [New York, 1974], p. 554). *Aleatory music*: "From *alea*: one of a pair of dice—music in which the composer introduces elements of chance in the composition or the performance" (Joan Peyser, *The New Music* [New York, 1971], p. 189). —*Translator's note.*

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being-in-itself. By virtue of its technical organization the work of art attains to a context of meaning; everything in the work is able to legitimize itself in terms of technical necessity.

Content and technique are at the same time identical and non-identical. They are non-identical because the work of art derives its life force from the tension between the interior and the exterior, because it becomes a work of art only by offering indications which go beyond its material manifestation. The work of art without content, the very idea of its superficial existence only for the senses, would be nothing but a sample of that empiricism, whose rational and disenchanted counterpart gives form to the art work. The unmediated identity of content and manifestation would invalidate art itself. Nonetheless, it is also possible to view both factors as identical. For in the composition only that which achieves realization is of value. The idea of spiritual content—finite, as it were, and existing-in-itself—which could be given external projection with the help of a technique no less material in its conception is Philistine. The interior and exterior produce each other alternatingly and mutually. The external is by no means simply determined from within, as the phrase regarding the spirit which constructs the body would maintain. The reverse of this course is equally familiar in music. The spirit of Debussy and Ravel, the animalian sadness of sensual happiness which they present, would not be art without the addiction to the pleasure of sound, no matter how deflected this pleasure might be. The same is true, however, for the relationship of technique to content as a whole. What Schumann introduced into music in terms of things never heard previously and of unfathomable feeling is not only a matter of historical discoveries which he made in the technique of pianistic touch, but further—as a new dimension of spiritual existence in music—it is essentially inseparable from his manner of composition for the piano. Schumann once stated that the difference between his earlier and later works was that in the former he had specifically attempted to do justice to the piano, while in the latter this had become a matter of indifference to him. This description might well be accurate. It might well be correct to state that the quality of the compositions speaks out against the course which Schumann took. Whenever he let himself be inspired by the piano, the resulting music was also inspired. In progressive measure this analogy is applicable to all music.

The assertion that content and technique in music are both identical and non-identical amounts to nothing less than the fact that the concept of technique encompasses its own dialectic. That the expression "technique of composition"—no matter how old the actual practice itself might be—is of relatively recent coinage offers an indication of this. The term was hardly used at all before the 19th century. It makes its appearance only with the advent of artistic self-reflection within the act of composition, with the consciousness of progressive domination over tonal material by the means of compositional intention, and with the increasing freedom in the disposition of these means which themselves achieve autonomy through this very process. As

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in every case of rationalization, this progress takes place through the progressive division of labor: new levels of material are conquered, as separate fields they are treated by the specialist with great care, and, finally, they are then drawn into the unity provided by an aesthetic context of meaning. These new sectors first arose outside actual compositional praxis; in Bach's case, for example, a certain arbitrariness regarding instrumental realization in relation to the score of a composition prevails. Techniques in the narrower sense of the word usually dwell in a parallel relation to the compositional process itself. Included here are effects such as those which Berlioz in his theory of instrumentation praised in the work of Gluck and Weber. This externalized aspect of music—in a certain sense its communicative aspect—then penetrates into the interior of the formal law of music. It is no longer only musical meaning which is shaped in this process, but musical reproduction itself is now included, in part, in the act of composition. Since Berlioz performance virtually has been placed in the hands of the composer; this in turn has greatly reduced the tension between score and performance. However, this accomplishment was not without negative connotations: performance, the vehicle of realization, took primacy over that which it actually was intended to serve: over the composition itself. The technique of composition as a reflection upon means which were at first distinguished from purpose and which were no doubt originally part of the treatment of the instrumental parameter as a unique aspect of artistic dexterity derived from reproduction established itself firmly only in the second half of the 19th century. Parallel to the growing technification of music is the inclusion in music of techniques which had developed extraterritorially within the total course of technical and technological advancement. For example, the valve horn—a decisive precondition of Wagner's art of instrumental composition—was available long before its compositional hour tolled—to say nothing of the saxophone. The concept of musical technique undergoes complication in a manner comparable to developments in the film. Means which are in no way primarily a product of the composition are admitted to the composition for the sake of its expansion; in so doing, however, these means raise demands of their own. This results in the establishment of an extra-aesthetic factor normatively—as it were—within the aesthetic realm. The unity of an epoch, which is actually the unity of its total social tendency—asserts itself above and beyond works of art through its presence in these very works themselves. This is the dialectic law of motion regarding the technification of the work of art. It is the law of its increasing integration and of its self-alienation: integration, because technification makes possible the inclusion of more and more sectors which once occupied positions alongside or outside the aesthetic configuration (through integration they are subjected to the newly achieved unity); self-alienation, because such totality is measured in terms of specialization and by the most objectified means possible—cut off from content, this totality opposes that subjectivity without which aesthetic content is inconceivable. The more completely the end subjects the means unto itself,

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the more threatening the domination of the means over the end becomes: it is the aesthetic dialectic of master and slave. In a totally false way, disintegration becomes the ally of every integration. It causes precisely that force within the totality to disappear, the sole preservation of which in the work made totality possible.

Berlioz was the prime phenomenon of modernity in music; he was the first composer in whom the continuity of tradition and—along with it—the continuity of musical structure broke into fragments. In the most pregnant sense, he created a compositional technique conscious of itself in its disposition over a level of musical material—the level of instrumental realization—which up to that time had been an arbitrary concern. At the same time, he was the first significant composer—if Gluck is disregarded—for whom the technique of composition, the ability to create structures characterized by unity, coherence and consistent development, was insufficient. His is the first music of the more modern age in which the context of musical meaning and musical meaning itself become dubious. The first technician of music was the first musician who was no longer a good musician; in his work instrumental organization and compositional disorganization complement each other. It is precisely this work which explains the modern impression made by his works. The explosion of meaning in his disposition over the phenomenon—shock, in short—defines his content: the negation of meaning is elevated to the level of meaning, just as in positivism the negation of philosophy becomes philosophy. The attempt of his program music to portray intoxication through opium is by no means a Romantic arabesque, but rather the truth regarding the beginning crisis of musical logic. The continuation of this crisis is not to be found in Wagner, but rather in Richard Strauss, in whose works technification and the technique of surprise—i.e., the permanent suspension of the context of meaning and of musical logic as well—go hand in hand. Ever since music came to share emphatically in progress—in industrial progress, that is—ever since the *Symphonie fantastique* of Berlioz, music too, like the entirety of industrial society, has had to pay the price for this progress.

Unless appearances lie, this development has today reached an extreme. The separation of technique from the composition—which came to the surface in such an innocently provocative fashion in Berlioz, Liszt and Strauss—was revoked. Through rational command, all musical sectors have been made into compositional impulses related to each other; with the advent of twelve-tone technique this has become transparent as the telos of composition. The integral organization of the musical score through the twelve-tone method has increasingly limited the scope of interpretation and—according to the convictions of the method itself—would like to get its hands upon interpretation as well. In contrast to notation in which every note, every structural feature, has a tendentially unequivocal designation, the desire to interpret here becomes obsolete. In the face of such music, mute reading with precise use of the imagination defines itself as the true interpretive ideal. The

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integrally composed work as a work integrally designated has already developed into its own realization. By reverse process the development of the mechanical means of reproduction, which—as in the visual arts—makes it possible to define music as independent from ephemeral performance and from the arbitrary elements involved therein, decisively approximates the reproduction of production. Technological development, understood at first as extra-musical, then guarded by compositional intentions, converges with inner-musical development. If works of art become their own reproduction, it is then foreseeable that reproductions will become works. With the absolute acoustic realization of a composition through electronic means, indeed, perhaps even by means of recording on wire or tape, doubts are registered regarding the writing down of a manuscript score: as if one could make music as directly as one paints a picture and the significative intermediate level, notation, could be by-passed as though it were an ornamental formality. In this process, the tension between technique and content is necessarily reduced further. The less musical portrayal continues to be the portrayal of something, the more the essence of the means comes to agree with the essence of that which is portrayed. Attempts in opposition to this to preserve a refuge removed from technification for portrayal, spirit, or meaning are struck down by impotence. Spirit, apologetically cultivated as a domain alongside the technical, falls victim to those very mechanisms which it had hoped to oppose and thus takes part in its own negation. To sermonize today about spirit in music is almost as reactionary as it was fifty years ago when an opponent of Vassily Kandinsky's *Concerning the Spiritual in Art* spoke in praise of that which brought sensual pleasure. Spirit—culture in general—is lost as soon as it makes reference only to itself.

But the art work as a totality of means is in no better condition; it is no less endangered than the work of art of conservative spirit. The legitimate demand for the proper use of material turns against the accord of continuity—against its own idea. With total seriousness, the work of art reacts to this demand by seeing nothing in the material beyond that which it conceals in its own constitution and, in the final analysis, it executes the old judgment regarding the excess of allegorical intention. From this perspective, a continuity consisting of nothing more than relationships to which one can point with his finger ceases to be continuity. It disintegrates into elements which it, in turn, abstractly and impotently subsumes. Verifiable correctness in a composition, raised to the level of an absolute, is achieved at the expense of a truth content which cannot be sought anywhere outside the constellation of the work and nonetheless volitalizes in the moment in which the constellation exhausts itself in the immanence of its own factual components.

The individual impulses no longer perceive anything of that force which drives them towards totality. This parallels the manner in which in a totally administered human community all elements interlock and each functions uninterruptedly for the other; but no one element any longer knows its purpose within the total function of the community. However, since the

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artistic whole derives its essence from the reciprocal impact with its parts, the result is vacuous action as soon as the reciprocal relationship is dropped in favor of a prior decision in favor of the whole. The non-resistant adjustment to technical possibilities liquidates the very factor for whose sake adjustment is sought: the self-preservation of the composition. Musical technique and content—formerly completely intertwined—now devour each other like the two lions in the old comic strip. In this situation extra-musical technique no longer functions as a corrective, but becomes rather its own court of justice. The fetishism of musical means, which is the direction taken by the entire official musical culture, still triumphs even in the hands of the avant garde enemies of this culture. At its height the integration of technique and content sings the reprise of its inflexible dualism. The garment of regained objectivity is deceptive. The expulsion of the subjective impulse which can no longer be executed directly but is preserved only in abstract correspondences is in no way an act of objectification. It is precisely through this expulsion that subjectivity is unconsciously driven to its peak; it becomes an arrangement which prevails over nature, magnifying the petrified result of its manipulations as being-in-itself. Musical language, on the basis of its own perfected power, sets itself up as universally binding and it is proud to achieve what was once the accomplishment of tonality, rather than surrendering to the good fortune that it has finally rid itself of that long super-annuated generality. This language now approaches the nonsense of an arbitrariness no longer disciplined by any obligation, the consequent instauration of abracadabra as the voice of creation.

The disintegration of the integral cannot be judged by external criteria; it does not represent the loss of any holy property about the unsaleability of which one might brag. The continuity of meaning is undermined by the reduction of all musical elements and dimensions to the same level; this is done in order to promote the complete continuity of meaning and the liberation of it from anything alien or heteronomous which is unable to resolve within itself. The destiny of every musical phenomenon, disrupted in this way, is that the disposition of material in a manner no way identical with the material befalls the material itself, rather than paying heed to the direction which the phenomenon would take of its own will. All this—in the midst of a determination in which everything is mutually related—eliminates the binding factor from the composition. In compositional terms, atomization complements integration; compositionally, the victory of thought over being is understood as an achievement. This being, however, no longer offers resistance and, consequently, no longer exists. The absolute and total necessity which one group of notes here and now fantasizes out of those notes—rhythm, pitches, volume levels, coloration—if possible, indeed, out of types of performance—it is, in short subsumption perfected—all this lends the individual phenomenon the character of arbitrary pleasure, even if the result is not music clearly developed in time. The less possible any alternative to the prevalent situation becomes, the more this music sounds as though it

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could very well be completely different. This situation, and not the ideological loss of extra-musical content, gives actual definition to the crisis of meaning within which music itself grows aware of the integration of its meaning with technique.

All of this is technically understandable. The concept of absolute identity of which the technological work of art dreams involves the unity of a deductive system—hardly more metaphoric than it is literal; this system would make possible the deduction of everything which takes place in such music from an extremely restricted, minimally primitive compositional act which excludes every possible coincidental factor. According to an ideal once formulated, in a serial composition of totally consequent arrangement the choice of initial material would predetermine the entire composition down to its last accent completely in advance of actual composition. This presumes, however, that all musical parameters can be reduced to a common denominator, indeed, to this basic material. It is then beyond debate that everything is interrelated, that the isolated treatment of any musical dimension not only falls behind general development, but further does injustice to that individual dimension, insofar as any given dimension becomes what it is only through its relationship to every other dimension: in this complex, contemporary compositional praxis has finally rejected the heritage of school discipline which divides everything into isolated categories. The most drastic expression thereof is the substitutionality of parameters. Decades ago Ernest Newman observed that the comprehensibility of highly complex harmonies could be effected through instrumental disposition. Schoenberg experimented with substitutionality in matters of tone color and melody during his Expressionist phase; this can be observed, for example, in the third orchestral piece, opus 16, and later in the identification of vertical and horizontal, of harmony and melody in twelve-tone technique—endeavors which could succeed, to be sure, only as the function of a third parameter, the contrapuntal. Recent praxis has elevated this tendency to the level of a concept and to a comprehensive, universal norm. In so doing, the question of absolute identity of parameters has been raised, a question which Stockhausen has seized upon with an energy which knows no limits. Perhaps his intention can be expressed as the thesis that the parameters defined by simultaneity and color—in appearance timeless parameters—can be made identical temporarily. But such identity of parameters in terms of their temporality remains abstract: at the same time they are, indeed, non-identical. The vertical dimension of music lies, to be sure, within the realm of time; but within it, the vertical functions as a counter-force—spatially, as it were. Beyond this even the most advanced among young composers recognize that intervalic relationships do not lead unequivocally and judiciously to time relationships capable of immediate realization, nor do they lead from tonal quantity and rests further into form, just as—in a reverse situation—colors within the phenomenon of uninterrupted continuity withdraw with other parameters. The objectively physical side—the side viewed from the "psychology of sound," to use the old termi-

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nology of Ernst Kurth—must be distinguished from the specifically musical side, which Kurth—probably as the result of misunderstanding—called the musical-psychological side. This side comprehends the subjective mediation of musical phenomena within itself, a process as far removed from physical matters as the phenomenon of perception is from the event in the brain which is its physiological origin. This is all totally contrary to meaning: the technical work of art is false in every instance in which this non-identity is ignored and in which elements lacking a common denominator are treated as though they had one; oranges are multiplied by typewriters. Mere analogies in the treatment of parameters of a composition falsely view themselves as an impulse of strict unity which guarantees the necessity of development. Illusion —by now totally outlawed—smuggles itself into the work in spite of everything. Analogy as the means of aesthetic unity might be of a certain legitimacy in cases where unity is not intended in any literal sense, but rather only as illusion—for example, in the relationship between harmony and color in Wagner. If, however, the claim of integration is expressed rigorously, the obligation for unity is then so intensified that, wherever the phenomenon violates this unity, it offends its own principle and grows ambiguous, sacrificing correctness along with meaning. The seemingly abstract or mathematical necessity which is dictated to the musical phenomenon from the exterior without subjective mediation has an affinity with absolute coincidence. It is quite possible that most of the recent experiments in "aleatory" music bear witness to this. In obvious disintegration, the integral composition attains to productive self-consciousness, negating thereby its own *raison d'être. Summum ius summa iniuria.*

There is little point in playing the eulogist of the past and making helpless attempts to reverse the process which led to this situation—nor is anything to be gained from hoisting the banner of the absurd, an action which loses ground as soon as it ceases to be provocative and sets itself up as the voice of positivity. Rather it is necessary to reflect upon those matters which determine whether this development must be obeyed as its dictatorial gesture demands, which, in turn, arouses doubts about the objective authority behind this gesture. This, however, brings one to the musical score. The general attitude taken towards the score today is rooted in the positivist view—strangely unreconcilable, by the way, with the spiritual climate of most contemporary music—that the score is nothing more than instructions for performance; indeed, it might even be seen as a system of signals, the goal of which is communication and "information." Thereupon depends the unmediated unity of composition and realization, the axiom of the absolute identity of the parameters, and finally, the idea of the integration of the work of art within which all tension is resolved. Originally the score was looked upon merely as the representation of music; the more modern view defined above arose through the imposition of the management of composition upon music and, further, through the convergence of musical and extra-musical technique, a union which promoted the musical handyman and the electrician to

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composers. Once such a mechanically-oriented individual advanced to the same position in the process of musical production which he occupies in industry, other composers eagerly imitated his example. The entire procedure falls under the spell of ambivalent progress which, because of its foundation upon supposedly literal and factual matters, establishes itself as the guarantor of irrefutability; it sticks obstinately to whatever the case presents and thus secretly falls into regression—the same direction in which in the meantime late-industrial society as a whole is moving.

If, however, musical notation was originally intended not merely as instructions for the performer, not a prescription, but a guide to memory, a safeguard of tradition, and an objectification of the imaginary and the spiritual, it is undeniable that something of these intentions has always been preserved through a diversity of practices. In musical notation, as in verbal language, the impetus of the symbol—now secularized as the vehicle of communication—and that of the image, of similarity with what is to be portrayed, are united. Not only does musical notation form the basis of performance; it constitutes further something quite independent from this, just as verbal writing establishes the conditions for the objectification of a spiritual content without regard for its transmission. If the impulse of autonomy is purged from the musical text, the tension involved in composition, notation, and realization in sound dissolves in favor of a primitivization which exerts itself all the more coarsely through the complexity of the means for which it would hope to offer compensation. That quality which threatens to be lost to oblivion and which cannot be saved through any isolated action finds itself again in the object, as soon as the compositional energy is directed to the notated text, seeking in it the objectification of the subject, rather than clinging to an extra-musical subject or to manipulated objectivity. The reduction of the composition to the level of its appearance could be corrected only through recognition of the primacy of the composition. Tension is felt in the resistance of the composition against its realization through performance; the composition does not adjust to this realization—indeed, it is as little concerned about this process as was Beethoven about that "miserable fiddle." As a result of this recognition, the inner-compositional means will no longer simply exercise blind domination, for this domination itself is rooted in the power of mere appearance. At the same time, total sociological consequences could be drawn from a state of musical affairs in which social truth is stated only when it refuses obedience to the prevailing social norm, the concept of being all-for-all, which only conceals the will of those who actually are in control of production. Only immanent critique can serve as the vehicle of new quality. Advanced music today is unable to gain sympathetic and receptive listeners. This realization is supported by the experience of the social incommunicability of that which in the name of the totality of appearance has chosen technical communicability as the highest norm and further by the failure involved in the formal inclusion in composition of psychological formulae of reception. This realization

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indicates that the positivist attitude is not on the same level as the positivist a priori, nor as the concrete relationship of music to mankind. The chances for the communication of truth are to be found only in a music which, without surrendering to the practices just described, removes itself from appearance and, by virtue of its intransigence, subdues those to whom it must remain alien—insofar as it is able to humor them.

The progressive intertwining of art and technique is not necessarily to be accepted as irrevocable; indeed, it contains the potential of a more positive development. If art is to restore nature—mutilated as it is by the seigneurial spirit—to itself and grant it freedom, it can do so only through liberation from the heteronomy of nature. Nevertheless, the false aspects of present-day technocratic praxis are not to be passed over in silence. In this endeavor, the hellishly difficult effort of exercising criticism without the always prevalent and futile gesture of "so far and no further" is not to be circumvented. The inadequacy of mediation and syntheses also become evident, particularly as manifested in the syntheses designed by many middle-aged composers who have mixed into their works achievements of radical technification as fermentation against their own obsolescence while carefully avoiding all extremes. No matter how firm one is in the strategic knowledge of his own standpoint, the task of expressing this responsibility in art is fraught with despair; this, in turn, betrays the objectivity of the contradiction. For it is a simple tautology that meaningless composing is meaningless; meaning, however—meaningful composing—is not simply an additive which can be blended into the imperative integral procedure of composition. Perhaps help lies only in ruthless reflection of the process upon itself, a technical examination of technique even in those instances where it offers itself to the self-critical ear as a wall without either cracks or handholds. If the time has really come for music to turn once again to the subject, then this must not be done in such a way that the intention is again immersed only in the subject itself. Mediation through the subject can succeed only in objective terms, as criticism of the technical context in itself—not of those things which one might think or feel, not even of that which one might hear imaginatively in isolated inwardness. Musical imagination is intensified through the experience of the configuration and its objective tendency to the same degree as the configuration is intensified through subjective imagination. The aging of new music is not opposed by its older phases, but rather by definite negation; aging which is aware of itself elevates itself through this awareness above the controversy. This happens in authentic works. Modesty, however, becomes the theory: the rogue offers more than he actually possesses.

Nonetheless, theory is not totally helpless in its relationship to praxis: theory, after all, results from reflection upon experienced gained through praxis. Several rules-of-thumb can be established, which might at the same time serve as the model for consideration of the ways in which the composer can employ this theory in his own work:

1. An absolute necessity in terms of artistic-technical economy is consi-

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deration for the relationship between expenditure and result. Again and again total—or even half—dilettantes submit compositions, accompanied by letters full of praise for these works because of some supposedly new serial structure or relationship; as music, however, they are terribly inadequate. This nonsense usually can be recognized at first glance through rigid composition from bar line to bar line without any movement—or even an inner motion—which transcends these boundaries. It is further characteristic of such work that—following upon a more or less plastic idea at the outset—the defining force of the composition soon gives out—often after only a few measures—or that it is mechanically continued with no evident feeling for the total form. In such exercises, however, musical event is incomparably simpler throughout than the serial combinations of which these young fellows are so very proud; at times the event is so primitive that relationships would be perceptible, even if serial techniques were not employed at all. Such relationships are, for the most part, based upon rhythmic symmetries which, in turn, are at odds with the asymmetrical intervalic relationships in the composition. In other cases, no relationship at all is to be found between mechanically arranged measures or groups of measures from which every spiritual formative force is absent. Serial composition per se can do nothing to alter this state of affairs. These lesser configurations of such composers, however, throw some light upon many other works of a certain *métier*. In response to this last sentence one might ask somewhat heretically—with an eye to Webern's Chamber Concerto—what the good of serial arrangement is, when the composition concludes with nothing more refined than a grand march. In the case of many imitators, the infinite struggle to include all parameters in the construction produces something of a uninimity of dotted notes, unrelated to each other and painfully monotonous when deployed over vast stretches; even the sympathetic listener cannot avoid the impression that a great amount of muscle has been used to lift hollow weights. A good measure of common sense is a necessary prerequisite of advanced composition—just as it is, it might be added, of all radicalism which aims at something beyond vacuous activity. Of those who come to this realization too late, it is to be feared that they will develop into renegades and deny the course upon which they once embarked all too naively. No responsible composer can hide behind an obstinate responsibility towards the means employed in composition as a dispensation from careful scrutiny of the music which he thus produces; he must examine whether its structure, its weight, its tension justify these means and whether precisely these means—rather than others—are called for.

2. If, in the course of the development of the technical work of art, the composer exercises control over his own work, it must be a control which never exhausts itself in construction, but rather is extended to an examination of the extent to which the construction extends into the phenomenon itself. This is more easily said than done, for there is no abstract norm by which such decisions can be made. The concern is not whether every constructional

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aspect concealed in a composition can be "noticed"—that is to say, whether it can be detected immediately in the same manner in which the return of a theme is noticed. Even Beethoven was aware—as Schenker pointed out—of connections below the official level of motivic-thematic craftsmanship which created a unity all the deeper and more binding, the less manifest they were. It was never in any way Schoenberg's intention that the rows as such—either thematically or as something reminiscent of key—should be audible; they were rather intended to effect a latent organization which, in fact, in the detailed works of his later years, proves itself magnificently as "putty." This latency of effective constructive principles is not, however, a license which permits the separation of principles from every possible relationship with the acoustic phenomenon. Quite the contrary, an intense criterion of value is involved here. The less it is possible to offer a general description of actual constructive principles in the phenomenon—no matter how indirectly they are detached—and of those efforts which can simply be overlooked as elbow grease, the more cogent the task assigned the controlling ear of the composer becomes. If, for example, parameters such as lengths and intervals which are not subject to musical identity are nonetheless treated indifferently in the construction, then every perceptibility of the construction is denied the phenomenon from the outset; the effort is in vain. Beyond these considerations, temporal correspondences between individual rests or note values, separated from each other by long distances, are not to be understood as unconscious elements through which the art work is experienced; this is possible only if such correspondences have been clarified by means of more conspicuous compositional means, such as obvious analogies of tone color or rhythm. The control of such relationships is objectively necessary if the construction is not to remain pre-artistic and irresponsible from the perspective of the thing-in-itself—of music; this control, however, can be achieved only by the vital subject. Objectivity itself calls this subject home to the composition.

3. Live performance is the true test of the relation between construction and phenomenon. Ever since music liberated itself from tonality stories have made the rounds—told most frequently by orchestral musicians—which would discredit modern composers as charlatans, because they reportedly have failed to recognize some huge error—intentional or unintentional—in the performance of their works. Most of these stories are apocryphal. It might be added that a good ear is an invaluable advantage to composing, but it is by no means to be identified with compositional ability. I have known highly significant composers of quite unreliable ear; only school teachers, however, would be able to establish valid theses regarding the process of composition: whether the source of composition lies in absolute and exact imagination, or whether a composer, faced by possibilities neither fixed nor completely unambiguous, listens, examines, compares, and then—as the critic of his own ideas—chooses those elements best suited to his needs. Haydn and, more recently, Stravinsky—and no one can deny that his music is extremely

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well-made in terms of tangible material—worked at the piano. Mozart and Schoenberg disdained this practice. But this is a further factor which cannot be mechanically transferred from older production and imposed upon recent work. In music which claims that the smallest of its moments is strictly and unalterably predetermined through construction, precision in the conception of such moments assumes a totally different force than in those works where notation is understood beforehand as nothing more than an approach to living music, leaving to the imagination a wide range of variations. If in a serial composition there really is no freedom, if every departure from the prefigured notational text endangers its correctness, then the composer must in fact conceive and realize every note with all its designations exactly as it is written; otherwise he negates his own principle of composition. Late in Webern's life it was often noticed how far at times he as an interpreter removed himself from what was on paper; but it was precisely through the flexibility with which he performed his Mondrian-like constructions that he provided them with their musical meaning. It might even be asked whether this meaning was not imported—somewhat like contraband—into the austere landscape of his scores which, it must be admitted, supported no literal claim to total determination. Nonetheless, when in the final section of the Piano Variations, opus 27, a free interpretation makes it impossible to recognize the notes which are introduced in the unstressed beats of measures as such, so that the construction of an entire variation, as it is written down, no longer emerges, doubts are awakened about the constructive principle itself. Should it actually prove to be true that a significant composer of highly complicated serial music behaves in sovereign manner with what he has written, above all in terms of rhythm—and even the most experienced musician will hardly be able to judge this merely by following the score during performance—this would affirm that at some point he has set himself free from the principles of integral composition and proceeds simply by following his ear. The next logical step would be that he no longer does notation in the sense of integral construction, but rather as he hears and performs the work within himself. At any rate, the composer who wishes to avoid falling victim to objectively alienated construction ought to compare his written copy with his own imagination as carefully as possible. The results of such comparison might very well question the principle of the total compositional process.

4. The origin of the new principles of construction lies in the mastery of profusion; for abundance, following the abolition of tonal support, dissolves into chaos unless it is able to discipline itself by means of its own resources and through the demands inherent in its own material. (This abundance is the fundamental richness found in Schoenberg's unparalleled combinative imagination.) What can be done, however, when chaos itself is absent and there is nothing to be disciplined—when victory is predetermined by principles vested with meaning only through conflict with their opposite, with unruly, diffuse musical impulses? What, in such cases, might give rise to Nietzsche's "dancing star"? From a technical viewpoint, this question defines

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the state of affairs which reveals itself in its effect as the loss of inner tension. The excitement in Webern's work does not refute the suspicion of highly constructed music, often impoverished in essence and lacking concentration of quintessence. Today every composer would have to ask what the material basis of construction is and what is stunted through constructivism. This alone is insufficient to produce music of tension, but it could be of aid in eliminating many superfluous diagrams. The contrast between thematic content and execution is passé, for it would result in nothing beyond the total plasticity of all phenomena; everything would have to be thematic, rather than simultaneously athematic and formless. The organization of complexity can be achieved through perfected polyphony, but polyphony, once it has been reduced to monody in the face of implicit canonic structure, can no longer perform this role. There is great danger of the impoverishment of that which is the center of compositional activity in favor of principles underlying this effort; such devaluation of the determined composition in favor of the determining factors is particularly flagrant in the case of electronic composition. According to its basic concepts, electronic composition involves the liberation of all acoustic means and tone colors along with their mutual mediation, whereas up to now they have been totally dependent upon the contingency of acoustic media and isolated from each other through the individual characteristics of these media. Most electronic compositions which I have heard—even a work so strong and shocking in its effect as Stockhausen's *Jünglinge*—strikes me as nothing more than the transposition and expansion of pianistic ideas to new material; it seems untouched by the expectations which might be placed upon the continuum of tone color and by the potential of a polyphony which would be in a position to give form to truly new musical territory. The desired constructive unification could be realized only through the multiplicity of voices inclining toward and away from each other.

5. It is correctly demanded that instrumentation should be included in composition—indeed, that it be made a "parameter" of composing. However, what is meant by functional instrumentation? It is hardly possible to state that it can be defined in terms of certain formulae according to which tonal colors change, are intermixed, and then return as in a kaleidoscope; not even in those cases in which parallels exist between those formulae and others regarding intervalic and tempo relationships is this true. Constructive instrumentation is achieved rather by the composer who realizes through every tonal color—above all, however, through their arrangement in orchestral composition—every impulse of construction embraced by the composition, the comprehension of which is essential for the understanding of musical meaning. It is a procedure which does not—as the critic says—merely envelop music in an orchestral garment, but rather transforms its own articulation into that of sound. The principle of constructive instrumentation has nothing to do wtih the calculation of tonal colors, but rather with compositional clarity. In this regard, the orchestral scoring of Schoenberg—who today is by

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no means dead[1]—remains unequalled; Webern's arrangement of the six-voice ricercata from Bach's *Musical Offering* is a masterful example of this same ability. Rather than treating instrumentation as one parameter capable of mediation only abstractly along with other parameters, the composition must develop its instrumentation out of the meaning of the musical events themselves: this would make of instrumentation a true parameter, a concrete function of music. Such instrumentation would further benefit this function as a means of objectification—a necessity for the composition no longer sheltered by various schemes. The ability to instrument constructively depends, to be sure, upon competence in instrumetation per se. Every other use of the palette of possibilities is, however, nothing but frivolity.

6. The idea of complete pre-determination in composition is an illusion, for construction resulting in absolute clarity is simply not possible; nor would such a construction ever correspond to the resulting music. Therefore, composers should draw the consequences and renounce every thought of illusion. Nonetheless, the constructive principles achieved in musical material must be advanced further. This contradiction can be overcome only if the composer devotes his efforts to the relationship between construction and the music which appears in the score; this makes demands upon artistic ratio, if the gap between rational determination and that which is present for the senses is to be closed. Schoenberg demonstrated his awareness of this when he —as a matter of principle—developed the row out of a thematic concept—not the reverse. In his case, the primary musical impulse always gave rise to the constructive principle. The firm justification of this practice is demonstrated when the continuing construction does not permit adherence to this principle, but requires rather that the configuration be removed from the row. Every teacher of composition with a somewhat refined ear would be able to put his finger on the point at which this happens, indicating the compass-like measure, the angularity, and the arbitrariness of such secondary figures. With some exaggeration, it could be said that integrally composed musi consists generally only of such secondary figures. This is its weakness and today its most urgent task is the rediscovery of primary figures, the production of directness in universal mediation. There is no mediation at all without directness, just as great music—in the reverse process—tolerates nothing which is direct but not also mediated. Construction must, therefore, be preceded by an idea of the totality of the work and the disposition of the construction must agree with this idea. The idea must—no matter how athematic it might be—affirm musical nuclei—regardless of parameter—as

1. This seems an obvious rejoinder to Pierre Boulez, who concluded his contribution to a collection of essays prompted by Schoenberg's death as follows: "We are certainly indebted to him for his *Pierrot Lunaire*...; and for a few other outstanding works. It is time, however, that we did away with misunderstandings and contradictions; and time to learn from his errors. Let us then, without any wish to provoke indignation, but also without shame or hypocrisy, or any melancholy sense of frustration, admit the fact that *Schoenberg is dead*." *The Score* (May, 1952), p. 22. Boulez' view has become more moderate in the intervening quarter-century. —*Translator's note.*

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freely-produced before the actual composition can begin. Since these nuclei themselves cannot be understood as a priori subordinates to the principles of construction, it is impossible to prescribe definite norms for them—not even their twelve-tone character can be pre-established. From this perspective, the first four piano pieces from Schoenberg's opus 23 remain exemplary today: they work with basic configurations and are through-constructed; the basic configurations themselves, are "free" and that lends them a concreteness and flexibility, for the loss of which no compensation is offered by the later strict insistence upon the twelve-tones of the basic configurations, despite the advantages found in such adherence. Pre-determination would have to be embraced by freedom as well. The development of music in time, the essence of which is the continual production of the new rather than of that which has already been, contradicts pre-determination in itself. Pre-determination blasted music out of its own element—out of time; totally determined music would no longer be a matter of becoming, but only of mere existence, and its becoming within the framework of time would degenerate into an illusion—quite simply, into subjectivity. In conversation, Stockhausen—faced by the question of total determination—treated it restrictively through reference to the concept of "indeterminability," borrowed from physics to designate an irresistible impulse. However, this indeterminability is not a concession to the irrational imperfection which musical material extorts from the musical domination of nature; rather it designates the foundation of constructive determination. It is common knowledge that Schoenberg, in the first movement of his Violin Concerto—one of the most magnificent works of his mature years—made a slip in his treatment of the row; this error affects a lengthy section of the work, so that the movement can be called "incorrect" from the perspective of twelve-tone technique. Michael Gielen undertook an experiment, in which he corrected this section, substituting within it the right tones of the row. The result—quite plausibly—is that this correction proved impossible. This experiment, however, is not to be interpreted as a refutation of serial technique, to which the composition is indebted for the force of its structure, nor does the "error" make the musical phenomenon any less logical. It is rather that this error represents the breakthrough of that which is to be constructed by the construction itself and it is only this breakthrough which gives the construction its legitimacy.

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THE SOUL AND LIFE: THE YOUNG LUKACS AND THE PROBLEM OF CULTURE*

by György Markus

"Every serious human being has only one thought. Indeed, the term thought may not have a plural at all." —*Lukács*

"It took him no longer than a week to change from a Saul into a Paul." This is how Anna Lesznai, close friend of Georg Lukács, described the philosopher's conversion to Bolshevism in the year 1918.[1] This image of a sudden break not only crops up in biographical remarks by former disciples and friends; it is also one of the fundamental motifs of an ever-growing interpretive literature on Lukács' philosophical development. It is a view that has some justification. A review of Lukács' early intellectual career, at first sight, confirms this perception. At the by no means young age of 34, Lukács joined the Hungarian Communist Party in December of 1918. From then on, he devoted his whole life and work to the realization of the ideas of the communist movement, weathering all historical vicissitudes and disruptions of his personal life. His turn to communism did in fact put an astonishingly sudden end to his whole previous activity, which, in view of its influence upon contemporary letters, can hardly be labelled "immature" and "groping." However, Lukács' interest in the problems and alternatives posed by Marxism and socialism did not begin in 1918. Rather, they were present in his first major work, entitled *A modern drama fejlödésének története* (*The Development of Modern Drama*), and were to hold his attention for years to come. The study *Megjegyzések az irodalomtörténet elméletéhez* (*Remarks on a Theory of Literary History*), written in 1909, was by his own account an attempt to explain his "complicated and barely explicable" position towards historical materialism.[2] Nothing shows better the paradoxical nature of Lukács' turn to Marxism than the fact that prior to the conversion of 1918 his relation to Marxism, through repeated intellectual discussion had become ever more critical and, notably with respect to matters of practice, ever more resigned. To understand this paradox, one need only compare the relevant remarks of *Development of the Modern Drama* of 1909 with those in the essay

*English translation by Christian Lenhardt.

1. Quoted in David Kettler, "Culture and Revolution. Lukács in the Hungarian Revolution of 1918-19," *Telos*, 10 (Winter 1971), p. 69. For a bibliographical summary of Lukács' early work, see note 68 below.

2. Letter to the poet Mihály Babits of March 1910 (unpublished).

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Esztétikai kultura (*Aesthetic Culture*) written a year later, or with his evaluation of Marxism in *Halálos fiatalság* (*Deadly Youth*), written in 1916.

These matters become even more paradoxical when we look at the substance of the turn itself. Compare for instance the essay *A bolsevizmus mint etikai probléma* (*Bolshevism as an Ethical Problem*), published in December 1918, with *Taktika és Etika* (*Tactics and Ethics*), which dates from the months immediately preceding the council republic of 1919. In both works, the same problem is addressed and parallel thoughts, even identical formulations, can be found in them. Yet, while the first piece arrives at the conclusion that bolshevism poses an "ethical dilemma" which is fundamentally insoluble and while bolshevism is consequently rejected, the second essay resorts to a passionate "ought" in order to solve the dilemma in terms of active historical praxis.[3] "The choice between the two standpoints is, like any other ethical question, a matter of belief,"[4] Lukács wrote in the first of the two articles mentioned. It appears that the irrational hiatus between the two standpoints could only be bridged by an arbitrary decision.

Paradoxically, it is precisely the extraordinary and clearly visible acuity of this break which immediately points to the fact that the relation between what are generally seen as two distinct periods cannot be adequately understood if we use concepts like "discontinuity" or "hiatus." Yes and no are diametrical opposites; yet, if two standpoints facing each other clearly and explicitly negate each other, then they must in conformity with the nature of this relationship also have points of intimate contact. Where answers can be polarized opposites, the underlying question must be the same.

Indeed, a deeper analysis of the so-called early works reveals substantive theoretical agreement with the later ones of the Marxist period, an agreement which confirms the hidden line of continuity.[5] In this regard, the *Heidelberg Manuscripts on Aesthetics*, written between 1912 and the beginning of 1918, are especially important. These manuscripts, which represent the theoretically most comprehensive and important work of the young Lukács, contain some of the most essential ideas and categories of the late synthesis entitled *Die Eigenart des Aesthetischen*, particularly the concept of objectification, the dichotomy of "total man" and the "human whole," the category of the homogeneous medium, the notion of the work of art as complete totality, etc. Likewise, inasmuch as they characterize the world of the art work as a utopian reality adequate to man, the Heidelberg manuscripts contain the basic idea of the late, Marxist aesthetic concerning the defetishizing mission of art.

It would be misleading to think that my intention here is to replace the

3. For a fuller treatment, see Mihály Vajda, "A dialektika nyomaban" (In the footsteps of the dialectic), unpublished manuscript.

4. *Történelem ès osztalytudat* (*History and Class Consciousness*), Budapest 1971, p. 17.

5. For the subjective motives behind Lukács' turn, see his own references in the later works, in particular the prefaces in several volumes of selected works in Hungarian.

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generally held view of the discontinuity in Lukács' intellectual development[6] by another similarly one-sided view stressing continuity. It is simply impossible to deny the significance of the turn of 1918 which was ideologically so decisive, shaping the solution to each and every problem of theory. One could easily show that the two systematic works on aesthetics, despite their common theoretical assumptions, arrive at opposite conclusions and interpretations, precisely because of their embeddedness in divergent theoretical and ideological contexts. Again, one example must suffice to substantiate the point: The utopian function of art, i.e., its function of creating a reality adequate to man, is interpreted by the young Lukács as the "Luciferism" of art. Art posits harmony and fulfillment before, or without, redeeming man in actuality.

In view of this peculiar combination of similarities and contrasts, the continuity of certain motifs, even important ones, does not by itself tell us much about the relation between the two biographical periods. In order to understand Lukács' development as a thinker it is more important to consider the identity of the ways in which problems are raised in both periods, even though the answers may be quite contrary. The real connection between the *Heidelberg Manuscripts* and the late *Aesthetics* has to be seen in the fact that these two works, separated as they may be by half a century, are intended to solve one and the same theoretical problem, which they pursue with different conceptual tools and from the point of view of divergent ideological premises, arriving necessarily at contrary conclusions. Both works seek to determine the place and function of art in the system of human activities, its relation to every-day life or "lived reality," as the young Lukács called it, and its relation to those forms of activity and objectification through which the human species shapes and appropriates reality (art's relation to the fundamental kinds of "transcendental constitution," according to contemporary terminology). Behind this identity of the theoretical objective lies the problem whose solution constituted, for Lukács, something more than a purely intellectual task and which is the underlying problem of his whole life and work, namely the question as to the possibility of culture. The present essay is conceived as an attempt to study, however cursorily, Lukács from this point of view.

Culture was the "one and only" thought of Lukács' life. Is culture possible today? Throughout his life, Lukács' central concern was to provide an answer to this question and at the same time to contribute actively to the creation or realization of this possibility. This concept of culture includes more than is comprised in the term "high art" or philosophy; it is not just the problem of "high culture." The question of culture was always identical for Lukács with the question of *life*, or as he put it, with "meaning immanent in life."

6. Two works that I have relied on heavily in this and in other respects are Ferenc Feher, "Balázs Béla és Lukács György szövetsège a forradalomig" (The Alliance between Bela Balázs and Georg Lukács down to the Revolution), *Irodalomtörténeti Tanalmanyok*, 2-3 (1969); and Andrew Arato, "Lukács' Path to Marxism (1910-1923)," *Telos* 7 (Spring 1971).

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"Culture is the unity of life; it is a unifying force that intensifies and enriches life.... Every culture is a conquest of life, a forcible unification of all phenomena of life.... That is why we will always find the same things at the deepest level of analysis, no matter which part of the totality of life we may single out for consideration. In true culture everything becomes symbolic...."[7] A plurality of human beings and events becomes a meaningful totality through culture.[8] Culture assigns a vital and shared meaning to the most diverse facts of life thus guaranteeing their uniform interpretation within a practical world view. It is only in the framework of a culture that the unity of subject and object, individual and society, subjective inner conviction and objective external institutions, becomes possible. Culture does not eliminate or bracket these fateful conflicts but points the way to their resolution, thus "emancipating future progress from the sway of accident."[9] The alien character of high-culture forms like art, philosophy, etc., and the hostile attitude of life toward them can only be overcome by true culture. For the forms of high culture are nothing but "the becoming conscious, the coming to the surface of everything that had been lying dormant as a vague longing in the innermost depths of that which had to be given form."[10]

To put it differently, since his earliest beginnings as a thinker, Lukács conceived of the problem of culture as one concerning the possibility of a life free from alienation. Hidden behind this question lies however the passionate diagnosis of the cultural "crisis" of modern bourgeois life with its enmity toward culture. Moreover, there is an equally passionate rejection of bourgeois life itself. Lukács was not the only one to have this sense of crisis. It was a sense shared by Dilthey, Simmel and Weber, to mention only those thinkers whose influence on Lukács is beyond doubt. What is unique to Lukács is the sense of the depth of the contradictions, of the tragic vehemence of the struggle against them; unique is also the "pathos" of this century, the decade of "blissful peace." The whole of Lukács' "pre-Marxist" period is an uninterrupted struggle for a precise conceptual diagnosis of this "crisis" and its contradictions. By the same token, Lukács is concerned to find theoretical ways leading out of the crisis, or at least to find norms offering a guide to right conduct within it.

All through the early period this sort of diagnosis is coupled with a continuous parallelism between metaphysical-existential and historical analysis. Both approaches or, if you will, levels of analysis are taken up in succession in different works, sometimes even merging into each other in the same essay. This process of fusion makes a sharp separation of levels of analysis somewhat artificial. Lukács himself regularly and repeatedly tried to

7. G. Lukács, *Esztétikai Kultura* (Aesthetic Culture), (Budapest, 1913), pp. 12 and 14. The essay was reprinted in *Müvészet és Társadalom* (Art and Society), (Budapest, 1969).
8. Cf. *Theory of the Novel* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 147.
9. In *Soul and Form* (London, 1971), p. 47.
10. *Theory of the Novel*, p. 34.

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clarify the methodological relations between these two approaches,[11] without much success: unresolved, yet fruitful contradictions have persisted between the two types of analysis. Concealed behind the problem of methodological "parallelism," which Lukács never managed to solve in his early period, there lies a deeper ideological dilemma which differs from the methodological one. It concerns the question as to whether the actual state of things at the time was an expression of the existential-ontological tragedy of culture or simply an expression of its historical and therefore resovable crisis.

It is this ongoing intellectual struggle during Lukács' early period that distinguishes his work from his contemporaries. It is a struggle that never reached a point of theoretical rest. This is what is typical of Lukács during this period. The "development" of his thought at this time is difficult to trace, mainly for the reason that while his basic problems and intentions remained constant, the positive answers and solutions kept changing kaleidoscopically. Every work is an often exceedingly penetrating thought experiment developing a position which is remorselessly criticized in the next, sometimes even the same work. To mention only one example, the *Metaphysics of Tragedy* is one of the best known and most frequently analyzed studies of the young Lukács. Several critics, including Lucien Goldmann, have correctly pointed out the relationship between this essay and what later came to be known as existentialism. What is less well known, however, is the fact that Lukács almost at the same time, namely in the essay *Esztétikai kultura*, formulated a passionate critique of *Metaphysics of Tragedy*. What in the Paul Ernst piece had been called "life before the last judgment,"[12] was now labelled "the greatest frivolity. . . : because everything is permitted in view of a future, never-to-be-realized settling of accounts; because on the day of the last judgment everything that is weighed will be found wanting. . . and because the sympathy of eternal tragedy will dispense absolution for every frivolity."[13]

That is why the essay, in the technical meaning Lukács gave to the term, has to be looked upon as the "representative" genre of his early work. The study which opens *Soul and Form* sees the essay as a form of mediation between art and philosophy, conceptually expressing a world view that is based upon the immediate facts of life or their representation. The essay formulates a world view as lived experience or as a question of life, rather than as a conceptually grounded answer. "The essay is a judgment, but the essential, the value-determining thing about it is not the verdict (as is the case with the system) but the process of judging."[14] This element of polemical give

11. To mention only the most important of these attempts: "Megjegyzések az irodalomtörténet Elméletéhez" (Remarks on the Theory of Literary History), in *Müvészet és Tarsadalom* (Budapest, 1969), pp. 31-56; chapter 3 of the unpublished Heidelberg manuscript *Philosophie der Kunst: Geschichtlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit des Kunstwerks*, written 1912-1914; and the first sections in *Theory of the Novel*.

12. "The Metaphysics of Tragedy: Paul Ernst," in *Soul and Form*, p. 159.

13. *Esztétikai Kultura*, pp. 22-23.

14. "On the Nature and Form of the Essay," *Soul and Form*, p. 18.

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and take, at times even structures the form of the essay itself: It is no accident that some of the ideologically most important essays like the Sterne essay in *Soul and Form* and the essay entitled "Von der Armut am Geiste" (Of the Poverty of the Spirit) were written in dialogue form.

According to the terminology of the "representative" essays, which we will mostly draw upon in the following discussion, the basic concepts of the "philosophical," metaphysical-existential analysis are the concepts of "life" ("ordinary" life), "soul" (to which corresponds "real" or "living" life) and "forms."

Life is above all the "world of mechanical forces that are oblivious to man,"[15] a world of rigidified structures (institutions and conventions) hostile to man. There was a time when they were guided by purposeful reason, created by the soul. Now they are simply and necessarily existent external forces, or second nature, which "like first nature is only determinable as the epitome of known yet meaningless necessities." This world "is a complex of meaning that has become rigid and strange, no longer capable of shaping a realm of inwardness. It is a charnel-house of long dead inwardnesses,"[16] a close-knit maze of ineluctible necessities whose "basis...is contingent and meaningless:" it is the necessity of "being ensnared by a thousand threads in a thousand contingent relationships and combinations."[17]

The concept of life denotes both a type of social, "inter-human" objectivity and its corresponding subjectivity. The empirical individual of ordinary life is lonely and isolated, groping for ways to find the other. Because of the conventionality of forms of social interaction, however, the individual fails in its search, thus experiencing itself as a human being only in a peripheral way.[18] In this life only two fundamental types of behavior are possible: Man either drowns in a world of conventions, losing his personality, or escapes from the pressure of irrational external necessity by seeking refuge in pure inwardness. The second strategy of total abandonment to momentary moods, of protecting and enjoying the purity and independence of one's lived experience, is as self-abnegating as the first. "...Where everything supposedly comes from the inner realm, nothing comes from that inner realm. Moods can only be engendered by things of the external world. If somebody takes pleasure in a phenomenon of his own soul, or, in other words, when he has a beautiful mood, he is still just a passive observer of something which a fortunate circumstance caused to cross his path. Complete freedom is the most awful unfreedom."[19]

Finally, in "life" the antagonistic relationship between exteriority and interiority, between objectivity and subjectivity, never reaches a point of actual struggle such that one of the two principles emerges victorious. "To

15. "Von der Armut am Geiste," *Neue Blätter*, 2:5-6 (1912), p. 73.
16. *Theory of the Novel*, pp. 62 and 64.
17. *Soul and Form*, p. 157.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
19. *Esztétikai Kultura*, p. 16.

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claim [of ordinary life] that it is dissonant, would be to misjudge the situation. Dissonance is possible only in a system of sounds, meaning a world that already has unity. Disturbance, inhibition and chaos per se are not dissonant."[20] "Life is an anarchy of light and dark: Nothing is ever completely fulfilled in life, nothing ever quite ends; new, confusing voices always mingle with the chorus of those that have been heard before. Everything flows, everything merges into another thing, and the mixture is uncontrolled and impure; everything is destroyed, everything is smashed, nothing ever flows into real life. To live is to live something through to the end: life means that nothing is ever fully and completely lived through to the end. Life is the most unreal and unliving of all conceivable existences."[21] Ordinary life is the sphere of "mere existence" or inauthentic being.

Authentic being means the soul in a twofold sense. Firstly, in a metaphysical sense, the soul is the substance of the human world, the creative and formative principle of every social institution and every work of culture. Secondly, in an existential sense, soul refers to the authentic individual, the "nucleus" that gives to every individual intrinsic worth making him irreplaceable and unique. This second element of the concept of "soul" in Lukács, at least the Lukács of the "essay period," is encrusted with an unmistakable polemical accent, pointing straight at German classical philosophy, specifically the Hegelian notion of spirit. ". . .(S)urely subjectivity is the truth; the individual object is the only thing that is; the individual is the only true human being."[22] And in another passage: "Only that which is individual, only something whose individuality is carried to the utmost limit, is adequate to its idea—i.e., is really existent. That which is general, that which encompasses all things yet has not color or form of its own, is too weak in its universality, too empty in its unity, ever to become real."[23] And only such life is "essential" and "authentic" as can be achieved "through the lived experiences of a full and genuine selfhood, the self-experience of the soul. . ."[24]

The pointed dualism of "life" and "soul," of inauthentic and authentic being, probably constitutes the most typical aspect in the philosophy of the young Lukács. The term dualism is used in its explicitly metaphysical sense, because the substantiality of a subject that shapes the human world and history does not, for Lukács, imply that the inhuman and mechanical objectivity—originally created by the subject but now abandoned by it—is merely a distorted appearance. Inauthentic being, the world of phenomena of ordinary life, is juxtaposed to the "soul" as a principle equal to the latter in rank but not in value. Inauthentic being is a dynamic power having the weight of inertia and tending to repress everything. ". . .(O)nce it has entered

20. "Von der Armut am Geiste," *op.cit.*, p. 86.
21. *Soul and Form*, pp. 152-153.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
24. *Theory of the Novel*, p. 147.

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life, everything has its own existence independent of its progenitor and his purposes, whether they be useful or detrimental, good or evil.... We are dealing here with the notion of subsistence, with mere being as a power or value or as a category playing a decisive role in the organization of life as a whole.... The life [of every work] separates itself from its originator and from the aims he had in mind. It lives an independent life. As it grows, it develops into directions not anticipated by him; it may even turn against him, annihilating that which it was supposed to ground and support. Means become ends, and nobody knows in advance or after the fact what sorts of latent situational energies lie in wait in the things."[25] Thus, the concept of "ordinary," inauthentic life becomes a synonym of alienation, which is the metaphysical trait of human existence Lukács passionately rejected, knowing full well that it is inevitably given.

There is no need to document the relation between these Lukácsian views and the diverse currents of vitalist philosophy, especially that of Simmel. There are, however, essential differences of position which one must not overlook. These differences come into view when we look at the concept of soul. Mainstream *Lebensphilosophie* generally identified creative subjectivity, insofar as it was the opposite of the mechanical world of things and reified relations, with an irrational and uncommunicable psychic flow of lived experience, purged of all conceptuality. Lukács' hostility toward this view is not only motivated by his explicit and intransigent anti-psychologism.[26] He opposes that view also for deeper ideological reasons. As we saw, he understood this world of "pure inwardness" always as a typical form of inauthentic being and ordinary life. This, by the way, is also the basis of his rejection of any kind of impressionism both in art and other fields.[27] "Soul" is lived experience; put more precisely, soul can become lived experience; but it is by no means identical with the total flux or the sum of lived experience. In effect, then, soul means the highest possible intensification and unfolding of will powers,[28] abilities and "psychic energies" characteristic of every particular individual. Soul is that which man can become and which he should become, if he hopes to realize his authentic self. "Soul," in short,

25. *A Modern Drama Fejlödések Története* (Development of the Modern Drama) (Budapest, 1911), pp. 100-101. The notion of "mere existence" reappears later in "The Metaphysics of Tragedy: Paul Ernst," and in chapter 3 of the unpublished Heidelberg manuscript.

26. In his obituary on Dilthey in *Szellem* (Budapest, 1911), p. 253, Lukács singles out the latter's psychologism as the culprit that prevented Dilthey from bringing about a renaissance of philosophy.

27. This is most concisely formulated in "Az utak elvalták" (The Ways Have Parted), in *Esztétikai Kultura, op.cit.*

28. The point is made in the following passage: "...the essence of man with its immediate energy reveals itself only through his will and willful actions... Feeling and thought have fleeting and changeable forms. They are much more flexible and susceptible to external pressures than is will. As far as feelings and thoughts are concerned, man tends to be unsure to what extent they are truly his own (or have become so). The uncertainty evaporates only at the point where these feelings and thoughts are put to a test, that is, when they become elements of volition, giving rise to deeds." From *A Modern Drâma Fejlödések Története, op.cit.*, vol. I, pp. 12-13.

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means the "determination" or "destination" (*Bestimmung*) of the individual. This determination is turned toward the outside: on the world of things and other human beings. Authenticity, then, is nothing but the transformation of maximum of my abilities into deeds; it is a way of shaping everything that happens to me into a personal fate wherein I express my essence.

There is a certain flirtation with Fichtean terminology in our discussion. This is not accidental. For independent of any question of direct influence,[29] there is no doubt that the philosophy of the young Lukács from its inception had certain points of contact with the dialectic of Fichte (and Hegel). Man is not what he is but what he could be. That is why the dualism in Lukács' philosophy, which was discussed earlier, always signifies a dialectical struggle of opposite forces. Not only alienation but also the actual active struggle against it seem to him to be a "metaphysical" necessity.

It should be noted, of course, that Lukács at the same time tried indefatigably to overcome the fundamental subjectivism of vitalist philosophy as well as its consequent relativism. While authenticity means narcissistic pleasure of the isolated individual who accepts his isolation as an inevitable fact, the flood of lived experiences which are in principle inexpressible and incomparable, yet individual and true, devours any kind of value and value differentiation. "The I has externalized itself in the world, incorporating the latter through its moods. By the same token, however, the world has seeped into the I, and there was nothing which could have served as a barier between the two.... Both the rigidity of the things and the rigidity of the I came to an end, and as the facts were lost, so were the values. Nothing remains but individual and shared moods, of which no single one is privileged or more important."[30] However, if authentic life as the active manifestation of the soul means the self-realization of an inimitable personality forging its life into a totality, then this self-realization at the same time signals the fact that something has been attained which already lies beyond the purely individual. Self-actualization is the metamorphosis of the possibility of human action (*Tat*) into a fact (*Tatsache*), which nobody can repeat but which nonetheless is normative and exemplary for all. "The soul has the task of divesting itself from everything that is not truly its own, forming itself into true individuality. Yet, that which it forms also constitutes something more than pure individuality. That is why such a life is exemplary, for the actualization of one individual implies the possibility of actualization for all."[31] The work of art can only come from this great effort of the self, this enormous struggle of the soul with life, by which the individual achieves the truly universal, that which is forever collective and absolute. "Redemption is born of our impoverishment and limitation."[32]

29. Already in 1911, Lukács makes the point that Fichte is the common source of Stirner's and Marx's philosophies. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 153.
30. *Esztétikai Kultura*, p. 33.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
32. "Leo Popper—Ein Nachruf," in *Pester Lloyd*, December 19, 1911.

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For Lukács, the work represents a type of objectivity or "givenness" which does not subsist by virtue of the inertia of its "mere existence." Rather, it remains true as value and meaning; it refers to those objectifications that have grown out of history, while having assumed timeless-eternal meaning, insofar as they can forever be imbued with new life and new meaning. Such objectifications are the perfect works of art, the great systems of philosophy and religion and science, in their progressive development. (It is self-understood that Lukács focused mainly on the work of art.)

This then is the point where the philosophy of the young Lukács unequivocally differs from the mainstream vitalist currents of his time, seeking to establish a connection with the traditions of German classical philosophy. The controversial point is the question of the "absolute spirit" and, more generally, the question of objectifications.[33] This comes out clearly in the review of Croce of 1915. While according to vitalism it is fundamentally impossible and unnecessary to go beyond the merely individual, Lukács recognizes in the cultural objectifications of absolute spirit the indubitable proof that such a transcendence is indeed possible.

The "work" (and the "form" which explains its possibility) is a guarantee for the fact that the struggle against the mechanical meaningless and isolating facticity of "life," the struggle for a meaningful order entailing true communication among men, is necessary; it even has a chance of succeeding. "Dissolution—the redemptive power of form—comes only at the end of all trials and suffering. It lies in the belief, which is beyond proof, that the divergent paths of the soul are destined to meet at an extremely distant end-point. It is the belief that they must converge because they went forth from the same center. Form is the only thing that confirms this belief, since it is a living actualization, fuller of life than all life."[34]

The work, and more specifically that type which was most important to Lukács, i.e., the work of art, grows out of life. This means two things. One, as an objectification created by an empirical person, the art work necessarily bears all the marks of its time. Two, in terms of its contents, the work of art is essentially nothing but the representation and peculiar formation of life. How is it possible that something which is universally valid and effective originates in an ephermeral, chaotic material without significance and meaning? If there is no way *in* life that leads from one soul to another, how can we then build a lasting eternal link between all of mankind, *using* life as mere "stuff?" This is the ultimate point of departure for the philosophical analysis pursued in the two systematic works on aesthetics by the young Lukács, namely the

33. In this paper I wanted to outline the enduring structural features of the philosophy of the young Lukács. Omitted from consideration are the more intricate aspects of his development. Generally speaking, this development saw a gradual dissociation from *Lebensphilosophie*. The last major systematic work of the pre-Marxist period, the *Aesthetic* of 1916-1918, is decidedly Kantian in outlook, even though Lukács' reading of Kant is sharply dualistic. Lukács acknowledges this in the first chapter, where he positively assesses the work of Rickert and Lask.

34. *Esztétikai Kultura*, p. 28.

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Philosophie der Kunst (1912-1914) and the *Aesthetik* (1916-1918). Both address themselves to the question: "There are works of art—but how are they possible?"

This question receives an answer in terms of the concept of "form," undoubtedly derived from Kant. The scope of the notion of "form" is more comprehensive than that of the notion of the "work." For Lukács, form has the function of constituting meaning. The many facts and elements of life can be arranged and combined into *meaningful* structures (*Sinngebilde*) by means of form. Accordingly, the concept of form not only relates to the sphere of the "absolute" spirit but also to that of the "objective" spirit. Every specific form is the soul's determinate "mode of response" to life. In every particular form the soul becomes pure and homogeneous, as it is oriented to one single value. On the other hand, the soul, related as it is to this one single value, by means of the form orders the "merely existent" chaos of life, imbuing it with meaning. Form as a principle of objectification, as a principle validating objectification, is also the principle of mediation between soul and life. However, form can never definitively negate their dualism, as we will see shortly.

The art work is only one of these "formations" of life.[35] The artist must select some of the threads of the infinitely proliferating stuff of life. Out of the immeasurable sea of reasons and motives, the artist must pick a few such that they remain intimately tied to each other, making up a closed and perfectly homogeneous system which can be viewed from one single point. In its abstract conception, the art work is nothing other than a "system of schemata...mediated by lived experience, a system so complete and self-sufficient that its effect depends only on the immanent relations among its elements."[36] The scheme governing the selection of elements of life according to ways which vary with artistic genre, style, etc., is the *aesthetic form*. Aesthetic form is "the form that orders life in a work by bringing parts of life into a completed whole. It is the form that prescribes speed, rhythm, fluctuation, density and liquidity, hardness and softness; that accentuates what is deemed important while removing what is deemed unimportant; that places some things at the center, others into the background, structuring each group within itself."[37] Through this process of formation the amorphous chaos of life becomes, in the work, an ordered cosmos. It becomes a new life,

35. "Plurality" and "autonomy" of the forms are basic ideas in the philosophy of the young Lukács. According to the *Aesthetic*, this problem supplied Lukács with the rationale for rejecting Hegel's philosophy. In fact, the manuscript already reveals Lukács' interest in a critique of Hegel. Hegel's monism and panlogism rest on the assumption that all types of transcendental constitution can be reduced to one: the logical-theoretical. More precisely, the other types can be dialectically derived from the one type. In contrast, Lukács describes the (Kantian) axiom of his own system as the "complete independence and irreducible autonomy of all types of constitution." Cf. chapter 1 of *Aesthetik*, "The Essence of Aesthetic Constitution" (unpublished).

36. *Philosophie der Kunst*, chapter 2. This chapter was published in German in *Arion*, 5 (1972), p. 39.

37. "Megjegyzések az irodalomtörténet elméletéhez," *op.cit.*, p. 38.

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which in contrast to ordinary life is now unequivocal, lending itself to being encompassed by the human eye. Every art work entails a kind of glancing at and through life. Art therefore is the process of rendering life meaningful and conscious, overcoming the vicissitudes of life situations and life contexts. It is a "judgment upon life"[38] as well as the "domination over things."[39] The being of art is proof of the transcendability of ordinary alienated life.

This holds true in relation to objectivity and subjectivity. Every form embodies a vision, a manner of interpreting life immediately and sensuously. Such an "interpretation" is, however, not a subjective standpoint toward life; rather, it finds its expression in the objective structures of the art work, which is itself a schema of creatively arranging life, directly capable of arousing lived experience. That is why form is the principle of combination and communication between human beings, specifically between the creator and the receptor. "Form is what is fundamentally social about literature... It is a kind of link, the only true connection between the creative artist and his public, and therefore the only category of literature that is both social and aesthetic."[40] By virtue of their structure, i.e., the immanent arrangement of the life stuff they depict, the perfect works of art both realize a great form and inspire a vision of life, an interpretive evaluation of life, in short, a *Weltanschauung*. Their irresistible evocative power tends to awaken that vision in every receptor. This explains the universal and timeless truth of art as well as its eternal effect on posterity.

Every timeless work of art and of culture testifies to the domination of the soul over life, and to the attempted negation of alienation. However, art works cannot by themselves solve the immediate problems of life which arise from the dualism between soul and life. Art transcends the alienation of ordinary life without abolishing it. While art works spring from life, they also necessarily and quite abruptly deviate from it precisely because they have the quality of a perfect self-contained cosmos. The work of art constitutes a new life. Once created, and because of its immanent perfection-in-itself, the art work loses all relations with the world that exists outside of it.[41] Nor can it have such a relation. That is why the relation between the art work and life (the reception of art) can only be the momentary touching of two different spheres through which the inauthentic individual of "life" fails to find redemption. The work of art puts the receptor in the position of being able to get a glimpse of the meaning of life, without making it possible for him to order his own empirical life accordingly, filling it with meaning.

Nor can art get rid of the inadequacy of interhuman communication which tends to isolate individuals. One reason for this is the necessarily elitist quality of artistic messages (the concept of "genius" is one of the basic categories of

38. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
39. *Esztétikai Kultura*, p. 17.
40. "Megjegyzések az irodalomtörténet elméletéhez," p. 36.
41. This is the point of departure for Lukács' running critique of naturalism. See especially *A Modern Drama...*, chapters 7-10, and *Philosophie der Kunst*, chapter 2 (unpublished).

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the young Lukács). The other reason has to do with the inherent nature of the artistic message itself. The art work brings about a universally true connection between creator and receptor, since this connection is exclusively supported by the form objectified in the work. For that very reason the connection can never be substantively adequate. For one thing, the *Weltanschauung* objectively embodied in and expressed by the work has no necessary connection with the views and intentions of its creator (intention and the finished work, according to the *Aesthetik*, are separated by an "irrational leap"). For another, those lived experiences evoked by the work are *ipso facto* the receptor's own and do not in any way correspond to the lived experience of the creator. "To be able to find oneself immediately in a work and to be touched by it at a deep layer of one's personality—this is the mechanism upon which its timeless, repetitive effect rests. But this excludes the possibility of achieving a community of creators and receptors in terms of their respective lived experience. The misunderstanding that was merely a *vérité de fait* as far as the reality of lived experience is concerned, in art becomes a *vérité éternelle*."[42] The substantive inadequacy of processes of communication in everyday life, this "misunderstanding," does not come to an end in art. Art only makes it eternal. Misunderstanding, originally an empirical category, becomes a constitutive one.

Thus, the mediation between life and soul, as represented by the cultural objectifications of the "absolute spirit," becomes the starting point of new tragic conflicts. One of these is what Lukács calls the "tragedy of the artist." The most important aspect of this tragedy has already been mentioned; it has to do with the "unredeemed condition" of the artist or, in other words, the fact that "all the perfection artists embody in their work, or the lived experience flowing from them into the work, remains in vain. Their muteness is greater than that of the people who remain imprisoned in themselves and in ordinary life. Their works constitute the highest achievement of man, but in creating them artists become the most wretched and unredeemed human beings of all."[43]

This, then, is the way in which Lukács philosophically grounds what at the beginning of the present study was posited as a mere supposition: The problem of culture is not identical with the question of "high culture," nor can the crisis of culture be resolved in the high-cultural domain alone. The guarantee offered by the great cultural objectifications—that the struggle against the alienation of ordinary life is not in vain—turns out to be spurious. It is no more than a hope deprived of any proof that the actual purpose of the struggle can be achieved. The big question regarding the possibility of culture, to use the philosophical terminology of the young Lukács, cannot be reduced to a search for the conditions of eternal, objective forms which secrete themselves from the stuff of life. Rather, the question primarily turns

42. *Philosophie der Kunst*, chapter 2. In a general way, the first two chapters of this book deal quite systematically and deeply with the problems raised here.

43. *Ibid.* See also *Arion*, 5 (1972), p. 46.

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on the possibility of forming *life itself,* however ephemeral that form may be.

This question is at the bottom of the *ethics* of the young Lukács.[44] In our own context we can only touch on this complex of problems from the viewpoint of very general questions.

Generally speaking, we can say that wherever Lukács raises this problem systematically (he articulates it clearly on several occasions), his answer tends to be *negative.* This is clearest in the *Philosophie der Kunst,* where he states that the ethical formation of life is impossible because the I that is constituted by the moral will not only cannot reach the facts of the outside world but cannot permeate the totality of the soul either. It is even impossible to transform the process of inner life into "destiny," that is, to transform it into a meaningful totality in accordance with the moral values of the person. "Faced with such facts, the purely ethical stylization of life cannot be maintained, since such a stylization can neither annihilate nor permeate the material surrounding it. As soon as ethical stylization presumes to form the totality of the external world, it becomes an allegory, a form that is inadequate to its material."[45] At this point Lukács refers, and justly so, to his essay on Kierkegaard where he had already delineated a similar position. The same goes for the "Metaphysics of Tragedy," where he states that authentic, "real" life is "always impossible in the midst of empirical life... No one could live at such heights—at the height of one's own life and its ultimate possibilities. One has to fall back into numbness. One has to deny life in order to live."[46] It is only a select group of tragic personalities that enjoys the unity of fate and life, inwardness and event, meaning and being; and even they enjoy it only for a moment. "Such a moment is a beginning and an end. Nothing can succeed it or follow upon it, nothing can connect it with ordinary life. It is a moment; it does not signify life, it *is* life—a different life opposed to and exclusive of ordinary life."[47] The struggle for culture, the eternally active longing of man "to transform the narrow peak of his existence into a wide plane with the path of his life winding across it, and his meaning into a daily reality"[48]—all this is tragic and hopeless. One must never give up this struggle, however, because it is not in vain: from it results the great moral examples as well as the man-made, eternally valid works marking the peaks of our existence, our possibilities and the realization of truly human dimensions of life. This struggle, however, cannot in principle achieve its immediate aim: The "crisis" of culture is only a phenomenal reflection of the metaphysical tragedy of human existence.

Besides this view, there is in the early works always another perspective suggesting that the formation of life through culture is possible after all. This optimistic answer as a rule emerges in less systematic contexts than the

44. Agnes Heller has studied this question more closely in her *Jenseits der Pflicht* (forthcoming).
45. *Philosophie der Kunst,* chapter 2.
46. *Soul and Form,* p. 153.
47. *Ibid.,* p. 158.
48. *Ibid.,* p. 162.

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opposite view. It crops up either in the course of historical and sociological analyses that are more particular in kind (I shall deal with them later, referring here only to the essay on Storm, which in a sense is a counterpoint to the Kierkegaard essay and which sees the "formation" of life in the light of a bourgeois ethic of calling and duty) or it crops up in allusively sketched "utopias" which to some extent determined the ideological coloration of the early works. The concrete content of these utopias, incidentally, changes sometimes in one and the same work.[49] To mention only one example, in the *Theory of the Novel* one can find two entirely different utopias side by side in seemingly perfect harmony. On the one hand, there is the utopia that is reminiscent of Wilhelm Meister, stressing the inner community and harmonious cooperation of people who actively restructure the objective social world in accordance with their aims.[50] On the other hand, there is the utopia of Dostoevskyan inspiration, the prophecy of a "pure soul-reality," where every social determinism and form is left behind, the prophecy of a "new world" in which the duality between Ego and World has been abolished in favor of an immediate connection between souls beyond all objectifications.[51] Despite the differences in these utopias, there is the

49. For more on the utopias of the young Lukács, cf. the essays by Feher and Heller cited above in notes 6 and 44.

50. Cf. *Theory of the Novel*, pp. 132-134 and 143.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153. See also "Halálos fiatalsag," *Magyar irodalom, magyar kultura* (Budapest, 1970), pp. 113-116. In order to understand the role that the "Dostoevsky utopia" played in Lukács' intellectual development, one must keep in mind that the outbreak of the war brought about a short-lived turn to irrationalism, which was also a partial return to and resuscitation of an earlier vitalist position. This comes out most clearly in the correspondence with Paul Ernst, to whom Lukács writes on April 14, 1915: "The power of structures seems to be increasing constantly, assuming an actuality for most people which is more living than the truly existent. But—and this for me is *the* experience of the war—we must not admit that. Again and again we have to emphasize that the only entity which has essence is us, our social and even the soul's eternal aprioristic objectivations, are, to use Ernst Bloch's beautiful metaphor, only paper money whose value depends on whether or not it can be redeemed in gold. Nobody can deny the real power of the structures. However, to imbue every power with metaphysical dignity—a tendency in German thought since Hegel—is to commit a deadly sin against spirit." Replying to comments by Ernst, Lukács writes on May 4, 1915: "Your remark that the state is a part of the self is correct. What I do not accept is the notion that the state is a part of the soul. Everything to which we have any kind of relationship is a part of our self (including the object of mathematics). But the self which 'creates' these objects (in the sense that reason has a synthetic function) thus binding them to itself, is an *abstract* methodological concept. Thus when we say that the objects partake of the self we are talking about a methodological relationship which holds only in the realm of methodology. It is a mistake to convert the self into a soul, however, for this would mean to reify 'structures' making them metaphysical because every substantiation of the subject implies also that a corresponding object becomes substantial. Truly speaking, *only* the soul has metaphysical reality. In saying this, I am not being solipsistic. The problem is precisely one of finding ways that lead from one soul to another." A large part of this correspondence has been published in *A MTA II. Osztályanak Közlelményei*, vol. 2a (Budapest, 1972).

This sort of irrationalistic denial of historical objectivations has left no trace in the *Aesthetik*, which Lukács began work on in 1916. There we find a clear and consistent continuation of the developmental tendencies discussed previously: the irrationalistic turn, reflecting the direct influence of mysticism in its philosophical form, turned out to be only a brief aberration. The biographical literature in Hungarian (as yet mostly unpublished) by Béla Balázs, Anna Lesznai and other friends of Lukács seems to make entirely too much of the mystical irrational side of his views. Their judgment about Lukács seems to be colored as much by their own intellectual preferences as by what Lukács actually thought.

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common aspect of a belief in the possibility of a humane world where the deep chasm between the innermost inclinations and strivings (the "destination") of man and the objective structures of external social being would vanish and where the estrangement between I and Thou, which condemns individuals to endless solitude, would find an end. This is the belief in the possibility of a culture that pervades and homogenizes the everyday life of all human beings. The great variety of these utopias can be taken as a sign that this belief on the part of the young Lukács during the entire pre-Marxist period was not based on a clearly formulated social program, nor on a concrete historical perspective. The repeated emergence of these "utopias," paralleled as they are by a philosophical discussion that seeks to prove the "metaphysical impossibility" of culture, clearly shows the existence of a typical and constant trait of Lukács' intellectual world: They highlight his passionate negation of alienated, "uncultured" reality, which is unable in the most emphatic sense of the word to accommodate itself within such an inevitably alienated condition of the world.

Up to this point, we have tried to retrace the steps of Lukács' metaphysical-existential analysis of alienated life and of the modern hostility to culture. As mentioned before, this discussion goes hand in hand with another type of analysis which in part supplements and in part contradicts the first. The second type aims at interpreting the same problems and facts as historically grown and socially determined temporal phenomena. Its accent is on historical (sociological or teleological) interpretation. Seen in this light, the crisis of culture appears as an essential feature of modern bourgeois society, determined partly by the latter's economic and class structure.

The conceptual background frame of this interpretation is given by the teleological juxtaposition of closed, organic societies (particularly those of Greek antiquity) and open, mechanical bourgeois society. Such terms are used explicitly in *The Theory of the Novel.* But we can go as far back as *The Development of the Modern Drama,* and we will find there already the beginnings of this historical dualism. The whole structure of the book on the modern drama rests on the dichotomy between ancient and modern drama, which is explained in terms of logical categories. Lukács considered the Greek city state to be a historical social order where culture had attained a kind of abiding actuality in that the polis as an organic community reflected the "common possession of ethical values covering all important aspects of life."[52] There was in the polis a "powerful ideology tolerating neither debate nor doubt," an ideology which people no longer perceived as being ideological because it was a unified world view. It was "so exclusively emotional in kind . . . that it seemed to contain no value elements at all."[53] It is this "mono-ethical" aspect of antiquity—its tendency to suffuse everyday life and the opinions of people with the pervasive organizing power of "culture"—that

52. *A Modern Drama . . ., op.cit.,* p. 196.
53. *Ibid.,* p. 173.

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enables the individual to perceive the world as a home where the particular phenomena and the order as a whole are given a clear, homogeneous and perceptible meaning. "Fate" manifesting itself in the incalculability of external events and in the irrationality of the actors can in some cases "shake the solid foundations" of this universal order. But in so doing, fate only generates a temporary turbulence which is soon reabsorbed and smoothed over by the motionless surface of culture, which looks "as though nothing had happened to it."[54] The "self-contained" quality of this world is also evident in that antiquity did not undergo constant change of the material and intellectual forces of production; nor did it reach the same degree of individuality as modern bourgeois society. It was a closed world extending no farther than the boundaries of the respective community. It was in a sense a bound world. The hierarchical system of human relations and the station of the individual within it were laid down in and reaffirmed by the situational force of age-old traditions.[55] However, since these relations were organic, "claiming the whole personality of the individual," and inseparable from his personality, the individual did not experience them as ties. On the contrary, they gave weight and meaning to his activities. "In short . . . once upon a time, life was itself individualistic. Today it is human beings who are individualistic. One could even say that it is the convictions and expectations of human beings that are individualistic. At an earlier time, ideology was integrative in that it made people believe that their embeddedness in relations was a natural part of the order of things. Every detail of concrete life gave them a chance, as it were, to extrude their personalities into deeds and things. Such an individualism was spontaneous and unbroken, whereas modern individualism . . . is conscious and problematic."[56]

Bourgeois society irrevocably dissolves the personal nature of interhuman relations and dependencies, destroying all the ties typical of closed societies. No doubt this process of dissolution has created its own values (the expansion of human productivity and inwardness do constitute positive values in the view of Lukács). The price, however, that has to be paid for this change is the fact that new impersonal and reified ties have been created in the place of the old ones, resulting in man's dependence on a system of dead institutions which in turn is based on commodity and money relations and which is becoming so complicated that nobody can understand its function. "Modern life frees man from many old ties, leaving him in a position where he experiences any residual ties as fetters. At the same time, modern life sets up a whole new set of abstract and more complicated ties around the individual."[57] While "man's autonomy *vis-à-vis* other men is continually strengthened,"[58] his life is "increasingly governed by relationships to things

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

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external to him." Human "life is the totality of man's relation to things."[59] As the individual becomes problematic to itself, so does the world become problematic to it. Individual lives and destines are determined by a vast, meaningless, yet logical maze of objects and their effects. In place of a universal ethical order we have "modern fate...which consists of a narrow and fiercely logical connectedness of things (institutions, ignorance of the other and of life, life situations, genetic inheritance, etc.). These things appear relative and contingent when we look at them in isolation. There is no point in trying to understand the uselessness or falseness of individual parts; like chains in a causal link, they have some inherent power to effect something, irrespective of whether their being is justified or not."[60] Lawlike regularities which are not permeated by reason and which are indifferent to human judgment govern the course of the world, a world which has ceased to be man's home.

After the decomposition of relations which appeared natural and organic, the relations between individuals are mediated by competition. The individual rejects every personal dependence, trying to assert itself. However, for his personality to come into its own, he must assert it in relation to and against another person, who in turn seeks to secure his personal autonomy. "One of the greatest antinomies of individualism consists in...not being able to conceive of the assertion of personality without the repression of another personality..."[61] This antagonistic relation among individuals necessarily engenders a growing isolation and loneliness of each and every one of them. "Modern man is much more lonely than traditional man. This proposition is so obvious as to require no elaboration... The authentic personality of the individual is a lonely island in a roaring ocean. There is no voice that penetrates to the island from outside without being distorted by the noise of the sea. Muteness is the result. The other can only try to gesticulate with longingly outstretched arms, but his gestures are bound to be misunderstood."[62] Likewise the continued clash of wills that oppose, destroy and misunderstand one another can only give rise to a result which nobody intended or willed, but which is determined by the abstract logical necessity of the conditions of human life.

Apart from the clash between individuality and the objective external conditions, there is also the tendency of these conditions to bring about a leveling and homogenizing of all the activities and life phenomena of the individual. One of the most important symptoms of the "problematic" status of the modern individual is the fact that the tendency toward increased individualization is intimately tied up with the opposite tendency toward leveling.[63] Governed by competitive forces, economic development is based

59. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 453.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-166.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

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upon a growing fragmentation and division of labor, alienating the individual from his activity, which becomes ever more abstract. "The nature of the modern division of labor (as seen from the vantage point of the individual) is perhaps best characterized by saying that it frees work from the irrational, hence only qualitatively determinable faculties of the worker, while at the same time ordering individual activity in accordance with objective criteria of utility which have no direct relation to the personality of the worker... The relationship between the worker and his work tends to become increasingly loose. Fewer and fewer elements of the worker's personality are being projected onto his work, which no longer requires such a projection. Work thus attains an objective being separate from the personality of the individual. The latter's personality is now forced to reveal itself in areas other than work."[64] Since increased individuality can no longer find expression in real activity, it tends to become repressed and internalized. Individuality thus becomes empty inwardness as well as the cult of inwardness, renouncing any attempt at actively shaping the process of "external" events, including one's own fate.

The crisis of culture is the necessary outcome of this historical state of affairs. Culture in the true sense of the word ceases to be possible in the bourgeois world. The limits to the possibility of culture are objective: In the framework of relations constituted by the "anarchy of production" with its abstract and irrational necessities, no universal purpose or meaning can be shown to exist. The objective, inhuman laws governing these relations cannot be reduced to a uniform world view of the subject. Yet, because of that, the bourgeois world is also subjective in that the individuals recognize as valid only their autonomy and their own aims, thus resisting all tendencies to subsume their subjectivity under a universally shared outlook or a common sentiment.

Without claiming to have exhausted the matter, we have outlined Lukács' views on the social and historical origins of the cultural crisis as evidenced by the *Development of the Modern Drama*, his first major work, finished in 1909. We have tried to show that there are considerable similarities between the "philosophical" and historical analyses. It should not be difficult to make sense of the work on modern drama in the terms suggested above: it is a socio-historical explanation of the same kinds of problems Lukács was dealing with under the metaphysical-existential label of "ordinary," inauthentic life. These similarities in the problematic occasionally shade over into matters of detail. Thus, for instance, the problem of the "tragedy of the artist" is viewed in historical perspective as a historically specific paradox of the situation and role of the modern artist, forced as he is to create universal cultural values in a world without community and culture. The possibility of a homogeneous world view—the prerequisite of art and of its impact on others—today is something the artist has to provide himself; in every work he tries anew to

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.

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create such a world view, his only tool being art forms with which he tries to make art plain to the receptor. If he succeeds in this, his work is once and for all cut loose from the world of everyday life (including his own life), opposing the latter as an unnegatable and transcendent other. The "tragedy of the artist" results from the fact that "something became a question of art which never had been a question of art before and which should never have become a question of art."[65]

This preliminary discussion has tried to uncover the contradictory dualism and interwovenness of metaphysical and socio-historical levels of interpretation and analysis which Lukács employed throughout his pre-Marxist period in his attempt to explain modern alienation in terms of a crisis of culture. (It would be tedious to prove that the historical-sociological analysis of the early Lukács reflects the influence of Marx refracted by the prism of Simmel's interpretation of Marx). It was mentioned that Lukács himself frequently and explicitly posed the question as to the relation between these two modes of investigation and their logical compatibility. It is a question that is central to some of his writings. This is not the place to examine the answers given by Lukács to this quesiton. They all point in the same direction, though they do differ in the details, at times essential ones. We have to content ourselves with the statement that the problem was deeper and more comprehensive than the young Lukács had thought. The works which deal with this problem and which I have referred to above as a rule fail to go beyond the *methodological* aspect of the question or simply some elements of it. (The central object of these studies is the relationship between an aprioristic-aesthetic and a sociological-historical concept of form.) However important Lukács' reflections on this issue may have been, there seems to be more to the contradiction between the two methods of study than simply their methodological aspect: What is at least implied here is that Lukács was at the point of considering diverse, partly contradictory attempts to find a solution to the crisis of culture.

Of course, this argument is not to be understood in the vulgar sense that an understanding of the crisis of culture as a historical phenomenon—in contrast to its metaphysical interpretation—necessarily implies a historical solution to the crisis. To argue along these lines would be to commit a *non sequitur*. In terms of their concrete content, the socio-historical analyses, to the extent that they raise this question at all, essentially point to solutions which are no different from those reached in the course of a philosophical analysis of the antinomies already mentioned. In the last analysis, the historical works are not a single bit more "optimistic" than the philosophical essays or the systematic writings on philosophy. The difference lies in the approach to the question.

As we have seen, the question as to the possibility of culture, or as to the extent to which life is formable, appears mainly as an ethical problem in the

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-197.

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"philosophical" writings. In these works, the problem is one of moral conduct, or more loosely, of the way in which the individual lives his life in a context of autonomy.

As we can glean from his correspondence, some of which has been preserved, Lukács' interest in early 1918 begins to shift to the field of ethics, more precisely, to the relationship between ethics and politics.[66] We are probably justified in saying that the dualism dealt with in this paper must be perceived as a "limiting problem" of the development of the young Lukács. The antinomy of the two types of necessity—"the one which flows without cause from the inside, and the other which flows meaninglessly outside"[67]—both of them implicit in the early works since the beginning, gradually become an explicit and conscious problem for theory. Seen in this light, Lukács' conversion in 1918, his turn to Marxism, does not constitute a break or an irrational hiatus in his intellectual development. Instead, it must be seen as an attempt to find the theoretical answer and the practical solution to the question which in the last analysis had fuelled his entire early development.[68]

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66. The first important document by Lukács, reflecting his interest in this problem, is his contribution to the debate on conservative and progressive idealism in the Hungarian Academy of the Social Sciences. Cf. "A konzervativ és progressziv idealizmus vitája," in *Utam Marxhoz* (My Path to Marx) (Budapest, 1971), vol. I, pp. 177-186.

67. *Soul and Form*, p. 168.

68. In 1906-07 Lukács began work on his first major study, *The Development of the Modern Drama*. The manuscript earned him a prize awarded by the Kisfaludy Society but was not published until 1911, after Lukács had made substantial revisions in the text. *Remarks on a Theory of Literary History* (cf. note 11 above) both presupposes and continues the analysis of the drama book. The so-called "essay period" covers the years 1908-11, when Lukács published all the pieces assembled in *Soul and Form* (Hungarian edition: 1910, German edition: 1911) and *Aesthetic Culture* (1913), as well as some of the articles that later appeared in the volume on Béla Balázs (Hungarian edition: 1918). The essays in *Soul and Form* and *Aesthetic Culture* were deliberately selected by Lukács so as to form a kind of ongoing debate, as was pointed out earlier. The volume entitled *Aesthetic Culture*, though less well known than *Soul and Form*, also contains at least two important articles, namely "The Ways Have Parted" and "Of the Poverty of the Spirit" (cf. note 15 above), that should be understood by anyone desiring to understand the early Lukács. In 1912, Lukács started work on his systematic *Philosophy of Art*, eventually interrupted by the First World War. The portion of the manuscript that was finished before 1914 comprises three chapters, and consists of 450 typewritten pages.

Late in 1914, Lukács planned to do a large monograph on Dostoevsky. As can be gleaned from a hand-written outline, he wanted, among other things, to touch on questions like religion and atheism, state, revolution, socialism, and terror. This work also was interrupted in 1915, whereupon Lukács published the first introductory chapter as an essay with the title "The Theory of the Novel." In 1916, Lukács returned to the *Philosophy of Art* in order to round it out systematically. In the meantime, however, his conception of the work as a whole had changed so radically that he started all over again. Only the second chapter of the original version was supposed to have been incorporated (probably after revisions) in the new manuscript, which was now renamed *Aesthetik*. In 1918, four chapters of the *Aesthetik* were finished, having about the same overall length as the *Philosophy of Art* manuscript. Chapter 3 of the *Aesthetik* ("Die Subjekt-Objekt Beziehung in der Aesthetik") was separately published in *Logos*, 1917. In May of 1918 Lukács submitted the entire (but incomplete *Aesthetik*, which by then had grown to five chapters, to the University of Heidelberg as his *Habilitationsschrift*. Rickert and M. Maier read and commented on the thesis, but then events in Hungary intervened so that an oral defense never took place.

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THE CONCEPT OF TOTALITY IN LUKACS AND ADORNO

by Martin Jay

At a conference dedicated to the memory of George Lichtheim, it is a risky undertaking indeed to attempt an analysis of the relationship between Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School. For in so doing, one must traverse much of the same ground that Lichtheim crossed with such agility in *From Marx to Hegel* and elsewhere.[1] Rather than trying to match the integrative sweep and synthetic power which characterize the essays in that collection, as so much of Lichtheim's work, I have set myself the more modest task of focusing on one facet of that relationship which seems central to an understanding of the development of Marxist Humanism in this century. The issue I have chosen is the different uses of the concept of totality in the work of Lukács and Theodor W. Adorno, who represents the most radical antipode to Lukács among the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists.[2] More specifically, my concern will be with the implicit clash between *History and Class Consciousness*[3] and *Negative Dialectics* and its implications for Marxist theory today.[4] Although many of the same questions were treated in the aesthetic writings of both men —Lukács in fact first used totality in *The Theory of the Novel*[5]—limitations of space preclude an examination of the implications for Marxist aesthetics. No study of aesthetic theory, however, could proceed without a prior grasp of the philosophical issues underlying the approach of both men, which is what I hope to provide in this essay. I will try to show that *Negative Dialectics* represents a serious, perhaps fatal, challenge to the assumptions of the early Lukács, assumptions which, combined with the recovery of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, led to the rise of Marxist Humanism. In fact, I will suggest some surprising similarities between Adorno's critique of *History and*

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1. George Lichtheim, *From Marx to Hegel* (New York, 1972), and *George Lukács* (New York, 1970).

2. By the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists, I mean the inner circle of the Institut für Sozialforschung which coalesced around Max Horkheimer in the 1930's. Included in their number were Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal, Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm, and Adorno. See Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950* (Boston, 1973) for their history. The second generation's most important members are Jürgen Habermas and Alfred Schmidt.

3. George Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

4. Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York, 1973).

5. Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). For a discussion of the use of totality in Lukács' aesthetic work, see Roy Pascal, "Georg Lukács: The Concept of Totality" in G.H.R. Parkinson, ed., *Georg Lukács, The Man, His Work and His Ideas* (New York, 1970). See also Fredric Jameson, *Marxism and Form* (Princeton, 1971).

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Class Consciousness and that of Louis Althusser,[6] who is usually seen as an opponent of both Lukács and the Frankfurt School. Adorno, from within the walls of the humanist camp, and Althusser, from without, have jointly presided over the dismantling of the problematic introduced into Marxist theory by Lukács (and Karl Korsch)[7] in 1923.

"It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality. The category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts is the essence of the method which Marx took over from Hegel and brilliantly transformed into the foundations of a wholly new science... *The primacy of the category of totality is the bearer of the principle of revolution in science.*"[8] With these now familiar words from his January 1921 discussion of "The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg," the second essay in *History and Class Consciousness,* Lukács announced a new paradigm in the history of Marxist theory, whose exploration was to occupy western Marxists for the next half century. All of the other major characteristics of what has been variously known as "Western Marxism," "Para-Marxism," "Marxism with a Human Face," or simply "Marxist Humanism" have been integrally connected to the concept of totality. No serious discussion of alienation, reification, *praxis*, the critique of everyday life, or critical theory in general has failed to recognize that totality (or totalization) is an essential category of the discourse in which these issues are meaningful. Even Althusser felt the need to use the term in his polemic against Hegelian Marxism, although more recently he has claimed that what he meant to say was "the whole."[9] What I hope to demonstrate, however, is that its meaning underwent a very crucial alternation in the usage of the Frankfurt School, especially of Adorno, so that much of its power had been eroded by the time Althusser abandoned it. To do so, I will develop five different meanings of totality—longitudinal, latitudinal, expressive, decentered, and normative—which will be defined in the course of the argument.

Before tracing the development of the concept after 1923, it will be necessary to glance at the antecedents which precede its adoption for Marxist purposes by Lukács in the postwar period. Strictly speaking, Lukács' claim that the Hegelian concept of totality was preserved solely by the Marxist tradition was incorrect. His reasoning, which was more logical than historical in any empirical sense, was as follows: Marxism is the theoretical expression of the *praxis* of the proletariat. Because the proletariat was the universal class

6. The best exposition of Althusser's position can be found in *For Marx*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York, 1969).

7. Karl Korsch, *Marxism and Philosophy*, trans. with an intro. by Fred Halliday (London, 1970).

8. Lukács, *History and Class consciousness*, p. 27.

9. Althusser uses totality throughout *For Marx* and *Reading Capital* (written with Etienne Balibar), trans. Ben Brewster (New York, 1970), but he rejects it in *Essays in Self-Criticism*, trans. Grahame Lock (London, 1976), p. 183.

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by virtue of its uniquely constitutive role in the production process, it (and its spokesmen) possessed the epistemological vantage point necessary to grasp the totality of social relations, which were ultimately of its own creation. Implicit in this claim was Vico's now familiar argument against Descartes that knowledge of the historical world was superior to knowledge of the natural world because men could know what they made better than what was created elsewhere. To Lukács, the bourgeoisie was thus precluded from a totalistic view, even though it dominated capitalist society: "The tragic dialectics of the bourgeoisie can be seen in the fact that it is not only desirable but essential for it to clarify its own class interests on *every particular issue*, while at the same time such a clear awareness becomes fatal when it is extended to *the question of the totality*. The chief reason for this is that the rule of the bourgeoisie can only be the rule of a minority."[10]

Although bourgeois hegemony may well have meant minority control, this did not prevent bourgeois thinkers from employing totality in their work. The traditional German obsession with the alleged harmony of Greek culture still had a powerful impact in early twentieth-century thought, despite Nietzsche's exposure of its illusory qualities;[11] indeed, Lukács' own pre-Marxist *Theory of the Novel* adhered to the Greek epic as the idea of aesthetic totality against which the fragmented modern novel might be measured. More significantly from the viewpoint of social thought, totality was a potent category in the historicist tradition, which persisted until the second world war.[12] Dilthey, Simmel, Troeltsch, and Mannheim all used the term in one fashion or another. For Dilthey, history as a whole still had an inherent meaning, although this meaning was inexpressible in rational terms, as Hegel had believed. The historical world, he wrote, is "a system of interactions centered on itself; each individual system of interactions contained in it has, through the positing of values and their realization, its center within itself; but all are structurally linked into a whole in which, from the significance of the individual parts, the meaning of the whole context of the social-historical world arises."[13] To Dilthey, the meaning of this irrational whole was accessible through a process of hermeneutic interpretation, which to be sure remained incomplete until the end of the story. Like Hegel, he believed that totalistic knowledge was only a retrospective possibility.

A similar belief in an irrational *Lebenstotalität* can be found in Simmel, Troeltsch, and Mannheim, although in a more modest sense than in the quasi-Hegelian Dilthey. Instead of seeing universal history as a meaningful totality, they restricted their use of the term to what Troeltsch called

10. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 65-66.

11. For a discussion of the German fascination with Greece, see E.M. Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany* (Cambridge, 1935).

12. See Georg G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History* (Middletown, Conn., 1968) for a history of historicism. See Sylvie Rücker, "Totalität als ethisches und ästhetisches Problem," *Text plus Kritik*, 39-40 (October, 1973) for Lukács' debt to historicism's use of totality.

13. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Pattern and Meaning in History*, ed. with an intro. by H.P. Richman (London, 1961), p. 82.

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"individual totalities," the specific historical configurations that have emerged throughout history. Closer to Ranke than Hegel, they refused to extend the concept beyond the boundaries of these irreducible cultural wholes, a reluctance that Spengler was also to share. This usage of totality we will call "latitudinal," in opposition to the "longitudinal" use which will be reserved for the belief that universal history was itself a totality.

Still other examples of holistic thinking can be found in the literary criticism of Friedrich Gundolf, the biology of Hans Driesch, the art criticism of Max Dvorak, and the anti-associationist psychology of Oswald Külpe and his students at Wurzburg, who anticipated the Gestalt psychology of the 1920s. In short, there was, to borrow a phrase from Peter Gay, a "hunger for wholeness"[14] in late Wilhelmian Germany which expressed itself in bourgeois as well as proletarian terms. That Lukács' own world view developed in the context of a bourgeois culture in crisis, a culture anxious about fragmentation and absurdity, has now become a commonplace.[15]

If then Lukács was overstating the case by saying that only Marxist theory possessed the point of view of totality, it was nonetheless true that his use of the term did set him apart from the majority of his non-Marxist competitors. First, Lukács returned to the Hegelian stress on rationalism that the *Lebensphilosophen* had repudiated. Although he was not yet as hostile to their irrationalism as he was to become by the time of *The Destruction of Reason*,[16] it is clear that the essence of history to Lukács was the collective realization of a rational society, a project that had been at the heart of German idealism at least since 1784 and Kant's "Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View." His notion of reason, of course, was essentially Hegelian—that is, reason was understood in the substantive sense of reconciling contradictions between essence and appearance, "is" and "ought," particular and universal, potential and actual, rather than in the formal and instrumental sense employed by neo-Kantians like Max Weber. Formal reason meant the separation of reason from ethics and its restriction to a set of shared procedural rules. Instrumental reason signified an efficient choice of means to reach ends which were irrationally selected.

Lukács also differed from the later *Lebensphilosophen*, although not from Dilthey, by extending the idea of totality beyond the boundaries of individual cultures to include the entire historical process. "The question of universal history is a problem of methodology that necessarily emerges in every account of even the smallest segment of history. For history as a totality (universal history) is neither the mechanical aggregate of individual historical events,

14. Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (New York, 1968), Chapter IV.

15. For a discussion of the early Lukács that sees him as an anticipation of existentialism, see Lucien Goldmann, "The Early Writings of Georg Lukács," *TriQuarterly*, 9 (Spring 1967); for a critique of this argument, see Paul Breines, "Lukács, Revolution, and Marxism, 1885-1918: Notes on Lukács' 'Road to Marx'," *The Philosophical Forum*, III: 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1972).

16. Georg Lukács, *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* (Berlin, 1954); for a critique of the book, which Adorno once said expressed "the destruction of Lukács' own reason," see H.A. Hodges, "Lukács on Irrationalism," in Parkinson.

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nor is it a transcendent heuristic principle opposed to the events of history... The totality of history is itself a real historical power—even though one that has not hitherto become conscious and has therefore gone unrecognized—a power which is not to be separated from the reality (and hence the knowledge) of the individual facts without at the same time annulling their reality and their factual existence."[17] In so arguing, Lukács adopted what we have called a "longitudinal" view of totality, which carried with it the possibility of a theodicy in the manner of Hegel and Kant, who argued that strife and antagonism were necessary components in the process of historical development. It was the danger of such a theodicy that aroused the skepticism of the Frankfurt School about the notion of "longitudinal totality," as we shall see shortly. Lukács, to be sure, did not endorse the Hegelian use of universal history without serious reservations of his own. One of the most fundamental was his rejection of the belief, shared by Dilthey as well as Hegel, that knowledge of the whole comes only at the end of the process; for Lukács, Minerva's owl flew at midday, not at dusk, which meant that the constitutive role of subjectivity in creating the totality and the cognitive process of knowing it were essentially the same.[18]

Lukács departed from the post-Hegelian bourgeois use of totality in yet another way. For the social whole, as he understood it, was a concrete, complexly mediated totality, which did not stand opposed to the isolated individual as an abstract, collective other. Instead, as his student István Mészáros has succinctly put it: " 'Social totality' without 'mediation' is rather like 'freedom without equality': an abstract—and empty—postulate. 'Social totality' exists in and through those manifold mediations through which the specific complexes—i.e., 'partial totalities'—are linked to each other in a constantly shifting and changing, dynamic overall complex. The direct cult of totality, the mystifications of totality as an immediacy, the negation of mediations and complex interconnections with each other, can only produce a myth and, as the Nazis have proved, a dangerous one at that."[19]

Because of his stress on mediation, Lukács' notion of totality still contained a moment of that personal wholeness so extolled by previous German thinkers. Thus, *History and Class Consciousness* contains a description of "authentic humanity," of "man as a perfected whole who has inwardly overcome, or is in the process of overcoming, the dichotomy of theory and practice, reason and the senses, form and content...for whom freedom and necessity are identical"[20] which bears a striking resemblance to Nietzsche's analysis of Goethe in *The Twilight of the Idols*: "What he wanted was

17. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 151-152.

18. For a critique of this assumption, see Alfred Schmidt, *Geschichte und Struktur; Fragen einer marxistischen Historik* (Munich, 1971). Schmidt distinguishes between an historical "Darstellungsweise" and a structural, genetic "Forschungsweise."

19. István Mészáros, "Lukács' Concept of Dialectic," in Parkinson, *op. cit.*, p. 65, and later reprinted as a separate book with the same title (London, 1972).

20. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 136-137.

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totality; he fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling and will (preached with the abhorrent scholasticism by *Kant*, the antipode of Goethe); he disciplined himself to wholeness; he *created* himself."[21] Although Lukács was to neglect this aspect of totality far more than, say, Sartre, it remained in dialectical tension in his work with the more frequently used notion of social totality.

Nietzsche's reference to Kant as the antipode of Goethe leads us to one of the key functions of totality in *History and Class Consciousness*: a means to overcome what Lukács called the "antinomies of bourgeois thought." The most important of these was the irreconcilability of theoretical and moral knowledge, of facts and values, which had most recently been expressed in the work of Weber. Science and ethics to Kant and the neo-Kantians required two separate modes of cognition, one "pure"—that is, contemplative—the other "practical" or active. This division was retained by the neo-Kantians, with the further complication that for many of them, no truly cognitive approach to ethical or "practical" knowledge was possible. Weber was such a skeptic, who attempted to face the relativist implications of historicism with stoic resignation. For Weber, the idea of a substantive rationality positing ends as well as means was an absurdity. Nor did the concept of totality appeal to him as a means to overcome the gap between "is" and "ought," as it did to his friend Troeltsch (and to the Lukács of *History and Class Consciousness*).

A second antinomy suggested by Kant, which Lukács saw as characteristic of all bourgeois thought, was the gap between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. Our knowledge was inevitably imperfect because of our inability to perceive things-in-themselves. Weber's celebrated method of ideal types was an attempt to deal with this problem, but one which did not restore the epistemological confidence of the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, a restoration Lukács was anxious to achieve. Before 1917, however, he was unable to find the means to do so and his attitude closely paralleled Weber's in many respects.[22] Like Weber, he seemed to regard the "disenchantment of the world" an irreversible process. Both *The Soul and its Forms* (1911) and *The Theory of the Novel* (completed in 1916) expressed a profound pessimism about regaining the sense of wholeness and harmony that provided a social-cultural precondition for the Greek epic.[23]

21. Friedrich Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols," reprinted in Walter Kaufman (ed.), *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York, 1968), p. 554.

22. For Lukács' relation to Weber, see Andrew Arato, "Lukács' Theory of Reification," *Telos*, 11 (Spring 1972); Andrew Feenberg, "Lukács and the Critique of 'Orthodox' Marxism," *The Philosophical Forum*, III: 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1972); and Fritz J. Raddatz, *Georg Lukács in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1972).

23. The novel, Lukács argued, was the appropriate genre for an age of irreconcilable subject-object dualism, an age Fichte had correctly called an "epoch of absolute sinfulness." In it the "conflict between what is and what should be has not been abolished and cannot be abolished in the sphere wherein these events take place—the life sphere of the novel" (p. 80). Only at the very end of his study did Lukács offer the tentative and undefined hope that in Dostoyevsky a possible herald of a new age of wholeness might be seen.

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But with the Russian Revolution and Lukács' subsequent entrance into the Hungarian Communist Party, all of this suddenly and dramatically changed. With the special fervor of a recent convert, Lukács proclaimed the imminent rise of the proletariat to power as the source of a new totality. The age of "transcendental homelessness"[24] now seemed nearing its end; the antinomies of bourgeois thought were to be resolved as the bourgeoisie lost its hegemony in the forthcoming revolution. For a Marxist intellectual, this meant *inter alia* that a radical rethinking of traditional Marxist categories was on the immediate agenda, a task Lukács set himself in the essays he wrote during the early 1920s. The need was urgent as even Marxist theory had been tainted by the antinomies of bourgeois thought during the pre-revolutionary era. Revisionists like Bernstein, Otto Bauer, and Tugan-Baranovsky were clearly weakened by their neo-Kantianism, but even Engels with his scientistic dialectics of nature and Rosa Luxemburg with her overly economistic theory of spontaneity were severely deficient. "Economic fatalism and the reformation of socialism through ethics are intimately connected," Lukács argued; "the 'ethical' reformation of socialism is the subjective side of the missing category of totality which alone can provide an overall view."[25]

The category was missing in both bourgeois theory and in its Marxist counterpart during the Second International because, as we have already noted, only the proletariat could totally create society and become conscious of its self-creation. Capitalism, to be sure, had laid the groundwork: "with the mounting socialization of society it becomes increasingly possible and hence necessary to integrate the content of each specific event into the totality of contents."[26] But the crucial step toward a real totalization of society could only be taken when a universal class took power, an event that Lukács thought imminent in the heady climate after 1917.

The fundamental reason for this totalistic overcoming of the several antinomies of both bourgeois society and bourgeois thought must be found, so Lukács argued, in the new relationship between subject and object that emerged with the ascendency of the proletariat. For once the historical world was understood as the objectification of an historical subject, it could no longer stand opposed to that subject as a reified other, a "second nature," which could only be passively contemplated. Values also gain an objective quality when this new relationship emerges, although they never can be seen as eternally immutable. Values are more than mere subjective whims because they exist in the objective (or more correctly, objectivized) world of institutions and mores, a world which is historically created.[27]

24. Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, p. 41.
25. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 38.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
27. As Merleau-Ponty recognized, Lukács answered Weber's relativism not by absolutizing values, but rather by carrying relativism as far as it could go: "The old problem of the relations between subject and object is transformed, and relativism is surpassed as soon as one puts it in historical terms, since here the object is the vestige left by other subjects, and the subject—historical understanding—held in the fabric of history, is by this very fact capable of

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The "sense of totality" Lukács introduced here, however, was very different from that which we have seen in Hegel and the historicist tradition. For instead of seeing all of history as a totality or individual periods as totalities, Lukács was talking about a totality as the product of a creative act. Here he was anticipating the distinction postwar French Marxists were to make between a given totality and the process of totalization.[28] In fact, in *Adventures of the Dialectic*, Merleau-Ponty interpreted Lukács solely as a theorist of totalization rather than totality.[29] Here a new use of totality, which following the structuralists we choose to call "expressive," was operative for the first time. In *The Theory of the Novel*, this usage had been completely absent, even in the discussion of the Greek epic: "In the epic, totality can only truly manifest itself in the contents of the object; it is metasubjective, transcendent, it is a revelation and grace."[30] The subject of the epic, he wrote at that time, is a "purely receptive"[31] one. In *The Theory of the Novel*, Lukács was thus in the tradition of what Dilthey called "objective idealism," rather than that of the "idealism of freedom," which was to surface in his positive remarks on Fichte in *History and Class Consciousness.*[32] For both Fichte and the Lukács of those years, the subject was a meta-individual who created the social world through will and action. Although Lukács was to move away from this position and explicitly criticize Fichte in his 1925 review of a new edition of Lassalle's letters,[33] it is clear that the "expressive" use of totality in *History and Class Consciousness* derives as much from Fichte as from Hegel. Here history is understood as the product of a creator-subject, not as a constellation of structures or processes whose origins cannot be traced to human agency, either partially or wholly. One crucial result of this assumption was that the totality was understood to have a genetic center which was reflected in all of its various aspects.

Lukács was able to embrace the "idealism of freedom" to the extent that he did only because of his radical separation of history and nature, a consequence of his overzealous, if essentially justified, critique of Engels'

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self-criticism... Would not a more radical criticism, the unrestricted recognition of history as the unique milieu of our errors and our verifications, lead us to recover an absolute in the relative? This is the question that Georg Lukács asks of his teacher, Weber. He does not reproach him for having been too relativistic but rather for not having been relativistic enough and for not having gone so far as to 'relativize the notions of subject and object.' For, by so doing, one regains a sort of totality." Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, trans. Joseph Bien (Evanston, 1973), pp. 30-31.

28. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique* (Paris, 1960) contains the most extensive discussion of totalization and de-totalization in the postwar French literature.

29. Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, p. 31.

30. Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, p. 50.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

32. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 123. Here Lukács praises Fichte for going beyond Kant and putting "the practical, action and activity in the center of his unifying philosophical system." As a Marxist, of course, Lukács could not then fail to chastise Fichte for neglecting to "enquire after the *concrete* nature of this identical subject-object."

33. Lukács, "The New Edition of Lassalle's Letters," in Rodney Livingstone, ed., *Political Writings, 1919-1929*, trans. Michael McColgan (London, 1972.

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dialectics of nature. This distinction of course reveals Lukács' indebtedness to the Diltheyan tradition of setting the *Geisteswissenschaften* apart from the *Naturwissenschaften*, as well as to the more conservative dichotomy of *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*. In *The Theory of the Novel*, Lukács had chastised Tolstoy for seeking totality in nature, whereas "a totality of men and events is possible only on the basis of culture."[34] This attitude persisted in *History and Class Consciousness*, where Hegel is praised for seeing that "the dialectics of nature can never become anything more exalted than a dialectics of movement witnessed by the detached observer."[35] To Lukács, totality was a solely historical-social concept because only the most extreme idealism could argue that nature was the objectification of a creator-subject.

In confining totality to the non-natural, Lukács thus avoided the embarrassment of trying to marry Descartes and Vico, an obviously unnatural match. But in so doing, he also skirted the issues raised by Kant's antinomies, or at least seriously weakened his answer. For Kant's recognition that phenomenal and noumenal knowledge were not identical rested in his acceptance of a Newtonian scientific world view in which natural objects could not be understood as the objectification of the observing subject. That men were in fact rooted in such a natural world, as well as capable of transcending it through history, eluded Lukács' grasp. Any totality that limited itself to the historically changeable "second nature" that was society without dealing with the "first nature" could only be an idealist notion, as Lukács himself later came to believe.[36] The result of this failing, as Paul Piccone has acutely argued, was that Lukács' dialectic was "not between form and content, but between form and *formed* content."[37] History for Lukács thus became a reified category itself because of its overly stark opposition to nature, or if a phenomenological vocabulary is preferred, to a precategorical *Lebenswelt*. As we shall see shortly, one of the most serious charges laid against Lukács by the Frankfurt School concerned his inadequate handling of the society-nature question.

Before turning to their critique, one more issue must be clarified: the political implications of Lukács' use of totality. Here the ground is particularly slippery as, Lenin notwithstanding, it is extremely difficult to derive political positions directly from philosophical ones. This is especially the case when the theory itself is supposed to reflect dialectically on the practice which is its only verification. Still, efforts to see a link between totality and Lukács' politics have been made and must be discussed. In the article quoted above, Piccone asserts a direct link between Lukács' idealism and his defense of Soviet dictatorship, in both its Leninist and Stalinist forms:

34. Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*. pp. 146-147. In his later work, Tolstoy was to be seen in a much more favorable light. See *Studies in European Realism* (New York, 1964).

35. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 207.

36. The 1967 preface to *History and Class Consciousness* contains the most extensive expression of his self-criticism on this point.

37. Paul Piccone, "Dialectic and Materialism in Lukács," *Telos*, 11 (Spring 1972), p. 108.

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"That substitutionism so often charged by Trotskyists whereby the proletariat substitutes itself for humanity, the party for the proletariat and the leader for the party, receives in Lukács its theoretical justification precisely in those works that 'Western' Marxism has always contraposed to his later Stalinist contributions. The *Zeitgeist* that Hegel had already identified in Napoleon, Lukács identifies in Lenin and, after his death, in whomever happened to follow him *precisely through the same idealistic dialectical methodology.*"[38] To Piccone, the very use of totality as an expressive category, combined with the idea of "imputed class consciousenss," is a license for tyranny. Similar charges have been leveled against Lenin by previous anti-Bolshevik critics such as Max Eastman and Neil McInnes.[39]

Although this argument has a certain logical validity—Lukács could have derived his Stalinism from a distorted idealism—it appears that the historical reality was somewhat different. For it was precisely at the time that he began to move away from the notion of expressive totality that the more sinister political turns of his career began. A glance at his attitude toward the most significant political models of his life, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, will clarify the issue. Although it would be a mistake to oversimplify Lukács' evolution and see a Luxemburgist (or Sorelian or left communist) phase superseded by a Leninist one,[40] a clear change occurred in his thinking between January 1921, when "The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg" was written, and September 1922, when "Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organization" appeared. With Lukács' shift toward a more Leninist notion of a vanguard party came a subtle movement away from expressive totality. In the first essay, he commended Rosa Luxemburg for using totality in her analytical work: "Just as the young Marx's concept of totality cast a bright light upon the pathological symptoms of a still-flourishing capitalism, so too in the studies of Rosa Luxemburg we find the basic problems of capitalism analysed within the context of the historical process as a whole."[41] Similarly, he praised her insight into the true function of the party as the *"bearer of the class consciousness of the proletariat and the conscience of its historical vocation."*[42] Although unwilling to fall back into fatalistic economism,

38. *Ibid.*, p. 124. Italics in the original.

39. For a discussion of Eastman's argument, see John A. Diggins, "Getting Hegel out of History: Max Eastman's Quarrel with Marxism," *American Historical Review*, LXXIX: 1 (February, 1974). McInnes makes the same point in his article, "From Marx to Marcuse," *Survey*, XVI: 1 (Winter 1971), where he writes: "Lenin wholeheartedly takes over Hegel's absolute idealism, the notion that everything is in touch with everything else in one vast moving totality. This is that 'total movement' that is to be so useful in Lenin's political writings. It is the overall picture to which the Party has privileged access, and in terms of which other peoples' political actions can be declared too Left, too Right or even (this happened also) too Center" (p. 143). For a more positive assessment of Lenin's discovery of Hegel, see Raya Dunayevskaya, *Philosophy and Revolution* (New York, 1973).

40. See Feenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 423, for a critique of this periodization of Lukács' development.

41. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 32.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

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Lukács was still arguing for a continuum between economics and politics, which he saw accurately expressed in Rosa Luxemburg's thought and practice.

Nineteen months later, however, Lukács was no longer as sure that the party's role was that of mere bearer of proletarian class consciousness. Now Rosa Luxemburg was criticized for failing to see that the party was something more than the voice of the working class. Although still superior to the left communists and the revisionists, she shared one major flaw with both of them: a belief in the "illusion of an 'organic,' *purely proletarian* revolution."[43] Lenin in contrast was now praised by Lukács for acknowledging the need to exploit a revolutionary situation in which the demands of other discontented factions can be manipulated to destroy the system. As a result, the party was not to be understood solely as expressing working class consciousness, even if the notion of imputation was still used to veil its departure from that role. Moreover, the soviets or *Räte*, which Lukács had once seen as the link between the masses and the party, had faded from view. What was left was a vision of the party as "an *autonomous form* of proletarian consciousness serving the interests of the revolution."[44]

Lukács' hasty retreat from the Fichtean elements in his notion of totality can be more clearly seen in his 1924 *Lenin, A Study on the Unity of His Thought*, where Lenin is frequently praised for his adherence to the idea of totality, but without a concomitant stress on the proletariat as the subject-object of history.[45] The successful experience of the Bolshevik revolution, which could not be construed as a purely proletarian affair, in combination with the failure of its German counterpart, where spontaneism had been completely discredited, sobered Lukács considerably. His new realism, which expressed itself theoretically in his critique of Fichte in the 1925 essay on Lassalle and in a piece he wrote during the next year on Moses Hess,[46] reached its peak in the rightist "Blum Theses" of 1928, which earned him the calumny of the Comintern and led to his subsequent political silence. Significantly, his subsequent recantation of the Theses, unlike that following *History and Class Consciousness*, did not really come from the heart.[47] Thus all

43. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 330.
45. Georg Lukács, *Lenin, A Study on the Unity of His Thought*, trans. Nicholas Jacobs (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). In his 1967 postscript, Lukács made the implications of his shift away from expressive totality clear: "Without orientation towards totality there can be no historically true practice. But knowledge of the totality is never spontaneous, it must always be brought into activity 'from the outside,' that is, theoretically. . . As Lenin well knew, the totality of being as it unfolds objectively is infinite, and therefore can never be adequately grasped. A vicious circle seems to develop between the infinity of knowledge and the ever-present dictates of correct, immediate action. But this abstract-theoretical insolubility can—like the Gordian knot—be cut through practically. The only sword suitable for this is that human attitude for which once again we must refer to Shakespeare: 'The readiness is all'."
46. Lukács, "Moses Hess and the Problems of Idealist Dialectics," *Political Writings, 1919-1929*.
47. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. xxxi.

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throughout the period he supported Stalinism, it was a non-expressive view of totality—a view that can be justly called "decentered"—that was operative in his reasoning. In embracing the Leninist position that consciousness must be brought to the workers from without, he returned to the very stance that Pannekoek and the Council Communists had condemned in Kautsky, a condemnation that had been shared by the early Lukács.[48] This position may have been more "realistic" in a way that earned Thomas Mann's caricature of Lukács as Naphtha in *The Magic Mountain*, but it was a far cry from the utopian expectations contained in his previous use of expressive totality. If expressive totality was retained in Lukács' thought at all, it was in the guise of a future possibility, as a normative idea, not a descriptive one.

Be that as it may, it was the ideas in *History and Class Consciousness*, confirmed as they seemed to be by the recovery of the 1844 manuscripts, that set the terms of the Western Marxist discussion for the next generation. The members of the Institut für Sozialforschung grouped around Max Horkheimer played a crucial role in that discussion. Their adherence to the general tenor of thought expressed in *History and Class Consciousness* has been frequently asserted, as has their unalloyed repudiation of the compromises with Stalinism that the later Lukács made. What has not, however, been fully clear is the extent to which their development in the years from the founding of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in 1932 to the publication of *Negative Dialectics* in 1966 saw a gradual but decisive rejection of the early Lukács as well. The Institut member whose work best represents the distance, as I have noted before, is Adorno. Anticipations of his argument in *Negative Dialectics* can be found in many places in his earlier writings, including specific critiques of Lukács in his 1931 speech "Die Idee der Naturgeschichte" and in the essay entitled "Erpresste Versöhnung," reprinted in *Noten zur Literatur II* in 1961.[49] But it is in his intellectual testament, as many have seen *Negative Dialectics*, that the full force of his repudiation of *History and Class Consciousness* can be felt. At the center of the dispute is the concept of totality.

The intellectual sources of Adorno's new use of totality, prime among which must be counted his friendships with Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer, cannot be dealt with here.[50] The basic non-intellectual stimulus can be more simply stated, as Adorno himself has done in the frequently

48. Stanley Aronowitz, "Left-wing Communism: The Reply to Lenin," in Dick Howard and Karl Klare, ed., *The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism Since Lenin* (New York, 1972), p. 176; for a discussion of Lukács' early adherence to a similar position, see Raddatz, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

49. Adorno, "Die Idee der Naturgeschichte," *Philosophische Frühschriften, Gesammelte Schriften*, I (Frankfurt, 1973); *Noten zur Literatur* II (Frankfurt, 1961).

50. For a discussion of the intellectual influences on Adorno, see Susan Buck-Morss, "The Dialectic of T.W. Adorno," *Telos*, 14 (Winter 1972) and Martin Jay, "The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism," *Social Research*, XXXIX:2 (Summer 1972). For a specific discussion of Kracauer's role, see Adorno, "Der wunderliche Realist; Ueber Siegfried Kracauer," *Noten zur Literatur* III (Frankfurt, 1965).

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quoted first sentence of his book: "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed."[51] In other words, the revolutionary optimism of the period from 1917-1923, which served to dispel the gloom of *The Theory of the Novel,* has since been revealed as premature. In fact, *Negative Dialectics* revived the tone of despair of that very book, without, however, expressing any of its nostalgia for a lost wholeness.[52] "Transcendental homelessness" in Adorno's eyes had become a far more permanent reality than the Lukács of *History and Class Consciousness* had believed. Whatever hopes for change that might have survived the defeats of the working class movement were irrvocably silenced by Auschwitz: "The earthquake of Lisbon sufficed to cure Voltaire of the theodicy of Leibniz, and the visible disaster of the first nature was insignificant in comparison with the second social one, which defies human imagination as it distills a real hell from human evil... Auschwitz confirmed the philosopheme of pure identity as death."[53]

Adorno's rejection of identity, which long antedated Auschwitz, did not, however, mean that he ceased using totality in his work. As in the writing of his Institut colleagues,[54] the concept still functioned as a corrective to positivist nominalism or vulgar Marxist economism. In 1938, for example, Adorno chastised Benjamin in what is fast becoming one of the most celebrated editorial disputes in recent history, for reductionism in one of his *Passagenarbeit* manuscripts: "I regard it as methodologically unfortunate to give conspicuous individual features from the realm of the superstructure a 'materialistic' turn by relating them immediately and perhaps even causally to corresponding features of the infrastructure. Materialist determination of cultural traits is only possible if it is mediated through the *total social*

51. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* p. 3.

52. "The meaningful times for whose return the early Lukács yearned were as much due to reification, to inhuman situations, as he would later attest it only to the bourgeois age. Contemporary representations of medieval towns usually look as if an execution were just taking place to cheer the populace. If any harmony of subject and object should have prevailed in those days, it was a harmony like the most recent one: pressure-born and brittle. The transfiguration of past conditions serves the purpose of a late, superfluous denial that is experienced as a no-exit situation; only as lost conditions do they become glamorous. Their cult, the cult of pre-subjective phases, arose in horror, in the age of individual disintegration and collective regression." Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* p. 191. Lukács' nostalgia for a lost past and Adorno's lack of the same might well have something to do with their respective ages. Lukács was born in 1885 into a wealthy, patrician family; Adorno's family background was no less fortunate, but he was born in 1903. Thus, whereas Lukács matured in an environment that still seemed relatively secure, even if bourgeois culture as a whole was in decline, Adorno came of age during the war when it had completely collapsed. Like Brecht, who was roughly of the same generation, he had no nostalgia for the prewar era, which may account for their common interest in the modernist art that Lukács abhorred. (I owe this last observation to a still unpublished manuscript on the Brecht-Lukács debate by Eugene Lunn of the University of California, Davis.)

53. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* pp. 361-362. For a discussion of the impact of Auschwitz on Adorno, see Arnold Künzli, *Aufklärung und Dialektik; Politische Philosophie von Hobbes bis Adorno* (Freiburg, 1971).

54. See Max Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie,* 2 vols., Alfred Schmidt, ed. (Frankfurt, 1968), *passim,* and Herbert Marcuse, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory,* trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1968), *passim,* for examples of their use of totality.

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process."[55] As late as the 1960s, he wrote in a piece on society that one must understand "the dependency of all individuals on the totality which they form. In such a totality, everyone is also dependent on everyone else. The whole survives only through the unity of the functions which its members fulfill."[56] Other examples could be adduced to show that Adorno still used the term, but what must be understood is the way in which his usage differed from Lukács'. This will be easier to see after a review of what appears to me as the five ways in which Lukács employs the word. Unfortunately, these usages were never very clearly differentiated in his writing, which accounts for much of the confusion surrounding the meaning of the word.

(1) *Longitudinal totality:* A synonym for universal history, which, as I have already noted, connects Lukács to Hegel and Dilthey.

(2) *Latitudinal totality:* The specific constellation of social structures and tendencies in effect during any one period in history or in any one culture over time. Here the usage is close to Troeltsch's idea of "individual totalities," although without the irrationalist emphasis. Still diachronic and process-oriented, this use of the term suggests a somewhat more stable set of relationships which define one totality as opposed to another. Although he did not use the word, Jacob Burckhardt's study of the Renaissance demonstrates this use perfectly.

(3) *Expressive totality:* This concept rests on the assumption that a totalizer, a genetic subject, creates the totality through self-objectification. This essentially Fichtean idea was important in Lukács' work only for a brief time—after *The Theory of the Novel* and before the concluding chapters of *History and Class Consciousness*—but it was to have a profound impact on the later development of Marxist Humanism. The concepts of reification and alienation, which Lukács failed to distinguish from objectification *per se*, were intimately tied to the expressive use of totality, which also served in the ways we have examined to overcome the antinomies of bourgeois thought. Possible synonyms for this usage are "centered" or "reflective" totality in that all of the significant manifestations of the expressive totality reflect in miniature its genetic center, somewhat like Leibnizian monads.

(4) *Decentered totality:* A force-field of relationships whose constituent elements cannot be understood without reference to the whole, but a whole which is irreducible to one expressive or genetic center. In other words, the totality is not seen as the objectification of a creator subject, but rather as a constellation of interactions without a specific origin. This revised use of totality appears, albeit without fanfare, in the essays following Lukács' repudiation of his extreme leftism and in *Lenin, A Study on the Unity of His Thought*; it underlies his criticism of Rosa Luxemburg's notion of a purely proletarian revolution. Its usage in these works suggests a narrowing of the

55. Adorno, "Letters to Walter Benjamin," *New Left Review*, 91 (September-October, 1973), p. 71.

56. Adorno, "Society," in Robert Boyers, ed., *The Legacy of the German Refugee Intellectuals* (New York, 1972), p. 145.

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gap between Lukács and Althusser, who uses totality in precisely this way.[57]

(5) *Normative totality:* Totality as a desirable goal towards which humanity should strive in an age of fragmentation. Whereas the other uses of totality can be said to be descriptive, here Lukács uses the word in a value-laden way as a state of integrated harmony in which all social contradictions are reconciled. In *The Theory of the Novel,* nostalgia for a past totality and yearning for a future one indicate that the word has normative rather than merely descriptive power. The integration sought in that early work is essentially a passive one in which the subject can surrender himself to a meaningful whole. In *History and Class Consciousness,* the whole that is desired is an expressive, active one, but the yearning is just as strong. Thus when Lukács writes that "what is crucial is that there should be an aspiration towards totality,"[58] he reveals a "hunger for wholeness" worthy of any *völkisch* critic of *Zerrissenheit.*

If the same set of categories is applied to Adorno's use of the word totality in *Negative Dialectics,* the following contrast with Lukács emerges:

(1) *Longitudinal totality:* In conscious opposition to Hegel, Marx,[59] and Lukács, Adorno vehemently inveighed against the concept of universal history. The only sense in which the historical process as a whole might be viewed was negative: "Universal history must be construed and denied... No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb... It is the horror that verifies Hegel and stands him on his head."[60] To Adorno, as to Horkheimer, who once remarked that past suffering can never be redeemed no matter how utopian the future, the longitudinal use of totality smacked of a theodicy which must be exposed as an illusion.

(2) *Latitudinal totality:* This is perhaps the most frequent use of the term in Adorno's lexicon. Bourgeois society, an individual totality of unfortunately elastic boundaries,[61] is the main target of his opprobrium. It is an "administered world," whose still unreconciled contradictions are covered by a veneer of what his former colleague, Herbert Marcuse, made famous as "one-dimensionality." Adorno's famous pronouncement in *Minima Moralia* that "the whole is the untrue," a deliberate play on Hegel's "the true is the whole," must be understood in the sense that our present totality makes a mockery of true reconciliation.[62] Our "satanic" system, as he called it in his

57. Althusser, *For Marx,* p. 256. Althusser tries to avoid relativism by saying that the "Marxist totality is a decentered structure in dominance" (p. 256), which means that the elements of the whole are autonomous, but asymmetrically related with one of them dominant at a particular juncture in history.

58. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness,* p. 198.

59. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* p. 321. For a defense of Marx against Adorno, see Helmut Fleischer, *Marxism and History,* trans. Eric Mosbacher (New York, 1973), p. 64.

60. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics,* p. 320.

61. In Adorno's *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Amsterdam, 1947), he and Max Horkheimer extended the sway of the exchange principle, the chief characteristic of bourgeois society, as far back as Ulysses.

62. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben* (Frankfurt, 1951),

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1957 study of Hegel,[63] is the dialectical negation of an expressive totality.

(3) *Expressive totality:* The very possibility of a totality based on an identical subject-object was anathema to Adorno. The idealism at the root of this notion derived from human domination of nature, from "rage" against the irreducible otherness of the non-human: "the system in which the sovereign mind imagined itself transfigured, has its primal history in the premental, the animal life of the species... Idealism—most explicitly Fichte—gives unconscious sway to the ideology that the not-I, *l'autrui*, and finally all that reminds us of nature is inferior."[64] An outgrowth of this rage was the conceptual imperialism which arrogantly identified thought with its object. In contrast, negative dialectics sought "the disenchantment of the concept."[65] Lukács' revival of the subject-object identity argument was thus as fallacious as the Cartesian dualism it was intended to overcome.

Expressive totality contained other dangers as well, so Adorno suggested. Perhaps chief among them was the absolutization of the collective subject in opposition to the empirical individual; dialectics, he maintained, must always preserve a tension between the universal and the particular, thereby avoiding the liquidation of the latter in the name of the former. The very search for a transcendent subject, whether in idealist or materialist form (the proletariat) was thus a potentially hazardous undertaking. A truly materialist dialectics adhered to what Adorno called the "preponderance of the object."[66]

In so arguing, Adorno was explicitly minimizing the importance of reification and alienation, those mainstays of any Marxist Humanist analysis. Although he used the former concept frequently in his writings (far more so than alienation), he was reluctant to accord it primary importance: "The thinker may easily comfort himself by imagining that in the dissolution of reification, of the merchandise character, he possesses the philosophers' stone. But reification itself is the reflexive form of false objectivity; centering theory around reification, a form of consciousness, makes the critical theory idealistically acceptable to the reigning consciousness. This is what raised Marx's early writings—in contradistinction to *Das Kapital*—to their present popularity, notably with theologians."[67] Adorno did not have to go far to put his finger on one of the main culprits for this distortion: "There is a good deal of irony in the fact that the brutal and primitive functionaries who more than forty years back damned Lukács as a heretic because of the reification chapter in his important *History and Class Consciousness*, did sense the idealistic nature of his conception."[68]

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p. 80. Hegel's statement was made in the preface to *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*.

63. Adorno, *Aspekte der Hegelschen Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1957), p. 33.
64. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, pp. 22-23; also see the remarks on p. 189.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 190; also see his remarks on p. 374.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

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Yet another manifestation of his rejection of expressive totality was Adorno's denial that labor constituted the social world out of its own objectifications, an idea that Horkheimer had criticized as early as 1934.[69] Here too he called on the mature Marx to bear witness against his earlier incarnation: "When Marx, in his critique of the Gotha Program, told the Lassalleans that in contrast to the customary litany of popular socialists labor was not the source of social wealth, he was philosophically...saying no less than that labor could not be hypostatized in any form, neither in the form of diligent hands nor in that of mental production. Such hypostasis merely extends the illusion of the predominance of the productive principle."[70] Although labor had not been at the center of *History and Class Consciousness,* a failing Lukács was to bemoan in his 1967 preface, it is clear that the notion of *praxis* in that book was beholden to the same "production principle" whose hypostatization Adorno found objectionable.

Finally, Adorno rejected the notion of expressive totality because of the assumption behind it that the historical and natural worlds were separate and distinct spheres.[71] While thoroughly endorsing Lukács' insight that society under capitalism was falsely perceived as a "second nature," Adorno felt that Lukács had neglected the "first nature" which man could not entirely escape. To Adorno, the total socialization of the world, which both Marx and Lukács had celebrated, threatened a new regression to a socialized barbarism. The revenge of exploited nature was one of the main Frankfurt School explanations of fascism in the 1940s.[72]

A corollary of this position was the abandonment of Lukács' answer to Weber's relativism, an answer rooted in the Vichian distinction between history and nature. "The concept of sense," Adorno wrote, "involves an objectivity beyond all 'making': a sense that is 'made' is already fictitious."[73] Once again, the idealist rage at nature was involved: "The permanent *reductio ad hominem* of all appearance prepares cognition for purposes of internal and external domination."[74] In short, the antinomies of bourgeois thought could not be overcome through Lukács' desperate gamble to relativize both subject and object and unite them as an historically changing subject-object. No stronger condemnation of Lukács' belief that the gap between "is" and "ought" was transcended by the proletariat could exist than the sorry spectacle of Lukács' endorsement of Stalinism. How to avoid falling

69. Max Horkheimer [Heinrich Regius, pseud.] *Dämmerung* (Zurich, 1934), p. 181.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178.
71. He also rejected the absolute separation of the methodologies appropriate for the exploration of the natural and social worlds. Lukács had condemned the natural scientific method as contemplative and contrary to *praxis*. But to Adorno, post-Newtonian physics suggested the possiblity of a non-passive scientific method in both spheres. See his remarks in *Negative Dialectics* on Einstein (p. 188).
72. See Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* and Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1947).
73. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 376.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 387.

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into the relativism that Lukács had attempted to overcome without at the same time resorting to an "extorted reconciliation," Adorno could not really say. *Negative Dialectics* ends with a weak plea for an uneasy alliance between a non-absolutist metaphysics and the negation of identity. The ghost of the Kantian antinomies remained unexorcised.

(4) *Decentered totality:* Like Lukács after *History and Class Consciousness*, Adorno implicitly adopted the belief that totality could not be reduced to a genetic center. Also like Lukács, he came to believe (or had believed from the beginning) that the proletariat by itself could not rise above trade union consciousness. But in direct opposition to Lukács, Adorno refused to appeal to an "autonomous" proletarian organization, the party, to direct the revolution from above. Instead, he rested content with the much debated belief that theory was itself a form of *praxis* in an era when no historical subject could be located. In constantly demanding adherence to the principle of non-identity, Adorno cast doubt on the possibility that such a subject could ever be found.,

(5) *Normative totality:* Despite the clear pessimism of his vision, Adorno did not entirely abandon the idea of an integrated, reconciled totality in the future. In at least two places in *Negative Dialectics*, he permitted himself to indulge his own, albeit faint, "hunger for wholeness." In a section entitled "Noncontradictoriness Not To Be Hypostatized," he wrote: "Dialectical reason's own essence has come to be and will pass, like antagonistic society."[75] And in his closing remarks, he adopted a view reminiscent of Ernst Bloch in saying that "it lies in the definition of negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total. This is its form of hope."[76] Despite these isolated comments, however, it is clear that the concept of totality did not become an affirmative category in his thought, but remained a perpetually critical one.

What emerges from this comparison between Lukács and Adorno is a sense that the problematic introduced into Marxist theory with *History and Class Consciousness* is now approaching its end. For although a certain continuity has often been assumed between Lukács and the Frankfurt School because of their common reliance on the Hegelian notion of totality, the very different uses to which they put the concept suggests a radical disparity in their thought. Moreover, one can find other examples in recent Marxist thinking, even within the humanist camp, to illustrate the exhaustion of the Lukácsian problematic. Leszek Kolakowski is just one prominent instance among many.[77] But the most vigorous polemic against Lukács' notion of totality has, of course, come from the structuralist Marxists such as Louis Althusser,

75. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 406.
77. See the essays in Kolakowski's *Towards a Marxist Humanism*, trans. Jane Zielonko Peel (New York,1968), in particular, "In Praise of Inconsistency." To adopt Kolakowski's well-known distinction Lukács is a Marxist "priest," whereas both Adorno and Kolakowski are "jesters."

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Maurice Godelier, Nicos Poulantzas, and Göran Therborn. Although their own alternative has serious problems that cannot be discussed here, it will be illuminating to finish this essay by casting a glance at the surprising similarities that unite Adorno's critique of Lukács with Althusser's.

These similarities are unexpected because the differences between the Frankfurt School and the Althusserians have been so thoroughly explored. Göran Therborn has assimilated Critical Theory to the humanist, historicist Marxism so disliked by the structuralists.[78] And Alfred Schmidt, Adorno's student and, until recently, director of the Institut für Sozialforschung, has inveighed against structuralism in general and Althusser in particular in several places.[79] The battle lines have been unmistakably drawn. Althusser's political Leninism, adulation of science, quasi-religious appeal to the authority of the real Marx (read, of course, "symptomatically"), and undialectical rejection of all subjectivity are clearly irreconcilable with Critical Theory. Although both camps criticize empiricism, Adorno was unwilling to sacrifice the reality of appearances in the name of a higher reality allegedly to be found in deep structures or essences. For all his hostility to identity theory, he was clearly in the Hegelian-Marxist problematic reintroduced by *History and Class Consciousness*.

And yet, the antipathy that we have seen in *Negative Dialectics* to many of the fundamental premises of that book suggests a common ground with Althusser and his followers. What has obscured the similarity is the seeming irreconcilability of Adorno's essentially positive attitude toward Hegel with Althusser's obvious hostility.[80] The difficulty is resolvable, however, if one realizes that their interpretations of Hegel differ radically, with the result that what Althusser attacks in Hegel is precisely what Adorno thinks Hegel has himself overcome. More specifically, in his *Aspekte der Hegelschen Philosophie*, Adorno strove to exorcise the Fichtean idea of "expressive totality" from Hegel's work. In fact, he went so far as to say that Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program, with its rejection of the absolute constitutive power of labor, was implicit in Hegel as well.[81] Whether or not this is valid (Marcuse thought not in *Reason and Revolution*)[82] is not at issue. What is significant is that Althusser has seized on precisely the same work of Marx for a similar purpose: to attack the notion of "expressive totality."[83] Although Althusser's "ever pre-given complex whole" consists of structures without

78. Göran Therborn, "Frankfurt Marxism: A Critique," *New Left Review*, 63 (September-October, 1970). I have tried to refute Therborn's position in "The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism."

79. Schmidt, "Der Srukturalistische Angriff ajf die Geschiscte," in Alfred Schmidt, ed., *Beiträge zur marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie* (Frankfurt, 1969), and *Geschichte und Struktur; Fragen einer marxistischen Historik*.

80. For Althusser's attitude towards Hegel, see *For Marx*, pp. 202-204.

81. Adorno, *Aspekte der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 28.

82. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*, revised edition (Boston, 1960), p. 173.

83. Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York and London, 1971), pp. 93-94.

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genetic subjectivity, whereas Adorno's "force-field" involves an unreconciled dialectic of subject and object, both clearly reject the idea of a collective, constitutive subject as an idealistic residue. Both clearly employ a concept of over-determination that maintains the irreducibility of one causal chain to another. Both share a considerable coolness towards the usefulness of such humanist categories as alienation and reification, although Adorno is not as unqualified in his disavowal. Moreover, Althusser's assertion that "the last instance never comes," which qualifies and perhaps even undermines his argument that the economy is always determinant "in the last instance," suggests a reticence to make any centered totality, even an economistic one, an historical possibility, which corresponds to Adorno's retreat from the normative idea of totality. Further evidence of this caution is Althusser's argument that ideology will exist even after the revolution, which is paralleled in a number of statements in Adorno's work.[84] Similarly, when Althusser speaks of a "theoretical praxis" distinct from other *praxes*, he is reinforcing Adorno's claim that theory can itself be a form of *praxis* (although, of course, the method of the theoretical *praxis* in the two cases is very different). Not surprisingly, this assertion has earned Althusser the same reproach so often leveled against Adorno for elitism and covert idealism.[85]

Such simlarities can be extended further, but I hope the point has been made. For what Adorno and Althusser together signify is the exhaustion of the problematic introduced into Marxist theory by *History and Class Consciousness*. Both represent the Marxism of a more sober and disillusioned time. For with Althusser's reluctance to see ideology asnd the division of labor end after the revolution, we have come a long way from the utopian expectations of both the early Marx and the early Lukács. As Lucien Goldmann, himself an uneasy interpreter of the Lukácsian notion of totality, once noted: "All of the great Marxist works which stress the powers of man, his possibilities of changing society and the world through action, are found in the great revolutionary epochs, around the years 1848, 1871, 1905 in Russia, and 1917. It is enough to mention the philosophical writings of the young Marx (1841-6), his essay on *The Civil War in France* (1871), *Gosudarstvo i Revolutsia* by Lenin (1917), the *Juniusbroschüre* of Rosa Luxemburg (1917), and *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* by Georg Lukács (1917-1922). Conversely, the epochs during which the dominant classes are stable, epochs in which the workers' movement must defend itself against a powerful adversary, which is occasionally threatening and is in every case solidly seated in power, produce naturally a socialist literature which

84. See, for example, Adorno's assertion in *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London, 1967), that "humanity includes reification as well as its opposite, not merely as the conditon from which liberation is possible, but also positively, as the form in which, however brittle and inadequate it may be, subjective impulses are realized, but only by being objectified" (p. 262).

85. See, for example, Norman Geras, "Louis Althusser—An Assessment," *New Left Review*, 71 (January-February, 1972), p. 84.

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emphasizes the 'material' element of reality, the obstacles to be overcome, and the scant efficacy of human awareness and action."

Whether or not a new revolutionary era will emerge is still uncertain. But if it does, one thing is clear: no future Lukács will be able to see totality as "the bearer of the principle of revolution in science" without having answered, if he can, the devastating critique of the concept in its Lukácsian form so skillfully and painfully made by Adorno and his unwitting allies in the structuralist movement.[86]

85. Lucien Goldmann, *The Human Sciences and philosophy*, trans. Hayden V. White and Robert Anchor (London, 1969), pp. 80-81.

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

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

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

NOTES ON JOURNALISM*

by Antonio Gramsci

Notebook 24. § (1). The type of journalism considered in these notes is what could be called "integral" journalism (in the sense that will become increasingly clear in the course of the notes themselves) i.e., the kind of journalism that not only seeks to satisfy all the needs (of a certain category) of its public, but also seeks to create and develop these needs and therefore to rouse its public in order to progressively expand it.

If one examines all existing forms of journalism or of publishing and editorial activity in general, it can be seen that each one of these presupposes other forces to integrate or to "mechanically" coordinate. To begin to critically present the subject and study all sides it seems more appropriate (for methodological and didactic ends) to presuppose another situation: that there is, as a starting point, a certain type of a more or less homogeneous cultural grouping (in a broad sense) at a certain level of development, and especially having a certain general orientation, so to construct on such a grouping a complete autarchic cultural edifice beginning, of all things from language i.e., from the means of expression and of reciprocal contact. The whole edifice would have to be constructed according to "rational" principles, i.e., functional ones, to the extent that there are determinate premises and determinate consequences to be sought. Certainly, during the formulation of the "plan" the premises necessarily change, because if a certain goal presupposes certain premises, it is also true that, during the real elaboration of the given activity, the premises are necessarily changed and transformed. The consciousness of the end, by expanding and concretizing, reacts upon the premises forcing them to progressively "conform." The objective existence of the premises permits thinking toward certain ends, i.e., the given premises are such only in relation to certain ends which can be thought of as concrete. But if the ends progressively begin to be realized, due to such realization they necessarily change the initial premises which meanwhile are no longer initial and hence the conceivable ends also change and so on.

This nexus is thought about quite rarely even though it is immediately evident. We see its manifestation in undertakings "according to a plan." These are not pure "mechanisms," precisely because they are based on this mode of thinking in which the parts of liberty and the spirit of initiative (spirit of "free association" "combination") is much greater than it is generally admitted by the official representatives of "liberty" and of abstractly conceived (or too "concretely" conceived "initiative" because of their role as masks or art commodities). Hence, this nexus is true. Yet, it is also true that the initial "premises" continuously reappear, even if in other conditions. That a certain "class of students" learns the alphabet does not mean that illiteracy disappears all at once and forever. Every year there will be a new "class" to be taught the alphabet. Yet it is evident that the rarer illiteracy becomes among adults, the fewer difficulties there will be in filling elementary schools up to 100% capacity. There will always be illiterates, but they will tend to disappear down to the normal limit of five or six year old children.

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Notebook 24. § (2). This is how the various types of newspapers are described in *Annali dell'Italia Cattolica* in 1926 in reference to the Catholic press: "In a broad sense the 'Catholic' newspaper (or rather that newspaper written by Catholics) contains nothing against Catholic doctrine and morality, and follows and defends its norms. Within these bounds the newspaper can pursue political, socio-economic, or scientific ends. On the other hand, the 'Catholic' newspaper, in the strict sense, is the one which, in agreement with Ecclesiastic Authorities, has as its direct aim an effective Christian social apostolate, in the service of the Church and for the aid of the 'Catholic Action.' At least implicitly, it carries the responsibility of Ecclesiastic authorities and therefore their norms and policies must be followed."

Here, the so-called information or explicitly "non-partisan" newspaper is distinguished from the opinion newspaper, from the official organ of a particular party; the newspaper for the common masses or the "popular" newspaper is distinguished from that aimed at a necessarily restricted public.

For some aspects, in the history of journalistic technology the *Piccolo* of Trieste can be considered "exemplary," at least as it appears from Silvio Benco's book dedicated to this newspaper's history (in relation to the Austrian legislation on the press, on the position of Italian subversion in Istria, on the formal legitimacy of the imperial and royal authorities, on the internal struggles of the various subversive factions, on the relation between the national popular mass and the political direction of Italian nationalism, etc.).

For other aspects the *Corriere della Sera* was very interesting during the Giolitti or generally liberal period, if one takes into account the Italian journalistic and politico-cultural situation, which was quite different from the French one or generally from that of other European countries.

The neat division which existed in France between popular and opinion newspapers, cannot exist in Italy, where there is no center as populous and culturally predominant as Paris (and where there is less "indispensability" for the political newspapers even in the upper and so-called cultured classes). It is to be noted that the *Corriere della Sera*, even though it was the most widely circulated paper in the country, has never been explicitly ministerial except for brief periods of time and even then idiosyncratically: in order to be "of the state" it indeed almost always had to be antiministerial, thus expressing one of the most noteworthy contradictions of national life.

It would be useful to investigate in the history of Italian journalism the technical and politico-cultural reasons why the fortune the old *Secolo* of Milan was to successful for a while. It seems that two periods can be distinguished in the history of Italian journalism: the "primitive" era of the indistinct cultural-political generic press which made the *Secolo's* wide circulation possible on a program of vague "secularism" (against the clerical influence) and vague "democratism" (against the preponderant influence of right-wing forces in state life). Furthermore, *Secolo* was the first "modern" Italian newspaper with foreign correspondents, with an abundance of European information and news, etc. Subsequently through "Transformism," the forces of the right were "nationalized," in the popular sense, and the *Corriere* replaced the *Secolo* for wide circulation. The *Secolo*'s vague democratic secularism becomes a more concrete national effort for unification in the *Corriere*. The secularism is less coarse and slipshod and the nationalism less plebeian and democratic. It must be noted that not one of the parties distinguished by *Secolo*'s amorphous populism tried to recreate a democratic unity of a higher and more concrete politico-cultural level than the previous

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primitive one, but this task was abandoned almost without struggle to the *Corriere's* conservatives. And yet, after every process of clarification and distinction, the task should be to recreate the unity, broken in the progressive movement, on a higher level through the elite which has succeeded in capturing a more concrete personality from indistinct generalities, thus exercising a guiding function over the old complex from which it has separated itself. The same process was repeated in the Catholic world after the formation of the *Partito Popolare*: democratic "distinctions" which the rightists succeeded in subordinating to their own programs. In both cases, although constituting the majority of ruling intellectuals, the petite bourgeoisie were subverted by individuals from the fundamental class: in the secular camp by the *Corriere* industrialists, and in the Catholic camp by the agrarian bourgeoisie united with large landowners to subvert the *Secolo* and the *Partito Popolare's* political professionals who still represented the great masses of the two camps, the semiproletariat and the urban and rural petite bourgeoisie.

Notebook 24. § (3). *Types of Journals.* Generally speaking, it is possible to distinguish three basic types of journals, characterized by the way they are put together, the type of readers they intend to address, and the educational ends they want to attain. The first type can be represented by the combination of directional elements who meet in a specialized fashion in B. Croce's *Critica*, in F. Coppola's *Politica* and in C. Barbagallo's *Nuova Rivista Storica*. The second "critical-historical-bibliographic" type is characterized by the combination of elements found in the most successful issues of L. Russo's *Leonardo*, *Rerum Scriptor's Unità*, and Prezzolini's *Voce*. The third type is a combination of some elements of the second type and of the type of English weeklies such as the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* or the *Times Weekly*.

Every one of these types should assume a very unified and non-anthological intellectual direction, i.e., each should have a homogeneous and disciplined editorial staff, and a few "main" contributors should write the main body of each issue. The editorial direction should be forcefully organized in such a way as to produce an intellectually homogeneous work, even in the necessary variations of style and literary personality; the editorial staff should have a written statute which, to the extent that it can, would prevent overlaps, conflicts, contradictions (for example, the content of every issue should be approved by the editorial majority before publication).

A unified cultural organism offering to diverse strata of the public the three indicated types of journals (and a common spirit should circulate among the three types), supported by corresponding book series, would satisfy the requirements of a certain body of the public which is most intellectually active, but only potentially. What is more important is to elaborate, to allow concrete thinking, transform and homogenize according to an organic process of development leading from simple common sense to coherent and systematic thought.

Critical-historical-bibliographic type: an analytic examination of works from the viewpoint of the journal's readers who generally cannot read the works themselves. A scholar examining a particular historic phenomenon to construct a synthetic essay, has to carry out a whole series of preliminary investigations and intellectual operations which are utilized only in small part. Instead, this tiring work can be utilized for this middle type of journal, addressed to the reader who, in addition to the synthetic essay, needs all of the analytic activity which has led to that result in order to develop intellectually. The common reader does not and cannot have "scientific" habits, which

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are acquired only through specialized work: thus, it is necessary to help him at least to grasp its "sense" with a suitable critical activity. It is not enough to give him some concepts already formulated and fixed in "definitive" expressions. Their concreteness, which consists in the process that led to those claims, eludes him: thus, it is necessary to provide him with the whole series of well identified and not just indicated reasonings and intermediate connections. For instance, a complex historical movement disintegrates in space and time and on different levels: thus, *Azione Cattolica*, although it has always had a single and centralized directive, manifests great differences (and even contrasts) of regional attitudes in different times and according to specific problems (for example, the agrarian question, the syndicalist course, etc.).

In this type of journal a few particular rubrics are indispensable: 1) An encyclopedic political-scientific-philosophic dictionary, in this sense: every issue should include one or more short monographs of an encyclopedic character, on political, philosophical and scientific concepts frequently recurring in newspapers and journals which the average reader understands with difficulty or even misunderstands. In reality, every cultural current creates its own language, i.e., it participates in the general development of a particular national language by introducing new terms, enriching the terms already in use with new contents, creating metaphors, making use of historical names to facilitate the comprehension and judgement of specific contemporary situations, etc. The accounts should be "practical," i.e., be connected to really felt needs and its form of exposition, be suitable to the average reader. The compilers should possibly be informed of the most widespread errors and return to the very source of these errors, i.e., to the publication of scientific trash like *Biblioteca popolare Sonzogno*, or encyclopedic dictionaries (Melzi, Premoli, Bonacci, etc.) or more widely circulated encyclopedias (The *Sonzogno* one, etc.). These accounts should not be presented in an organic form (for example, in alphabetical order or by classification according to subjects), nor according to a predetermined economy of space, as if a complete work were already in sight. Rather, they should be put in immediate relation to the topics presented in the journal itself or in associated journals of a superior or more elementary type. The amplitude of the coverage should not be determined each time by the intrinsic importance of the subject, but by immediate journalistic interest (all of this is said generally and with the usual grain of salt). In short, the rubric does not have to be presented like a book published in installments, but rather each time as a discussion of subjects interesting in themselves from which a book could arise but need not.

2) Related is the previous rubric, to be understood in two senses: both to the extent that the whole life of a man can be of interest to a certain social stratum's general culture, and to the extent that an historical name can enter into an encyclopedic dictionary because of a particular concept or suggestive event. Thus, e.g., it could be that one must speak about Lord Carson to point out that the crisis of the parliamentary regime already existed before the First World War in England, in the country where the parliamentary system appeared most efficient and stable. This does not mean that a whole biography of Lord Carson must be written. Only two biographical events are interesting to the average person: a) In 1914, on the eve of the war, Lord Carson enlisted a very large armed corp to oppose through insurrection the application of the Irish Home Rule Law—approved by a Parliament which, according to the English manner of speaking, "can do everything except turn a man into a woman;" b) not only was Lord Carson not punished for high treason, but he became minister shortly thereafter at the outbreak of the war. (It could be

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useful to present complete biographies in separate rubrics).

3) Another rubric could deal with politico-intellectual autobiographies. If well-constructed, with sincerity and simplicity, they can be of the greatest journalistic interest and formative efficacy. The means by which a person succeeded in extricating oneself from a certain provincial or corporate environment, and the externally motivating factors and internal struggles that were experienced contributing to the development of a historically superior personality can suggest, in a lively manner, an intellectual and moral course in addition to providing a document of cultural maturation in certain epochs.

4) A fundamental column can be composed from the critical-historical-bibliographic examination of regional conditions (by region is meant a differentiated geo-economic organism). Many would want to know and study local conditions, which are always very interesting, but do not know how to do it or where to start: they do not know the bibliographic material, how to do research in libraries, etc. It would be a matter of giving the general configuration of a concrete problem (or scientific theme), identifying the books dealing with it, articles in specialized journals, in addition to raw material (statistics, etc.), in the form of bibliographic surveys, with special emphasis on the less common or foreign language publications. In addition to regions, this work can be done, from various points of view, for general problems, for culture, etc.

5) A systematic screening of newspapers and magazines for what regards the fundamental rubrics listing only citations of authors, titles, with brief notes on their tendencies. This bibliographic index should be compiled for every issue, and for a few themes it should also be compiled retrospectively.

6) Book reviews. Two types of reviews. A critical-informative type: it is presumed that the average reader cannot read the given book, but that it is useful for him to know it contents and conclusions. A theoretical-critical type: it is presumed that the reader must read the given book and hence it is not simply summarized, but rather possible objections against it are critically presented and emphasis is placed on the most interesting parts, some sacrificed parts are developed, etc. This second type of review is more appropriate for the higher level journal.

7) A critical-bibliographic screening organized around themes or groups of questions, of the literature concerning authors and the questions fundamental for the world-views of the published journals: both for Italian authors and for Italian translations of foreign authors. This screening should be very meticulous and detailed since it should be kept in mind that only through this work and this systematic critical elaboration is it possible to reach the authentic source of a whole series of wrong concepts circulating without control or censure. It is necessary to bear in mind that in every Italian region, given the extremely rich variety of local traditions, there exist groups characterized by particular ideological and psychological motives: "every village has or has had its local saint, therefore his cult and his chapel."

The unified national elaboration of a homogeneous collective consciousness demands multiple conditions and initiatives. The diffusion of a homogeneous way of thinking and working from a homogeneous center is the main condition, but it does not have to be, and cannot be, the only one. A widespread error consists in thinking that every social stratum develops its consciousness and culture in the same manner and with the same methods, i.e., those of professional intellectuals. The intellectual is a "skilled" professional who knows the functioning of his own specialized "machines:" he has his "training" and his "Taylorism." It is as puerile and illusory to attribute this acquired capability to everyone, as it would be puerile to believe that every menial

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laborer could be a railroad engineer. It is puerile to think that an appropriately spread "clear concept" will find its way into the various consciousnesses with the same "organizer" effect of widespread clarity: this is an "enlightenment" error. The capability of the professional intellectual to ably combine induction and deduction, to generalize without falling into empty formalisms, to shift certain discriminative criteria from one sphere of judgment to another, adapting them to new conditions, etc., is a "specialty," a "qualification," not a vulgar common sense datum. This is the reason for the inadequacy of the premise of the "organic diffusion from a homogeneous center of a homogeneous way of thinking and working." The same luminous ray of light passing through different prisms creates different light refractions: a whole series of rectifications of the individual prisms is necessary, if one wants the same refraction.

Patient and systematic "repetition" is a fundamental principle: but not mechanical, "obsessive," material repetition. Rather, every concept must be adapted to the various cultural peculiarities and traditions. Its presentation and representation must be related in all of its positive aspects and in its traditional negations always relating every partial aspect to the totality. To find real identity beneath apparent differences and contradictions, and to find the substantial diversity beneath apparent identity, is the most delicate, misunderstood and yet essential skill for the critic of ideas and for the historian of historical development. The educative-formative work carried out by a homogeneous center of culture, the elaboration of a critical consciousness it promotes and favors on a definite historical base containing the concrete premises for such an elaboration, cannot be limited to the simple theoretical ennunciation of "clear" methodological principles; this would be the pure action of eighteenth century "philosophers." The necessary labor is complex and must be articulated and planned out: there must be a combination of induction and deduction, formal logic and the dialectic, identification and distinction, positive demonstration and the destruction of the old. But not abstractly, but rather concretely, on the basis of the real and of actual experience. But how is one to know the most widespread and firmly rooted errors? Evidently, it is impossible to come up with "statistics" concerning ways of thinking and individual opinions, with all the resulting permutations and combinations for groups and grouplets, which would provide an organic and systematic picture of the actual cultural situation and of the ways in which "common sense" really appears. There is nothing left but the systematic review of the most widely circulated and most popularly accepted literature, combined with the study and critique of past ideological currents, each one of which "could" have left a sediment variously combining with previous and subsequent ones.

A more general criterion enters this same order of observations: the changes in the ways of thinking, in beliefs, in opinions, do not occur through rapid, simultaneous and generalized "explosions," but rather almost always they occur because of "successive combinations" according to extremely disparate "formulae" beyond the control of "authority." The "explosive" illusion is born from the absence of a critical spirit. As the methods of locomotion have not gone from the stage-coach driven by animal power to the modern electric express trains, but have passed through a series of intermediate combinations which in part still exist (as with animal locomotion on rails, etc.) and as the railroad material obsolete in the United States is still utilized for many years in China where it represents a technical advance, so in the sphere of culture the different ideological strata variously combine, and what is "scrap-iron" in the city is still "useful" in the countryside. In the cultural sphere, in fact, the

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"explosions" are still less frequent and less intense then in the technological sphere, in which, at least on the highest levels an innovation spreads with relative rapidity and simultaneity. The "explosions" of political passions accumulated over a period of technological transformations, to which correspond no new forms of adequate juridical organization but rather immediately a certain degree of direct and indirect coercion, are confused with cultural transformations which are slow and gradual, because if passion is impulsive, culture is the product of complex elaborations. (The allusion to the fact that sometimes what has become "scrap-iron" in the city is still "useful" in the country-side can be fruitfully developed).

Notebook 24. § (4). A typical journal was Gozzi's *Osservatore*, i.e., the moralizing journal typical of the 1700s (which reached its perfection in England, where it arose, with Addison's *Spectator*). It had a certain historical-cultural significance in disseminating the new conception of life, serving as an intermediary link, for the average reader, between religion and modern civilization. Today the type has degenerated and is preserved especially in the Catholic camp, while in the camp of modern civilization it has been transformed by becoming incorporated into humorous magazines which, in their own way, want to be "constructive" critiques of custom: typical examples are publications like *Fantasio, Charivari*, etc., which have no parallels in Italy (though Podrecca's primitive *Asino* and the *Seme*, written for peasants, were something of the sort). In some regards, some articles on city news and judiciary news in the dailies and the so-called "little boxes" or italics are derivations from eighteenth century moralizing journals.

Baretti's *Frusta Letteraria* is of this type: an encyclopedic bibliographic journal, critical of the contents and with moralizing tendencies (critique of customs, points of view, taking its departure not from life and the news, but from books), Papini's *Lacerba*, in its non-artistic part, in some respects belonged to this type in an original and charming manner, but the "satanic" tendency (Papini's "Gesu Peccatore" [Jesus the Sinner], "Viva il Maiale!" [Long Live the Pig], "Contro la Famiglia" [Against the Family], etc., Soffici's "Giornale di Bordo" [Captain's Log], Italo Tavolato's article "Elogio della Prostitutione" [Elegy of Prostitution], etc.) was forced and the originality was too frequently artificial.

The general type can be said to belong to the sphere of "common sense" or "good sense," because the goal is to change the average opinions of a certain society by criticizing, suggesting, mocking, correcting, rejuvenating and, in the last analysis, by introducing "new commonplaces." Although written vivaciously, with a certain sense of detachment (so as not to assume a preaching tone), but still with cordial interest in common opinion, journals of this type can have a large circulation and exercise a profound influence. They must not have any "haughtiness," either scientific or moralistic, and must not be "philistine" and academic, nor appear fanatical or excessively partisan: they have to place themselves in the same camp with "common sense," detaching themselves only so much as to permit a scoffing smile, but not one of scorn or supercilious superiority...

Every social stratum has its "common sense" and "good sense," which are at bottom the most widespread conceptions of life and man. Every philosophical current leaves a sediment of "common sense": this is the document of its historical efficacy. Common sense is not something rigidified and immobile, but is continuously transformed, becoming enriched with scientific notions and philosophical opinions which have entered into customs. "Common sense" is the folklore of philosophy and is always in

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the middle between true folklore (i.e., as it is commonly understood) and philosophy, science, and the scientists' economics. Common sense creates the future folklore, i.e., a relatively rigidified stage of popular knowledge in a certain place and time.

Notebook 24. § (5). *Yearbooks and Almanacs.* The "Political-Critical" type of journal requires a body of specialized editors regularly able to provide scientifically selected and elaborated material; the existence of this body of editors, who have attained among themselves a certain degree of cultural homogeneity is anything but easy, and represents the arrival point in the development of a cultural movement. This type of journal can be replaced (or anticipated) by the publication of a "Yearbook." This "Yearbook" would not have anything to do with a common popular "Almanac" (the compilation of which is qualitatively tied to the daily, i.e., must keep in sight the average daily reader); nor should it be an occasional anthology of writings too long to be included in another type of journal; instead, it should be organically prepared, according to a general scheme, so as to be like the prospectus of a journal's specific program. It could be dedicated to a single theme or else be divided into sections and treat an organic series of fundamental questions (the State's constitution, international politics, the agrarian question, etc.). Every "Yearbook" should be self-contained (it should not be written in a series) and be provided with bibliographies, analytical indices, etc.

Study the various types of popular "Almanacs," which are, if well-prepared, little encyclopedias of current events.

Notebook 24. § (7). *Original Essays and Translations.* The question arises especially for middle and elementary types of journals, for even they should consist mainly of original writings. It is necessary to react against the traditional habit of filling journals with translations, even if they are writings of "authorities." Yet, the contribution of foreign writers cannot be abolished: it has its cultural significance, a reaction against provincialism and paltriness. There are various solutions: 1) obtain and translate original foreign contributions; 2) sum up the main writings of the international press, compiling a rubric like that of "Marzocco's" *Marginalia*; 3) compile periodical supplements exclusively of translations with a partially independent heading, and its own pagination, which should contain an organic, critical-informative selection of foreign theoretical publications. (See the popular *Minerva* and *Rassegna della Stampa Estera* published by the foreign ministry.)

Notebook 24. § (8). *Scientific Rubrics.* The Italian type of daily newspaper is determined by all of the organizing conditions of the country's cultural life: lack of a vast popularizing literature, both in terms of books as well as journals. The newspaper reader, therefore, wants to find in his paper a reflection of all the aspects of a modern nation's complex social life. It should be pointed out that the Italian newspaper, relatively better prepared and more serious than in other countries, has neglected scientific information, while there was a notable corp of journalists specialized in economic, literary and artistic literature. Even in the most important journals (such as *Nuova Antologia* and *Rivista d'Italia*) the section dedicated to science was negligible. (Today conditions have changed and, from this viewpoint, *Corriere della Sera* has a series of renown contributors specialized in scientific matters.) Scientific journals for specialists have always existed, but popularizing journals were lacking (to be consulted is the *Arduo*, which came out in Bologna edited by S. Timpanaro; and *Scienza per*

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tutti from Sonzogno Publishers, which was widely circulated, but in order to judge it, it is enough to remember that it was edited for many years by... Massimo Rocca).

Scientific information should be an integral part of any Italian newspaper, both as a carrier of scientific and technological news as well as a critical exposition of major scientific hypotheses and opinions (there should be also a separate rubric devoted to health and medicine). More than any other, a popular newspaper should feature such a scientific section so as to guide and direct its readers' culture, which is often at the level of witchcraft and science fiction, and to "de-provincialize" current notions.

There are difficulties in finding specialists who know how to write popularly. The systematic scrutiny of general and specialized journals of professional culture and the minutes of the Academies should be undertaken for the purpose of compiling abstracts and summaries in special appendices. The themes and subjects should be accurately chosen in view of the cultural needs of the people.

Notebook 24. § (9). *Schools of Journalism.* In the *Nuova Antologia* of July 1, 1928, an article appeared with this title by Ermanno Amicucci, which maybe later has been republished in a volume with others. The article is interesting in light of the information and insights which it offers. It should be pointed out, however, that in Italy the question is far more complex to resolve than would appear from reading this article and it is likely that the results of these educational initiatives cannot be very significant (at least in so far as it concerns journalism in its technical sense; journalism schools will be schools of general political propaganda). Yet, the principle that journalism must be taught and that it is not rational to let the journalist develop by himself, casually, through the "school of hard knocks" is vital and will continue to impose itself more and more as journalism gradually becomes, even in Italy, a more complex industry and a more responsible civil entity. In Italy, the problem encounters its limitation in the fact that there are no large journalistic concentrations due to the decentralization of national cultural life, and that newspapers are very few and the number of readers sparse. The newspaper staff is very limited and thus it is nourished by their own ranks of importance; the less important papers (and the weeklies) serve as schools for the more important ones, and vice-versa. A second rate editor in *Corriere* becomes director or chief editor of a provincial newspaper, and an editor who has a proved himself first-rate in a provincial newspaper or weekly is swallowed up by a large newspaper. In Italy, there are no centers like Paris, London and Berlin which reckon with thousands of journalists comprising a really broad and economically important professional category: furthermore, remuneration in Italy is on the average very low. In a few countries, as in Germany, the number of newspapers published in the whole country is awesome, and a vast stratification in the provinces corresponds to the concentration in Berlin.

There is also the problem of training local correspondents who rarely can be journalists by profession (and then only in large cities and generally in those where important weeklies are published).

For certain kinds of newspapers the problem of professional schools has to be resolved in the context of the editorial office, transforming or integrating periodic editorial gatherings into organic schools of journalism, to those lessons even individuals foreign to the editorial group in the strict sense should be invited; youths and students, until it acquires the character of a real politico-journalistic school, with lessons on general subjects (history, economics, constitutional law, etc.) assigned even to competent outsiders who know how to enter into the needs of the newspaper.

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The starting point should be the principle that every editor or reporter should be put in the position to compile and direct all aspects of the newspaper, as every editor should immediately acquire the quality of a reporter, i.e., give all his energy to the newspaper, etc.

In regard to the number of Italian journalists, *Italia Letteraria* of August 24, 1930 reports the data of a census made by the Secretariat of the National Journalists' Guild: as of the 30th of June there were affiliated 1960 journalists of whom 800 were members of the Fascist Party distributed as follows: the Bari local, 30 and 26; Bologna 108 and 40; Florence 168 and 43, Genova 113 and 39; Milan 348 and 143; Naples 106 and 45; Palermo 50 and 17; Rome 716 and 259; Turin 144 and 59; Trieste 90 and 62; Venice 147 and 59.

Notebook 14. § (62). *Journalism. The Readers.* The readers have to be considered from two main viewpoints: 1) as ideological elements philosophically "transformable," and able, malleable and amenable to transformations; 2) as "economic" elements able to purchase publications and to have others purchase them. In reality, the two are not always separable to the extent that the ideological element is a stimulus to the economic act of acquisition and circulation. Yet, in constructing an editorial policy, it is necessary to keep the two aspects distinct, so that calculations be realistic and not according to one's own desires. On the other hand, the economic sphere, possibilities do not correspond to will and to ideological impulses. Thus, it is necessary to allow that there be a possibility of "indirect" purchase, i.e., compensation through services (circulation).

A publishing enterprise publishes various types of journals and books, according to various levels of culture. It is difficult to establish how many possible "clients" exist at every level. It is necessary to start with the lowest level, and base on this the "minimum" marketing policy, i.e., the most realistic estimate, still bearing in mind that the activity can change (and must change) the starting point not only in the sense that the sphere of clientele can (must) be broadened but that a hierarchy of needs to be satisfied can (must) be established along with activities to perform.

It is obvious that the enterprises which have existed up until now have become bureaucratized, i.e., they have not stimulated needs and organized their satisfaction. Thus, it has often been the case that chaotic individual initiative has borne better fruit than organized initiative. The truth was that in this second case there was no "initiative" or "organization" but only bureaucracy and fatalistic custom. Frequently the so-called organization, rather than being a stimulator of efforts, was a narcotic, a depressant, indeed an obstruction and a sabotage. On the other hand, one cannot speak about a serious journalistic and editorial business if this element is lacking: the organization of the client of sales, since, being a particular client, it is in need of a particular organization, closely connected to the ideological direction of the "commodity" being sold. It is a common observation that in a modern newspaper the real boss is not the editorial but the administrative director.

Notebook 14. § (71). *Journalism. Intellectual Movements and Centers.* It is the duty of journalistic activity (in its various manifestations) to follow and control all intellectual movements and centers in existence or in the process of being formed in the country. *All* of them, i.e., with the bare exclusion of those having an arbitrary and crazy nature; although even those, in the tone they deserve, have to be at least acknowledged. Distinction between intellectual *centers* and *movements* and other

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distinctions and gradations. For example, Catholicism is a large center and a large movement, but within it there are partial movements and centers which tend to transform the whole, or aim at other more concrete and limited ends which have to be taken into account. It seems that before anything else it is necessary to "draw" the intellectual and moral *map* of the country, i.e., to circumscribe the large movements of ideas and the large centers (but it is not always the case that large centers correspond to large movements, at least with the characteristics of visibility and concreteness that one usualy attributes to this work, and the typical example is the Catholic center). In adition, it is necessary to take into account the innovative thrusts taking place, which are not always vital, i.e., they have a consequence, but this does not mean that they should be followed and controlled any less. In any case, at first a movement is always uncertain, of a doubtful future, etc. does this mean that it is necessary to wait for it to acquire all its strength and consistency in order to be of concern? It is not even necessary that it should have the assets of coherence and intellectual wealth: the most coherent and intellectually wealthy movements are not the ones which always triumph. In fact, often a movement triumphs precisely because of its mediocrity and its logical elasticity: there is room for everything in it, the most striking compromises are possible and these can be exactly the reasons for its triumph. Read youth magazines in addition to those which have already asserted themselves and represent serious and well-established interests. The *Almanacco Letterario Bompiani* of 1933 (pp. 360-61) outlines programs of six youth magazines representing the moving thrusts of our culture: *Il Saggiatore, Ottobre, Il Ventuno, L'Italia vivente, L'Orto, Espero* which, with some exceptions, do not seem very perspicacious. The *Espero*, for example, "in regards to philosophy proposes to cater to the *post-idealists*, who carry out an attentive critique of idealism, and only those idealists who can take such a critique into account." The editor of *Espero* is Aldo Capasso, and to be a post-idealist is being something like a "contemporary," i.e., nothing. Clearer, perhaps the only clear one, is the program of *Ottobre*. Yet, snobbishness aside, all of these movements would have to be examined.

Distinction between *militant* movements, which are the most interesting, and *rear-guard* movements dealing with established ideas which have become classic or commercial. Among these, where should one place *Italia Letteraria*? Certainly not among the militant nor among classic ones! A sack of potatoes seems to me to be the most exact and appropriate definition.

Notebook 14. § (73). *Journalism. Typical Journals.* Between the first issue of the journal *Leonardo*, edited by Sansoni of Florence, and the issues edited by Casa Treves, the difference is very notable; and yet Casa Treves is not typographically one of the most recent. The exterior appearance of a journal is very important, both commercially and "ideologically," in ensuring loyalty and affection. In reality, in this case it is difficult to distinguish commercial from the ideological matters. Factors: page, margins, the width of columns, (line-length), the compactness of the column, i.e., the number of characters per line and the choice of typefaces, the paper and the ink (esthetics of the headlines, clearness of the typefaces due to the major or minor wear of the fonts or the artwork, etc.). These factors are not only important for journals but also for dailies.

The fundamental problem of every periodical (whether daily or not) is that of insuring stable sales (possibly in continuous growth), which means then the possibility of developing a commerical scheme (in development, etc.) Certainly, the fundamental

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factor in the success of a periodical is the ideological one, i.e., whether or not it satisfies definite intellectual and political needs. But it would be a great error to believe that this is the only factor and especially that it is valid when taken in "isolation." Only under exceptional conditions, in terms of definite booms of public opinion, is an opinion, whatever the exterior form in which it is presented, a success. Usually, the manner of presentation has great importance for the stability of the enterprise, and this importance can be positive as well as negative.Giving away *gratis* or below cost is not always a "good speculation," as it is not good speculation to have one pay too much or give too "little" for "one's money." That is true at least in politics. The public destrusts an opinion whose publication does not cost anything,. it sees a trap. Likewise, it "politically" distrusts those who do not know how to manage the funds which the public contributes. How could a party be considered capable of managing State power which does not know how to select individuals to manage well a newspaper or a journal? On the other hand, a group with scarce resources which knows how to obtain appreciable journalistic results demonstrates that it will manage even broader structures competently. This is why the "exterior" of a publication has to be dealt with the same care as the ideological and intellectual contents; actually the two are inseparable and rightly so. Usually, a good principle is to give the outside of a publication an appearance which makes it noticable and remembered: it is free publicity, so to speak though not always, because it depends upon the psychology of the particular audience to be captured.

Notebook 18. § (57). *Typical Journals.* Individually nobody can follow all the literature published on a group of themes and not even on a single theme. For an audience of mediocre erudition or for those beginning their cultural life, the service of providing critical information concerning all publications on a group of themes of most interest to them is mandatory. As rulers have a secretariat or a press office which regularly keeps them informed on all that is published which is indispensable for them to know, so does a journal for its public. It will define its task, it will limit it, but this will be its task: this, however requires that it provide an organic and complete body of information: limited, but organic and complete. The book reviews should not be casual and irregular, but rather systematic, and they must be accompanied by retrospective "summary reviews" dealing with the most essential themes.

A journal, like a newspaper, a book, or any other didactic mode of expression directed at a certain public, having as its aim a definite average reader, listener, etc., cannot make everyone happy to the same degree, cannot be equally useful to everyone, etc. The important thing is that it be a stimulus for everyone since no publication can substitute a thinking brain or define intellectual and scientific interests *ex novo* where there is only interest for gossip where it is thought that one lives just to have a good time. Therefore, one should not be troubled by the multiplicity of critiques: rather, the multiplicity of critiques is proof that one is on the right road; when instead there is a single critical theme, there is cause for reflection: 1) for it can be a matter of real journalistic deficiency; or 2) its publication may have been based on a mistaken view of the "average" readers it addresses, and thus one works to no avail, "for eternity."

Notebook 7. Para. (81). *Typical Journals. Foreign Contributions.* One cannot do without foreign contributors, but even foreign contributions must be organic, not anthological, sporadic, or casual. To be organic it is necessary that foreign contributors, in addition to knowing the cultural currents of their country, be capable

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of "contrasting" them with those of the country where the journal is publiched i.e., by knowing its cultural currents and the national "language." Consequently the journal (or the editor of the journal) must also shape up his foreign contributors in order to attain organicity.

During the *Risorgimento* this happened very rarely and thus Italian culture continued to remain rather provincial. On the other hand, an organicity of international contributors was perhaps only achieved in France, because Frence culture, even before the liberal epoch, had exercised European hegemony; thus, German, English, and other European intellectuals who knew how to report about their countries' culture in the French "language" were relatively numerous. In fact, it was not enough that Vieusseux's *Antologia* published articles by French or German or English "liberals" so that such articles could usefully inform Italian liberals, i.e., so that this information could promote or reinforce Italian ideological currents: thought remained generic, abstract and cosmopolitan. It would have been necessary to generate contributors specialized in the knowledge of Italy, of its intellectual currents, its problems, i.e., contributors able to instruct Italy about France, in so far as they were able at the same time to instruct France about Italy.

This type of contributors do not "spontaneously" exist: they must be encouraged and cultivated. Opposed to this rational manner of understanding contributions is the superstition of having among one's own foreign contributors the heads of schools, the great theoreticians, etc. The utility (especially commercial) of having big names should not be denied. But from the practical viewpoint of promoting culture, it is more important to have the type of contributor who is attuned to the journal, who knows how to translate one cultural world into the language of another cultural world, because he knows how to find similarities even where they do not seem to exist, and to find differences even where there appear to be only similarities.

Notebook 8. § (60). *Typical Journals. Reviews.* I have alluded to various types of reviews, setting out from the viewpoint of the cultural requirements of a well-defined public and a well-defined cultural movement which is to be encouraged: thus "summary" reviews should be written for the books which presumably will not be read, and critical reviews for the books recommended for reading, but not as such without further ads, but after leaving determined their limitations and partial deficiencies. This second kind is the more important and scientifically worthy, and it has to be understood as a reviewer's contribution to the theme dealt by the reviewed book. Thus, the need for specialized reviewers and the struggle against the extemporaneousness and generality of the critical judgments.

These observations and notes concerning typical journals and other themes dealing with journalistic techique could be put together and organized under the title: *Small Manual of Journalistic Techniques.*

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POWER AND SEX: AN INTERVIEW WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT*

Q.: Your book La Volonté de Savoir (The Will to Know) *marks the beginning of a "history of sexuality" of monumental proportions. What justification is there today for you, Michel Foucault, to undertake so huge an enterprise?*

Foucault: So *huge*? No, no, say rather, so *needed*. I do not intend to write the chronicle of sexual behavior over the ages and civilizations. I want to follow a narrower thread: the one that through so many centuries has linked sex and the search for truth in our socieities.

Q.: In precisely what sense?

Foucault: In fact, the problem is this: how is it that in a society like ours, sexuality is not simply a means of reproducing the species, the family, and the individual? Not simply a means to obtain pleasure and enjoyment? How has sexuality come to be considered the privileged place where our deepest "truth" is read and expressed? For that is the essential fact: Since Christianity, the Western world has never ceased saying: "To know who you are, know what your sexuality is." Sex has always been the forum where both the future of our species and our "truth" as human subjects are decided.

Confession, the examination of conscience, all the insistence on the important secrets of the flesh, has not been simply a means of prohibiting sex or of repressing it as far as possible from consciousness, but was a means of placing sexuality at the heart of existence and of connecting salvation with the mastery of these obscure movements. In Christian societies, sex has been the central object of examination, surveillance, avowal and transformation into discourse.

Q.: Hence the paradoxical theme underlying this first volume: far from making sexuality taboo or bringing strong sanctions against it, our societies have never ceased speaking of sex, and making it speak.

Foucault: They could speak very well—and very much—of sexuality, but only to prohibit it.

But I wanted to stress two important facts. First, that the bringing to light, the 'clarification' of sexuality occurred not only in discussions but also in the reality of institutions and practices.

Secondly, that numerous, strict prohibitions exist. But they are part of a complex economy along with incitements, manifestations and evaluations. We always stress the prohibitions. I would like to change the perspective somewhat, grasping in every case the entire complex of apparatuses.

And, as you well know, I have been given the image of a melancholic historian of prohibitions and repressive power, a teller of tales with only two categories: insanity

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and its incarceration, the anomaly and its exclusion, delinquency and its imprisonment. But my problem has always been on the side of another term: truth. How did the power exerted in insanity produce psychiatry's "true" discourse? The same applies to sexuality: to revive the will to know the source of the power exerted upon sex. My aim is not to write the social history of a prohibition but the political history of the production of "truth."

Q.: A new revolution in the concept of history? The dawn of another "new history?"

Foucault: A few years ago, historians were very proud to discover that they could write not only the history of battles, of kings and institutions but also of the economy, now they are all amazed because the shrewdest among them have learned that it was also possible to write the history of feelings, behavior and the body. Soon, they will understand that the history of the West cannot be dissociated from the way its "truth" is produced and produces its effects. The spirit likes to descend on young girls.

We are living in a society that, to a great extent, is marching "toward the truth"—I mean, that produces and circulates discourse having truth as its function, passing itself off as such and thus attaining specific powers. The achievement of "true" discourses (which are incessantly changing, however) is one of the fundamental problems of the West. The history as true—is still virgin territory.

What are the positive mechanisms which, producing sexuality in this or that fashion, result in misery?

In any case, what I would like to study, as far as I'm concerned, is the sum total of these mechanisms which, in our society, invite, incite and force one to speak of sex.

Q.: Still, despite such discourse, you believe that repression, sexual misery also exist . . .

Foucault: Yes, I've heard that objection. You are right: we are all living more or less in a state of sexual misery.

Q.: Why? Is that a deliberate choice?

Foucault: In subsequent volumes, concrete studies—on women, children, the perverted—I will try to analyze the forms and conditions of this misery. But, for the moment, it is a question of establishing method. The problem is to know whether the misery should be explained negatively by a fundamental interdiction, or positively by a prohibition relative to an economic situation ("Work, don't make love"): or whether it is not the effect of much more complex and much more positive procedures.

Q.: What could be a "positive" explanation in this case?

Foucault: I will make a presumptuous comparison. What did Marx do when in his analysis of capital he came across the problem of the workers' misery? He refused the customary explanation which regarded this misery as the effect of a naturally rare cause or of a concerted theft. And he said substantially: given what capitalist production is, in its fundamental laws, it cannot help but cause misery. Capitalism's *raison d'être* is not to starve the workers but it cannot develop without starving them. Marx replaced the denunciation of theft by the analysis of production.

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Other things being equal, that is approximately what I wanted to say. It is not a matter of denying sexual misery, nor is it however one of explaining it negatively by a repression. The entire problem is to grasp the positive mechanism which, producing sexuality in this or that fashion, results in misery.

Here is one example that I will deal with in a future volume: at the beginning of the 18th century tremendous importance was suddenly ascribed to childhood masturbation, which then was persecuted everywhere like a sudden epidemic, terrible and capable of compromising the whole human race.

Must one conclude from this that childhood masturbation had suddenly become unacceptable for capitalist society in the process of development? This is the position of certain "Reichians," but it does not seem at all satisfactory to me.

On the contrary, what was important at that time was the reorganization of the relations between children and adults, parents, educators; it was an intensification of the intra-family relationships; it was childhood as a common area of interest for parents, the educational institutions, the public health authorities; it was childhood as the training-ground for future generations. At the crossroads of body and soul, of health and morality, of education and training, children's sex became both a target and an instrument of power. A specific "sexuality of children" was constituted—precautious, dangerous, constantly in need of supervision.

This resulted in a sexual misery of childhood and adolescence from which our own generations still have not recovered, but the objective was not to forbid, but to use childhood sexuality, suddenly become important and mysterious, as a network of power over children.

Q.: This idea that sexual misery stems from repression, and that, to be happy, we must have sexual liberation, is held basically by sexologists, doctors, and vice squads...

Foucault: Yes, and that is why they present to us a formidable trap. What they are saying, roughly, is this: "You have a sexuality; this sexuality is both frustrated and mute; hypocritical prohibitions are repressing it. So, come to us, tell us, show us all that, confide in us your unhappy secrets..."

This type of discourse is, indeed, a formidable tool of control and power. As always, it uses what people say, feel, and hope for. It exploits their temptation to believe that to be happy, it is enough to cross the threshold of discourse and to remove a few prohibitions. But in fact it ends up repressing and dispersing movements of revolt and liberation...

Q.: Hence the misunderstanding of certain commentators: "According to Foucault, the repression or the liberation of sex amounts to the same thing." Or again: groups such as "The MLAC [a radical pro-abortion movement] and Laissez-les vivre [a pro-life movement], employ basically the same discourse..."

Foucault: Yes! Matters still have to be cleared up on that point. I was quoted as saying in effect that there is no real difference between the language of condemnation and that against condemnation, between the discourse of prudish moralists and that of sexual liberation. They claimed that I was putting them all in one bag to drown them like a litter of kittens. Diametrically false: that is not what I meant to say. But the

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important thing is, I didn't say it at all.

Q.: But you agree that there are some common elements and statements...

Foucault: But a statement is one thing, discourse another. They share common tactics even though they have conflicting strategies.

Q.: For example?

Foucault: I believe that the movements labeled "sexual liberation" ought to be understood as movements of affirmation "starting with" sexuality. Which means two things: they are movements that start with sexuality, with the apparatus of sexuality in the midst of which we're caught, and which make it function to the limit; but, at the same time, they are in motion relative to it, disengaging themselves and surmounting it.

Q.: What do these surmountings look like?

Foucault: Take the case of homosexuality. Psychiatrists began a medical analysis of it in the 1870s: a point of departure certainly for a whole series of new interventions and controls.

They began either to incarcerate homosexuals in asylums or to try to cure them. Sometimes they were looked upon as libertines and sometimes as delinquents (hence condemnations—which could be very severe, with burnings at the stake still occurring even in the eighteenth century—were necessarily rare). In the future we will *all* see them as manifesting forms of insanity, sickness of the sexual instinct. But taking such discourses literally, and thereby turning them around, we see responses arising in the form of defiance: "All right, we are the same as you, by nature sick or perverse, whichever you want. And so if we are, let us be so, and if you want to know what we are, we can tell you better than you can." The entire literature of homosexuality, very differently from libertine narratives, appears at the end of the 19th century: recall Wilde and Gide. It is the strategic return of one "same" desire for truth.

Q.: That indeed is what is happening with all minorities today, women, youth, the blacks in America...

Foucault: Yes, of course. For a long time they tried to pin women to their sex. For centuries they were told: "You are nothing but your sex." And this sex, doctors added, is fragile, almost always sick and always inducing illness. "You are man's sickness." And towards the 18th century this ancient movement ran wild, ending in a pathologization of woman: the female body became a medical object *par excellence*. I will try later to write the history of this immense "gynecology" in the broad sense of the term.

But the feminist movements responded defiantly. Are we sex by nature? Well then, let us be so but in its singularity, in its irreducible specificity. Let us draw the consequences and reinvent our own type of existence, political, economic and cultural...Always the same movement: to use this sexuality as the starting point in an attempt to colonize them and to cross beyond it toward other affirmations.

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Q.: This strategy which you are describing, this strategy of a double détente, *is it still a strategy of liberation in the classical sense? Or must one not rather say that to liberate sex, one must from now on hate and surmount it?*

Foucault: A movement is taking shape today which seems to me to be reversing the trend of "always more sex," and "always more truth in sex," which has enthralled us for centuries: it is a matter—I don't say of "rediscovering"—but rather of inventing other forms of pleasures, of relationships, coexistences, attachments, loves, intensities. I have the impression of currently hearing an "anti-sex" grumbling (I am not a prophet, at most a diagnostician), as if an effort were being made, in depth, to shake this great "sexography" which makes us try to decipher sex as the universal secret.

Q.: What are some symptoms for this diagnosis?

Foucault: Only an anecdote. A young writer, Hervé Guibert, had written some children's stories: no editor wanted them. He wrote another book, certainly very remarkable and apparently very "sexy." It was the condition for being heard and published. And, presto, he was published (the book is *La Mort Propagande*). Read it: it seems to me the opposite of the sexographic writing that has been the rule in pornography and sometimes in good literature: to move progressively toward naming what is most unmentionable in sex. Hervé Guibert opens with the worst extreme—"You want us to speak of it, well, let's go, and you will hear more than ever before"—and with this infamous material he builds bodies, mirages, castles, fusions, acts of tenderness, races, intoxications; the entire heavy coefficient of sex has been volatilized. But this is only one example of the "anti-sex" challenge, of which many other symptoms can be found. It is perhaps the end of this dreary desert of sexuality, the end of the monarchy of sex.

Q.: Unless we are pledged and chained to sex like an inevitable destiny. And since childhood, as they say...

Foucault: Exactly, just look at what is happening where children are concerned. Some say that the child's life is sexual. From the milk-bottle to puberty, that is all it is. Behind the desire to learn to read or the taste for comic strips, from first to last, everything is sexuality. Well, are you sure that this type of discourse is effectively liberating? Are you sure that it will not lock children into a sort of sexual insularity? And what if, after all, they didn't give a hoot? If the liberty of not being an adult consisted just in not being a slave of the law, the principle, the *locus communis* of sexuality, would that be so boring after all? If it were possible to have polymorphic relationships with things, people and the body, would that not be childhood? This polymorphism is called perversity by the adults, to reassure themselves, thus coloring it with the monotonous monochrome of their own sex.

Q.: Children are oppressed by the very ones who pretend to liberate them?

Foucault: Read the book by Schérer and Hocquenghem: it shows very well that the child has an assortment of pleasure for which the "sex" grid is a veritable prison.

Q.: Is this a paradox?

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Foucault: This stems from the idea that sexuality is not feared by power, and instead, is far more a means through which power is exercised.

Q.: But consider authoritarian states: can it be said that power is exercised not against but through sexuality?

Foucault: Two recent events, apparently contradictory: About ten months ago, China launched a campaign against childhood masturbation, along exactly the same lines that defined this campaign in 18th century Europe (masturbation hampers work, causes deafness, brings about the degeneration of the species). On the other hand, before the year is out, the Soviet Union will, for the first time, host a congress of psychoanalysts (they have to come from abroad since there are none in Russia). Liberalization? A thaw on the part of the subconscious? The springtime of the Soviet libido against the moral bourgeoisificiation of the Chinese?

In Peking's archaic stupidities and the quaint Soviet novelties I see mainly a double recognition of the fact that, formulated *and* prohibited, expressed [*dite*] *and* forbidden [*interdite*], sexuality is a recourse which no modern system of power can do without. We should deeply fear socialism with a sexual physiognomy.

Q.: In other words, power is no longer necessarily what condemns and encloses?

Foucault: In general terms, I would say that the interdiction, the refusal, the prohibition, far from being essential forms of power, are only its limits, power in its frustrated or extreme forms. The relations of power are, above all, productive.

Q.: This is a new idea compared with your previous books.

Foucault: If I wanted to pose and drape myself in a slightly fictional style, I would say that this has always been my problem: the effects of power and the production of "truth." I have always felt uncomfortable with this ideological notion which has been used in recent years. It has been used to explain errors or illusions, or to analyze presentations—in short, everything that impedes the formation of true discourse. It has also been used to show the relation between what goes on in people's heads and their place in the conditions of production. In sum, the economics of untruth. My problem is the politics of truth. I have spent a lot of time dealing with it.

Q.: Why?

Foucault: For several reasons. First, power in the West is what displays itself the most, and thus what hides itself the best: what we have called "political life" since the 19th century is the manner in which power presents its image (a little like the court in the monarchic era). Power is neither there, nor is that how it functions. The relations of power are perhaps among the best hidden things in the social body.

On the other hand, since the 19th century, the critique of society has essentially started with the nature of the economy, which is effectively determining. A valid reduction of "politics," certainly, but a tendency also to neglect the relations of elementary power that could be constitutive of economic relations.

The third reason is the tendency, itself common to institutions, parties, an entire current of revolutionary thought and action, not to see power in any form other than

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the state apparatus.

All of which leads, when we turn to individuals, to finding power nowhere except in the mind (under the form of representation, acceptance, or interiorization).

Q.: And faced with this, what did you want to do?

Foucault: Four things: to investigate what might be most hidden in the relations of power; to anchor them in the economic infrastructures; to trace them not only in their governmental forms but also in the infra-governmental or para-governmental ones; to discover them in their material play.

Q.: What factor did you start with?

Foucault: If you want a bibliographical reference, it was in *Surveiller et Punir*. But I would rather say that it started with a series of events and experiences since 1968 involving psychiatry, delinquency, the schools, etc. These events themselves could never have taken their direction and intensity without the two gigantic shadows of fascism and Stalinism looming in the background. If the workers' misery—this sub-existence—caused the political thinking of the 19th century to revolve around the economy, then fascism and Stalinism—these superpowers—induce political anxiety in our current societies.

Hence two problems: power, how does it work? Is it enough for it to issue strong prohibitions in order to really function? And does it always move from above to below and from the center to the periphery?

Q.: I saw this movement—this sliding—in La Volonté de Savoir*: this time you made a clean break with the diffuse naturalism that haunts your previous books...*

Foucault: What you call naturalism refers, I believe, to two things. A certain theory, the idea that under power with its acts of violence and its artifice, we should be able to rediscover the things themselves in their primitive vivacity: behind the asylum walls, the spontaneity of madness; through the penal system, the generous fever of delinquency; under the sexual interdict, the freshness of desire. And also a certain aesthetic and moral choice: power is bad, ugly, poor, sterile, monotonous and dead; and what power is exercised upon is right, good and rich.

Q.: Yes. Finally, the theme common to orthodox Marxism and the New Left: "Under the cobblestones lies the beach."

Foucault: If you like. At times, such simplifications are necessary. Such a dualism can be provisionally useful, to change the perspective from time to time and move from *pro* to *contra*.

Q.: Then comes the time to stop, the moment of reflection and regaining of equilibrium?

Foucault: On the contrary. What should follow is the moment of new mobility and new displacement, for these reversals of *pro* and *contra* are quickly blocked, being

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unable to do anything except repeat themselves and forming what Jacques Rancière calls the "Leftist *doxa*." As soon as we repeat indefinitely the same refrain of the anti-repressive anthem, things remain in place; anyone can sing the tune, and no one pays attention. This reversal of values and truths, of which I was speaking a while ago, has been important to the extent that it does not stop with simple cheers (long live insanity, delinquency, sex) but allows for new strategies. You see, what often embarrasses me today—in fact, what I regret—is that all this work done in the past fifteen years or so—often under hardship and in solitude—functions for some only as a sign of belonging: to be on the "good side," on the side of madness, children, delinquency, sex.

Q.: There is no good side?

Foucault: One must pass to the other side—the good side—but by trying to turn off these mechanisms which cause the appearance of two separate sides, by dissolving the false unity, the illusory "nature" of this other side with which we have taken sides. This is where the real work begins, that of the present-day historian.

Q.: Several times already you have defined yourself as an historian. What does that mean? Why "historian" and not "philosopher"?

Foucault: Under as naive a form as a child's fable, I will say that the question of philosophy for a long time has been: "In this world where everything dies, what does not pass away?" It seems to me that since the 19th century, philosophy has never stopped raising the same question: "What is happening right now, and what are we, we who are perhaps nothing more than what is happening at this moment?" Philosophy's question therefore is the question as to what we ourselves are. That is why contemporary philosophy is entirely political and entirely historical. It is the politics immanent in history and the history indispensable for politics.

Q.: But isn't a return to the most classical, metaphysical kind of philosophy taking place today?

Foucault: I don't believe in any form of return. I would say only this, and only half seriously: The thinking of the first Christian centuries would have had to answer the question: "What is actually going on today? What is this time which we are living in? When and how will this promised return of God take place? What can we do with this intervening time, which is superfluous? And what are we, we who are in this transition?"

We could say that on this incline of history, when the revolution is supposed to hold back and has not yet come, we can ask the same question: "What are we, are we superfluous in this age when what should be happening is not happening? The question of the revolution has dominated all modern thought, like all politics.

Q.: Are you, on your part, continuing to pose the question and to reflect on it? Does it, in your eyes, remain the question par excellence*?*

Foucault: If politics has existed since the 19th century, it is because the revolution took place. The current one is not a variant or a sector of that one. Politics always

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takes a stand on the revolution. When Napoleon said "the modern form of destiny is politics," he was merely drawing the logical conclusions from this truth, for he came after the revolution and before the return of another one.

The return of the revolution—that is surely what our problem is. It is certainly that without it, the question of Stalinism would be purely academic—a mere problem of the organization of societies or of the validity of the Marxist scheme of things. But something quite different is at stake in Stalinism. You know very well what it is: the very desirability of the revolution is the problem today...

Q.: Do you want the revolution? Do you want anything more than the simple ethical duty to struggle here and now, at the side of one or another oppressed and miserable group, such as fools or prisoners?

Foucault: I have no answer. But I believe that to engage in politics—aside from just party-politics—is to try to know with the greatest possible honesty whether the revolution is desirable. It is in exploring this terrible mole-hill that politics runs the danger of caving in.

Q.: If the revolution were not desirable, would politics remain what you say it is?

Foucault: No, I believe not. It would be necessary to invent another one or something else as a substitute for it. We are perhaps experiencing the end of politics. For politics is a field that has been opened by the existence of the revolution, and if the question of the revolution can no longer be posed in these terms, then politics is in danger of disappearing.

Q.: Let us return to your politics in La Volonté de Savoir. *You say: "Where there is power, there is resistance." Are you not thus bringing back nature, which a while back you wanted to dismiss?*

Foucault: I think not. This resistance I am speaking of is not a substance. It does not predate the power which it opposes. It is coextensive with it and absolutely its contemporary.

Q.: The inverse image of power? That would come to the same thing. The cobble-stones under the beach always appear...

Foucault: Absolutely. I am not positing a substance of resistance versus a substance of power. I am just saying: as soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance. We can never be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy.

Q.: Power and resistance, tactics and strategy... Why this stock of military metaphors? Do you think that power from now on must be visualized in the form of war?

Foucault: I have no idea at the present time. One thing seems certain to me; it is that for the moment we have, for analyzing the relations of power, only two models: a) the one proposed by law (power as law, interdiction, institutions) and b) the military or

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strategic model in terms of power relations. The first one has been much used and its inadequacy has, I believe, been demonstrated: we know very well that law does not describe power.

The other model is also much discussed, I know. But we stop with words; we use ready-made ideas or metaphors ("the war of all against all," "the struggle for life"), or again formal schemata (strategies are very much in vogue among certain sociologists and economists, especially Americans). I think that this analysis of the power relations would have to be tightened up.

Q.: But this military conception of the power relations was already used by the Marxists?

Foucault: What strikes me in the Marxist analyses is that they always contain the question of "class struggle" but that they pay little attention to one word in the phrase, namely, "struggle." Here again distinctions must be made. The greatest of the Marxists (starting with Marx himself) insisted sharply on the "military" problems (the army as an instrument of the state, armed insurrection, revolutionary war). But when they speak of the "class struggle" as the mainspring of history, they focus mainly on defining class, its boundaries, its membershp, but never concretely on the nature of the struggle. One exception comes to mind: Marx's own non-theoretical, historical texts, which are better and different in this regard.

Q.: Do you think that your book can fill this gap?

Foucault: I don't make any such claim. In a general way, I think that intellectuals—if this category exists, which is not certain nor perhaps even desirable—are abandoning their old prophetic function.

And by that I don't mean only their claim to predict what will happen, but also the legislative function that they so long aspired for: "See what must be done, see what is good, follow me. In the turmoil that engulfs you all, here is the pivotal point, here is where I am." The Greek wise man, the Jewish prophet, the Roman legislator are still models that haunt those who, today, practice the profession of speaking and writing. I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn't know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present; who, wherever he moves, contributes to posing the question of knowing whether the revolution is worth the trouble, and what kind (I mean, what revolution and what trouble), it being understood that the question can be answered only by those who are willing to risk their lives to bring it about.

As for all the questions of classification and program that are asked of us: "Are you a Marxist?" "What would you do if you had the power?" "Who are your allies and what are your resources?"—these are truly secondary questions compared with the one I have just indicated: it is the question of today.

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FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ON ANDERSON'S *CONSIDERATIONS ON WESTERN MARXISM*

by Martin Jay

In the past decade, *New Left Review* and *Telos* have jointly done more to open up the ongoing tradition of continental Marxism to English-speaking readers than any other journals. Through their lengthy and frequent commentaries on what until recently has been an "unknown dimension"[1] of Marxist theory, they have stimulated a discussion more sophisticated and open-ended than any in the previous history of radical thought in Britain or America. Without their tireless translations of continental articles and books, our awareness of what is now known as "Western Marxism" would be severely impoverished. Yet, except for the rare article by Robin Blackburn or Russell Jacoby, writers associated with one journal have been almost entirely absent from the pages of the other. Although readers might infer a certain degree of coolness resulting from the different attitudes each journal has towards certain figures within the continental tradition, most obviously Althusser, no direct confrontation has taken place. That is, none *had* taken place until very recently, when Piccone's review[2] of Perry Anderson's *Considerations on Western Marxism* made it clear that the studied indifference of the two camps towards each other has finally ended.

For this writer, an outsider to both circles although personally on good terms with members of each, Piccone's critique was a source of some sorrow. Although it articulated certain very real issues separating the two journals, it did so at the cost of introducing a sectarian note into the discussion that can only be harmful in the long run. In addition, it failed to give the readers of *Telos* a really balanced or even fully accurate account of Anderson's book. Instead Piccone allowed his formidable rhetorical powers to overcome his no less impressive analytical skills with results that can only be termed regrettable.

Having communicated my reservations about his review to Piccone in private, I've been asked by him to make them public here in the hope of opening a general discussion about the contours and significance of Western Marxism. Since the task corresponds well with the work I've been doing on 20th century Marxist concepts of totality, I've agreed. In fact, a piece I had previously written arrives at certain conclusions similar to Anderson's. And so, with Piccone's encouragement, it is being added here to my defense of Anderson's book.

In his critique of Anderson, Piccone makes several general charges which rest on what appears to me a hasty and tendentious reading of the book. To Piccone, Anderson is a dogmatic Trotskyist whose view of the Western Marxist tradition is unremittingly hostile. Anderson, he alleges, sees nothing fundamentally wrong with Marxism-Leninism, treats orthodox Marxism as a universally valid theory, and interprets the Western Marxist obsession with philosophy as a simple negation of the aberration of Stalinism. Piccone's Anderson is insensitive to the value of Hegelian Marxism and virtually writes Gramsci, Korsch, and Lukács out of Western Marxism in

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1. *The Unknown Dimension* is, of course, the title of a collection of essays on European Marxism since Lenin edited by Dick Howard and Karl Klare (New York, 1972).
2. *Telos*, 30 (Winter 1977).

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its mature form. Because of this insensitivity, Anderson includes anti-Hegelians such as Colletti, Althusser, and Della Volpe, who are really throwbacks to the "objectivity" theory of the Second International period, however much they may protest otherwise. The result, so Piccone argues, is a "profoundly dogmatic and theoretically shallow book," which displays the characteristic English vice: "inability to make heads or tails of the dialectic. . . uneasiness with complex explanatory schemes, etc." Not content with this type of argument about national character, which seriously misrepresents the *New Left Review*'s place on the English left,[3] Piccone goes further and attacks its editors as "a few declassè English aristocrats yearning for the long-time British Empire [who] relive their glorious past by dabbling in global politics as would-be leaders of a betrayed but resurgent world revolution." As if this kind of *ad hominem* attack were not enough, he then berates them for their "previously half-hearted publication of many of the relevant documents" (what would a more committed publication look like? larger print? better binding?) and condemns them for failing to arrive at "any new theoretical syntheses." Their theoretical bankruptcy, he contends, is illustrated by their recent championing of the pathetic Sebastiano Timpanaro's *On Materialism*. And so, as he concludes with characteristic panache, "the *New Left Review* has very little *Left* and absolutely nothing *New*."

Now, it should be granted from the outset that *New Left Review* has not come up with a profoundly new theoretical perspective, an impression that its interest in Timpanaro does little dispell. But such really original syntheses are, after all, not that easy to come by and even *Telos* might hesitate before justifying its own achievement on these grounds. Its exotic stew of phenomenological Marxism, Critical Theory, and the early Lukács has not yet really come to a boil. But more important, one cannot fairly judge *Considerations on Western Marxism*, a modest book whose limited goals its author freely admits, on these grounds. It must be evaluated instead as a concise history of a tradition that until now has lacked any really synoptic treatment.[4] Although it is a history informed by current concerns, its tone, contrary to Piccone's allegation, is relatively open and non-dogmatic, Anderson having originally intended as a natural prolegomenon to a collection of evaluative essays that has still to be published. As a result, Anderson has cast his net widely and, with a few exceptions, the most glaring being Bloch, the Council Communists, and Habermas, treats all the important contributors to the tradition with relative evenhandedness.

3. In 1963, control of *New Left Review* passed from the hands of an older generation of English Marxists led by John Saville, Ralph Miliband, and E.P. Thompson into those of a younger, more theoretically oriented group including Anderson, Tom Nairn, Robin Blackburn, Ben Brewster, Quintin Hoare and Juliet Mitchell. Significant differences between them surfaced in a number of essays published in *New Left Review* and the *Socialist Register*, begun in 1963 as the new organ of the older generation. Very crudely put, the *New Left Review* consistently represented the side of the debate stressing the weaknesses of an empirical, positivist approach to social issues. The older generation was and remains far less intrigued by continental theory and finds its heroes home-grown, William Norris being perhaps the best example. Not surprisingly, the younger generation was far more favorable towards Britain's entry into the European Common Market than the older. In the most recent issues of *New Left Review*, the debate has continued with Raymond Williams being the focus of discussion. For a summary of the origins of the debate, see E.P. Thompson, "An Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski," *The Socialist Register*, 1973.

4. Aside from *The Unknown Dimension*, the only attempts at an overview are Neil McInnes, *The Western Marxists*, (London, 1972) a crude polemic against Hegelian Marxism using Colletti's arguments for non-Marxist ends, and Fredric Jameson, *Marxism and Form*, (Princeton, 1971) which deals almost exclusively with aesthetic issues.

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From the vehemence of Piccone's critique, it is clear that he thinks Anderson has cast it too widely and should not have included two groups in particular: the Trotskyists and the anti-Hegelians. He would have preferred Anderson to restrict his treatment to the specific tradition intended by Merleau-Ponty when he coined the term "Western Marxism" in *Adventures of the Dialectic: Lukács and his neo-Hegelian progeny*. To Piccone, the only truly anti-Stalinist and libertarian tendency is what Bloch once called the "warm current" of humanist, subjective, cultural Marxism, a current he identifies with Hegelian Marxism alone. To include anyone else "reduces the whole notion [of Western Marxism] to meaninglessness."

Merleau-Ponty, however, is an odd touchstone to use for a number of reasons. First, *Adventures of the Dialectic* is not exactly a celebration of Marxism, Western or otherwise, and its author clearly thinks Lukács' answer to orthodox Marxism is not an entirely satisfactory one. Second, Merleau-Ponty includes a discussion of Trotsky in his book, albeit a far more hostile one than Anderson's. He thus recognizes that the history of Trotskyism and the history of Western Marxism cannot be entirely divorced: both are variations of the retrenchment of Marxism during a period of sustained defeats. Finally, Merleau-Ponty's *Adventures* was written in 1956, *before* the anti-Hegelian generation of Western Marxists really began to attract attention. In fact, if one were to follow Merleau-Ponty too closely, Gramsci would also have to be excluded as he is nowhere to be found in *Adventures of the Dialectic*. In short, to make Merleau-Ponty the arbiter of who should be included in the Western Marxist tradition will simply not do.

The more important issue, of course, is who does belong. Anderson's working criterion is to include those Marxists in Central and Western Europe who broke with the social democratic practice and "orthodox" theory of the Second International without fully committing themselves to the Soviet inspired Marxist-Leninist alternative. He characterizes them as preoccupied more with philosophical, cultural, and methodological issues than social, economic, or political ones, and notes that they generally had difficulty forging links with concrete movements for radical social change. He further argues that they normally tended to come from middle-class, often well-to-do backgrounds, and frequently acknowledged their intellectual roots in bourgeois philosophies. He sees them as lacking a certain universal perspective because of their almost exclusive focus on European or "Western" problems. And finally, he notes their general tendency towards a pessimistic appraisal of the chances for the realization of socialism and a dampening of their expectations of what such a realization might in fact bring. He does not dismiss their accomplishments out of hand. "In its own chosen fields," Anderson writes, "this Marxism has achieved a sophistication greater than that of any previous phase of historical materialism. . . no new generation of revolutionary socialists in the imperialist countries can simply ignore or bypass it. To settle accounts with this tradition—both learning and breaking from it—is thus one of the preconditions of a local renewal of Marxist theory today."

In seeking a way to break from the weaknesses of Western Marxism, Anderson introduces, to Piccone's chagrin, the Trotskyist tradition, "a polar contrast, in most essential respects to Western Marxism." Contrary, however, to Piccone's allegation, Anderson does not present Trotskyism as the "arrival point" of his argument. Although it is clear that he finds their concern for concrete political and economic issues a corrective to the exclusively philosophical and cultural focus of the Western Marxists, he does not argue that they are superior philosophically or without their own inadequacies in other areas. In fact, he explicitly states: "The combination of

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enforced isolation from the main detachments of the organized working class throughout the world, and protracted absence of revolutionary mass upsurges in the central lands of industrial capitalism, inevitably left its effects on the Trotskyist tradition as a whole. It, too, was subject to the ultimate dictates of the long epoch of historical defeat for the working class in the West. Its defiance of the turn of the time, which set it apart from Western Marxism, exacted its particular penalties. Reaffirmation of the validity of socialist revolution and proletarian democracy, against so many events which denied them, involuntarily inclined this tradition towards conservatism. The preservation of classical doctrines took priority over their development. Triumphalism in the cause of the working class, and catastrophism in the analysis of capitalism, asserted more by will than intellect, were to be the typical vices of this tradition in its routine forms... A systematic critical assessment of the legacy of Trotsky and his successors, comparable to that which is now potentially available for the heritage of Western Marxism, is overdue" (p. 100-101). This is clearly not the defensive and dogmatic Trotskyist speaking, although it is true that Anderson is generally more optimistic about what can be salvaged from the Trotskyist legacy than either Piccone or I.

Far more interesting than the Trotskyist issue is the question of the inclusion of the non-Hegelians, Althusser, Colletti, Della Volpe and Co., under the Western Marxist rubric. Piccone wants to reduce them to little more than warmed over Diamat dogmatists, who represent a regression to theoretical cretinism. He is outraged that *New Left Review* has taken them seriously enough to translate and Anderson has been foolish enough to place them side by side with Lukács, Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, etc. as members of a discrete tradition. That they share with the Hegelians a certain emphasis on philosophy and methodology, come from the same essential social background (non-proletarian and often well-to-do), and have as little use for the Second International or Stalinism, Piccone does not pause to acknowledge. All that matters to him is that they are anti-Hegelians and for Piccone, at least in this review, one's attitude towards Hegel separates the sheep from the goats.

This criterion Anderson specifically repudiates in his book, and I think for good reason. First of all, calling the Lukács, Gramsci, Korsch generation "Hegelian Marxists" in opposition to their positivist or scientistic predecessors in the Second International underplays the extent to which Diamat itself was a version of Hegelianized Marxism. As Z.A. Jordan and Colletti have pointed out,[5] there are significant and acknowledged residues of Hegel's later theory in Engels' philosophical works. His *Dialectics of Nature* in particular owes a great deal to Hegel's *Logic*. Thus, what Lukács *et al.* did was not so much reintroduce Hegel *per se* to Marxism as reintroduce a specific reading of Hegel, the one which stresses subjectivity, consciousness, totality, and the dialectical method. Their Hegel was preeminently that of the *Phenomenology*, not the *Logic*, but in certain ways they were closer to the Second International theorist than they, or many of their current admirers, have cared to admit. As will become clear from my essay on Adorno and Althusser, the most important of these is the notion of "expressive totality," which Althusser has criticized and which I will argue the Frankfurt School, for all its Hegelianism, also

5. Z.A. Jordan, *The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism* (New york, 1967). Lucio Colletti, *Marxism and Hegel*, trans. Lawrence Garner (London, 1963). For a trenchant critique of Lukács' later accomodation with Soviet Marxism, which argues that the Hegelian residues in his thought helped make it possible, see Silvia Federici, "Notes on Lukács' Aesthetics," *Telos* 11 (Spring 1972).

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came to distrust. Because I see certain surprising similarities between Adorno's critique of the early Lukács and Althusser's (as well as Colletti's), I share Anderson's distrust of the Hegelian-non-Hegelian distinction Piccone wants to retain.

Secondly, I would argue that it is impossible to classify the *political* views of the theorists according to their attitude towards Hegel. Although Piccone may be right to say that the dominant tendency within Western Marxism has been to reduce Lenin and Trotsky to "relatively unoriginal theoreticians of the Second International," there has been no agreement whatsoever over Lenin's political role. Indeed, the so-called Hegelian Marxists have split down the middle with Lukács and Gramsci coming to very different conclusions from the Frankfurt School, Sartre or Korsch over the meaning of Leninism. And among the anti-Hegelians, Althusser has defended Lenin unreservedly in a way very foreign to Colletti's current position. On the perennially sensitive issue of Lenin's responsibility for Stalinism, which Piccone wants to assert and Anderson deny, the battle lines are equally confusing, with Lukács and the Frankfurt School once again in opposite camps.

And finally, I would contend that the Hegelian-non-Hegelian distinction does little to help us understand the divisions within Western Marxism on the now volatile issue of psychology's place in radical theory. The Frankfurt School and Althusser were both interested in different ways in Freud, Goldmann learned a great deal from Piaget, Sartre developed his own existential psychoanalysis, while Lukács was unremittingly hostile towards any form of psychology and Gramsci had little to say about it. These are preferences Piccone's distinction simply does not help us to understand. Nor does it help us deal with the related issue of individual or collective subjectivity which ties "Hegelians" such as Adorno closer to non-Hegelians like Colletti than to a fellow "Hegelian" like Lukács.

Because he is so incensed by Anderson's inclusion of the anti-Hegelians, Piccone misreads him to be claiming that Gramsci, Lukács, and Korsch are to be virtually excluded from Western Marxism because of their attempt to unify theory and practice, a characteristic of the orthodox period before 1914. To Piccone, Anderson places "the *real* rise of Western Marxism after World War II." This seems to me a simple misreading of the text. What Anderson is saying is that one must distinguish between generations within Western Marxism, the first coming of age at a time when the unity of theory and practice[6] was still a possibility, the second maturing in the shadow of Stalinism, when that unity was becoming increasingly utopian. He makes

6. In the body of his text, Anderson makes a generalization about "the organic unity of theory and practice realized in the classical generation of Marxists before the First World War," which is highly questionable. For what he neglects to do is discuss *which* theory and *what* practice. Although one might find a unity between Diamat and the ambivalent quietism of the SPD in particular, there was never any real unity between Marx's theory, more correctly understood, and working class *praxis*. If anything, such a unity appeared only briefly and without lasting success in the councils after the war, and even that is uncertain. In his "Afterword," Anderson in fact recognizes the over-simplification of his use of the theory-practice nexus in his text, which he admits might lead to an overly "activist" conclusion. He shifts his ground in an interesting way by arguing that historical materialism deals pre-eminently with the past, which cannot be altered by future practice. "There will thus always remain an inherent scissiparity between knowledge and action, theory and practice, for any possible science of history. . . . Marxist theory is thus not, despite every laudable temptation, to be equated with a revolutionary sociology. It can never be reduced to the 'analysis of the current conjuncture,' in a now fashionable terminology. . . the proud title of historical materialism can only be earned by a modest respect for the reality of its two terms. This respect necessitates a limit to the notion of the unity of theory and practice."

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no claims that one generation represents the "real" Western Marxism, although he quite correctly says that the full blossoming of the tradition did not take place until after 1945. In the light of Lukács' recantations, the Frankfurt School's obscurity, Gramsci's imprisonment, and Korsch's sectarian isolation during the interwar period, this observation seems irrefutable. In fact, a number of Anderson's insights, which Piccone chooses to ignore, appear to me correct. Thus, for example, he is right in pointing to the general pessimism that underlies the various theories within the tradition, a pessimism which nonetheless never turned into reformism.[7] He is equally correct in pointing to the remarkable lack of direct interchange among Western Marxist theorists, with the occasional exception, such as Colletti on the Frankfurt School, being marred by hasty generalizations and tendentious interpretations (a failing, alas, that Piccone replicates in his review).

One could multiply these examples several times, but I hope the point has been made. *Considerations on Western Marxism,* for all its modest proportions and limited intentions, is the most stimulating synoptic treatment of a dimension of Marxism whose broad outlines have hitherto remained obscure. However one may quarrel with certain of its judgments or wish its balance of emphasis were somewhat different, it is a book well worth reading by those unwilling to rest content with the tired faith that Hegelian Marxism has all the answers.

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7. The only "example of renegacy" he mentions is Horkheimer, whom he categorizes as "always intellectually of secondary rank as a thinker with the Frankfurt School." This seems to me doubly mistaken: Horkheimer's later quixotic embrace of Schopenhauerian Marxism with its religious overtones, whatever it may have been, was not reformism, and he was certainly a major Frankfurt School thinker, even if his published works did not show his impact as clearly as the testimony of his colleagues.

RETHINKING WESTERN MARXISM: REPLY TO MARTIN JAY

by Andrew Arato and Paul Piccone

The most painful aspect of having to reply to Jay is that it requires rereading a book which, the second time around, turns out to be even worse than originally suspected. Yet, a more extensive elaboration of its themes is warranted, not by any significant re-evaluation of the book's quality, but by the need to provide more substantial counter-arguments to patently untenable claims and to indicate the *general* characteristics of an alternative view of Western Marxism. Before broaching the main question, however, it is necessary to dispense with several of Jay's lesser objections.

Jay bemoans the "sectarian tone" of the *Telos* review. Yet, if anything, the tone typifies traditional Marxist discourse from Marx and *especially* Lenin. In this instance, the sarcastic tone was an appropriate response to Anderson's *sectarian* account of Western Marxism: his complete omission of Bloch and Habermas, his non-treatment of Benjamin, his virtual dismissal of Lukács—despite the fact that Anderson's hero Rosdolsky himself shows Lukács to have provided the first adequate interpretation of *Capital*—along with Anderson's non-analysis of Adorno, Marcuse, etc. Anderson is likely to receive a more polite reception in the future if and when he discards his

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authoritarian politics—i.e., Leninism—and writes less sectarian books.

Jay resents the characterization of *New Left Review*'s recycling of the "unknown dimension" as "half-hearted" and asks whether "better binding or larger print" would constitute a more "committed" effort. But their pricing policy, their publication of relevant texts in hardcover editions only, their choice of the Humanities Press as their U.S. distributor, compounded with their sustained contempt for and summary dismissal of most of the works in question leads to the suspicion that the publication of such works may amount to no more than a profitable marketing of saleable esoteric commodities, rather than deriving from political or theoretical concerns.[1]

Jay further objects to the reproach of *New Left Review* for having failed to reach a "new theoretical synthesis" since, among other things, *Telos* has not fared much better. But their failure to reach such a synthesis was not the issue. Rather, it was their premature and totally unwarranted drawing of a "concluding balance sheet"[2] on the pretense that by the early 1970s they had fully absorbed whatever was valuable in the continental tradition. Taking this seriously would mean cutting off discussion *before* the American and the English Lefts have even begun to digest the tradition which Anderson bastardizes and rejects in so appalling a manner. Far from being over, the "consideration of Western Marxism" has hardly begun. Publishing a few crucial texts does not exonerate anyone from thinking through them.

In footnote 3, Jay argues that *New Left Review*'s position within the English Left is misrepresented by dismissing it as inextricably caught within a positivistic quagmire. He points out that *New Left Review* has tried to move away from that traditional national posture. But Anderson has not moved far enough. He still considers Marxism a *cumulative* science such as physics or astronomy,[3] and when, in the "Afterword," he finally gets around to discussing some of this science's inevitable internal flaws, he merely points to marginal lacunae (the lack of an account of politics, the State, nationalities) that can be remedied by additional research leading to "the production of new concepts clearer and closer to material reality."[4] This explains the need to establish a continuity with traditional Marxism and Leninism, which leads him to misinterpret Western Marxism as a temporary detour brought about by Stalinism—itself understood as an accident.

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1. Obviously, these texts are not meant for wide distribution—fully in accordance with *New Left Review*'s crypto-Leninism which, true to form, is populist in rhetoric and elitist in practice.
2. Perry Anderson, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (New York, 1976), p. viii.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 53. Presumably, when these concepts eventually touch reality they will either be electrocuted or result in revolution. This is classical empiricist nonsense! As Gramsci repeatedly pointed out, it is not a matter of the *distance* of the concepts from material reality—which would still presuppose a metaphysical and therefore idealist concept of being—but of their *utility* as mediations "to make superior (develop) life itself." Cf. Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere* (Turin, 1975), p. 1766. All concepts are equally fictional and incommensurable with the reality that they try to mediate—a point well articulated by the American pragmatists. Elsewhere Anderson claims that Gramsci's concept of hegemony "was the product of scientific study of empirical material" (*ibid.*, p. 80). Later, however, he traces the same concept through the debates within Russian social democracy (cf. his "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," *New Left Review*, 100 [November 1976-January 1977], pp. 15ff). Yet both accounts are equally off the wall. As Gramsci points out repeatedly in the *Prison Notebooks*, the concept of hegemony traces back to Cuoco's "passive revolution" and characterizes all 19th century Italian liberalism (cf. Gramsci, *Quaderni*, p. 1089). In an exercise in scholastic futility, Anderson also separates the "proletarian" from the "bourgeois" versions of the concept and, not surprisingly, discovers an "antinomy" in Gramsci's thought!

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The result is that Anderson cannot provide a meaningful account of Stalinism, has no understanding of the real problems of traditional Marxism and, therefore, has no basis from which even to begin to analyze Western Marxism. Contrary to Anderson's belief that the only problems with traditional Marxism were a few theoretical omissions and an incipient "catastrophism," the situation is considerably more complicated. The Hegelian epistemology that Marxism inherited could not be employed without the support of Hegel's *Geist*. The attempted substitution of the *Geist* by the proletariat as the universal class in a situation in which that class remained "in itself" posed the problem of *representation*. But this, as the early Lukács clearly saw, could make sense only on the basis of a *post facto* justification, after the revolution had succeeded in realizing the classless society or collective subjectivity as the embodiment of the Hegelian *Geist*. In other words, in becoming materialist, the dialectic lost its epistemological foundation and could no longer support the Marxist philosophy of history: henceforth it could either become an *objectivistic* science and find a new foundation in a transcendent notion of being—and thus fall back into traditional metaphysics—or seek a subjectivistic foundation entailing the forfeiture of that "scientific" certitude typical of objectivistic Marxism.

Marx himself never resolved this problem and when, in the *Grundrisse*, he sought to come up with his own version of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, he ran into the "Asiatic mode of production," which abruptly showed that an *objectivistic* historical reconstruction is impossible along Hegelian lines, that man must explain the ape and not the other way around, and that if the dialectic were to remain, then it would need a foundation different from that provided by Hegel. Instead of systematically thinking through this problem, Marx chose to put the whole manuscript of the *Grundrisse* away in a drawer and write *Capital*.[5] By avoiding the genetic account and focusing on the commodity as the starting point of economic analysis, Marx temporarily postponed the problem of the epistemological foundation. But it reappears full-blown when the theoretical edifice as a whole is considered. The Marxist tradition has sought to interpret it along *objectivistic* lines, but this clashes with the internal dialectical structure. Of all people, it has been Colletti who has clearly seen this problem most and, to the extent that he wants at all costs to retain Marxism as an *objective science*, he draws Della Volpe's anti-Hegelianism to its logical conclusions that the dialectic must go,[6] along with the underlying philosophy of history and all the metaphysical guarantees that have made Marxism such an attractive and powerful religion over the

5. That there is a change of plans in Marx's work is universally recognized within Marx-scholarship. But the reasons adduced for such a shift, e.g., as dictated by the nature of the subject-matter (Grossmann), or as owing to a finally proper methodological posing of the problem (Behrens), or even to Marx's having completed his preliminary research and shifting to a more appropriate mode of presentation (Rosdolsky), fail to come to grips with the fundamental problem within the *Grundrisse*, which may be the key to the change of the plan of *Capital*. At any rate, this is a problem yet to be fully investigated. Cf. Henryk Grossmann, *Die Akkumulations und Zusammenbruchsgesetz der Kapital* (Frankfurt, 1967); Friedrich Behrens, *Zur Methode der politischen Oekonomie* (Berlin, 1952); and Roman Rosdolsky, *Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Marxschen "Kapitals"* (Frankfurt, 1968). When Anderson pleads for the Asiatic mode of production to "be given the decent burial that it deserves" in his *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1974), p. 548, he also attempts to bury the fundamental theoretical problem that it poses. In his totally descriptive and inconclusive account, Anderson fails to see the problem as such. This, once again, is due to his basic *empiricist* approach, which seeks to squeeze theoretical juice out of accumulated descriptive accounts.

6. Lucio Colletti, *Intervista Politico-Filosofica* (Bari, 1975), pp. 112-113.

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past century. While Stalinism uncritically rehabilitated the Second International tradition of Marxism as an *objectivistic* science, thus ending up in the same bureaucratic and manipulative framework of classical social democracy, the Hegelian Marxists sought to avoid the problem by re-Hegelianizing the whole theory. Even though Gramsci was the only one who eventually developed a full critique of objectivism—and even he never managed to integrate it within a reconstituted Marxism[7]—all of the Hegelian Marxists sought to *break* with the Second International and to set Marxism on a new foundaiton. Western Marxism and Stalinism are thus not historical *detours* but are different answers to an internal unresolved contradiction in Marxism—a contradiction which does not disappear by invoking any magic formulae such as Anderson's "reunification of Marxist theory and working class practice."

In Leninism and Stalinism it is the objectivistic moment which has the upper hand, with the result that the theory loses its revolutionary dialectical character and deteriorates to the level of a confused and second-rate bourgeois objective science, while the logic of representation turns Marxism into a legitimating ideology of the bureaucracy as the false representative of a fictitious universal class. Thus, contrary to Anderson's intimations, Stalinism is not merely a "problem of the East"—i.e., a result of Russian backwardness, etc.—but is one of the two possible answers to what Colletti sees as the fundamental contradiction in Marx—even if Colletti would not draw these conclusions. And whereas Anderson and the whole Trotskyist tradition fantasize that Russia and China are a step closer to socialism because they have partly fulfilled certain necessary conditions (social vs. political revolution), it is simply not possible to see Stalinism as just an aberration of a relatively backward society. Rather, it must be regarded as the consistent outcome of Marxism taken to be an objectivistic and scientistic ideology. Far from constituting either threats or alternatives to advanced capitalism, the historical role of China and Russia will come to depend increasingly on Western imperialism in a situation where Carlo's "iron law of underdevelopment" systematically prevents them from posing any serious socialist challenge.[8]

Anderson's misunderstanding of Stalinism entails a parallel misunderstanding of Western Marxism as a philosophical retreat where political activity is no longer feasible. But the philosophical turn was not triggered only by the impossibility of engaging in politics during the "Stalinist interlude," but also and primarily by the recognition of fundamental flaws in traditional Marxism. The return to Hegel of Lukács, Korsch and Gramsci—and subsequently the whole Frankfurt School—was an attempt to reconstitute Marxism so as to avoid the bureaucratic outcome of the Second International—and also of the Third International after it restored all of the bankrupt theoretical tenets of pre-World War I social democracy. But this return was not enough. The re-Hegelianization of Marxism led right back to the same problematic that Marx himself had confronted but not solved: the need to come up with a non-objectivist and materialist foundation.

7. For a fuller account of this, see Paul Piccone, "Gramsci's Marxism: Beyond Lenin and Togliatti," in *Theory and Society*, 3:4 (Winter 1976), pp. 485-512.

8. Cf. Hillel M. Ticktin, "The Current Crisis and the Decline of a Super Power," *Critique*, 5 (Fall 1975), pp. 103-110; and "The USSR: The Beginning of the End?" in *Critique*, 7 (Winter 1976-77), pp. 88-93. For Carlo's "iron law of underdevelopment," see his "The Oil Crisis and the Iron Law of Underdevelopment," *Telos*, 31 (Spring 1977). Of course, Carlo would want to exclude China from the application of the law, but his argument to this effect remains unconvincing. See Antonio Carlo, "Autenticità e Contradizioni del Socialismo in Cina," in *Terzo Mondo*, 30 (December 1975), pp. 3-36.

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Jay takes great pains to show how the problematic of Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness*[9] is finally exhausted with Adorno and Althusser. But a closer examination of a large enough spectrum of relevant texts would show that (1) doubt concerning Lukács's concept of totality developed, in Adorno's case, as early as 1930;[10] and (2) while doubt concerning Lukács's concept of the proletariat as revolutionary subject was solidified only after 1940, Adorno never stopped searching for adequate *micrological* substitutes as tokens of immanent critique. But to understand all this one must first recognize (as did Merleau-Ponty) that Lukács's conception of identical subject-object is only an objectively possible project in the capitalist epoch,[11] that Lukács's totality of universal history is a *reconstruction* based on Marx's "man-ape" analogy, that Lukács's concept of capitalist totality is as "decentered" and "objective" as Adorno's for one essential reason: both share the same concept of reification. For Lukács, to be sure, there was an objectively possible center, or subject. After 1940, Adorno clearly abandoned Lukács's solution to reification (proletarian class consciousness), yet in his cultural criticism he always described the phenomena of reification in a directly Lukácsian manner.[12] What is perhaps the most important clue to Adorno's thought is that after the surrender of all hope or even desire for a collective, self-mediating subject of praxis, he maintained a Lukácsian structure of thought *minus* class consciousness. In a context where two dimensional ideologies are supposedly absent, he split ideology critique into the "transcendent" dimension of the "untrue" yet very real, immediate, second-nature reified and static totality of the administered world, and the "immanent" critique of the remaining self-critical, self-mediating, self-defetishizing monads of genuine, post-auratic, autonomous works of art.[13]

Of course, Adorno's later criticisms of Lukács's concept of reification in *Negative Dialectic* and *Aesthetic Theory* are well known. But not well enough known for Jay not to confuse the whole problem. Instead of abandoning the concept of reification, Adorno *expands* or *inflates* it as a category of all society, all civilization. Such an inflation of his own basic concept was a threat to the explanatory power of his theory of culture. Even this move "beyond" Lukács should be seen as an attempt to stay within the framework of "Western Marxism." Several of Lukács's concepts were modified or even rejected for the sake of a project continuous with his—for better or, more likely, for worse. The new addition that was to save the old approach was Freud.

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9. Cf. Martin Jay, "The Concept of Totality in Lukács and Adorno," in this issue of *Telos*.

10. See Theodor W. Adorno, "The Actuality of Philosophy," *Telos*, 31 (Spring 1977). Thus, Jay's claim that "the years from the founding of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in 1932 to the publication of *Negative Dialectic* in 1966 saw a gradual but decisive rejection of the early Lukács" is right only in relation to the proletariat as revolutionary subject. The same is true for his other claim in *The Dialectical Imagination* (Boston and Toronto, 1973), that the Frankfurt theorists had gradually abandoned Marxism by 1950. If anything, they tried to make whatever modifications were possible to uphold the Marxist tradition. In this respect, Russell Jacoby is correct in his review of Jay's book (*Theory and Society*, 1:2 [Summer 1974], pp. 231-238) in vindicating the Frankfurt School's stubborn retention of a modified but fundamentally Marxist framework to the bitter end.

11. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London, 1971), p. 79.

12. Cf. Friedemann Grenz, *Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen* (Frankfurt, 1967), and Alfred Schmidt, "Die Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung," *Zur Idee der kritischen Theorie* (Munich, 1974).

13. Andrew Arato, "Aesthetics and Cultural Criticism," *Frankfurt School Reader* (New York, forthcoming in 1977).

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Freud's metapsychology, as the new home for the concept of reification, was responsible for the inflation-preservation of the concept.

Thus, psychoanalysis was introduced into critical theory precisely to keep a re-Hegelianized Marxism viable by explaining why the revolution had failed, why Fascism had arisen, and how the new state of affairs could be seen as a result of the intensification and extension of traditional Marxist contradictions.[14] But instead of solving the problem of *objectivism* in Marxism, this theoretical strategy aggravated it. Thus theory remained burdened with the impossible task of conceptually reproducing the lacerated totality, exploitation became subsumed as a special case of the broader category of domination, and the dialectic expanded to cover the whole trajectory of Western civilization from Odysseus to Hitler and beyond—if, indeed, there was one. Critical theory became pessimistic precisely because of its unwillingness to forfeit the Marxist project in a context where the conditions necessary for its realization were almost entirely lacking. Psychoanalysis became the explanatory missing link between a Marxist theory that did not hang together even as originally formulated, and a social reality which could not have seemed more foreign to it. Adorno's wavering between Hegel and Kant, his vindication of non-identity and of the autonomy of theory, and the refusal to accept any false reconciliation can be understood only in terms of a Marxist background that became increasingly difficult to maintain. Sometimes like Marx, Adorno did speak from the perspective of the Absolute Spirit, but unlike Marx, whenever he remembered that it could not be done, he reverted to "micrology," where the concern with particularity and specificity is seen as protection from the deadly total embrace of the concept. Furthermore, turning vice into virtue, he elevated this methodological embarrassment to the level of the only dialectic possible in the totally administered society.[15]

This is not the place to launch a major critique of Adorno, whose single aphorisms are immensely more profound and rich in content than dozens of pompous treatises by *New Left Review*'s favorite contemporary Marxists. It suffices to indicate the nature of the general project of the Frankfurt School as the last exponent of Western Marxism understood as the tradition that *unsuccessfully* sought to reconstitute Marxism along Hegelian lines. Unlike Anderson's or Jay's much broader notion of Western Marxism—which becomes an indiscriminate grab-bag whose contents are chosen on the basis of geographical and chronological criteria alone, thereby allowing anyone to hop in (including theoretical Neanderthals such as Timpanaro)[16]—the restriction of the tradition to the Hegelian wing follows from a consideration of internal theoretical tensions and attempts at their resolution.

Jay objects to the use of Merleau-Ponty's characterization of Western Marxism on the grounds that it includes Trotsky, but he misses the main point: Merleau-Ponty included Trotsky only as the object of intransigent criticism, to demonstrate the bankruptcy of all objectivistic forms of Marxism and the need to break with that tradition in order to save the Marxist project. More than anyone else, Merleau-Ponty sought to draw the full political and theoretical implications of the objectivistic

14. Thus Rusconi locates as the two fundamental limitations of Adorno's discourse the "uncritical utilization of residual categories of the classical critique of political economy, and the failure to locate collective subjects." Cf. Gian Enrico Rusconi and Alfred Schmidt, *La Scuola di Francoforte* (Bari, 1972), p. 140.

15. See Adorno's "Introduction" to his *Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. Wes Blomster (New York, 1975).

16. Anderson, *op.cit.*, p. 92n.

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interpretation of Marxism and to provide an alternative to it by elaborating an existential foundation. Only when he finally realized the irreducible inconsistency of existential ontology and Marxism, and the hopelessness of communist politics, did he come to reject the whole effort. It is no accident that non-Hegelian theoreticians such as Della Volpe, Colletti and Althusser—whom Anderson can fit into a model of Western Marxism understood as a geographical category—are or have been affiliated with Western European Communist Parties.[17] The problem with this affiliation is that Western parties have been caught in the quandary of having to retain as much traditional Marxist theory as is compatible with a *de facto* social democratic practice. This has prevented party theoreticians from systematically undertaking the needed reconstitution while, at best, carrying out only minor theoretical revisions to remain consistent with political practice. Unlike the Hegelian Marxists, who unsuccessfully sought a regrounding of the theory, the anti-Hegelians were forced into piece-meal revisionism by the nature of their political predicament. This alone is sufficient ground for not amassing all of these people under the same tradition on the spurious grounds that they were philosophers and came from middle-class backgrounds.

Notwithstanding Jay's efforts to locate certain similarities in their evaluation of the category of totality, there is no way that an Althusser, whose work cannot be understood independently of party *Realpolitik*, can be compared with an independent and original thinker such as Adorno. The concept of "theoretical praxis," e.g., in the one case, means bitter resignation, while in the other, the *legitimation* of the manipulative and authoritarian separation of the science of party intellectuals from the ideology for the masses. Jay succeeds in carrying out a dubious comparison by separating five different notions of totality, which, on closer examination, turn out to reflect an eclectic muddling of structuralist and romantic categories. That he could come up with such an arbitrary classification is further evidence of his distance from the Western Marxist tradition that he seeks to analyze. Ironically, he ends up missing one of the most important concepts of totality: Popper's neo-positivist version. From the viewpoint of Western Marxism, the three basic notions of the totality are the romantic, the positivist, and the dialectical.[18] Unfortunately, the notion of the dialectical totality remains extremely problematic—thus the tribulations of Hegelian Marxism.[19]

But this failure to generate an epistemologically well-grounded and politically viable theory should not be taken as a license to bunch Hegelian Marxism together with all those who happen to have dealt with Marxist philosophy during the past 60 years into a meaningless category united solely by the barbarity of Stalinism.[20]

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17. It could be objected that the Hegelian Marxists have also been affiliated with official Communist Parties. But Korsch was eventually thrown out, Lukacs was allowed to remain only at the price of having to periodically repudiate his own work, and Gramsci's imprisonment and premature death spared him the unpleasant fate of either quitting or being thrown out. The point is that Hegelian Marxism, notwithstanding the brief appearance of an objectivistic variety, even within Russia's *Diamat*—which, of course, was immediately purged—is inconsistent with official Marxisms.

18. For a fuller account, see Karel Kosik, *The Dialectic of the Concrete* (Dordrecht, 1976), translated by Karel Kovanda and James Schmidt.

19. Some of these problems are discussed in more detail in Paul Piccone, "Karel Kosik: Czech Marxism," in *Mirai* (in Japanese), 8:151 (Summer 1976), pp. 71-82. (An English version is forthcoming in *Critique*, Summer 1977).

20. Even in doing this, Anderson is high-handed. Not only does he fail to include Bloch and

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This is not the place to provide a full-blown alternative interpretation of the history of 20th century Marxism—which, at any rate, may still be premature. But these few remarks should indicate that, notwithstanding Jay's defense of him, Anderson has not provided even the beginnings of an account of a tradition that is far from exhausted—a tradition whose failures are immensely more interesting than any 'successes' that may have been realized by "the unity of theory and practice."

Habermas, but he elevates Della Volpe to the level of "the most eminent professional philosopher" in the Italian Communist Party (p. 41). As Colletti himself recalls in an interview conducted by the same Anderson, Della Volpe was never all that popular in the PCI: "Dellavolpism was a phenomenon circumscribed in time and space of a very short duration" (Colletti, *op.cit.*, p. 16). The real philosophical giant in the party until his death (July 21, 1957) was Antonio Banfi, concerning whom Anderson says absolutely nothing. One need only skim through Eugenio Garin's *Cronache di Filosifia Italiana 1900-1943* (Bari, 1966)—especially the final chapter on "Quindici Anni dopo 1945-1960"—to realize the disproportionate influence of Banfi and Della Volpe. Also indicative is that in his more recent *Intellettuali Italiani del XX Secolo* (Rome, 1974), published by the PCI press, Garin devotes two out of twelve chapters to Banfi, and none to Della Volpe. Cf. also Predrag Vranicki's somewhat superficial account in his *Storia del Marxismo*, vol. II (Rome, 1972), pp. 448-464, where Della Volpe's work receives almost as much attention as Banfi. Up to the middle 1950s, Della Volpe was a Sicilean oddity within the Party where the two main philosophical poles were constituted by Banfi's Milanese school of phenomenology and critical rationalism, and the Neapolitan neo-Croceans. Anderson's overemphasis on the crypto-positivist "scientific" current within the Marxist tradition leads him to distort the history of Marxism in an unwarranted hypostatization of relatively insignificant figures such as Della Volpe, Althusser, Timpanaro, and the like.

HERBERT BIBERMAN AND THE ART OF SUBJECTIVITY

by George Lipsitz

In recent years *Salt of the Earth* has acquired a reputation as one of the finest American films ever made about workers' and women's liberation. Yet comparatively little is known about Herbert Biberman, the director and co-producer of the film and one of the most important radical intellectuals in Hollywood in the 1940s.[1] For more than forty years, Biberman wrote plays, essays and screen treatments which addressed the political, moral and aesthetic questions of his time. An irrepressible crusader, Biberman argued for the creation of an egalitarian society, for the realization of the artistic potential of each individual, and for the unity of life and art.

Biberman studied at George Pierce Baker's 47 Workshop at Yale, one of the finest drama schools in the nation, and certainly the most prestigious. After receiving his Master's at Yale, he toured Europe studying the latest theories of drama and working in theaters in Paris and Moscow. He was particularly impressed with the Soviet theater as well as with the entire Soviet social system. He remained an admirer of Soviet Communism for the rest of his life. Returning to the United States, he directed several

1. Research is based upon manuscripts from the *Biberman-Sondergaard Papers*, State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin; Rudolf Arnheim, *Film as Art* (Berkeley, 1957); Herbert Biberman, *Salt of the Earth* (Boston, 1965); John Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting, Movies* (New York, 1972); and Gordon Kahnz, *Hollywood on Trial* (New York, 1972).

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repertory companies in New York and in 1935, he went to Hollywood to work as a producer, director and screen writer.

While in Hollywood, Biberman was active in several anti-fascist organizations that included Communists in their membership. In 1947, the House Un-American Activities Committee subpoenaed Biberman and eighteen other Hollywood writers to testify about possible membership in the Communist Party and about alleged Communist propaganda in feature films. Biberman and nine others refused to answer some of the Committee's questions and were sentenced to prison for contempt of Congress. Biberman contended that the hearings were an attempt to intimidate the film industry and keep it from making socially relevant films and were the first step toward preparing the country for war with the Soviet Union. He maintained that his political beliefs were none of the committee's business and that to answer their questions, even by invoking the Fifth Amendment, would be granting their right to ask questions that invaded the privacy of law-abiding citizens. He served six months in a federal prison for remaining true to that belief.

In 1953, Biberman and blacklisted screenwriters Paul Jarrico and Michael Wilson combined to write, produce and direct *Salt of the Earth*. The film was financed by the International Mine Mill and Smelters Union, which had been expelled from the CIO for alleged Communist domination. During production of the film, Congressman Donald Jackson denounced it on the floor of Congress as designed to inflame racial harteds and to smear the image of the United States abroad. He called for the supression of the film and received support from unions in the film industry who refused to allow their members to work on any part of the film or any technical process related to its production; from studios who announced that they would boycott any film laboratories, film suppliers, musicians, recording technicians, editors, suppliers of sound systems, or actors that participated in the film; and from Sinclair Weeks, Secretary of Commerce, who pledged all possible action to prevent the film from being exhibited abroad. Although critics praised the film, and although it won prizes at European film festivals, government, labor and industry pressures prevented its distribution in the United States or overseas.

Biberman charged that actions taken against the film constituted conspiracy and he sued several representatives of unions and film companies for the damage done to *Salt of the Earth's* earning power. While the suit meandered through the courts for ten years, Biberman was forced to return to the business career he had been so eager to leave as a young man. He sold real estate in the Hollywood Hills to support his family and finance his legal actions. The final legal verdict went against him, and although he made one more film (*Slaves* in 1969) before his death in 1971, his principled stand cost him over twenty years of creative life and subjected his finest film to pressures which prevented it from receiving its deserved recognition.

Throughout his career, Biberman described himself as a critic of subjective reason, by which he meant the evaluation of concepts and beliefs by standards arising from the immediate personal needs and experience of the individual. It is the opposite of objective reason which determines value by fixed principles which are universal and accessible to all. More dependent upon what should be than upon what is, objective reason appeals to universal, enduring, and transpersonal standards as a means of evaluating the present. Yet Biberman failed to understand the dialectical unity of these apparently contradictory standards, and, like many whom he criticized, he ultimately failed to inform his perceptions of immediate, personal, and practical

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needs with a more general theory capable of evaluating the potentially contradictory nature of those appearances. No single teleology illumined his social or moral views. When he criticized others for merely adjusting to existing social reality, he really meant that he thought they made the wrong adjustment. When attempting to show the harm done by rampant subjectivity, he pointed to specific results which he claimed were inefficient or counterproductive, not to objective standards of morality or human behavior.

Political themes dominate Biberman's cultural work: fascism, political repression, racial and sexual discrimination, and corruption are the common villains in his cosmos, but lurking behind them is the hidden hand of subjective reason with its emphasis on immediate personal needs and its neglect of objective social values. In the play "The American Nightmare," (written in the late 1940s to help justify Biberman's own non-compliance with a Congressional committee), a Congressman inveighs against people who think and who teach their children to think. He praises obedience, order, and fear of elected officials, but can offer no moral basis for his beliefs. He determines his views on the basis of what will get him re-elected and he pursues that goal regardless of the harm it does to the nation. His incessant demands for "loyalty" turn out to mean loyalty to his immediate interests and desires, not to the principles of the Constitution or the well-being of the country's citizens.

Subjectivity also dominates the thought of the villain in three other plays. In "Dance of Youth," the Marquis, an Italian nobleman and a leader of the local fascist movement, risks death, yet has no fixed political or moral purpose. He changes his values constantly because he views values as instruments to achieve immediate ends. He discards his values as soon as they serve their immediate purposes. In "People and Citizens" (also written to counteract anti-red inquisitions) a plutocratic law student complains about Supreme Court decisions which he feels protect Communists. His professor decries the myopia of this attitude and instructs the pupil that the welfare of all depends on the free interplay of ideas and opinions guaranteed by the Constitution. Similarly, in "An American Story," a woman trying to retain custody of her children must defend herself against charges of being a Communist. She quotes Jefferson, Lincoln, various Supreme Court Justices, and the army war department to demonstrate the importance of allowing diverse opinions, but the Judge ignores her arguments and following his own subjective beliefs takes her children from her.

Biberman's villains place their own immediate interests and feelings ahead of fixed moral principles, and he implies that his heros represent objective values as he defined them. They do not. Biberman opposes the short sightedness and opportunism of his villains with his own. He shows subjective reasoning to be harmful by demonstrating its immediate practical consequences, not its violation of principle. A witness before a Congressional investigating committee in "The American Nightmare" charges that the committee has made intellectuals and artists afraid of innovation and that consequently Russians are making all the important advances in science and art (presumably on the basis of Stalinist civil liberties). A business excutive in "Woman of the Century" realizes the evils of discrimination against women only because it hurts war mobilization. A Nazi prisoner in *The Master Race* rejects Hitler's doctrines of racial superiority when he sees that Russians fight well and that Americans build good airplanes.

When Biberman does invoke universal principles, he does so only when they advance the argument he wishes to make at the moment. In "An American Story" he

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depicts the susceptibility of the courts to right wing political pressures against Communists as evidence of the triumph of subjective political considerations over natural rights. Yet the hero of "People and Citizens" presents the willingness of the courts to respond to political pressures for civil rights for blacks as a vindication of constitutional principles. Biberman's appeals for tolerance or the free interplay of ideas extend only to situations where people with whom he agrees are in the minority. In both *The Master Race* and "An American Story" his heros demand the suppression of fascism in the post-war era, even contending in one instance that there can only be one opinion about fascism. While his political conclusions in each case seem quite laudable, Biberman's reliance on bourgeois universals which ultimately serve only one set of class interests undermines his arguments and precludes his discovery of universals capable of supporting another class vision.

Biberman came closer to an articulation of objective principles about art than he did about politics. Many of his fictional characters wrestle with the artistic problems that dominated Biberman's own life: the responsibility of artists to present a possible alternative to the present, the struggle by artists to freely practice their art, the difficulty of creating art that liberates rather than paralyzes its audience, and the importance of presenting what should be without obscuring what is.

A poet in "Prologue" identifies himself as one of those who defy the world by attempting to live according to their idea of what should be. Biberman represents the fantasy content of art as a necessary means of conveying utopian hopes about the future. However, he recognizes that art can not serve this function as long as government, financial considerations, or family pressures restrain the artist.

The frustrated artist repressed by his family's insensitivity to art appears often in Biberman's fiction. A millionaire's son in "The Big Shot" would rather be a dancer than run the family business. A would-be poet suffers while working in his father's brickyard in "Death, God, and What Goes Between" while a young boy in "Music in My Heart" runs away from home when his aunts forbid his singing. A toy company executive in "Our Greatest Hour" struggles with his family's ridicule of his desire to paint and a businessman's sons refuse to enter his business so that they can devote all their time to writing and painting in "Places in the Sun."

Artists who submit to societal pressures as well as those who fail to see beyond existing reality betray the potential of art. Yet Biberman reacts just as strongly against artists who lose touch with reality and substitute idealized visions for real experience. A poet in "A Comedy" uses his art to justify his detachment from the real world and pines for an idealized love affair while neglecting a real lover. In "Crazy American" a writer philosophizes that the trouble with the world is that everyone lives with myths and tries to cushion himself against reality. A small town's hero worship of a local citizen in *Together Again* hides the man's actual character and paralyzes his family when the town demands that they live up to his image.

Biberman criticizes both the subjectivity in art which fails to see beyond the appearance of the existing world as well as the idealized suffocating fantasy. He counters one extreme with another, and while aware of the positive potentials of both fantasy and realism, he fails to develop a synthesis. He hints that art is symbolic of all human creativity, but he fails to articulate any principles of human potential, or of the relationship between art and social organization.

Salt of the Earth combines many of the themes of his earlier works and presents the most impressive statement of Biberman's ability to perceive the immediate political,

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moral, and artistic needs of any situation. Biberman did not write *Salt of the Earth*, but his creative adjustments to outside pressures enabled the film to exist and gave it its distinctive character. Determined to make films despite the Hollywood blacklist, he formed the independent production company which raised the money for the film. Aware of his own limitations as a writer, he recruited Michael Wilson, a blacklisted Academy Award-winning writer. Dependent on the financing of the International Mine Mill and Smelters Union, he sent Michael Wilson to New Mexico to see if he could write a treatment based on a strike by one of that Union's largely Mexican American locals. After securing a story, a writer, and financing, Biberman turned his attention to production of the film.

Unable to convince more than five professional actors to defy the Hollywood blacklist, Biberman recruited members of the local union that had conducted the actual strike to appear in the film. Prevented by union restrictions from employing a professional crew, he assembled a group of technicians who had been excluded from the unions due to racial discrimination or lack of experience. Precluded from using Hollywood studios, he shot the film on location near where the original strike took place. Lacking the resources to acquire a mobile camera, he wrote stage directions to adapt the script to a stationary camera. Biberman's direction of the film blended these diverse elements into a coherent and moving film, and even turned many weaknesses into strengths.

Conscious of the limits of both his and Michael Wilson's knowledge of miners, Biberman insisted that all union members and their families have veto power over the script. Community suggestions insured the accuracy of the film, and cemented their commitment to its successful production. Those with speaking parts believed in their roles, and the rest assisted by learning the skills necessary to serve as script clerks, set builders, and wardrobe assistants.

Biberman had to re-examine his own theories about acting in order to instruct the amateurs that comprised most of the cast of *Salt of the Earth*. Without professional stunt men he had to develop ways of simulating punches and falls, and then teach them to the cast. When Juan Chacon, the local union president who played a major role in the film seemed uncertain about his lines, Biberman had him wander through the hills thinking about the injustices done to Mexicans. When he returned, Chacon delivered a performance that would be the envy of any professional actor. When complimented on their performances, varous community members explained that as workers and members of an ethnic minority who could be punished for showing their true feelings, they had learned how to act, out of necessity, long before Biberman came to their town.

To compensate for the absence of a mobile camera, Biberman experimented with distance and perspective with a stationary camera and produced some stunning effects. A long straight angle shot of a woman addressing a union meeting pictured her from the back of the room over the heads of the miners. The picture beautifully reflected the vulnerability of her position at the meeting. A view of a deputy sheriff shot from the ground level magnified the size of his gun and dramatized the threat of force implicit in his presence. A similar camera angle captured the triumphant smile on a woman's face when she knocked a deputy's gun from his hand. The camera angle gave her a larger than life appearance to go with her exultant feelings at the moment. By varying the distances of scenes shot from the same angle, Biberman gave the illusion of movement without jerking the viewer from place to place.

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The process of making *Salt of the Earth* involved many issues prominent in Biberman's earlier works. By making the film, he rebelled against the repression of his art and refused merely to accept the contemporaneous political climate. By employing black cameramen and by describing the struggles of Mexican-Americans he struck a blow against racism. By dramatizing actual events as portrayed by participants in them, he attempted a new synthesis of life and art. The content of the film echoes many of those same themes.

It depicts the struggles of the men and women of Zinc Town, New Mexico, focusing on the experiences of Esperanza Quintero (played superbly by Mexican actres Rosaura Revueltas) and her husband Ramon (played by Juan Chacon). Because most of the residents of Zinc Town are Mexican Americans the mining company pays lower wages, does not enforce safety regulations, and refuses to provide plumbing or heating in the company owned houses. While Ramon, a union militant, organizes his fellow workers against unsafe conditions in the mine, Esperanza remains at home. She spends her days caring for the children and chopping wood needed to stoke the fire which heats their water. At night Ramon goes to the beer parlor while Esperanza's only companion is the radio.

When an accident in the mine provokes a strike, the women in the community send a delegation to the union meeting and ask that adequate plumbing be included in union demands. They also offer to form a woman's auxiliary to help win the strike. The men ignore their request that plumbing be included in the demands and table the resolution for a woman's auxiliary.

The company gets a Taft-Hartley injunction against picketing by the union and the strike appears lost. One of the women points out that the injunction says nothing about wives picketing, and on behalf of the other women, she proposes that they take over the picket line. The men dismiss her suggestion, but by forcing a vote of the whole community—men and women—the women, get their resolution passed by a narrow margin. The men feel humiliated by having to "hide behind their women" and warn that once the company resorts to force, they will have to defend their women and be as bad off as if they had participated in the picket line in the first place. However, seeing no other alternative, they reluctantly allow the decision to stand.

Ramon forbids Esperanza from joining the picket line but she joins anyway. When the sheriff and his deputies attack the picket line, the women fight back and maintain the line. Esperanza overcomes her fears after triumphantly knocking a deputy's gun from his hand. When she returns home, Ramon suggests that she will probably never go back to picketing after seeing the violence; she replies that she will go back tomorrow. When he warns her that he will not play nursemaid to the children anymore, she informs him that she will take the children with her to the picket line.

As the women successfully maintain the strike, the men become demoralized and embarassed. When several of the women including Esperanza get arrested, the men get a taste of housework and do not like it one bit. Hanging up the laundry, Ramon informs his neighbor that the union should include plumbing as one of its demands. Gradually the men respect the women's role in the strike and at the same time gain an understanding that while being oppressed by their bosses, they have been oppressing their wives.

While Michael Wilson's writing provides a depth of characterization absent from Biberman's own writing, many of the themes of *Salt of the Earth* repeat those of his earlier works. The emphasis on women's rights, racial equality, alienated labor, and

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the necessity of not oppressing others as a prerequisite for one's own freedom, all echo familiar Biberman concerns. And like his earlier works, immediate, personal, and practical reason dominate the values of *Salt of the Earth.*

The characters in the film, like the people who made it, make sensitive and courageous adjustments to existing reality, but they show more ability to be shaped by reality than to shape it. The miners strike in response to an accident without considering the company's preparedness and even its willingness to endure a short strike to break the union. The women gain respect only after they have helped the men win the strike. The miners gain an appreciation of the difficulties of housework when they have to do it themselves. Ramon and Esperanza change their attitudes in response to immediate personal experiences. The miners and their families seek equality with other miners, defining success as equality with others, not the attainment of objective goals. They lack the ability to relate their particular oppressions and experiences to actions which will address the ultimate causes of their problems rather than just the immediate symptoms.

Of course all of Ramon and Esperanza's adjustments are quite laudable and one would have to fear for the future of people who could not make adjustments on the basis of such stimuli. It is just that their choices are completely defensive and reactive. In a co-optive hegemonic system like monopoly capitalism defensive adjustments can easily be co-opted into strengthening the system and playing off oppressed groups against each other. Without an offensive positive social movement attempting to realize utopian goals, even the most sophisticated and courageous adjustments only set the stage for future failures.

Salt of the Earth realizes the best possibilities as well as the limits of Biberman's sensitivity to the immediate and his uncertainty about the universal and transpersonal. It provides a moving and accurate portrayal of working class life, of relations between whites and Mexican Americans, and of the status of working class women. Yet in seeking solutions to their immediate problems, Ramon and Esperanza demonstrate the limits of their experience, vowing to "push everyone up along with us" without formulating long range and universal goals capable of speaking to varied interests.

Biberman's compassion and sensitivity to others motivated him to break with his upbringing in many significant ways, but he never transcended the liberal definitions of artistic and individual freedom which inhibit true emancipation. His training at Ivy League universities and New York theater groups limited his view of mass art to that which speaks to great numbers of people, not what involves them in changing their own worlds. Thus, Biberman praised film as the one truly democratic medium because it reached so many people, was culture-free (in reality substituting one particular culture for all human experience, but Biberman never understood that), and left the viewers free to make their own judgments. That film, with its distortion of size and perspective, its editing and music, and its use of time, should be considered non-manipulative demonstrates the superficiality as well as the liberal nature of Biberman's artistic philosophy. In politics, as in art, Biberman accepted the basic assumptions of liberal society and defined freedom as freedom from society for individuals rather than the realization of new human possibilities in a society which respected individuals but also developed a true collective sense of the inter-relatedness of human lives.

Yet Biberman did not view himself as a liberal and pursued his philosophy in sympathy with an avowedly Marxist group, the Communist Party U.S.A.

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Biberman became attracted to the CP's positions because of his favorable impression of Russia, the leadership of the Party in opposing fascism during the 1930s (at least until 1939), and the Party's popular front strategy which seemed to speak to the conditions which most concerned him. While there were doubtless better theoreticians in and around the Party than Biberman, his involvement with them should cause no wonder. The Party's strategy of acting just like liberals during the popular front period was aided by the fact that in most ways, party members were just like liberals in accepting liberal distinctions in social and philosophical matters. Biberman could embrace Party policies, because they expressed the views of liberals like him in a hurry rather than of critical thinkers. Much has been written about the Party's opportunism, yet opportunism has roots in an inability to relate immediate concerns to ultimate goals, an ability which is hard to develop within the context of liberal social philosophy.

Due to the Party's own secrecy and the propensity of Party members to portray themselves as just "interested citizens" we have no real knowledge of Biberman's membership in the CP, but if one grants him the dignity of responsibility for his beliefs, he clearly followed Party policy for most of his adult life. In "We Are All Little Gentlemen," written in 1934, he criticized the National Recovery Act and the New Deal as incipient fascism because they imposed a static equality on people who had an inherent right to be unequal, on the basis of their abilities. Yet, after the popular front wsa initiated, Biberman wrote screen treatments praising the TVA and in which his heroes named their children after Franklin D. Roosevelt. Not only did he completely change his view in three years (granting no legitimacy to the other side of the argument either time), he switched from an essentially liberal critique of the New Deal to an essentially liberal defense of it.

Biberman was active in anti-Fascist groups in Hollywood throughout the 1930s and wrote plays reflecting his concerns until the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939, when he discovered the evils of war. He related in "Dangerous People" and other works how only munitions makers profited from war and how reactionaries were trying to create an hysteria to force the U.S. into the war. After Germany invaded Russia, Biberman became an active propagandist for the war, condemning any opposition to the war effort as anti-democratic and not even calling for equality of sacrifice among social groups. After World War II, Biberman made some accurate criticisms of the Cold War, but he couched them in terms which professed to see a major reversal in U.S. foreign policy after the war toward a belligerent stance with Russia. In fact, it was his analysis which had been wrong all along; there was a remarkable continuity between U.S. conduct of the war and domestic policy and the subsequent cold war, but since Biberman could not admit that either he or the Party was wrong, he believed that circumstances had indeed changed. The man who called for repression of the civil liberties of all those opposed to the war effort (whom he described as fascists), rediscovered civil liberties during the repression of Communists after the war and Biberman bravely spoke up for constitutional liberties. If others concluded that Biberman was speaking only for himself and those he agreed with when he appealed to "principles," they had considerable evidence to support their position. None of this, of course, is to legitimize or excuse the vicious repression faced by communists in the U.S., but it is to understand the ways in which they helped construct the tools used against them.

Perhaps the most sinister aspect of Biberman's liberalism was his ability to divide the world into good people and bad. Once he identified the good guys they were very

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good, and the bad were without redeeming features. This not only obscures complex social realities and makes for poor one-dimensional art, but also leads to elitism when one is in the minority. If the enemy is evil, and most people support the enemy, most people must be either stupid or evil. And while this may be the case in exceptional situations, the assumption that people must be so if they disagree with the "right" position involves no self-criticism and accepts no criticism from others. Thus the vanguard position of a Leninist party becomes self-perpetuating, needed because people don't know their own best interests, and then is further justified by popular rejection of vanguard ideas.

Biberman's inability to synthesize what he considered to be objective and subjective values of politics and art was historically related to the particular philosophy and experience of the CPUSA in the 1930s and 1940s, but the philosophical and political dilemmas remain relevant. Elements of the anti-war movement made the same use of subordinate issues isolated from their social context that Biberman did in his day. Substitute peace in Vietnam or support for China's foreign policy for support for Stalin and the same process has been played out in the last ten years. Groups seeking black, gay, or women's liberation within the confines of existing values represent the same limited view of emancipation that Biberman championed thirty years ago. Radicals committed to working class activism have pursued defensive strategies within trade unions that have probably strengthened the system as much as they have weakened it. Community organizers seeking immediate "practical" success have jumped from issue to issue with no overall strategy or analysis capable of uniting diverse interests.

Yet Biberman's example is not completely negative. Intellectuals who have resolved the interaction of subjective and objective elements into a dialectical unity have done so mainly on paper in unreadable language. Theorists with no grasp of specifics, with no social practice and no understanding of the day-to-day problems of ordinary people are no alternative to Biberman, whose concerns at least centered on the lives of real people.

To borrow a metaphor, the workers who appeared in *Salt of the Earth* knew that miners take careful readings of rock composition and wind direction before blasting, but that they don't let such appearances determine their actions. Miners adjust to nature to defy and conquer it in line with original objectives. Cultural and political work has the same task.

LATIN AMERICAN FILMS

by Lynne Layton

The West Berlin film theater *Arsenal* presented a seminar on Latin American film under the direction of Carlos Alvarez, a Colombian film-maker, from April 14 to April 17, 1977 entitled "Latin American Film Yesterday and Today: Problems of Communication and Exile." Three periods of film showings and one period of discussion took place each evening; the sections of the seminar progressed from Phase 1 of Latin American film "Immediate Political Reality: Agitation, Denunciation, Militancy" to Phase 2: "Films of Analyzed Political Reality;" to Phase 3: "Possibilities and Perspectives of the Feature Film (non-documentary)." Part of Alvarez's

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introduction to the seminar reads as follows: "Latin America is no longer on the front pages of the international press or of film periodicals. Che Guevara's death is already old business and the European student movement no longer carries his portrait through the streets. The 'Chilean Way to Socialism' has been drowned in the bloodbath of the Military take-over; the example of such barbarous oppression was quickly followed in other Latin American countries. The initial panic was lessened by a movement of solidarity which, however, has faded away with the passage of time.

There are no more triumphant revolutions and no more stirring political trials. Without a doubt, Latin American reality is, for the time being, in shadow. But it continues to develop. And so does its film. The problems of cinematography—and of al forms of mass media which attempt to aesthetically mediate a political reality—have, due to the political situation described above, greatly increased: there is no longer any ground upon which film-makers and the audience for whom the films were made can meet. Exile is a new truth of the greatest magnitude for Latin American film, and this situation necessitates a new analysis..."

On the first evening, short agit-prop films of the 60s were shown. These films described some socio-political situation and were designed to provoke immediate action. For most film-makers, it was really the first opportunity to make political films; all films were quickly made and shown in this highly politicized period. At this time, a theory of Latin American film began to develop—a theory whose basic postulate was that film is the discussion of film. The "four-minute film" speaks superficially of some aspect of political reality which the audience then renders more complex through discussion, e.g., students' struggles, poverty, the alienation of the Church. These films provided a way for workers and intellectuals to begin to speak about these problems together.

In the second phase of Latin American political film, longer films were made which attempted a more in-depth analysis of socio-political reality. The major themes of all of the films shown were the unearthing of the "hidden history" of working class struggle in various countries (obviously to give people some feeling of continuity in their own struggle for liberation), and the theme of the new, insidious faces of imperialism, particularly cultural hegemony and population control. According to Alvarez, the goal of the films of this period (approximately 1968-70) was comparable to those of Eisenstein's film and Brecht's theater: the film was to be half of a whole experience. The second half was to be the participants' understanding, discussion, development and action. Alvarez rejected customary criticism of Latin American film—that it is too didactic and that the intellectuals set themselves up as teachers. He did not deny this, but he expressed the film-makers' feeling that their job was to *articulate* things that hadn't yet been articulated. For example, the subject of the first film, *La hora de los hornos I; Neo-Colonialism and Violence* (Solanas Getino; Argentina, 1968) was the everyday subtle violence of economic and cultural imperialism. This film, both technically and politically highly sophisticated, dealt with the history of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Argentina, contrasting the differing forms of the two. The first section bombarded the audience with a ream of facts—e.g., only 6% of the arable land in Argentina is farmed while people go hungry and jobless through the streets of Buenos Aires. The contrast between cities and countryside, the wonders of the Green Revolution, was starkly protrayed via these facts and juxtaposed imagery. The second half of the film, more hard-hitting for a left-wing foreign audience, dealt with ideological warfare: "In Latin America, the mass media is more

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effective than Napalm." This everyday cultural violence was protrayed through juxtapositions of U.S. advertisements (the good life) with Argentinian workers—who can't afford to buy meat—slaughtering cattle; of Batman and Robin smashing evil (in Spanish) and Agentinian disco dancers; "They've taught the people to think in English"—focus on teenagers gyrating in a record store to an English pop tune with meaningless lyrics. The film spoke often of the trickery inherent in universalist culture: a famous Argentinian intellectual, Manuel Mohica Lainez proudly stated at a cocktail party that he was fashioned by European culture, making it clear that he felt that Argentina was in the middle of nowhere, that he'd rather be anywhere but in Latin America. According to Alvarez, in language, analysis and imagery, these films consciously want to be as local as possible. They do not aim at a universal audience, because universalism obscures the already almost totally obscured particularity of Latin American experience. The pretense of a universalist culture, in which Latin Americans are urged to submerge and forget their inferior selves, to copy instead of create (cut to Manet's *Déjeuner sur l'herbe*—in its time, acutally received as a threat to bourgeois culture, now one of its masterpieces), was portrayed and experienced as one of the most violent attacks possible on the everyday lives of the people.

The second film shown as an example of the analyzed actuality was TVenezuela (Jorge Solé, 1969). It was made by a university group and was about Venezuelan television, owned by U.S. corporations, organ of U.S. imperialism. Again, the film underscored the attempt to impose U.S. cultural hegemony on Latin America. Viceroy ads, soap operas with the worst "morality" imaginable, brand-name products of all kinds were literally vomited out of the set. Of particular interest was the demystification of the news: as reporters told their pro-American lies about democracy, film clips from a militaristic reality were continusouly juxtaposed.

On this second evening, Alvarez spoke of some of the film-makers' problems: theory, for several reasons, leaps beyond praxis. Due to economic conditions, film-makers could only make one film every two or three years; often, by the time the film was finished, either the political reality or the film-maker's political and aesthetic perspective had changed. Beside the fact that material and technical factors are lacking, beside the fact that these films are no longer allowed to be shown in most Latin American countries, there is also the problem that the film-maker has in translating an advanced political position, an attempt at demystification, into the medium of the film. *La hora de los hornos* and *TVenezuela* are examples of successes, but many film-makers were disappointed with their final products.

On the third evening, the film of analyzed actuality was again the topic. The first film shown was *Los punos frente al canon* (Grupo 'Lutaro', BRD Chile, 1972-4), a film uncovering the hidden history of the Chilean working class. It begins with a close-up of a soldier, with shootings of political activists, of scenes of torture, all coordinated with the words of the Military Junta: "Our goal is to create social justice." The film demonstrates that the same events, the same words have occurred throughout Chilean history. As *La hora*, it shows the historical development of imperialism, what it means economically and culturally for the Chilean people. It portrays the struggle for socialism in the 20s around Luis Emilio Recabarren (publisher of "The Socialist," co-founder of the Chilean socialist and communist parties), the penetration of Big Stick politics into Chile via the military dictator. Ibanez (focus on Theodore Roosevelt stalking slowly but firmly to elephant-walk music—the new style of politics termed that of the hunter on a hunt), the

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re-emergence of working class movement in the wake of financial crises in the late 20s and early 30s (which brought about a 12-day socialist regime in 1932). Technically, as in all the films shown, this one too used well every medium at its disposal: a jazz band and the dollar bring the ruling class and the rest of the middle classes together, an old U.S. public-relations film shows an American mine owner visiting his Chilean mine, waving and smiling to his workers like a buffoon in a home movie. Imperialism is illustrated by a continuous series of frames showing the stationery of Chile-based U.S. firms of all sorts (to be compared with the earlier showing of the stationery of British firms, in an earlier period of Chile's history). Swing or jazz music accompanies all filmings of the upper class; jungle warrior music accompanies filmings of the working class. The goal is clearly to give the working class a feeling of a continuous history, of models for struggle, and an idea of who the enemy really is.

The second film shown was one made by Alvarez himself. *Los hijos del subdesarrollo* (*The Children of Underdevelopment,* Alvarez, Colombia, 1975). Here, Alvarez deals with several themes concerning Colombian children—undernourishment (the real cause of a death rate which, in the year of filming, reached 80,850 children under five), poor housing, no health standards, lack of educational opportunities, and the latest weapon of U.S. imperialism, population control. A comparison between this film, and a film by a North American shown on the previous day, begs to be made. The latter was called *The Abandoned Children* (D. Lyon, 1974) and focused on so-called "street urchins" in Bogota, children who had been abandoned and were surviving by begging, stealing, sleeping in the streets. Whatever its intent, the film can easily be seen as supportive propaganda for the U.S. policy to limit Third World populations and thereby control unrest and possible threats to U.S. interests in these countries. Unlike Alvarez's film, Lyons' film had no political analysis whatsoever of the *causes* of over-population and abandoned children. The viewer of the latter film would therefore be led to feel that, if people cannot support the children they have, they shouldn't be having children.

Alvarez posed the question: "what is freedom under capitalism, what is democracy under the rule of private property?" With a great deal of irony and emotion, he violently explodes the word "underdevelopment," demonstrating through all means at his disposal that, for the children of Colombia, underdevelopment realy means the impossibility to develop healthy bodies and functioning minds. "These are merely fragments of children," states the narrator as child after dying child appears: the signs are loss of hair, paleness due to loss of pigment, dead eyes, loss of motor skills. One of the film's goals is to shock the liberal middle class out of their usual complacency—the child so malnourished that he can no longer cry and the child with nearly no skin on his bones are sickening scenes for any people which idolizes its children. The ironic tone, combined with urgency, recurs in the narrator's designation of these children as "Colombia's future," as living symbols of what imperialism does to Colombia's human potential (Contrast Lyons' film, where these children are conceptualized only as the shame of the country, a scourge, a blight, but never as the victims of genocide!).

The condition of these children is then contrasted with that of the upper-class child, that fortunate 5% of the population which reaps the benefits of industrialization in Colombia. As these children mimic their parents and cheer for the recent winner of their "election," blithely throwing grain, the film stops on the open-mouthed cheering section, and the narrator comments: "How charming they are."

The fourth part of the film, which deals with ideological engineering and steri-

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lization, is dedicated to the U.S. on the 200th anniversary of its independence—cut to Donald Duck telling the Latin American people how much wealthier they would be if they would only have fewer children (Alvarez illegally appropriated this Walt Disney film which was made for the Population Council)—cut to "His boss, Lyndon B. Johnson." Colombia is the center of the sterilization industry in Latin America, an industry inaugurated by heads of major U.S. corporations (Rockefeller's Population Council) and financed by American finance capital (through A.I.D. and A.V.S.). Colombia's PROFAMILIA is daily doing the job that will prevent the necessity for the U.S. to again be engaged in guerrilla warfare. As opposed to Lyons, Alvarez makes it clear that overpopulation is caused by poverty and not *vice versa*, that a basic rule of capitalism is that, for every privileged child, nine must remain underdeveloped. The crying malnourished child with blemishes all over his body reappears. The narrator asks, "Is this the best possible socio-economic system?" The urgency of offensive action is underscored by the reiteration of the theme: underdevelopment means genocide.

After this film, Alvarez spoke a bit about its reception. It was shown in small, non-commerical theaters, for unions, in universities and in high schools—discussion always followed. The bourgeois reaction (middle and lower-middle) was *very* dramatic. Left intellectuals, who really never directly experienced lack of privilege in all of its inhuman manifestations, found that the film provided a mediation for them between theory and praxis. The film was in fact meant to be non-partisan and to provide a theme around which the left could be unified in action.

The films of the final evening attempted to mediate political events on yet another level. Abandoning the documentary, these films presented political reality, in the case of *Operacion Masacre* (Cedron, Argentina, 1971), through a group of revolutionaries with private as well as social concerns, in the case of *Reed-Mexico insurgente* (Leduc, Mexico, 1972), through a kind of *Bildungs* process—John Reed's progress from journalist to intellectual to observer of the Mexican Revolution to participating revolutionary.

The first film was so emotionally crushing that an aesthetic evaluation is impossible to make. It ws narrated by Peronist Julio Troxler who survived the massacre depicted in the film, but who was later caught and shot. The film-maker, Cedron, was seized in early April by the police—no one yet knows what has happened to him. Of technical interest was the use of color for personal scenes and black and white for scenes of collective action (including newsreel-type films of workers' struggles throughout Argentine history). Color was reserved for the massacre itself which occurred on a garbage dump. This scene was shown at the beginning, flashed continuously throughout, and was shown again at the end. As in many of the other films seen in this seminar, uncommented upon montage communicated imperialism and cultural hegemony. A typical sequence was: military laders shaking hands—cut to PEPSI COLA sign—cut to a religious procession—cut to SHELL—cut to a photo of U.S. ambassador meets military dictator. Yet, the personal and the political was not really well mediated in this film; there were too many stories, too few complex problems, oversimplified solutions. To the wife's protests and or total ignorance, the male revolutionary goes off to do his social duty. But the tense atmosphere of a police state was very well conveyed and, like in other films, it was provocative, put the viewer in contact with a long history of working class rebellion and political consciousness, and thereby contained an optimistic solidarity-evoking moment whose message was that *you* are responsible for reconstituting the revolution.

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The second film, painful to the eyes (done in sepia), was as boring as only a bad *Bildungsroman* can be. John Reed was uninteresting, several of the "revolutionaries" were idiots who had no real idea what they were fighting for—except, perhaps, adventure—platitudes were multiplied, and neither the political nor the personal came through at all.

In an interview, Alvarez said that Latin American film-makers were largely forced to submerge their personal problems as intellectual leftists in favor of making informative, directly political films. While this was painful for them, it was almost a necessity because, as noted, they could only make one film every two or three years, due to material deficiencies. However, the films discussed above raise the question that still divides left aesthetics—can a non-autonomous work, a work whose intention is directly political, be a good work of art? Clearly, the documentary film was the best medium for the film that had as its intention to convey a directly political content. But the documentaries shown were also aestheticaly interesting, emotionally and intellectually stirring. Montage was never before put to such good use as in those films in which it forced the audience to make connections between the ruling class, the ideology of everyday life and American imperialism.

The last films shown were made as military dictators were already taking over. Except in more 'liberal" places like Colombia, which has no military dictatorship, none of these films can be shown in Latin America today. The film-makers are in exile, daily becoming more and more out of touch with Latin American reality and therefore making films of lesser quality. European problems in no way resemble the class contradictions of Latin America. These film-makers have lost their desired audience and really no longer know who they are making films for. One year ago, a conference was held to try to find solutions to the problems faced by Latin American film in exile. The goals formulated at this conference were to continue to make films about all aspects of hidden repression in Latin America, to explain the contradictions of dependence and to demonstrate the workings of imperialsim for European and American audiences.

A representative of *Arsenal*, which continuously attempts to get these films shown more widely throughout Germany, commented a bit on the German reception of Latin American films. West German television has, in most cases, refused to show the films; DDR-TV has shown them. When *La hora de los hornos* was first shown at *Arsenal* in 1969, it seemed to come as a big shock to German intellectuals that their culture was a tool of imperialism (including what they consider "high" art). Bavarian TV ordered the film, but cut out the section which showed relations of solidarity between workers and students. Two rival left political groups recently ordered the film, but each decided not to show it when they found out that the other group intended to show it (thus giving some brief insight into the state of the German organized left!)

Alvarez himself felt that Latin American film does not really have great reception possibilities in Europe, and he was surprised at the fairly good turnout for the seminar (of course, the left always comes out to hear what it usually already knows—*Arsenal* mostly shows films critical of society). Because of its political intent, Latin American film continues to concern itself with the same issues and themes; the European audience wasn't novelty. Since the overthrow of the Allende government, Alvarez commented, interest in Latin America has consistently been on the wane, and the average European audience does not really want to see films which, like *Los punos frente al canon*, present a long history of a Latin American country, bombard the audience with facts, and attempt an in-depth political analysis.

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The seminar was, however, highly informative for the European audience. It showed the advanced level of Latin American analyses and film technique, the problems faced in trying to mediate political reality, personal life and film, and allowed one to begin to understand the everyday violence practiced by magnates of the U.S. ideology industry on the people of Latin America.

THE ANTIOCH *TELOS* CONFERENCE

by the Kansas *Telos* Group

Various members of the *Telos* staff met at Antioch College May 27-29 to discuss organizational and theoretical problems associated with the journal. The usual antagonism to instrumental rationality resulted in the postponement of bureaucratic matters to the last possible moment: only two persons arrived on time for the first scheduled "business" session, while the second was delayed considerably while many were combing nearby towns in southern Ohio for places to breakfast. Official activities during the first two days of the meetings thus consisted of the presentation of papers with heated exchanges ensuing.

Jim Miller gave the first paper, "Some Implications of Nietzsche's Thought for Marxism." In it, Miller sought no grand synthesis or great historical innovation, but merely to provoke a critical reflection on some Marxist notions by confronting them with similar concepts in Nietzsche. Arguing that Nietzsche indicates, at the very least, "a set of problems that raise doubts about Marx's original theory," Miller identified three central aspects of Marxist theory and their Nietzschean counterparts: (1) the status of "critique"; (2) the concept of human agency; and (3) the theory of history. Miller's paper, however, ended up merely juxtaposing Marx to Nietzsche, since the latter describes the bourgeois predicament without a concept of transcendence. This approach cannot speak to the Marxist critique, which is the effort to overcome the bourgeois era.

Andrew Arato, the aspiring Ilie Nastase of the *Telos* group, provided a caustic criticism of the paper on the basis of Miller's use of "interests" rather than "needs" in the presentation of the Marxian model. Following Agnes Heller's theory of needs, Arato insisted that this usage was inconsistent with all late Marx texts and that interest tends to imply a narrow rationalist perspective limited to civil society. Worse, the argument, confusing Marx with the philosophical position characteristic of the Marxism of the Second and Third Internationals, sets up only a strawman for Nietzschean perspectivism. The discussion was significant inasmuch as it brought out an important split, with one side represented by Miller and Schmidt, who would recycle theorists *outside* the Marxian-critical tradition, and the other by Arato and Bob D'Amico, who are concerned with theoretical renewal on the basis of the *immanent* criticism of that tradition, including Marx himself.

John Keane, a "Habermaniac," began the second day of the meeting with an exegesis of Habermas's analysis of late capitalism and his critique of Marx. Keane argued that Marxian theory does not portray accurately the nature of modern domination based on

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technical rationalization because it fails to recognize the cultural contradictions of capitalism today and, most importantly, it subsumes moral-practical problems under technical knowledge (the theory of labor) so that the independent roles of language, meaning and social action are ignored. Although Habermas recognizes work and communication as independent spheres, he fails to explain how these two realms can be related.

Jim Schmidt delivered the second paper of the day, "Immanent-Transcendent: Notes on Adorno and Habermas," where he suggested that critical theory seeks a position which "is at one and the same time immanent and transcendent." Critical theory, however, cannot maintain its "practical intent" and still develop a critique that is both an integral part of social life while pointing beyond it. This problem plagues the work of Marx, Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas. Consequently, there is no connection between the achievements of critical theory and the "actual practical self-reflection of subjects of that society." In other words, critical theory failed to realize its initial goals since it is a purely theoretical enterprise that aims not at practical action, but at intellectual criticism. Furthermore, Schmidt doubts whether a "Critical Theory of Society" even exists. There is no way out of the *cul de sac* except to abandon the approach altogether or to redefine it in a much narrower sense.

Arato, who commented on both papers, generally agreed with Keane's exegesis (except on the point of Keane's criticism of Habermas's supposed inability to link the spheres of work and communication: here Arato suggested that the split exists for Habermas only on the categorial level, as *Legitimation Crisis* demonstrates). But Arato gave a scathing denouncement of the Texas "perspectivists" (Miller and Schmidt). Schmidt was berated for choosing one narrow view of critique and then applying it arbitrarily to dismiss critical theory altogether. With his usual modesty, Arato listed eight different definitions of critique, only one of which, he claimed, was employed by Schmidt—and even that one Schmidt misunderstood, since his description of the late Marxian "immanent critique" was inaccurate and Adorno's notion of critique one-sided. The notion of defetishization was missing in both instances. Finally, Arato chastised Schmidt for being too eager to surrender the Marxian-critical position. Marxism must be treated as a representative ideology whose social function varies in accordance with its setting: it is an ideology for modernization in the Third World, a pseudo-science of legitimation and domination in Eastern Europe, and in its self-critical form still a critical theory in advanced capitalist societies. The implication was that Marxism and its various expressions constitute a world-historical system of thought with too much political and social import to be arbitrarily dismissed or even put on the same plane as the vast majority of other contemporary theories and approaches.

Schmidt, of course, rejected Arato's comments, calling them "sandbox critique" (his constant deference to "the text") and "ostrich critique" (his failure to admit problems), and denying that they were in any way an adequate response to his paper. Schmidt insisted that critical theory must be more modest in its claims. He pointed out—without much proof—that some of the eight notions of critique listed by Arato had been handled equally well by scholars outside critical theory who consequently should receive due consideration. D'Amico, reacting to this, accused Schmidt and Miller of capitulation rather than perspectivism—if everything is critical, then nothing is! But Miller explained that he and Schmidt had not advocated abandonment of Marxism but were only suggesting that it become more self-critical by reexamining its

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own posture in the light of other theorists' works. He then mentioned Schumpeter, Crozier and Huntington as thinkers whose work should be more seriously considered by critical theorists. Arato, gasping in disbelief, blurted out that no one in their right minds would equate them with Marx or Adorno or Habermas.

Paul Piccone's paper, "Beyond Critical Theory," was the boldest and most exciting of the presentations and, consequently, drew the most criticism. After climbing over three rows of seats to get closer to the audience, Piccone delivered his usual deafening harangue. Contrary to ordinary left critiques of the Frankfurt School, which bemoan its abandonment of Marxism, Piccone argued that most of the problems were actually a result of uncritically holding onto classical Marxist positions. In fact, the introduction of psychoanalysis was meant as a theoretical epicycle to keep as much of traditional Marxism intact as possible. But this remedial strategy resulted in an intensification of the theory's objectivism and led to a conception of one-dimensionality that allowed for no foreseeable qualitative changes. According to Piccone, the residual objectivistic Marxism prevented critical theory from theorizing fascism, Stalinism and the New Deal as new transitional social formations (one-dimensional society) leading neither to the holocaust or the final reconciliation and management of all contradictions within the totally administered society, but to a more advanced stage of monopoly capitalism. By elaborating Marcuse's original account of one-dimensionality, whereby the system feeds on its internal opposition, Piccone argued that in the late 1970s, the full collapse of the Russian and Chinese models of socialism had paved the way for unchallenged U.S. world hegemony, with the result that the main internal contradiction within advanced capitalism was the lack of internal opposition necessary to provide the system with much-needed control mechanisms. Thus, the most striking characteristic of the new phase of monopoly capitalism was the reversal of the transition phases' drive toward homogenization, standardization, and the ruthless elimination of all specificity and otherness—the reversal of the dialectic of Enlightenment. In this phase, the system finds itself increasingly forced to sponsor its own internal opposition—*artificial* negativity—which, inasmuch as it is just an extension of the logic of one-dimensionality, is counter-productive and will not succeed in providing the needed *organic* negativity. The latter can only be provided by lingering pre-capitalist formations not yet destroyed by one-dimensionality, and by radical intellectuals. Given these alternatives, the task of radical theory becomes one of devising ways of combining emancipatory possibilities within the organic negativity which it will be forced to provide. In conclusion, Piccone saw Marxism as the theoretical expression of entrepreneurial capitalism, critical theory as the expression of the transition phase, and only a subjectively or phenomenologically grounded new version of this tradition as adequate to the new monopoly phase.

Piccone was bombarded with critical comments, being accused of failing to provide adequate definitions of his major concepts, of erring in his analysis of contemporary events, and even of being a closet Parsonian! The paper seemed to have two especially glaring deficiencies. First, the discussion of the phenomenological grounding was totally inadequate. Piccone did not explain the connection between phenomenological subjectivity and his systems level analysis. Thus, his presentation seemed overly objectivistic at points, even though that is the last thing he intended. Secondly, the concept of organic negativity was left completely uninvestigated, other than its negative definition as the opposite of "artificial" negativity. Also, Piccone should have discussed the kinds of historical events needed to usher in a more advanced stage.

After Piccone dispensed with most of the criticisms, he readily admitted that he was

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presenting a set of programmatic ideas in need of considerable elaboration. Still, despite—or perhaps because of—the criticisms, frontal attacks, and the fact that it did not seem all that far removed from critical theory (at least not yet), Piccone's theory of artificial negativity provoked the most substantive and interesting dialogue of the meetings.

In the almost ritual ping-pong confrontations that followed, John Fekete avenged the Canadians' New Years' Eve humiliation by cutting down Bob Antonio, Arato, and Piccone in short order. After refueling, most of the *Telosers* attended the Antioch production of *Brecht on Brecht* and the party following it.

The last day of the meetings was devoted to "business," with problems relating to publishing the journal being considered by the 25 or so persons in attendance. Piccone proposed ten theses on internal reorganization, which served as a focus for much of the discussion. As in the December St. Louis meetings, Piccone suggested a discontinuation of the present policy of considering unsolicited manuscripts. He argued that the unsolicited material is invariably nonsense and that editorial consideration of it only wastes time, money and effort. But once again, this idea was not well-received. Fekete and Miller suggested that the St. Louis group perform a more rigorous filtering of papers, so that the obvious junk is rejected without further ado. Most of the group concurred, except the members of the St. Louis group, who reminded everyone that this was already being done.

One major change that Piccone set forth was unanimously endorsed—that involving the expansion of the book review section, particularly by developing more internally generated review essays. Of course, the journal will continue to publish original essays and translations, but in reduced numbers. The notes and commentary section will be retained—but not as the graveyard for essays of dubious value, as some have come to view it. It was suggested that the notes section be divided into a literary and a political section, but no decision was reached on this. Finally, Piccone criticized the short journal review section as being objectivistic and lacking critical perspective, and suggested that it be drastically "spiked" or completely eliminated. Those at the meeting viewed this section as a valuable service to the readers, and opted for the former approach.

Throughout the entire meeting, the journal's direction and format were discussed continually. In the business session, several persons stressed the need to escape the theoretical archaeology that has characterized *Telos*. They claimed that the tradition of left-wing scholasticism should be abandoned for more concrete studies that utilize our critical-theoretical tools for social analysis. While there seemed to be considerable agreement on this issue, D'Amico and Arato suggested that left-wing archaeology still performs an important critical and informative function. Miller and Schmidt felt that the journal should not only consider more work of a more concrete nature, but also should deal with a wider variety of theoretical orientations. Piccone's position that Marxism and critical theory are relatively obsolete was challenged as impractical and—by Arato, at least—as ridiculous. Most seemed to agree with D'Amico that there is a need to stop continuous rehash, but that this need not mean the abandonment of Marx and critical theory.

The most crucial issue of the conference was the last to be confronted. Piccone earlier had stressed that one purpose of the meeting was to draw out and confront the theoretical differences among the editors that too often were "swept under the rug." When the issue finally was raised, however, the conference participants seemed too exhausted to enter into what would probably have been the most interesting debate of

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the meeting. Thus, for the first time in the three-day meeting, the group reached a consensus—that a consensus was impossible on the direction the journal should take. D'Amico suggested that our differences were, after all, not so extreme, while Fekete emphasized that there was no impending crisis and criticized Piccone for having implied as much. Thus, the discussion of the "intellectual crisis" never got off the ground.

Certain important issues regarding bureaucratic rationalization of the staff and changes in the format and content of the journal were resolved. The most important of these perhaps is the determination to demand regular participation and contributions in the journal from those on the staff. But other issues remain unresolved—for example, problems in the functioning of so-called *Telos* groups or, more importantly, the journal's intellectual direction.

Still in all, there seemed to be a general agreement that *Telos* is 'condemned' to a dialogue with Marxism; as Arato pointed out, despite its obvious shortcomings, Marxism remains the primary emancipatory ideology in advanced capitalist societies. While *Telos* has provided translations and exegeses that serve to bring this dialogue to North America, it is time to do other things now in addition to these. But what? It is precisely this question that must be confronted or risk the *rigor mortis* that has come to typify most of the American Left today. It was agreed that this should be the main focus of the next *Telos* conference, to be held in early September in Washington, D.C.

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REVIEWS:

Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar and Future of Ideology*. New York: Seabury Press, 1976. 304 pages.

Let us begin with the closing consecration: "Knowing it will win no easy victories, relying upon its continual work and struggle, as well as upon a sometimes quiet capacity for 'surrender,' critical theory seeks to understand itself as well as the world and it suspects—as self-serving and sychophantic—all offered conceptions of itself that bring it no painful surprises. When it is at its best" (p. 294). The interpretation of the painful surprises offered by the *Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* will depend upon the reader: for those in search of an exemplary model of substantive critical theorizing, the continuing methodological and theoretical birth pains of reflexive sociology bear witness to a deeper anxiety about birth defects. Even if they are not crippling, merely disfiguring, such congenital difficulties are a source of lingering doubt for those concerned with the formation of a community of critical research.

The issue here is one of alternative paradigm formation. Clearly Gouldner sees his multi-volumed work in these terms, in part justifiably so. Yet there is much in the style and method of his theorizing which continues to make realization of such objectives problematic. Despite its insistent plea for "reflexivity," his work continues to remain more successful in defining its personal rather than its public responsibilities. To pose the issue in these terms is to imply that the seriousness of such a project demands nothing less if it is to become a source of inspiration for cumulative research rather than a politically prized *cul de sac*. Hence to name some of the stylistic and methodological features of Gouldner's latest study that should be avoided by younger scholars is directed not *against* his achievement, but forward to what should be possible in the future. If the reader feels that there is evidence of haste and prematurity in the first volume of this series, there is a solid case for tolerance; Gouldner has earned the right to be unconventional, a theoretical "one-man show." But it should be admitted that this is also a reflection of the "dark side" of the individualism of the North American sociological imagination and is rooted in the estrangement within the culture of critical discourse itself. The fate of C. Wright Mills is the best example here. His attack on bureaucratic "team research," however tacitly justified by the transformations of post-war sociology, culminates in the vindication of an "outlaw" brand of theorizing (to use Gouldner's self-designation) which ultimately runs the risk of the provincial wisdom of those "at home on the range" but ill at ease in a cosmopolitan conference. The ultimate fate of critical theory, while depending above all on future historical developments, will not be decided by masterpieces of eccentric genius, but by the capacity to generate a common language, a community of co-operative researchers, and a sense of vision permanently resistant to the reifying erosions of both "common sense" and "scientific explanation."

Gouldner has learned a lot since the portentous days of the *Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. As one of the very few of his generation to have attempted to bridge the gap between both generational experiences and the Anglo-American and Continental traditions of social research, he has conducted a lonely and courageous battle to make sense of matters repressed for decades. Whereas many of his teachers could command a linguistic and philosophical background on a par with classical European theorists and hence could construct a paradigm of empirical research which dominated the institutionalization of sociology world-wide in the post-war period, for his generation, these distant sources were largely a matter of second-hand lip-service,

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and for those who followed, of mere hearsay. Gouldner has finally circled all the way back to where he perhaps should have begun three decades ago with his first contact with the Institute of Social Research. As he admits now, more openly and reflexively than in the rush of the early days of the "crisis," "the 'father of us all'. . . is, of course, Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*. . . which reared the generation of post-World War II sociologists in the United States. . ." (p. 22). At the same time, he adds that "my relation to the first generation of the Frankfurt School, for and with whom I worked while they were in exile in the United States, has been a lasting, if hybridized influence" (*ibid*).

This relation to the dialectical-hermeneutic tradition remains a difficult and ambivalent one which Gouldner seems to have only fully rediscovered through the work of Jürgen Habermas. This recovery is accompanied, however, by a scarcely disguised sense of frustration with the heavy philosophical baggage presupposed within the Frankfurt tradition. Between the lines one hears his impatient, pragmatic "let's get down to sociological brass tacks" attitude. This betrays the painful memories of one who has in middle age spent many an agonizing hour in the philosophical language lab, never quite mastering all of the technical drills. But despite this lack of a faultless philosophical grammar and an often eccentrically accented vocabulary, he has pulled American sociology back toward the theoretical concerns long abandoned in the name of the intellectual division of labor.

Yet there is an unmistakable lack of generosity, even bad faith, in the ritualistic philistine lament of Anglo-American authors perplexed by what Gouldner terms the "occasionally strange, tortured, if not Aesopian formulations of Habermas" (p. 141)—as if folksiness and reflexive intonations conveyed more than "good cognitive vibes." There is no need to defend any stylized imitations of the Teutonic form of meta-theoretical discourse in order to acknowledge this language as the vital source of its particular form of reflexivity. Moreover, it is precisely this lack of philosophical language which has been the greatest deficiency of Anglo-American social science. This continues to be expressed in the tendency, shared in part by Gouldner, of much Anglo-American critical theory to veer off into a purely heremeneutic notion of reflexivity which paralyzes its logical moment as a dialectical theory of praxis and history. Hesitating between the two tendencies, Gouldner's attempt to rehabilitate the theory of ideology and appropriate aspects of the Frankfurt School tradition culminates in a richly ambiguous exploration of critical social theory which poses more questions than it resolves.

The most fundamental of the unsatisfactory methodological features of Gouldner's study is his often ill-advised effort to appropriate aspects of the Frankfurt School, especially Habermas, for his own purposes. Since this issue underlies the length of this review, there is no need to explicate it here. Suffice it to warn readers that, despite proclamations to the contrary, this is not in any meaningful sense a "critique" of Habermas so much as it is an only partly conscious extension and empirical translation of themes which have long dominated Habermas' work.

A stylistic trait closely related to this often historically insensitive and inadequately informed mediation of traditions is a habit of polemicizing against objectionable tendencies whose practitioners remain unnamed or implicated only by innuendo. Often the reader is not sure either who is being criticized or which readers are being addressed.

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More seriously, terms are frequently introduced without a precise indication of their sources or of the specific reasons for their choice.[1] For example, what is the source of the concept of the "paleosymbolic" level of discourse, defined as roughly parallel to the "restricted" code, referring to "languages of everyday life learned during primary socialization of children" (p. 225)? Obviously, this notion presupposes a developmental theory of cognition in its relation to ideological thought; the reader is given only a vague definition and no leads into the literature out of which such distinctions might be given a more secure and precise foundation. Or again, why the choice of the expression "dramaturgical criticism" to describe a participatory experience which "does not prod a viewer to do something or change something, but simply to 'appreciate' something in its givenness" (p. 169)? The distinction in question is that between ideology, which "implies rational criticism as preparation for action," and "dramaturgy," which "implies the cultivation of the viewer's sensibilities as the passive spectator of events as presented" (p. 170). While there may be some metaphorical basis for this usage in Goffman's "dramaturgical" sociology, the coupling of the terms "dramaturgical" and "criticism" produces a jarring and misleading expression Why not more simply the notion of ideological versus *existential* criticism to convey the intended distinction? Yet another example of terminological proliferation which might have profited from pre-publication criticism is the distinction between "ideological" and "paradigmatic" levels of the grounding of action. The term "paradigmatic" in this context is attributed to Mannheim rather than Kuhn—though without giving a source—and refers to the concrete, specific manifestations of ideology rather than its broader, more integrative forms. Why the term "paradigmatic" which already has established meanings in the sociology of science and applies equally well to ideology generally? Would it not have been simpler and less confusing to differentiate between something like the "generalized" and "particularized" interests in the grounding of action? Not unlike Popper's use of the term "historicism," such terminological promiscuity risks baffling a generation of students.

There are finally a number of details which should have been taken care of through the demands of the editors. For example, there are frequent references to names and ideas without mention of specific publications in cases of authors who cannot be assumed to be familiar to either a sociological or general intellectual public (e.g., Hans Freyer, Virginia Held, or even Pierre Bourdieu). And in addition to a somewhat arbitrary bibliographical and footnoting apparatus, we find such anomalies as the reference to page numbers in an essay by Comte for which no collection or edition is given (p. 3) or when Parsons is directly cited without a page reference (p. 10). Nitpicking, yes, but "reflexivity" has a public responsibility to the self-education and

1. Gouldner has provided, however, what might be read as a methodological self-defense of his own synthesizing style in another context: "The structure conducive to creativity is one in which several languages are not only functionally differentiated, but firmly *hierarchical*. By this I mean that the speaker has a language around which his work normally pivots... Given an ambiguity of hierarchy or an equality of languages, *within one speaker*, the result may be an ineffectual 'eclecticism,' seeing diverse sides of one problem but not *reintegrating* them into a single structure." See Alvin W. Gouldner, "Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals," *Telos*, 26 (Winter 1975-76), p. 26. While it may be granted that in focusing on the single problem of a unified theory of ideology and intellectuals, he *has* succeeded largely in avoiding eclecticism, this does not preclude that his own "openness to metaphor," a "form of linguistic switching that constitutes an *ad hoc* solution to the problem of eclecticism" (*ibid.*, p. 27) succeeds in adequately completing this integration. Terminological ambiguity is an important sign of this in his work.

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critical interests of the reader which a haphazard scholarly apparatus tends to betray. While all of these stylistic and methodological features may have their "good reasons" in Gouldner's personal working habits, publishing schedule and career trajectory, as well as the editorial practices of his publisher, they represent some of the sand traps en route to what would be the first round of a milestone study in critical sociology.

The criticism and further development of the substantive themes of Gouldner's work should perhaps begin with a close examination of the degree to which his synthesizing explorations manage to adequately mediate the traditions of inquiry on which they build. From this perspective, this volume can be seen as tacking between two points of departure: first, an attempt to critically appropriate, through a "political" reading and historical translation, the cultural theory (communications theory, decline of the public sphere thesis) of the Frankfurt School, especially in the revised form found in the early and middle works of Habermas;[2] and second, to situate this within a reformulation of the theory of ideology and intellectuals based on Mannheim, "normal" sociology and the newer phenomenological sociologies. And it is in this latter task that Gouldner can claim his most solid contribution, even as his effort to reconcile it with the former produces some obvious difficulties. As the first of a three volume series, this study of ideology and communications introduces most of the themes which will underlie later studies on Marxism as a symbolic system and revolutionary intellectuals in the twentieth century.[3]

Despite at least one reviewer's impression that with respect to the political implications of Habermas' theory of communicative competence Gouldner's critique is "devastating,"[4] a closer examination suggests that Gouldner himself scarcely fails to escape the difficulties ascribed to Habermas. The deeper problem here is the undifferentiated, historically uninformed attempt at a political reading of Habermas which is based neither on a firm grasp of all of his texts nor his revisionist relation to the Frankfurt School. As a consequence, what we find is not so much a critique of Habermas as Gouldner wrestling with himself trying to decide what Habermas must be saying. Ironically, then, Gouldner politely but firmly tends to use Habermas as the whipping boy for his frustration with the political implications of his own rather imprecise understanding of classical critical theory. The result is that Gouldner's own university-media politics is developed with all of the difficulties implicit in a reliance upon Habermas, but with a considerably less sophisticated account of the conditions under which particular transformations might take place.

As a consequence, Habermas' work on the historical sociology of the public sphere is read as motivated by a simplistic conception of a "one-dimensional" society.[5] While in

2. Strictly speaking, Gouldner's use of socio-linguistic theory should be situated in the context of his borrowing from Habermas and researchers influenced by his example. This discussion has, of course, been strongly influenced by Basil Bernstein's work and in West Germany has been a focus of educational research under the heading of "language barriers." For an overview, see Frithjof Hager, Hartmut Haberland and Rainer Paris, *Soziologie und Linguistik* (Stuttgart, 1973). Gouldner's use of semiotics and linguistic structuralism proper does not extend beyond the metaphorical references to the concept of "code."

3. Cf. "Prologue. . .," *op.cit.*, pp. 3-36, where some of the themes of this work in progress are introduced.

4. Paul Piccone, "Paradoxes of Reflexive Sociology," *New German Critique*, 8 (Spring 1976), p. 173.

5. Reference is made especially to Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1962). Gouldner's interpretation suffers from trying to view Habermas' later "communication theory" as growing directly out of the earlier "mass communications"

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fact in his early work Habermas is fairly non-committal regarding all of the possible implications of the failure of the public sphere to realize its initial potential, it is already accompanied by participation in research on West German students directed in part to assessing the political potential of the intelligentsia. At no point does he tie his analysis of the decline of the public sphere to any deeply pessimistic version of "one-dimensionality" such as found in Adorno and at times in Marcuse. And by 1968 he had already formulated the basic thesis of the legitimacy deficit of a depoliticized system of domination.[6] Hence it is not quite clear to whom Gouldner is addressing his argument that "the emancipatory politics of a 'one-dimensional' society must begin by seeing that it is *not truly* one-dimensional. It cannot be one-dimensional for reasons essential to its own property form, and the profound contradictions these generate. The public critique of current industrial society as 'unidimensional' is itself contradictory. For if modern industrial society was really unidimensional, there could be no *critique* of that unidimensionality made or heard" (p. 159). The Watergate affair and the end of the Vietnam War are cited as confirming evidence and the ecology movement held out as a long-term prospect.

Unfortunately, this type of argument has little to do with Habermas' position, nor does it meaningfully speak to the real issues at stake for those who affirm, either following Adorno or on the basis of recent policy studies, the essential immobility of social democratic politics. For the issue here is *not* the sheer capacity for reform, or of the ability of aroused minorities to occasionally stop a few outrageous and publicizable state actions, but of the prospects of a qualitative *systemic* transformation. One can easily find evidence of the greater multidimensionality of the systems of social reproduction of advanced capitalist societies, but by itself that is only indicative of their enhanced adaptive capacity. The degree of internal differentiation can and has progressively widened without bursting the fetters of systemic continuity. In this respect, Parsons and Adorno paradoxically converge in their assessment of the likelihood of system-maintenance, even if one man's universalistic value system is the other's universal reification. And if indeed, following Gouldner's own citation of Hegel, the whole is the truth, all of the apparent exceptions to one-dimensionality can be equally well read as its confirmation at a new level of integration.

In relation to Habermas, the "political" critique provided assumes largely the form of shadow-boxing. On the basis of the assumption that Habermas has failed to recognize and practically deal with the contradiction between freedom and equality, Gouldner asserts that "the doctrine of communicative competence seeks to mute this contradiction by developing, at the level of *theory*, so abstract a conception of communicative distortion that the place of *state* censorship and the growing domination of the modern state over communication is hidden. But a theory...that glosses over the new power of the state—socialist or otherwise—that says little about its vast domination of communication, such a theory simply cannot have a politics" (p. 151). Or in a more qualified and generous vein: "Let me state emphatically that I am *certain* that the great theorist of the breakdown of the public does not endorse a politics that sees no difference between liberal democracy...and Nazism or Stalinism...I am confident that his intent is freedom-strengthening. But his theory

analysis rather than from intervening epistemological concerns and problems in reconstructing historical materialism.

6. See the essay "Ueber einige Bedingungen der Revolutionierung spätkapitalistischer Gesellschaften" (1968), now in Jürgen Habermas, *Kultur und Kritik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), pp. 70-86.

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has a life of its own, and has its own ideological susceptibilities and functions" (p. 163). And then the political wisdom of the New World is refracted back to illuminate the illusions of the Old: "like his critics, Habermas is operating within a limited political horizon; living within the contradictions of historical socialism, Habermas lives within the *socialist* counterpart of the Weberian 'iron cage.' It is clear that Habermas does not manifest Weber's capacity for 'heroic' self-torment and grinding stoicism; but it is not yet clear whether this is an improvement" (p. 151).

Whatever force such a characterization might have for Adorno—whose self-torment is indeed on a par with that of Weber—this line of reasoning simply fails to grasp the way in which Habermas' whole theoretical project is directed toward transcending the "contradictions of historical socialism." While it is precisely on this account that he is attacked from the neo-Marxist left, here we find Gouldner assuring us that Habermas is firmly entrenched in the socialist museum. Yet it is considerably more plausible to argue that the isolation of the category of interaction and the reconstruction of its logic and rationality are designed to point the way out of the 'iron cage' of universal reification. To be sure, the transcendental-anthropological discourse of a universal pragmatics is not a political program as such, but to criticize it *as if* it were one and to make uninformed inferences about its translation into a media-politics is simply naive. And to criticize Habermas of all people for illusions about the modern state is patronizing.

But the more fundamental question here is not an evaluation of Habermas' strategy, but whether Gouldner succeeds in translating his criticisms into some viable alternatives. On the one hand, he suggests that the public sphere has migrated to the universities which then become the bastion for critical communications. In this context, media politics assumes a central importance: "the tension between the consciousness industry and the cultural apparatus can become *a* center for a politics sensitive to the importance of the media and of the modern communications revolution. In one part, this will entail a struggle for public control and access to the burgeoning new communication's technology. In another part, this will entail concern itself with the cultural apparatus' isolation from the mass media and the public it reaches" (p. 178). How is this any more than an extrapolation from Habermas' theory of communicative distortion which is labeled "a new Fabianism aimed at extending rationality and communicative competence," thus implying "the capture of the state, as well as strengthening the state so that it can overcome the limits established by the old property systems. . .?" (p. 150). Habermas' "dilemma" is equally that of Gouldner and us all: since capturing the state "generates a new system of domination grounded in the new politics and its state apparatus. . .Habermas can neither clearly renounce the old combat politics requisite for the reform of property domination nor finally commit himself to it" (pp. 150-151).

But Habermas' whole critique of traditional Marxist "combat politics" is based on the dual assumption that it can no longer generally succeed in advanced societies and even where it did would tend to undermine its own objectives. More fundamental here is the question of the alternative forms of transition which are envisioned. For on the basis of a strong one-dimensionality thesis, all efforts at state-guided generalization of communicative competence are doomed to facilitate the reproduction of the existing totality. For Habermas, on the other hand, who seems to operate with a strongly qualified version, hope is held out for the possibility of a break in this process of social reproduction which would open the way for conditions under which new forms of

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praxis could deal with the conflict between freedom and equality. Since Gouldner discounts the first possibility and is apparently unaware of this latter dimension in Habermas, he labels Habermas a 'Fabianist' and then proceeds to construct his own version of a "legitimacy crisis" theory without the benefit of either a comprehensive sense of the obstacles or the conditions of possibility of such a form of crisis.

If, on the other hand, Gouldner were interested in a political critique which really touches on the political difficulties of a communications politics based on the model of the "bourgeois public sphere," he should have turned to the discussion of the "proletarian public" developed in the work of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge.[7] That he did not and could not derives in part from the way in which his own "trickle-down" theory of university-based revolution goes much further and carelessly than Habermas' tentative probings. Above all, his unqualified vindication of elaborated code discourse simply does not broach the question of *how* this is to break through the barriers imposed by the consciousness industry and the restricted code discourse of the paleosymbolic and everyday life. As he admits, "in countries with an extensive development of the consciousness industry, talk of 'revolutionary solutions' is primarily indicative of ideological rage at political impotence and of the fear of personal passivity. . . revolutionary solutions remain mythical so long as ideological elites and their cultural apparatus can reach masses only by going through the consciousness industry" (p. 177). At best, then, he relies on projections (themselves dependent on present rates of growth) of the endless expansion of the tertiary sphere of the economy with the implication that as the intelligentsia grows, the question of a mass base solves itself. In any case, this remains merely an elaboration of Wellmer's concluding pages, where the possibility of enlightenment is viewed as limited to those participating in the scientific-cultural sphere and hence the potential addressees of theory are also its critics.[8] This may be, *faute de mieux*, a necessary strategy, but a "political" critique of Habermas which does not take the limitations of such a politics as its central theme is by definition confined within it.

As Negt and Kluge stress, the form of production of the intelligentsia's language (Gouldner's elaborated code)—complexity, differentiation, reciprocal relations, totality—are the forms of emancipation for intellectuals rather than for the proletariat. Even as the capacity for abstraction is the instrument which allows comprehension of the estranged character of social realities, it provides no basis for immediately coming to terms with the horizon of working class experience.[9] As a consequence, Negt and Kluge are skeptical of any attempt to see organized science as the domain for the accumulation of anything more than specialized experience. "The mode of expression of this experience as well as its contents are not therefore comprehensible to the overwhelming majority. These are not external limits of academic language or of the 'backwardness of experience of the people'; the basic parallel between the proletarian and scientific production of experience rests on different material foundations. Here lies the reason why the attempt of scientists or theoreticians to align themselves in emancipatory movements only by changing their intentions, while retaining their structure of production and the abstractly organized construction of their cognitive operations, must remain unsuccessful."[10]

7. *Oeffentlichkeit und Erfahrung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1972).
8. Albrecht Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society*, trans. J. Cumming (New York, 1971).
9. *Oeffentlichkeit und Erfahrung, op.cit.*, pp. 80-81.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

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Habermas, of course, is not unaware of this type of criticism and has attempted a general response to the problem of the organization of "enlightenment" in the new introduction to his *Theory and Practice*. In this context, Gouldner's assumption that European critical theory is based on illusions about the gains stemming from nationalization is simply without foundation. After all, television and radio have been under public control for some time in most European countries and that experience has given little basis for unqualified optimism. As Negt and Kluge argue, for instance, television can be analyzed as a characteristic institution in the transition phase in that while basic communication needs are no longer left to the capitalist market mechanism, "effective new forms of public control do not exist."[11] In short, to accuse European critical theory of naivete regarding nationalization of the media is to speak from the parochial experience of the American left and the unique circumstances of the American mass media system. To saddle Habermas with all the simplifications of Fabian reformism when the central objective of his whole theory is that of the reconstruction of the categories of theory and praxis is based on questionable inferences from a few texts taken in isolation. Then to further imply that somehow one's own theory has provided the basis for solving these problems is to compound misunderstanding with false pretenses.

The political critique of Habermas culminates in a theory of legitimation crisis: "The end of ideology thesis correctly defined the ideological incapacitation of the hegemonic classes in industrial society, but made the gross error of supposing it to be the sign of a new strength, rather than the symptom of an impending crisis of legitimacy" (p. 247). Since this discussion was apparently developed independently and without knowledge of Habermas' *Legitimation Crisis*,[12] it is elaborated as if it were the outcome of an exposure of the contradictions of the latter's communications theory and conception of the ideological function of technology. Without a doubt, had Gouldner written this as a response to and criticism of *Legitimation Crisis*, he would have produced a very different and substantially better book.[13] Instead, the result is an exemplary case of the confusing technique whereby Habermas is criticized in order to reproduce what ends up being simply an inferior version of the original, lacking both its theoretical rigor and propositional openness as the basis for future research.

The starting point of Gouldner's version of legitimacy crisis is the assumption that Habermas' theory of technology and ideology suffers from being a modified version of the "end of ideology" thesis. "Habermas' stress on the newness of modern technocratic legitimations, on the escape from Freudian irrationalities, derives from his having taken his starting point in the Marxist critique of ideology. For this critique one-sidedly emphasized the *cognitive* failures, or upside-downness, of ideology; the critique does not see the new ideologies as partly rational, and as having a relatively

11. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

12. The original German version appeared in 1973; the English translation by Thomas McCarthy in 1975 (Boston) appeared about the same time as the completion of Gouldner's manuscript, apparently.

13. He would have been forced above all to modify the assumption that a theory of legitimation crisis contradicted Habermas' earlier work. Trent Schroyer in his *Critique of Domination* (Boston, 1975), which appeared three years before Gouldner's study and before the availability of the German version of *Legitimation Crisis*, had a sense of the incompleteness of Habermas' theory and engaged in a similar anticipation. But he saw this as fully consistent with Habermas' intentions.

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heightened rationality" (p. 259). Hence to stress the *continuity* in the history of ideology, Gouldner points to the irrational character of technocratic consciousness as opposed to its instrumental rationality: "a kind of 'naive' consciousness, infantile and adolescent in its repressed yearnings for association with unlimited power. Scientific and technological power serve, in part, as the secularized symbol of the unlimited potency and cosmic unification once provided by religion" (p. 260). French positivism and Marxism possess elements of technocratic consciousness revealing that "both are clearly a part of the classical age of ideology, rather than any radically new thing" (p. 260). As he adds with a patronizing air of understanding: "Perhaps Habermas has not concerned himself with this because his critique of positivism has characteristically dealt with it as a *philosophy* and epistemology, rather than seeing it as a new social *movement* for cultural revitalization complete with a new *social* theory, and with a project for social reconstruction, including a new 'religion of humanity'..." (*ibid.*). The theoretical source of the difficulty is, however, that of a false conception of technocratic consciousness: "A concept of technological ideology that reduces it to instrumental rationality is an illusion of philosophical idealism" (p. 265).

Habermas is, of course, perfectly aware of the history of positivism as a social movement;[14] further, his analysis concludes along with Gouldner that "far from being the end of ideology, technology launches ideology upon a new stage in its career" (p. 270). But Habermas is concerned with the specificity of this new stage, which leads him to a rather different set of issues and a more penetrating formulation which, while not without its difficulties, scarcely suffers from those conjured up by Gouldner. What Gouldner refers to are the *origins* of modern technocratic ideologies as they arose in competition with traditional religious views. Ironically, it is his own concentration on mere "philosophy" which distracts him from Habermas' more sociological concern with the actual *institutionalization* of technology through the coupling of science and technology in the industrial process under the aegis of increasing state participation. This conception stresses that the ideological function of technology does not operate primarily as a conventional "belief system" but progressively penetrates all spheres of life through a process of rationalization which reorganizes social relations while suppressing awareness of the ethical implications of the decisions entailed. Technology as ideology comes to operate primarily through the medium of a "life-form," "common consciousness," as a "glassy background ideology."[15] And the decisive point in emphasizing the discontinuity implied by this novel form of legitimation is to illuminate the new problems it poses for a theory of demystification, of ideology critique. Gouldner's conception, dominated by a polemical need to discount completely the notion of an end of ideology to justify his legitimation crisis theorem, overemphasizes the continuity by focusing on ideological belief systems.

The price of this over-intellectualized account is a simplistic reinvention of Habermas' theory of legitimation crisis: "Advanced capitalism is characterized by a pattern of social control which has largely generated a tendency toward the *devaluation* of ideological integration—toward the 'secularization' of politics...it is not correct to say that technology *becomes* the new ideology and replaces ideology; rather, it *represses* the ideological problem... The new technology has not become a new *mass* ideology but, rather, for most of the population obedience is conditioned by

14. See, for instance, the essay "Kritische und konservative Aufgaben der Soziologie," in Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie und Praxis* (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), pp. 290-306.

15. *Toward a Rational Society*, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston, 1971), p. 111.

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the gratifications it associates with technology. Let the technology remain unchanged, but let the gratification levels decline, and the matter is put to the test... There remains an abiding need for a justificatory ideology" (pp. 245-246).

The primary difficulty here—aside from its self-understanding as a critique of Habermas—lies in the failure to take into account the diffuse character of technocratic ideology as a background ideology as both an obstacle to revolutionary delegitimation and a defense against fascist ideological solutions. Gouldner tends toward an unmediated version of the consequences of a failure of state performance and hence of the crisis potential of a legitimacy deficit. As Habermas argues more cautiously on the basis of policy studies, as well as his own theory of technology as ideology, "as long as the welfare-state program, in conjunction with a widespread technocratic common consciousness (which, in case of doubt, makes inalterable system restraints responsible for bottlenecks) can maintain a sufficient degree of civil privatism, legitimation needs do not have to culminate in a crisis."[16] It is also in this context that we can comprehend why Gouldner, despite his great hopes for "progressive" ideology, continues to see fascism as the most likely outcome in case of a crisis of legitimation: "the analysis formulated here suggests that all capitalist economies possess an inherent vulnerability to ideological crisis that may be met, and indeed, at some point met only, by an ideological revitalization borne by groups *outside* of its normal political arrangements. The fundamental danger of fascism, then, abides within even the most stabilized parliamentary democracies. While the structural decline of the 'public' in such societies, as a sphere of rational discourse, is an endemic vulnerability of contemporary democracies, their most critical vulnerability remains the danger of fascism" (p. 249).

This somber conclusion not only contrasts sharply with earlier criticisms of those who warn of the political implications of the decline of the public sphere, but stands in an uneasy relation to the following chapter on the extent and possibilities of the ecology movement as the basis for a new critical ideologization of politics. For on the basis of the assumption, absent in Gouldner's account, of the diffuse character of technological legitimation, it is plausible to argue that re-ideologization in advanced societies would not proceed arbitrarily, or in historically specific forms such as racism, but precisely in the sphere of science and technology. As a consequence, it is most likely that fascism—viewed generically as the political regression of liberal democracy in the face of insuperable systemic crisis—would also be expressed through the politicization of science and technology. If this is the case, the ecology movement contains a longer-term ambivalence which cannot be properly isolated in Gouldner's analysis.

The basis of the politicization of science and technology begins with drawing out the implications of the standard sociological distinction between formal bureaucratic position and expertise as sources of authority. While continuing to falsely see his analysis as a criticism of Habermas' conception of instrumental rationality, he makes the obvious point that the legitimacy of technical expertise is not based exclusively on competence, but is embedded in a given tradition: "Two conditions, then, are

16. *Legitimation Crisis, op.cit.*, p. 74. In contrast, Habermas attempts to locate such a possibility in what he terms a "motivational crisis"—"a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by the state, the educational system and the occupational system on the one hand, and the motivation supplied by the socio-cultural system on the other" (*ibid.*, p. 75). This social psychological level of analysis is absent in Gouldner's version of the legitimation crisis.

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necessary and sufficient for the legitimacy of experts and technicians: technical competence *and* the application of that competence on behalf of the interests of those from whom legitimacy is sought" (p. 270). While this question has been traditionally repressed—in this context the neo-Kantian fact-value distinction comes to mind, along with the occlusion of group alliances, since Hiroshima "this repression and this group alliance have become more difficult to maintain" (*ibid.*).

The case of the ecology movement is taken as exemplary of this transformation. "In ecology, technology itself starts a critique of its own traditional instrumental rationality, commits itself to new moral evaluations, and takes initiative in searching for new political alliances... the rumors of the death of the public may have been somewhat exaggerated... this means that the ecological movement has provided a general impetus to the development of an *ideology*, and is producing new types of ideologues, the technologues" (p. 272). The difficulty with this formulation is the tacit assumption that this process of ideologization is necessarily radically critical rather than just an advance early warning system made possible by the relative autonomy of science, but easily co-optable through the existing processes of stabilization.

This is related to one of the most potentially misleading aspects of the critique of positivism by critical theory: the implication that the threat of positivism is tied exclusively to a decisionistic fact-value distinction. Actually, this emphasis is linked primarily to the German discussions and the influence of neo-Kantianism, as well as the later American importation of this doctrine in the context of trying to shed the burden of the dangerous political promises of the failed pragmatism of the 1930s. The predominance of philosophies of value-free science is intimately related to market-societies in which public decisions are handled largely in the market place and monitored by a bureaucratically neutral state. The emergence of the strong, interventionist state as in Durkheim's France, or even the reformist pragmatism of the Progressive Movement in America presupposes the legitimation of the close interdependence of factual and normative concerns. In this respect, Parsons' value-neutrality could be viewed as a hangover from his Weberianism and an anachronism within his later systems theory which contains a full-fledged theory of value. In the younger generation of systems theorists this has been explicitly acknowledged. Here we also find one of the most fundamental issues underpinning the Habermas-Luhmann debate, which can be read as a re-articulation of the *Positivismusstreit* at a new level. Whereas Popper's epistemological analysis of planning theory complements that of the social democratic indicative planning of early organized capitalism, that of Luhmann and others looks forward, as a form of comprehensive planning, to coming stages in the development of capitalism.[17]

On the basis of such considerations it is possible to envision the politicization introduced by the ecology movement as in part converging in the long run with the reformulation of technocratic consciousness at a new level. Perhaps Gouldner's phrase from "ideologues to technologues" captures this possibility of a politicized systems theory as answer to the crisis of survival better than he realized. When we read such astute social liberals as Robert Heilbroner speaking of the luxury of the individual's

17. As Habermas concludes with reference to Luhmann: "Because the problem of world complexity has assumed the leading position, the problem of a rational organization of society in conjunction with formation of motives through norms that admit of truth has lost its object" (*ibid.*, p. 133). The radical functionalization and the radical individualization of value are equally plausible positivist solutions.

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needs in the face of eco-system crisis, we have a hint of the legitimative capacity of an ecology movement for a state which can no longer provide a regular supply of gratifications. Thus, to argue with Gouldner that "the fundamental 'weakness' of the technocratic consciousness is really that it does *not* promise 'pie in the sky' " (p. 261) is to gloss over that this is also its primary source of invulnerability in a period of frustrated expectations. As the science of the "technically" possible, it is secure against the abstractions of those imagining the "objectively" possible. And to point to the weakness of such limited aspirations in its colliding "with some of the most enduring characteristics of Western culture, particularly its constant need for struggle, the *agon*, and its continual drive for mastery and domination over the environment and . . . over the resistant part of the inner self" (p. 263) is to invoke the 'dialectic of enlightenment," the hubris of technical reason and its archaic affiliation with domination as the basis for revolutionary hope. In this last heroic gasp of the liberal imagination we see the final tragic consequences of Gouldner's profound misunderstandings of Habermas. For what provides a better vehicle for reviving technocratic consciousness through activistic renewal than the ecology movement? The limits of quantitative growth could thus come to justify the limits of qualitative development and the anxiety of self-preservation (*Selbsterhaltung*) reproduce the "dialectic of enlightenment" in the functional equivalent of post-capitalist fascism.

To summarize the limitations of Gouldner's political diagnosis: he fails to persuasively establish a link between the material interests, motivational structure, and elaborated code ideological potential of the expanding cultural apparatus based on the university system *and* a fundamental transformation of society. This thesis of the political potential of a legitimacy crisis turns more fundamentally upon a theory of intellectuals and the intelligentsia: "A theory of ideology thus implies a theory of intellectuals and intelligentsia . . . whatever else a concrete, specific ideology is about . . . there is also and always tacit within it some place assigned to intellectuals and intelligentsia, in the movement from the old order and in the new, reconstructed order" (p. 63). In addition to the previously discussed ambiguities of his theory of legitimacy crisis, Gouldner's political analysis suffers from having *raced ahead* of the completion of his theory of intellectuals and intelligentsia.

The theory of intellectuals is introduced in this volume only in a rudimentary form which serves to organize the application of socio-linguistic concepts and guide a provocative re-reading of much of the literature on the rise of modern communications. It is based on the thesis of the development of a split between the propertied and the educated middle classes. The latter are "exposed to pressures transforming the individualistic and venal utilitarianism of the propertied middle classes into a *social* utilitarianism, where the standard is the usefulness of things for the collectivity" (p. 132). This is further differentiated by the proposition that "as *technical* and scientific education expanded, the *educated* middle class underwent a binary fission, between the technical and humanistic intelligentsias" (p. 189). Hence the thesis of his prospective volume on revolutionary intellectuals: "the split in the middle class between those grounded in property and those grounded in education is central to the radicalization of the intelligentsia and thus to the development and spread of revolutionary social movements of the twentieth century" (p. 133). This is closely linked with the rise of modern ideology in that the "grammar of rationality was always an ideology supportive of the special status and vested interests and social position of the intelligentsia themselves . . . it was functional for the vested property

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interests of the intelligentsia. Based on the prime injunction of *self-groundedness*, the new rationality justified the transformation of culture, science and literature into a commodity, payment which now could be claimed by individuals" (p. 133).

While not unprecedented, such an effort to develop a theory of the middle class and intellectual labor is certainly one of the most important, difficult, and neglected areas of contemporary social theory. Moreover, Gouldner brings together a very original combination of materials which sheds new perspectives on old questions and points toward new directions of research. This is especially important for the tradition of Marxist theory which has been handicapped by the distinction between productive and unproductive labor. Whatever justifications this may have in Marx's formal economic model building, it has proved to be a tremendous theoretical burden for those trying to analyze organized capitalism where a simplistic dichotomous stratification model remains insufficiently differentiated to capture the dynamics of class conflict. When as in the most advanced economies, "productive" labor in the strict sense becomes a minority of the working population, the resulting anomalies call into question the whole foundation of Marxist theory and this is certainly Gouldner's implicit point of departure. The typical response among Marxists has been to fall back upon an abstract definition of all wage labor as the proletariat (thus the high expectations held out in France for the organization and revolutionary potential of technical occupations), or alternatively to abandon this framework with a more differentiated model. Sociological efforts have tended to move in the latter direction, of which Gouldner's is a variation.[18]

But this embryonic theory of the intelligentsia is not sufficiently developed to carry the weight of his political analysis of the contemporary and projected place of intellectuals in the transformation of society. In this respect the lack of an adequate social psychology of the intelligentsia is of decisive importance. While in principle the historical analyses of intellectuals could contribute to this, they are insufficiently developed here to be more than of suggestive value, especially since they are based almost exclusively on the experience of peasant and early industrial societies. Strictly speaking, the concept of "revolutionary intellectuals" in this traditional sense could have only an oblique relation to what it might mean in most advanced societies as Gouldner's own media and university politics makes clear. Decisive then in terms of historical studies would be a comparison of the role of the intelligentsia in the crisis of Europe in the 1920s, especially in Central Europe, which saw the last generalized blossoming of an independent Marxist intelligentsia, and that of the late 1960s, which paradoxically *preceded* the economic crisis and receded with its spread. Clearly, the radicalization of intelligentsias, and the different forms that this might assume depends upon very complex circumstances for which generalizations based on historical examples may be of little assistance without a more rigorous and complex theory.

In the end, then, we find that Gouldner's analysis of communications, the public sphere, legitimation crisis, and the intelligentsia is far less encouraging than either he acknowledges or even what appears at first sight. There is only a grim consolation that "the narrowing of the public sphere, by reason of the growth of a technocracy inimical

18. Aside from Mannheim's theory of the intelligentsia, which is not explicitly situated in a theory of stratification, mention should be made above all of Anthony Giddens, *The Class Structure of Advanced Societies* (London, 1973) and his thesis of a threefold class structuration generic to capitalist society based on ownership of property, knowledge and labor power.

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to mass political discourse" is coupled with the "transfer of that public space, its *movement* from the larger community into the smaller and more limited public space of the university itself," resulting in the "closing down of the *community* as the arena of public discourse and as the authentic site of the public sphere" (pp. 189-190). Further, "this retreat seems in the longer run likely to concentrate ideologically rational, political discourse in a university-centered political sphere. Yet such a concentration also risks isolation" (p. 191). But this was not a risk chosen: it is the *consequence* of isolation.

The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology could be described as a prolonged operational definition of the concept of ideology directed toward the problems posed by a theory of revolutionary intellectuals. It is a theory of ideology derived from a theory of intellectuals, rather than from a theory of society or of the ideological phenomenon as such. Thus understood, many of the initial difficulties posed by this account can be offset by awareness of the insight into historical materials which results. The risk is, of course, to overtax this operational definition as a comprehensive theory of ideology, and thus block appreciation of its partiality—a danger which Gouldner does not fully escape.

Perhaps the best way to clarify Gouldner's method is in contrast to that of Habermas. Whereas the latter typically proceeds in his communication theory at the level of a universal pragmatic of language, hence quasi-transcendentally, Gouldner moves at the empirical, historical-functional level. Thus for Habermas, the term "discourse" is restricted to ideal speech situations (theoretical vs. practical) and ideology (non-ideal, distorted communication processes) as all deviations from this ideal. Gouldner, on the other hand, uses the term "discourse" empirically (scientific vs. ideological) and essentially eliminates the epistemological dimension. This is replaced by a relativizing empirical one based on the difference between discourse as "elaborated" speech and hence capable of limited reflexivity, and the "restricted" codes of the paleosymbolic and everyday which are essentially unreflexive. The consequence of this empirical translation is the loss of the epistemological-critical dimension, which derives from Marx and which is preserved in Habermas' formulation. The gain, however, is a body of concepts which facilitates a redescription of the communications revolution, the rise of modern ideologies, and the consequences of the split between the intelligentsias based on property rather than education.

As a consequence, the "rational" component of the phenomenon of ideology is not viewed exclusively *substantively*, as in the Frankfurt School's notion of determinate negation which limits the rational moment of ideology to its capacity for latent utopian remembrance. Instead, it is extended in the classical sociological manner to its *formal* (functional) rationality as an effective mediation of theory and praxis—the ongoing adaptive reproduction of social reality. This functional valorization is thus achieved at the price of at least bracketing the epistemologically-grounded stance of critical theory and results in a more pluralistic and tolerant view of the phenomenon of ideology.

In this respect, Gouldner is certainly misleading to imply that his conception of ideology strays far behind conventional sociological versions which cast ideology "in the role of the force of darkness, the nonrational" (p. 4). For there is within contemporary sociology an unexplicated distinction between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" forms of ideology (functional vs. dysfunctional; extremist vs. rational,

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etc). The "end of ideology" thesis referred only to the decline of those irrational ideological movements which constituted a threat to the stability of the social order. Other than in studies of "extremism," the concept of ideology continues to be used neutrally as any group, especially interest group, belief system. What is perhaps more important, however, is the inability of sociological theory to deal with the nihilist anomaly of an inability to account for the rationality of that which is socially determined—a problem delegated to the philosophical profession. Further, there is an inconsistency of practice, or what Gouldner terms as the assumption that ideology is "some acned condition that sociology outgrows in its maturity" (p. 10). Gouldner deviates then from the sociological version largely in his admission of the existence and legitimate tasks of ideology-critique, a position which links him with Mannheim. In other words, Gouldner can be understood as attempting to reconstruct a sociological theory of ideology which aims to complement rather than deny its critical counterpart. Reduced to a formula, Gouldner's theory of ideology could be described as a partial extension and revision of Mannheim's theory. Hence it is appropriate to survey Gouldner's versions in terms of the categories guiding Mannheim's generalization of the Marxist theory of ideology—that it be (1) general; (2) total; and (3) evaluative.[19]

1. For both Mannheim and Gouldner, a theory of ideology must be fully "general" and renounce any self-excluding "partiality." And while both explored the implications of this at what might be termed the horizontal level of political ideologies or *Weltanschauungen*, neither gives much attention to the vertical dimension, the stratification of social reality into a multiplicity of levels or—in Gouldner's terms—types of discourse. While Mannheim acknowledges the importance of the *Lebenswelt* and common sense experience and Gouldner offers the domain of "paleosymbolic" discourse, both retain an orientation toward the strategic significance of the most highly developed forms of political discourse. And in this context Gouldner extends Mannheim's analysis through the introduction of the notion of a "technocratic ideology"—a phenomenon which remained a blindspot in Mannheim's own thought.

As a consequence, one of the unfinished tasks of Gouldner's formulation is to situate it within a framework of a comprehensive typology of the forms of discourse and their interrelations. For the dilemma of any analysis that would be historical rather than merely structural is that it must locate any given form of discourse within a social totality. Otherwise one cannot begin to come to terms with specifying the conditions under which elaborated codes operate to reorganize more restricted forms of communication, rather than simply co-existing as in the manner of a dissonant personality structure.

The consequences of this difficulty can be demonstrated in the case of the distinction between "scientific" and "ideological" discourse. As he argues, "ideologies. . . differ from traditionalistic value systems, religions, or myths, and have certain convergences with those symbol systems called 'science.' Both scientific and ideological symbol systems entail the negation of traditional value systems and share a certain rationality" (p. 55). They differ essentially in their relation to theory and praxis fact and value: science and social science "defocalize the command implications of their reports" whereas ideologies "focalized *both* their command *and* their report sides, grounding the former in the latter" (*ibid.*). Hence they are by definition a theory of praxis and oriented toward the mobilization of publics. The limitation of this

19. Cf. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. L. Wirth and E. Shils (New York, 1964), pp. 55ff.

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emphasis on the articulated forms of ideology becomes evident in the inability to conceptualize "ideological" phenomena which are not crystallized in the form of a social movement. The consequence can be seen in the previous discussion of Gouldner's misinterpretation of Habermas' remarks on the character of technocratic ideology as a part of common consciousness.

This is related to the more general question of the implications of the "generality" of ideology in its most radical form: the assumption—shared by Mannheim and Gouldner—that ideologization is the risk of every form of thought and that all cognition carries traces of ideology and has its ideological moment. This is *not* to say, as many superficial interpretations have suggested, that all thought is reduced to ideology. In this context it is useful for Gouldner to isolate the category of ideological discourse to indicate the kind of speech found where to use ideological grammar is proper and unavoidable. This is also essential for a theory of intellectuals. A comprehensive theory of ideology, however—especially one that is concerned with critique—cannot limit itself to this special case of ideological discourse proper. From within Gouldner's framework it becomes difficult to conceptualize the latent ideological dimensions of every form of discourse: sciences, arts, literature, folktales, religion, children's stories, or even the whole range of experience organized around the restricted codes of the paleosymbolic and of everyday life. Nor is their any guidance with respect to how all of these domains relate as part of a cultural field—surely the crucial empirical question of a practically and politically oriented theory of ideology.

2. The distinctiveness of Gouldner's approach and the point at which he genuinely attempts to extend Mannheim is in the context of the notion of a "total" as opposed to a "particular" conception of ideology. With this distinction Mannheim referred to a "structural" analysis of forms of thought as patterned systems rather than decomposing them into individual elements. This appears in Gouldner's concern with a "grammar" of ideology. In a paradoxical manifestation of changing scientific styles (whose origin and implications cannot be developed here), what Mannheim referred to from the hermeneutic tradition as "structural" reappears in Gouldner in the linguistic structuralist languages of "grammar" and "code." But Gouldner retains his hermeneutic commitments despite his metaphorical deployment of fashionable and ostensibly anti-phenomenological structuralist terminology—a form of metatheoretical dissonance which he does not acknowledge. Other than this changing terminology and the methodological perspectives it opens up, the most important shift in Gouldner's account is his elimination of an anomaly in Mannheim's theory, the distinction between ideology and utopias as respectively status-quo-oriented and future-progressive oriented forms of transcendence of social being. This schema, which retains residues of the Marxist theory of history and of the progressive character of the working class movement, was the primary source of the latent critical elements of Mannheim's theory of ideology. Gouldner continues the process of sociological generalization, however, by dropping this for a more generic model based upon a common structure defined by antithetical conceptions of the relation between is and ought. This culminates in a distinction between the "tragic" as opposed to the "utopian" visions, both of which lack the kind of realism necessary for an accurate perception of the possible. In any case, this is perfectly consistent with Mannheim's adaptive, pragmatic conception of truth as the historically possible within a given totality.

Yet, it must be stressed that the term "grammar of ideology" is used in a purely

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metaphorical sense. Or, perhaps more fairly, it refers to a search for those structuring principles which define the specificity of the language of ideology analogously to those of language in general. The term "structure of ideology" is probably avoided self-consciously and expresses acknowledgement of this ambiguous relation to the various formalist structuralisms. But this avoidance tends to beg the question of what type of "structural" analysis is most appropriate to the phenomenon of ideological discourse? For Gouldner's analysis is concerned not so much with the "grammar" of ideology as that which this grammar produces—a theory of praxis. On the one hand, he argues that ideological discourse is possible because of its organization as an elaborated code. On the other, this means that "the grammar on which all classical ideologies rest requires (1) the 'unity' of theory and praxis, and stresses (2) the power of consciousness, speech, the Idea—'generic ideology,' as I have called it" (p. 136). Or again: "Ideologies are thus 'rational' symbol systems in that they have a 'deep structure' (an analytic set of more or less tacit rules) requiring 'the unity of theory and praxis'... 'reflexivity' means self-awareness concerning the rules to which one submits and by which one is bound, thereby referring to a kind of 'theoreticity' " (p. 55).

In Gouldner's concrete discussions, however, there is considerable ambiguity as to what is "the" grammar of ideology. That in turn presupposes a more general theory of discourse and consciousness which could distinguish not only (a) the variety of possible types of discourse and their interrelations (vertical generality or discourse stratification), but (b) the kinds of formal properties which need to be taken into account in analyzing specific forms of discourse "grammars" (vertical totality, or levels of structuration). In short, the overcoming of such difficulties presupposes a broader set of considerations regarding types of discourse analysis which is missing in Gouldner's work. One of the perplexing features of the study of cultural artifacts generally is the multiplicity of possible modes of interpretation. While this issue is focalized in hermeneutics and indeed is the basis of its form of relativizing epistemological criticism, it is generally repressed in structuralism where latent or explicit positivist assumptions regarding some "essential" structure, presumably the "deepest," which is the bedrock of "reality" from which all theories of reality can be derived. From a strictly methodological viewpoint, however, the real question becomes—assuming that one rejects a structuralist ontology—one of considering the criteria in a given context for the selection of a particular type (or types) of formal analysis or a combination thereof. In the case of Gouldner, these criteria are not made explicit. Hence it can be seriously questioned whether he has fully come to terms with the possible contributions of various types of structural interpretation, their limitations, or of bringing together their implications for a theory of ideology. The socio-linguistic basis he metaphorically employs is simply too narrow and neglects a number of equally important "structural" dimensions of ideological discourse.

As illustrations, three directions might be explored for deepening the analysis of the "grammar" of ideology: (a) the formalist analysis provided by the theory of reification which is, after all, the basis of a specifically Marxist vocabulary of structure; (b) a closer look at classical poetics than that provided by such elementary dichotomies as "classic" and "romantic" or "tragic" and "utopian"; and (c) a taking of positions with regard to the relation between the polarization observed in ideological discourse and those elaborated on the basis of the paradigmatic-syntagmatic schema of linguistic structuralism in the tradition of Jakobson and Saussure.

(a) One of the most surprising features of Gouldner's volume, concerned as it is with

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the "origins, grammar and future of ideology" and guided by the judgment that Lukács is the "greatest Marxist theorist of the twentieth century" (p. xi), is that the category of reification and its cognates do not enter into his theory of ideology. Yet it is difficult to see how any general theory of modern ideology which would view itself as a critique of Marxism and would embrace both advanced capitalism and state socialism can dispense with a critical appropriation of these categories. This deficiency is further evident in the weak social psychological components of his analysis which are restricted largely to a general theory of interests and the thesis that "ideology is grounded in the tension between gratification and justification" (chapter 10). A possible source of this deficiency may be related to his reliance on Habermas, for whom the theme of reification recedes into the background given his interest in the reconstruction of a theory of rational communication rather than a theory of ideology. For Gouldner, however, this neglect has several important consequences. First, it deprives him of a vocabulary for mediating between the empirical and the epistemological levels of ideology, i.e., from ideology analysis to ideology critique. Further, it cuts him off from a critique of neo-Marxism's tendency to exclusively identify reification with the capitalist mode of production at the expense of a more general theory of domination built on Marxist categories. Finally, the theory of reification would provide the basis for deepening his discussion of the grammar of ideology by considering the structure of its irrationality, as well as its rationality.

In considering more closely Gouldner's analysis of the "grammar" or structure of ideological discourse, one is immediately struck by his assertion that its departures from rationality are incidental and circumstantial. "Dogmatism, we would say, is 'deviant' behavior from the standpoint of the grammar of proper usage to which the normal believer of the ideology submits" (p. 39). "That concrete ideologies (and social sciences) do become dogmatic is not necessarily intrinsic to their deep structure; it may be due to certain special social conditions under which they enact their grammar. For example, 'dogmatism' may be due to anxieties that become exacerbated under conditions of conflict and struggle, with all their dangers and risks" (p. 57). But is not the condition of anxiety inherent in the historical constitution of ideological discourse in conflict?

A corollary to this distinction is the refusal to identify the inherent partiality of ideologies with dogmatism: "Ideology is rooted in a kind of one-sidedness, in 'part-iality.' In other words, ideology is rooted in a conflict between the part and the whole, the individual, private and public interests" (p. 276). Ideology is that lack of objectivity which is produced by (and within) a structure of rational discourse, within an elaborated speech variant, when there is an inability to reach forward to the other because the reaching self has something to hide and is unable to reach downward into its own existence and speak its own grounding" (p. 277). But is partiality the only constitutive source of a lack of reflexivity in ideology? Or can partiality and dogmatism be so readily separated in practice?

The underlying problem here is Gouldner's ambiguity with regard to the status of the "grammar" of ideology. Is this meant to be an empirical generalization based on the analysis of "normal" ideological speech? If so, then it would be difficult to consider dogmatism a deviation. Or is he tacitly introducing here assumptions about an "ideal speech" situation of the type which manfiests the fully reconstructed logic of practical discourse and its "rationality" as discussed by Habermas? If so, this is one of the sources of the apologetic side of Gouldner's analysis: the tendency to justify the

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"rationality" of actual, normal ideological discourse in terms of the ideal type of its logical reconstruction. But given the empirical and historical focus of his analysis, this is an illegitimate step which surreptitiously introduces an epistemological identification of grammar and content.

If, on the other hand, we do assume that in some sense "dogmatism" is a deviation from the "grammar" of ideology, how would we analyze the "grammatical" form of such departues from the ideal? A theory of ideology which cannot handle this question, which is, after all, at the heart of the whole tradition of the critique of ideology as "falsifying" and not simply selectivizing knowledge, calls into question its own reflexivity. While operating with a different definition of ideology which restricts it precisely to such falsifying, dogmatic deviations, Joseph Gabel has provided a theory of ideology based on the concept of reification which neatly complements Gouldner's scheme.[20] On the one hand, his distinction between crystallized and non-crystallized or diffuse forms of ideological consciousness corrects Gouldner's tendency to restrict attention to only elaborated forms. On the other hand, in describing the "grammar" *of dogmatism as "ideology," he provides the perspective for finally seeing what* Gouldner must mean by what he terms "ideology." For as Gabel suggests, following the examples of Marx and Lukács, ideology should be viewed as a degradation of the normal-ideal of consciousness as dialectical. In a word: there is a profound rhetorical confusion in Gouldner's grand rehabilitation of the concept of ideology. What he means to say, when all is said and done, is that the "grammar" of ideology is inherently *dialectical,* that the structure of ideology parallels that of the dialectic of consciousness.

(b) This point is reinforced by consideration of Gouldner's analysis of what he terms the common latent structure of "generic" ideology as inherently idealist and based on a continuum ranging from the "tragic" to the "utopian" visions. This scheme, while employing the language of poetics, attempts to express the same distinction found in Gabel's notion of 'subrealist utopianism."[21] Both view utopianism as "pathological." For Gouldner this refers to the normal condition of the ideological, whereas for Gabel it refers to the normal dialectical structure of consciousness.

Gouldner's implicit conception of the dialectical character of the "grammar" of ideology is also evident in a closer examination of his somewhat schematic use of literary categories. In his schema, "the tragic vision represses awareness of what is possible; the ideologic vision represses awareness of what is *impossible*. Each, then, has its false consciousness" (p. 76). "The utopian is, we may say, the tragic inverted... The utopian...treats value commitments as a set of 'nonnegotiable' demands on reality, exactly as does the tragic, but the utopian seeks to *enact them in the world* rather than to protect the ideal by world-avoidance...the pathology is a pathology of the ideological, not its normal condition. Neither tragic nor utopian, the ideological vision premises a temporal sensitivity, of the 'what is' seen as a point (or space) in a lineal extension of time, defined both by what lies ahead and what has been before, and in which the latter is seen as the implicit grounding of the former. Neither utopian nor tragic, the ideological experiences itself as imbued with a sense of 'practical realism' " (p. 88). Here what Gouldner terms "ideological vision" corresponds closely to what Hayden White, based on a complex analysis of nineteenth century philosophies

20. See J. Gabel, *False Consciousness,* trans. M. Thompson (London, 1975).

21. This is most clearly developed in J. Gabel, "Utopian Consciousness and False Consciousness," *Telos,* 29 (Fall 1976), pp. 181-186.

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of history in terms of traditional poetics, sees as the theory of history of Marx and Hegel: "The plot structure of every historically significant sequence of events... represents a movement either toward liberation or bondage, *toward* a 'Romantic' transcendence of the world of experience or *toward* an 'Ironic' condition of bondage. Marx denied both extremes; mankind is indentured neither to total bondage nor to perfect transcendence. His historical vision, like that of Hegel, oscillated between apprehensions of the Tragic outcome of every act of the historical drama and comprehension of the Comic outcome of the process as a whole."[22]

These two examples suggest that there might be much to be gained from referring not to the "grammar" of ideology but to the dialectical structure of the languages of theory and praxis. Further, the theory of reification offers an analysis of this dialectical structure that facilitates a description of deviations of this ideal, hence of the constitution of "ideology" qua falsifying consciousness. As a formalization of the modes of speech found in literary action, classical poetics does offer useful devices for conceptualizing the social-historical narratives of theory and praxis. But this type of structuration needs to be also situated with reference to that of the more fundamental dialectical structure of consciousness of which it is a concrete expression. In short, Gouldner's use of the term "ideology" as synonymous with its idealized dialectical structure, as well as his haphazard use of literary categories, create considerable confusion as the framework for a study of the origins, grammar and future of ideology.

(c) Finally, if we consider the question of linguistic analogies, it is possible to point to the importance of establishing the qualitative transformation of communicative processes in the shift from the relatively closed systems of linguistic systems and the open systems of concrete historical praxis. This is implicit in Gouldner's hesitation to fall back directly on linguistic models; his metaphorical borrowings reflect his consistent hermeneutic commitments. But one of the most important tasks of a theory of ideology is to link it to a theory of praxis whose languages are not only structured, but capable of ongoing restructuration of the type found only in the longer evolutionary history of linguistic structures.

The issue here is then a comparison of the dialectic of theory-praxis discourse in contrast to the formalized dialectics of natural language and its codifications (myths, fictions, symbolic languages). Gouldner's analysis of ideology as elaborated speech code is predicated upon a series of polarizations: elaborated (decontextualized) vs. restricted (contextualized) speech code; culture of critical speech vs. casual speech; cultural classicism vs. cultural romanticism; unifying ideology vs. provincializing traditions; general ideology as unrestricted communicability vs. paradigms and paleosymbolic systems as restricted communicability. It is plausible to argue that this analysis of the dialectical "grammar" of ideology reproduces at the level of praxis the polarization apparent in the more fundamental model of linguistic structuralism, the axis of the syntagmatic (metonymy, combination, contexture, continguity) and paradigmatic (metaphor, selection, substitution, similarity) poles of language. This is not to suggest that Gouldner could or should have used these categories or that he was unaware of them, but that without situating his own schema in relation to them, there is considerable ambiguity as to the status and character of the "grammatical" analysis of ideology. A hypothesis worth entertaining in this context is that while such formalist linguistic models are appropriate for pre-modern ideologies (i.e., myths) or artificial texts (fictions), their usefulness declines sharply with the rise of modern ideologies

22. *Metahistory* (Baltimore, 1973), p. 328.

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whose enhanced reflexivity and dialectical self-consciousenss is the foundation of the self-constructing subjectivity which is the negation of structuralist ontology. As a consequence, a qualitatively new form of "structural" analysis is required which, while preserving the deeper tensions inherent in the medium of language, is directed toward a pragmatic of language as the medium of self- and collective consciousness.

Moreover, the example of the linguistic two-axis model cautions against Gouldner's tendency to hypostatize the elaborated-restricted code opposition as discrete entities. This obscures the way in which this polarity is reproduced within the elaborated code itself and hence an essential component of any comprehensive analysis of ideology. The identification of ideological discourse with its elaborated pole glosses over the way in which its essence consists in its capacity to unify general and particular, fact and value, symbolic and paleosymbolic. Without such a dialectical conception of the relation between levels of language, discourse analysis remains static and becomes an obstacle rather than a means for an analysis of the mediations between forms of discourse. There is need not only for a logic of the ideal speech situation, but an existential phenomenology.

3. The formulation of a general and total conception of ideology is inseparable in practice from a critical-evaluative concern. In a roundabout way, Gouldner focuses in his final chapter on these issues posed by the confrontation of hermeneutic phenomenology and ideology critique. This is coupled with a form of autocritique expressing the more conciliatory tone of his most recent work: "Certain passages of my *Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* have been criticized, and criticized correctly, for a lack of moral generosity. I do therefore most certainly include myself in this criticism" (p. 284n). Identifying "critique" with "unmasking," he suggests that "both apologia and critique are aspects of ideologies... The rationality of ideology-critique is that it reveals what apologia has hidden. The rationality of apologia, however, is that it reveals what *critique* has hidden. The irrationality of each is that it remains silent about what the other contributes, and each treats the hidden *part* that it reveals as if it were the *whole*, thereby tacitly denying its own partiality" (p. 283). The risk then of an unrelenting attack on ideology is the "possible danger of deauthorizing *all* morality and ideology, by making it seem as if this interest-protecting silence was *all* that ideologies and moralities did, and that they had no autonomy of their own" (p. 284). The consequences are the "pathologies of ideology critique ranging from cynicism and nihilism, through anomic egoism to fanatic idealism."

What is surprising in these remarks, in themselves valid and important, is that Gouldner's own theory of ideology offers little in the way of assistance in dealing with such issues. His own theory of ideology—a theory of ideology analysis rather than critique—is developed out of the modern-premodern transition and provides little assistance in making analytical or critical discriminations *within* the category of modern ideology. That would be, of course, the task of a non-dogmatic, differentiated, hermeneutically sensitive ideology critique that would also claim to participate in a "third discourse" form of reflexivity. The dangling issue here is the relation between the dialectical and hermeneutic moments of such a transcending form of discourse. For Gouldner this is viewed exclusively in terms of the subjective dimension of reflexivity: third discourse reflexivity, viewing one's speech as other speeches, "undermines Marxism's (and any ideology's) capacity to mobilize the action it seeks and to persuade men to pay the costs of their commitments. Relativism may foster a worldly tolerance of different gods and discourage costly sacrifices on behalf of

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one's own beliefs... Its attitude may promote neutrality rather than the struggle against the 'error' of opposing outlooks" (p. 44). How in this case can a critical theory—"the systematic self-reflection of critique" (p. 293)—justify its own affirmation of emancipation as a goal and the discourse of critique as its necessary medium? How can it answer those "recent heresies of ethnomethodology whose ultimate political rendevous is surely with the right" (p. 116)? And how, when all is said and done, can he answer Adorno on the left when he argues that unlike in classical bourgeois societies, ideologies no longer contain a latent critical content, but have regressed to pure illusion? How, in short, can he avoid the skepticism of a "mugwump sociology" agonizing before the aporia of apology and critique? In a word: if Gouldner's version of the "linguistic turn" is to be more than a technical instrument or metaphor, if the rhetoric of "reflexivity" is to refer to the objective possibilities as well as to the subjective limits to reason, then they must reconsider their relation to the tasks of a third form of discourse. Gouldner admits that "the historical step from ideology to the sociology of knowledge...was *not* a true step toward acceptance of *one's own concrete cognitive* limits." It is simply a vague and general admission that 'we are all human,' but not a specification of our own concrete 'guilt' " (p. 281). But is that not merely a precondition for reconsidering our cognitive *possibilities*? That too is an expression of our being "merely human" and no less a constituent of reflexivity.

Gouldner considers his work as "part of an effort to lay a basis for developing a third form of discourse that eludes the pretentiousness, false consciousness, and limits of both social science and ideology, as we have lived them historically. It is a probe toward a more transcending form of discourse that we might call reflexive rational social inquiry, toward a critical theory that wonders about itself and about the world" (p. 19). One may wonder how far he has moved us along that path toward a "third form of discourse" since it seems congenitally defined to deal with itself rather than the world; more convincingly he has succeeded in laying the foundations for a theory and comparative historical study of revolutionary intellectuals and a closely related critique of Marxism. Yet this difficulty is not his alone, a point which is obscured by the very implication that "rational reflexive social inquiry" could be a text to which one could refer. For such a "third form" of discourse could only be an emancipation from texts, displacing the locus of reason neither to an abstract community of inquirers nor to a party of intellectual soldiers, but an "invisible college" of citizen-critics that would turn the world into a critical university. So bluntly phrased, this might sound like a professor's dream. And so it is, but where increasingly revolutionary "subjects" are born through their own self-constitution rather than as a reflex from commands from above or rootedness in positions below, such questions are not merely "academic." This shift of the burden of the world-historical mission of the proletariat to the intelligentsia begun by Mannheim thus finds its most elaborate and self-critical sequel. We must await its completion, however, for fuller judgment.

Such a rationalistic conclusion may baffle those perturbed by Gouldner's long-standing polemics against the pretensions of social scientific intelligence. Ironically, Alvin Gouldner has contributed more than anyone in his generation of American sociologists to vindicate the "sociological imagination." And if he bears the intellectual scars and guilt of that past, he also preserves more than they can ever know its commitment to theoretical reason.

Ray Morrow

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Bruno Bettelheim, *The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976. 328 pages.

Bruno Bettelheim's study of the meaning and importance of folk tales[1] for child development is actually an unconscious exposé of orthodox Freudianism's crippling effects on psychoanalytic theory and literature. Bettelheim was impelled to write the book out of dissatisfaction "with much of the literature intended to develop the child's mind and personality, because it fails to stimulate and nurture those resources he needs most in order to cope with his difficult inner problems" (p. 4). Therefore, he explored the great potential of folk tales as literary models for children since "more can be learned from them about the inner problems of human beings, and of the right solutions to their predicaments in any society, than from any other type of story within a child's comprehension" (p. 5). This is, indeed, a grand statement in behalf of the folk tale's powers, and Bettelheim assumes an even more noble pose when he asks that children be provided with substantial cultural goods which will enable them to become masters of their destiny. However, despite his good intentions and moral concern in the welfare of children, Bettelheim's book disseminates false notions about the original inten of Freudian psychoanalytic theory and the literary quality of folk tales which ultimately results in a mystification of the dehumanizing forces in society. Not only is the manner in which he would *impose* meaning onto child development through the therapeutic use of the folk tale authoritarian, but his stance is symptomatic of numerous pseudo-humanitarian educators who perpetuate the diseases they desire to cure.

Bettelheim's major thesis is simple: "the form and structure of fairy tales suggest images to the child by which he can structure his daydreams and with them give better direction to his life" (p. 7). In other words, the folk tale liberates a child's subconscious so that he or she can work through conflicts and experiences which would otherwise be repressed and perhaps cause psychological disturbances. According to Bettelheim, folk tales present existential dilemmas in a clear-cut manner so that the child can easily grasp the underlying meanings of the conflicts. Most folk tales are an imaginative depiction of healthy human development and help children understand the motives behind their resistance against parents and the fear of growing up. The conclusions of most folk tales portray the achievement of psychological independence, moral maturity, and sexual confidence. Obviously, as Bettelheim admits, there are other approaches to folk tales. But, he maintains that it is primarily the psychological approach which uncovers the hidden meanings of the tales and their overwhelming importance for child development.

Given their immense volume, Bettelheim limits his discussion to the better known tales. The book is divided into two parts. The first, fancifully entitled "A Pocketful of Magic," focuses on a theoretical explication of his concepts, method, and purpose. The second, "In Fairy Land," consists of 14 case studies of such different tales as *Snow White, Sleeping Beauty, Hansel and Gretel, Jack and the Beanstalk, Little Red Riding*

1. Throughout his book, Bettelheim uses the term fairy tale to indicate folk tale or *Volksmärchen.* Occasionally he will make a distinction between a folk fairy tale and a literary fairy tale (*Kunstmärchen*), but more often than not he uses the term fairy tale indiscriminately. I shall employ the term folk tale when referring to the literature he discusses because it is more applicable to the material he treats.

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Hood, Cinderella, etc. In the first part, Bettelheim asserts that adults should not explain the tales to children since that would destroy their "magic." However, adults should tell the tales because that shows their approval of children's imaginative play. Children are allegedly drawn to folk tales because they symbolically depict the psychological problems which the children must work through *by themselves*. In doing this, a child supposedly attains a sense of his or her self. If we were to follow the logic of Bettelheim's argument, it is almost as though the folk tale could be considered a spychoanalyst in the manner in which it operated with a child. The tale by itself opens up unexplored realms of experience to children who learn to order their inner worlds by following the fantastic sign posts of the tale and by identifying with the hero who becomes ruler of a kingdom, i.e., ruler of the self.

Like many cultural censors of morality, Bettelheim believes that only literature which is harmonious and orderly should be fed to the delicate souls of children who should be sheltered from harsh reality. Thus, the folk tale is perfect. In contrast to myths, fables, and legends, folk tales are allegedly optimistic because they allow for hope and the solution of problems. In addition, they involve a conflict between the reality and pleasure principles and show how a certain amount of pleasure can be retained while the demands of reality are respected (as in the example of the oldest pig in *The Three Little Pigs*). Indiscriminately using the discoveries of Piaget, who has demonstrated (among other things) that the child's thinking up till the ages of nine or ten is animistic, Bettelheim explains how the magic and fantastic images in the folk tale enable the child subjectively to come to terms with reality. The adventures in the folk tale allow for vicarious satisfaction of unfulfilled desires and subconscious drives (pp. 56-7) and permit the child to sublimate those desires and drives at a time when conscious recognition would shatter or shake the child's character structure which is not yet secure. The folk tale provides freedom for the child's imagination in that it deals at first with a problematic real situation which is then imaginatively transformed. The narrative breaks down spatial and temporal limits and leads the child into the self, but it also leads him or her back into reality. Bettelheim argues against true-to-life stories for child development because they impinge upon the imagination of the child and act repressively as would the rational interference of an adult. In contrast, the folk tale transforms reality in such a way that the child can cope with it. Like the symbols of the id, ego and superego which Freud created as operative constructs, the folk-tale symbols represent separate entities of the child's inner sanctum, and their representation in a folk tale (for a child) show how order can be made out of chaos (p. 75). In particular, the folk tale demonstrates how each element (ego, id, superego) must be given its due and integrated if character structure is to develop without disturbance.

Many folk tales, such as *Brother and Sister*, show how the animalistic (male-id) must be integrated with the spiritual component (female-ego, superego) to permit human qualities to blossom: "integration of the disparate aspects of our personality can be gained only after the asocial, destructive, and unjust have been done away with; and this cannot be achieved until we have reached full maturity, as symbolized by sister's giving birth to a child and developing mothering attitudes" (p. 83). At the bottom of all the chaos and conflict which children experience are parents, leading Bettelheim to make the following claims: "Maybe if more of our adolescents had been brought up on fairy tales, they would (unconsciously) remain aware of the fact that their conflict is not with the adult world, or society, but really only with their parents" (pp. 98-99). In other words, the ambivalent attachments to one's parents are the roots of all evil and

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must be worked out by the child (particularly the oedipal conflicts) if a well-integrated personality is to be achieved. Symbolically folk tales are the most clear and distinct representations of children's anxieties and unconscious drives, and thus they can stimulate children to explore their imaginations for resolutions to the conflicts with true state of independence. Thus now we know what becoming a ruler over a kingdom means, and Bettelheim can conclude his first part by advising adults again to take an active part in the telling of the tale but not to interpret it for the child. The participation by the adult makes for a shared experience. Supposedly the tale will (like the psychiatrist) bring the child and parent closer together by magically restoring order to the child's mind.

This theory is fallacious on both the psychoanalytic and the literary levels. Not only does he misinterpret some of Freud's key notions about psychoanalysis, but he also twists the meanings of the literature to suit his peculiar theory of child development. The intended "humanitarian" goals of his study are undermined by his rigid Freudian abstractions which prop up irrational and arbitrary forms of social behavior whose norms and values children are supposed to adapt. The patterns of the folk tales allegedly foster ideal normative behavior which children are to internalize; yet, some of these literary patterns like the forms of social behavior are repressive constructs which violate the imagination of both children and adults alike.

The critical task of Freud's psychoanalytic theory was to demonstrate the manifold ways in which society made it impossible for the individual to achieve autonomy. His purpose was to expose the inner forces which hinder full development of the individual and cause psychic disturbances because of external pressures and conditions. His work in theory was to destroy illusions which society creates about the possibility of achieving autonomy and a happy life so that the individual could elaborate meaning out of the antagonistic relationship between self and society. As Russell Jacoby has recently demonstrated, the basic particular, orthodox Freudians have hampered the growth of Freudian theory by codifying the principles as absolute laws. Here, following Jacoby, it is important to make a distinction among orthodox Freudians: "Once the false opposition between orthodoxy and revisionism as that between obsolete dogma and contemporary insight is avoided, the notion of orthodoxy must be reformulated. To the point that the theories of Marx and Freud were critiques of bourgeois civilization, orthodoxy entailed loyalty to these critiques; more exactly, *dialectical* loyalty. Not repetition is called for but articulation and development of concepts; and within Marxism—and to a degree within psychoanalysis—precisely against an Official Orthodoxy only too happy to freeze concepts into formulas. . . . Freud and his students are clear enough as to what in psychoanalysis is to be preserved—not by thoughtless repetition but by reworking: the concepts of repression, sexuality, unconscious, Oedipal complex, infantile sexuality."[2] Unfortunately, Jacoby does not elaborate his critique of official orthodoxy. He spends most of his time defending the dialectical orthodox Freudians, but as a result of his work, it becomes eminently clear that Bettelheim belongs to the opposing camp of official orthodox Freudians who have blandly applied tenets of Freudianism without rethinking and reworking them in light of social and scientific changes. Moreover, he has also picked up one of the worst traits of the neo- and post-Freudians—their moralizing. Aside from Bettelheim's mechanical repetition of Freud's thought, his postulates read like "Sunday sermons."

2. *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Contemporary Psychology from Adler to Laing* (Boston, 1975), pp. 12-13.

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Jacoby's critique of Allport also applies to Bettelheim: "The positive is promoted to drive out the negative. One strives to be cheery because it is a cheerless world. Since reflection on the latter is taboo," Bettelheim "seeks to make palatable the unswallowable: the lie that the isolated and abandoned individual can 'become,' 'love,' 'be.' Hence, the 'how to' nature"[3] of his work. Bettelheim patches up his official orthodoxy with moral homilies about therapeutic self-help. He constantly asserts that the folk tale contains the answers to the good, happy life, implying that there is a social realm where individual autonomy can be reached. Yet, in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud made clear just how repressive society was and how limited and varied the possibilities were to attain freedom and happiness: "It is impossible to ignore the extent to which civilization is built on renunciation of instinctual gratifications, the degree to which the existence of civilization presupposes the non-gratification (suppression, repression or something else?) of powerful instinctual urgencies. This 'cultural privation' dominates the whole field of social relations between human beings; we know already that it is the cause of the antagonism against which all civilization has to fight."[4]

What is significant in Freud's work is that he located the cause for psychosis and all mental sicknesses in the historical development of social conditions. He may have misconstrued some theories, but his research into the dialectic relation of the human psyche to civilization provided the basis for a social science that could be altered as the social conditions changed. Bettelheim fails to develop Freud's far-reaching findings, and he mistakenly holds the family as primarily responsible for the conflicts a child experiences, thus not locating it as *one of the mediating agencies* through which civilization causes repression. Even worse, he employs Freudian terminology like a puritanical parson encouraging parents to have faith in the almighty power of the folk tale which will lead children through the valley of fear into the kingdom of grace. Gone is the antagonistic relationship between society and the individual. If anything, it is misplaced between child and family which shifts the real cause for repression. Bettelheim would have us believe that the child can voluntaristically work through internalized problems with the aid of a folk tale and become a well-adjusted, autonomous individual. Once familial conflicts are grasped and solved, happiness is just down the road. Consequently, Bettelheim unwittingly becomes an apologist for a "civilized" society noted for its abuse of children and its proclivity toward dehumanization.

Bettelheim's concern in children is ultimately specious. They are nothing but reified objects in his laboratory of official Freudian orthodoxy. His book is largely male-orientated and fails to make careful distinctions between the sexes, ages, and class backgrounds of children. It is no longer valid to postulate theories of the imagination, penis envy, castration complex, and oedipal conflicts without reworking them and perhaps even dismissing them in light of changing social conditions and normative behavior.[5] Perhaps the greatest weakness of Bettelheim's book is his neglect

3. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

4. Trans. Joan Riviere, 5th ed. (London, 1951).

5. Compare the excellent discussion of the debates around these topics in Patrick C. Lee and Robert Sussman Stewart, *Sex Differences: Cultural and Developmental Dimensions* (New York, 1976), pp. 13-32. See especially William H. Gillespie's article "Woman and Her Discontents: A Reassessment of Freud's Views on Female Sexuality," pp. 133-150. See also Ulrike Prokop, *Weiblicher Zusammenhang. Von der Beschränktheit der Strategien und der Unangemessenheit der Wünsche* (Frankfurt am Main, 1976).

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of socio-linguistic studies and his own careless use of terminology which reflects just how faulty his theory of communication is. In one of the more important studies of this problem, *Class, Codes and Control,* Basil Bernstein has pointed out that "as the child learns his speech or, in the terms used here, learns specific codes which regulate his verbal acts, he learns the requirements of his social structure. The experience of the child is tranformed by the learning which is generated by his own apparently voluntary acts of speech. The social structure becomes the substratum of his experience essentially through the consequences of the linguistic process. From this point of view, every time the child speaks or listens the social structure of which he is a part is reinforced in him and his social identity is constrained. The social structure becomes the developing child's psychological reality by the shaping of his acts of speech. Underlying the general pattern of his speech are, it is held, critical sets of choices, preferences for some alternatives rather than others, which develop and are stabilized through time and which eventually come to play an important role in the regulation of intellectual, social and affective orientations."[6] Bernstein discusses the ramifications of language for the psycho-social development of children in terms of elaborated and restricted codes used generally by middle-class and working-class children respectively.[7] Since "the mode of a language structure reflects a particular form of the structuring of feeling and so the very means of interaction and response to the environment,"[8] Bernstein investigates why working-class children respond differently and often negatively to the socialization process which has been developed to satisfy middle-class needs. In contrast, middle-class children adapt more readily and learn to use all sorts of codes to further their ends. The restricted code used by working-class children is not necessarily poorer than the elaborated code of the middle-class child, but it is *different* and does reflect the more limited and authoritarian margins within which a working-class child is socialized. Thus, in a formal learning situation which is generally predicated on the elaborated code of the middle class, the "I" of the working-cass child is threatened. "The attempt to substitute a different use of language and to change the order of communication creates critical problems for the working-class child as it is an attempt to change his basic system of perception, fundamentally the very means by which he has been socialized."[9]

In Bettelheim's discussion of folk tales and their use with children, there is no regard for the differences between children and their particular relationship to language which influences their receptivity to the linguistic and aesthetic codes and patterns of literature. In fact, differences are virtually levelled as if the education process were a democratizing experience and as if there were no codes, neither in public or private language nor in the folk tales themselves. This brings us to Bettelheim's misuse of the folk tale as an art form.

Though aware of the historical origins of the folk tale, Bettelheim fails to take into account that the symbols and patterns of the tales reflect specific forms of social behavior and activity which often can be traced as far back as the Ice and Megalathic Ages.[10] Leaving aside the questionable methodology of the orthodox Freudianism,

6. *Class, Codes and Control: Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language* (New York, 1975), p. 124.
7. *Ibid.,* pp. 76-94.
8. *Ibid.,* p. 26.
9. *Ibid.,* p. 35.
10. As August Nitschke has documented in his recent work *Soziale Ordnungen im Spiegel der Märchen: Das frühe Europa,* Band I (Stuttgart, 1976), and Band II, *Stabile Verlaltenweisen der*

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which sees penis envy and castration complexes everywhere in folk tales, and assuming that there is some validity to use folk tales therapeutically in educating children, one must still question the manner in which Bettelheim imposes meaning on the tales as well as his indiscriminate application of their meaning to children of all ages, sexes, and class backgrounds. August Nitschke has convincingly demonstrated that the creative purpose and major themes of the folk tales did not concern harmony but the depiction of changing social structures and alternative forms of behavior so that new developments and connections between things could be better grasped by people in a given primitive society. Central to most tales is the concept of power. Where does it reside? Who wields it? Why? How can it be better wielded? Many of the tales bespeak a primitive or feudal ideology of "might makes right." Depending on the historical epoch the tales portray either the possibilities for social participation or the reasons for social conflict. The immanent meaning of the tales has little to do with providing suitable direction for a contemporary child's life. From a present-day perspective, the tales are filled with incidents of inexplicable abuse, maltreatment of women, negative images of minority groups, questionable sacrifices, and the exaltation of power.[11] The point is that the psychological components and meanings can best be understood when first related to the contradictory developments of the historical period in which they originated.

To use the tales with children in the present for therapeutic education demands first a historical understanding and secondly a careful delineation of the progressive and regressive ideological and psychological meanings of the tales. Here we are dealing with the question of reception. How does a child receive and perceive a given tale? It is necesary to ask whether a child actually knows what a king is. What does a king mean to a five-year-old, to an eight-year-old, to a girl or boy, to girls and boys of different races and class backgrounds? A prince who uses magical gifts which sometimes involve killing to become a king of a particular realm does not necessarily imply, as Bettelheim would have us believe, that the child will psychologically comprehend this as a story about self-mastery? Couldn't it also serve to reinforce the aggressive instincts of a middle-class child to become more ego-centered, competitive, and achievement-oriented? Couldn't the code be understood by a lower-class child so as to reinforce the arbitrary power or authoritarian figures and to accept a strict hierarchical world? What is obviously necessary in working with the impact of the tales on children is to develop a method which takes into consideration the aesthetics of reception. Such a method would have to investigate the possibilities for comprehension by children in light of the relationship of a specific audience to the tale at a given moment in history.

Völker in unserer Zeit (Stuttgart, 1977), the contemporary psychological labels attached to the symbols and patterns of the tales are contradicted by the actual historical and archaeological findings. According to the data, the normative behavior and labor processes of primitive peoples as depicted in the tales which they themselves cultivated cannot be explained by modern psycho-analytical theory. Properly speaking, any psychological approach to the folk tales would first have to investigate the socialization processes of primitive societies in a given historical era in order to provide an appropriate interpretation.

11. Cf. Robert Moore, "From Rags to Witches: Stereotypes and anti-Humanism in Fairy Tales," in *Interracial Books for Children Bulletin*, 7 (1975), pp. 1-3. Moore's major thesis is that fairy tales are dangerous material for children since they present stereotypes which are based on racist and sexist ideologies. The only positive way to relate fairy tales to children is to expose the destructive nature of the tales. Moore goes to the opposite extreme of Bettelheim, and thus, like Bettelheim, he distorts the meaning of the tales and their possibilities for positive use with children.

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Meaning cannot be ordained by high priests or orthodox Freudianism.

The ultimate weakness of Bettelheim's methodology can be seen in the second part of his book dealing with case studies of popular folk tales. Let us look at his treatment of *Cinderella*. Bettelheim first discusses the various versions and cycles of the Cinderella story, in particular those of Basile and Perrault, diagnosing their major themes as sibling rivalry and the oedipal complex. He then uses the basic plot of the Grimm version as the paradigmatic model for comprehending all the *Cinderella* stories. Actually no matter what tale is touched by Bettelheim's orthodox Freudian wand, it is always transformed into a symbolic parable of self-realization and healthy sexuality. Here, as usual, Bettelheim is concerned with the hidden meanings which work wonders on children. *Cinderella* teaches children about sibling rivalry and a young girl's endeavors to prove her worth. It is significant that Cinderella is given "dirty" work to do since that reflects her own low self-esteem as well as the guilt she feels for desiring her father. Her thwarted oedipal desires must be overcome if she is to prove her real worth and achieve complete sexuality. The hardships which Cinderella must endure are tests that involve the development of personality.

Using Erik Erikson's model of the human life cycle, Bettelheim talks about the "phase-specific psychosocial crises "which individuals must go through in order to become the 'ideal human being'." In the case of Cinderella, she goes through five phases of the human life cycle to develop basic trust (the relationship with her original good mother), autonomy (acceptance of her role in the family), initiative (the planting of the twig), industry (her hard labors), and identity (her insistence that the prince see both her dirty and beautiful side). Bettelheim is particularly penetrating on this last point. "In the slipper ceremony, which signifies the betrothal of Cinderella and the prince, he selects her because in symbolic fashion she is the uncastrated woman who relieves him of his castration anxiety which would interfere with a happy marital relationship. She selects him because he appreciates her in her 'dirty' sexual aspects, lovingly accepts her vagina in the form of the slipper, and approves of her desire for a penis, symbolized by her tiny foot fitting within the slipper-vigina. . . . But as she slips her foot into the slipper she asserts that she, too, will be active in their sexual relationship; she will do things, too. And she also gives the assurance that she is not and never was lacking in anything" (p. 271). It is quite clear that the virginal Cinderella is the most suitable for prince charming because her step-sisters in their act of self-mutilation reveal through the blood (menstrual bleeding) that they are sexualy too agressive and cause the prince anxiety. In sum, *Cinderella* as story "guides the child from his greatest disappointments—oedipal disillusionment, castration anxiety, low opinion of others—toward developing his autonomy, becoming industrious, and gaining a positive identity of his own" (p. 276). After reading Bettelheim's concluding remarks one wonders why such books as Dale Carnegie's *How To Win Friends and Influence People* and *How to Succeed in Business* are necessary when we have folk tales.

In contrast to Bettelheim's moral primer about folk tales, Nitschke has demonstrated that *Cinderella* originated toward the end of the Ice Age. The norms of behavior and social activity depicted in *Cinderella* reveal that the tale revolved around a female who receives help and gifts from her dead mother, who continues living in the form of a tree, and from animals. Nitschke explains in some detail that the society which produced tales similar to *Cinderella* was one of hunting and grazing in which the woman was accorded the place of honor. Death was not feared, and women were

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sacrificed so that they could return to life in the form of a plant or animal to help their children develop. Life was seen in sequences and as eternal. Thus, a human being participated in his or her own time and, through transformation after death, there was a renewal of time. Most important is the function of the female. She was at the center of this society and maintained it. *Cinderella* does not reflect society undergoing great changes in production but a maintenance of the hunting and grazing economy. However, when compared to tales of the early Ice Age, it does show how human beings have taken over center stage from animals and the growing importance attached to the woman.

Nitschke's explanation of the historical origins and meaning of *Cinderella* obviously cannot be grasped by children. But it does set the framework for a psychoanalytic approach which must first consider the people and their social behavior if it wants to establish the psychological essence of a tale. The same thing holds true for the retelling of the tale today, but in a slightly different manner. And here the implications of the tale are remarkably different from what they were in the Ice Age. instead of having a tale which does honor to women, we have a tale which is an insult to women. Here I want to concentrate on just one aspect of *Cinderella* to question the relevance Bettelheim bestows upon it. In American society today where women have been at the vanguard of the equal rights movement, where female sexuality has undergone great changes, where the central agency of socialization of boys and girls has shifted from the family to the mass media and schools,[12] a tale like *Cinderella* can neither explicityly nor implicitly guide children to order their inner worlds and to lead fuller, happier sexual lives. Though it is difficult to speculate how an individual child might react to *Cinderella*, certainly the adult reader and interpreter must ask the following questions: Why is the stepmother shown to be wocked and not the father? Why is Cinderella esentially passive? (How Bettelheim twists the meaning to see Cinderella as active is actually another one of his Freudian magid tricks.) Why do the girls have to quarrel over a man? How do children react to a Cinderella who is industrious, dutiful, virginal and passive? Are all men handsome? Is marriage the end goal of life? Is it important to marry rich men? This small list of questions suggests that the ideological and psychological pattern and message of *Cinderella* do nothing more than reinforce sexist values and a Puritan ethos that serves a society which fosters competition and achievement for survival. Admittedly this is a harsh indictment as *Cinderella* as tale. Certainly I do not want to make it responsible for the maintenance of the entire capitalist system. However, the critique of *Cinderella* is meant to show how suspect Bettelheim's theory and methodology are. There is something ultimately pathetic and insidious about Bettelheim's appraoch to folk tales. It is pathetic because he apparently wants to make a sincere contribution in fighting the dehumanization of life. It is insidious because his banal theory covers up the processes and social mediations which contribute most to the dehumanization.

There is no doubt that folk tales are alluring, not only for children but for adults as well. Their imaginative conception of other worlds in which repressed dreams, needs and wishes might be fulfilled has long since motivated the common people to transmit and cultivate the tales in an oral tradition. As Johannes Merkel and Dieter Richter have shown, folk tales were often censored and outlawed during the early phase of the bourgeoisie's rise to power because their imaginative components which encouraged imaginative play and free exploration wee hostile to capitalist rationalization and the

12. Cf. Lee, *Sex Differences*, pp. 15-22.

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Protestant ethos.[13] Once the bourgeoisie's power was firmly established, the tales were no longer considered immoral and dangerous, but their publication and distribution for children were actually encouraged toward the end of the 19th century. The tales took on a compensatory function for children and adults alike who experienced *nothing but the frustration of their imagination in society. Within the framework of a* capitalist socio-economic system the tales became a safety valve for adults and children and acted to pacify the discontents. Like other forms of fantastic literature—and it is significant that science fiction rises also at the end of the 19th century—the tales no longer served their original purpose of clarifying social and natural phenomena but became forms of refuge and escape in that they made up for what people could not realize in society. This does not mean that the radical content of the imaginative symbols in folk tales and other forms of fantastic literature have been completely distilled. As Herbert Marcuse has suggested, "the truth value of imagination relates not only to the past but also to the future: the forms of freedom and happiness which it invokes claim to deliver the historical *reality*. In its refusal to accept as final the limitations imposed upon freedom and happiness by the reality principle, in its refusal to forgetwhat *can be*, lies the critica function of phantasy."[14] Still, the question remains as to how to make the artistic forms conceived by the imagination operative *in society*.

Bettelheim's book discusses the use of the folk tale to compensate for social repression. But folk tales and other fantastic literature can be used to suggest ways to *realize* greater pleasure and freedom in society. Take Oscar Wilde's literary fairy tale *The Selfish Giant* as an example. The plot is simple. It involves a giant who chases children out of his garden, erects a wall, and puts up a sign "Trespassers will be Prosecuted." Because he does this, spring and summer refuse to come to his garden anymore, and he suffers from cold and loneliness. One day he notices through his window that the children had crept through a hole in the wall and had climbed up a tree. In that part of the garden inhabited by the children it suddenly turns spring, and the giant realizes how selfish he has been. After that he opens up his garden to all the children and learns to share in their happiness. Because of this he attains heaven upon his death. The language and symbols of the tale are such that it is probably comprehensible for children of all sexes, races, and backgrounds. The major theme involves collectivity versus individualism and the struggle over private property. The children ban together and represent a principle of sharing and joy while the giant obviously represents arbitrary power and greed. Naturally it is possible to talk about the story in psychoanalytic terms: the fear of sexuality and parents, the id learning that there is a deeper pleasure to be attained by curbing its drive and participating in reality according to strictures of the superego. However, the message amounts to the same on an ideological and psychological level: the necessity for collective action and participation to attain pleasure. Wilde's tale is a valid critique of a society based on private property, a society which shuns children, and it provides hope that, if children stick together and use their initiative (*Hansel and Gretel* says this, too), they can convince their oppressors to change their ways. The children find a way into the giant's garden and show him the light so to speak, and the process of overcoming his greed is depicted not as anihilation but a movement toward collective action.

There are numerous folk tales (*The Bremer Town Musicians, How Six Travelled*

13. *Märchen, Phantasie und soziales Lernen* (Berlin, 1974).
14. *Eros and Civilization* (New York, 1962), p. 135.

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Through the World) and literary fairy tales which suggest means by which children can implement their imagination to promote collective action. I am not suggesting that it is only fantastic literature of this sort which should be used with children. In contrast to Bettelheim, I would argue that it is culturaly repressive to dictate what forms of ltierature or types of tales are best suited for aiding a child's development. Folk tales, after all, were never conceived as tales for children, and there was never a special children's literature or culture until the late middle ages. Even now this distinction is somewhat arbitrary since children are exposed to all forms of art through the mass media, commerical outlets, and institutions of socialization. Bettelheim's argument is apparently an argument for fantastic literature over realistic literature as the best mode for solving a child's inner problems. But, once we realize that literature in and by itself does not work automaticaly to solve psychological problems, that realistic literature is not inherently repressive, and that the evaluation of literature cannot be discussed without considering its production and reception, we draw nearer to a more sober approach to the use of folk and fairy tales for children.[15]

The specific usage of folk and fairy tales ultimately depends on the production and reception of the literature which is closely bound to the needs of the commodity market. Obviously, in American society it is near to impossible to control the Walt Disney industry and other conglomerates which mainly aim at making profit from the imagination of children and adults. Educators interested in using fantastic or realistic literature to aid children in developing critical and imaginative capacities must first seek to alter the social organization of culture and work that is presently preventing self-realization and causing the disintegration of the individual. One cannot talk about the wounded child's psyche without talking about a social praxis which is geared toward ending the unfair speculation with lives that our socio-economic system endorses. Cultural work with children must begin from a critical perspective of the production and market conditions of literature, and this involves using fantastic and realistic literature to make children aware of their potentialities and also aware of the social contradictions which will frustrate their full development. Any other approach will lead to illusions and lies. Thus, a concrete humanitarian engagement in behalf of children means utilizing the existing literature of all kinds while also creating new, more meancipatory forms so that the fallacies and merits of th literature become apparent as well as the fallacies and merits of society. There is no need to resort to methods of censorship or enchantment as Bettelheim does. But there is a need to develop effective means of enlightenment so that the repressed dreams, wishes, and needs of children and adults alike can be realized in a mutually beneficial way in the fight against what Freud called "cultural privation."

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15. One could perhaps talk about certain interesting experiments which have been undertaken in West Germany: the rewriting of folk tales from a socialist perspective, the conceiving of contemporary fairy tales written by adults and children which expose social contradictions and oppression, the active telling of folk and fairy tales which allow for a critical dialectical relationship between adults and children as the tale is told and interpreted. Such radical use of folk and fairy tales is significant in that it demonstrates ways in which the imagination can be used to operate in society so that children and adults gain a greater sense of forces acting upon them and begin relating in non-repressive ways around cultural worl. Cf. my article "Down with Heidi, Down with Struwwelpeter, Three Cheers for the Revolution: Towards a New Socialist Children's Literature in West Germany," *Children's Literature,* 5 (1976), pp. 162-179.

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Antonio Gramsci, *Quaderni del Carcere. Edizione Critica a cura di Valentino Gerratana.* 4 volumes. Turin: Einaudi, 1975. lxvii plus 3369 pages.

After Antonio Gramsci's death (27 April 1937) his *Prison Notebooks* were smuggled out of Italy and sent to Palmiro Togliatti in Moscow. At the end of May 1937 Togliatti wrote to Piero Sraffa, one of the last people to see Gramsci alive, in these terms: "...please let me know with precision what instructions Antonio left for the eventual publication of his writings. I mean in the first place the writings in prison, but also the earlier writings...I haven't the slightest, even approximate idea of what is in them or what they are about. Are they in a form which will allow us to publish them within a relatively brief period? The editing of Antonio's literary and political legacy is too important a matter to be left to the hazard of chance...encounters..."[1] Yet, probably for political reasons, the first volume of the Einaudi edition of Gramsci's prison writings was not published until 1947, and this was an unbalanced collection of his letters. By 1951, in a sort of helter skelter compensation for such tardiness, the six volumes of the Einaudi edition of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* had all appeared. It is the Einaudi edition with which we have had to work until this critical edition. The PCI chose what parts of Gramsci to publish in what were after all selections from his notebooks, when to publish them, in what order to publish them, and when to supplement the volumes with further crucial small items of evidence which added nuances to what was available.

With the appearance of each volume the debate about the meaning of Gramsci's theory became more savage.[2] Basicaly there were two sides to this debate: the exponents of the PCI orthodoxy which maintained that Gramsci was a Leninist and their non-party opponents of Left and Right who maintained that Gramsci in some way or another had created a "Crocian-Marxism," which, purged of its subtleties, really argued that Gramsci was a "humanist" Marxist.[3] Without doubt the PCI orthodoxy had the best of the debate until 1967 because the party, which had political as well as theoretical reasons for the innovations and supplements it made, naturally had the advantage where it counted most, with the facts, over its opponents who had to wait for the crumbs to fall from the table. The proponents of the view that Gramsci was humanist in the Crocian and Hegelian tradition were not slow in recognising that PCI control of the documents was their Achilles heel and quickly began to criticise the PCI for the lacunae in their editions of Gramsci's writings. When C. Salinari and M. Spinella produced their *Antologia popolare degli scritti e delle lettere* (Riuniti, Rome 1957), G. Scalia wrote a devastating review on this "Popular reduction of an official Gramsci"[4] which emphasized that really little could be said either way until better and less blatantly selected evidence was available. His was only one of a series of exchanges which involved accusations of fabricating evidence or of misuse of evidence. It became clearer and clearer in the sixties that a new complete edition of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* would have to be published, if Gramscian scholarship was to get past the

1. P. Spriano, "Gli ultimi anni di Gramsci in un colloquio con Piero Sraffa," *Rinascita*, April 4, 1967.

2. See A. Davidson, "The Varying Seasons of Gramscian Studies," *Political Studies*, XX:4, (December 1972), *passim*.

3. See E. Agazzi, "Praxis ed empirismo," *Passato e Presente*, 3 (May-June, 1958), p. 305.

4. G. Scalia, "Una riduzione 'popolare' di un Gramsci ufficiale," *Passato e Presente*, I (January-February, 1958) and 2 (March-April, 1958).

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marsh of viciousness into which it had sunk. Finally, for a combination of political and ideological reasons, Valentino Gerratana was commissioned by the communists to edit the Critical Edition of the *Prison Notebooks*. Gerratana wrote in 1967: "It can be said that a critical edition fulfills its purpose if it offers not so much an interpretation as a necessary philological support which is essential to a correct and reliable interpretation."[5] Since that date we have seen occasional tantalizing extracts from the complete work published, but only now ten years later does this admittedly magnificent Critical Edition finally make review columns in an English-language journal.

From the scholarly point of view it is a triumph of labor. The three and a half thousand pages are divided into four volumes, the fourth of which contains the critical paraphernalia proper and is 1004 pages long. Since this is comrade Gerratana's volume, I will deal with it first. It is mind boggling in its scope and erudition. The volume not only describes the exercise books, supplies exhaustive notes to the text, tracing practically every reference Gramsci made to people or works, but also contains an excellent index and a table of correspondences within the critical edition and to the earlier Einaudi edition as well as a list of the books Gramsci read and other tables. This allows the reader to work out what was left in and what was left out and how the reordering of the complex of notes was made. To make a detailed check of the information in the notes to the text would take another ten years, but no obvious faults have been spotted by the reviewer who feels it would be churlish to deny our plaudits to Gerratana, who makes clear again that much of the best sholarship in Italy is Communist.

Gerratana also wrote a useful introduction to the first three volumes which contain Gramsci's notes. In this he makes clear his method and generally tries to demystify the legendary Gramsci. Through his astute awareness of the legendary Gramsci he is able to avoid the pitfalls of making too much of notebooks or writing his own interpretation into the critical edition. He also comes to terms with the realities of the debate on Gramsci which have already been described. While the order of grouping in the Einaudi edition "seemed authorised" by Gramsci's own attempts to order his notes (after reading the critical edition I agree) "...the limits and inconvenience of this ordering could not but come to light when people started to study Gramsci's work more deeply." The order of the Einaudi edition was a "possible choice" but not in fact the choice made by Gramsci. Much more tentative aproaches would have to be made to Gramsci's notebooks.

The notes are reproduced in their entirety in Gerratana's edition with the exception of four exercise books of translations, extracts from which are produced in an appendix and whose contents are minutely detailed in the fourth volume. The notes proceed chronologically. Thus we have in Volume I, notes from 1929-1932 (notebooks 1-5), in Volume II, notes from 1930-1933 (notebooks 6-11) and in Volume III, notes from 1932–1935 (notebooks 12-29). Since one of the problems of interpretation is posed by the fact that Gramsci deleted large sections of his notes and then sometimes rewrote them elsewhere, the deleted sections are indicated by being printed in small type (and a correspondence for their later appearance given). Together they reconfirm the enormous richness of Gramsci's thought. The problem is, however, whether they allow us to reach the greater understanding, or the new look, that Gerratana hoped for.

5. V. Gerratana, "Sulla preparazione di un edizione critica dei 'Quaderni del carcere'," in *Gramsci e la Cultura Contemporanea* (Rome, 1970), II, p. 456.

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Provisionally, the answer must be affirmative. Provisionally, because a review prepared in two months cannot really do justice to such a plethora of riches, even to the extent of comparing the originals with the extracts in the Einaudi edition, or to following up the transformations in the transcriptions (it should be noted in fairness to the Einaudi edition, that very little seems to have been left out of the earlier "uncritical" edition), and provisionally because of the frequent caveats made by Gramsci himself at the beginning of several extended notes, usually in words like these: "the notes contained in this notebook, as in the others, were written as the pen flowed on—as rapid promemorias. They are all to be revised and checked minutely, because they certainly contain errors, false connections (*accostamenti*), and anachronisms. Having been written without having the books referred to at hand, it is possible that after checking, they might have to be radically corrected because precisely the opposite of what has been written proves correct" (II, p. 1365). But, even given these caveats we must take a new look, all the same, because we can now see the progress of his thought, and reorder the content and the volumes of the Einaudi edition in significant ways.

In a preliminary reading, the following Gramsci emerges. He most certainly started by reading all sorts of books to keep himself occupied in prison—the first volume is full of excerpts rightly under the heading "Miscellanea." However, even by 1931 he had started to make drafts of his views which are quite as deliberate as, say, the 1844 Manuscripts of Marx. While he urges caution with such drafts, both directly and indirectly, and they must be read with caution, the fact is that they exist on certain subjects, and on some more than others and in a certain order. This we could not really have known from the earlier edition. The position of those authors who have argued that Gramsci's notes were really too much of a hodge-podge or grab-bag of ideas to be much use compared with his earlier political writings has become much weaker. In broad outline Gramsci's theme unfolds in this way: Very early on the continuity of concerns with the *Southern Question* emerges in notes and comments on the role of intellectuals in the maintenance of the *problema del mezzogiorno*. As early as I, p. 37 he has defined the intellectuals as "...in general the whole social mass which exercises organizing functions in the wide sense, both in the field of production and in the field of culture and in the field of administration and politics..." And only four pages later he already writes: "The historico-political criterion on which I must found my own research is this: that a class is dominant in two modes, that is, leading (*dirigente*) and dominant (*dominante*). It is leading for allied classes, and 'dominant' over adversary classes. Thus even before coming to power a class can be leading (and must be)...There can and must be a 'political hegemony' even before coming to power and it is not necessary to count only on the power and material force that it (government) gives, to exercise 'leadership' or political hegemony."

So, from the outset Gramsci's concerns are clear. More and more threads then come into these concerns with the relationship between hegemonic control and its organizers: in particular a concern with the function in history of intellectuals from Machiavelli to Benedetto Croce. He argues by pp. 57-9 that the classical mode of rule of representative state (parliamentary government since 1870 and due to imperialism [III, 1567]) is consensual but with that consensus "organized." In terms reminiscent of the columns of *l'Ordine Nuovo* of 1919-1920, he remarks, moreover, that this mode of rule tends to collapse at moments of crisis. His criticisms of those who insist on "the military model" in politics is explicit (I, p. 121) but, in their terms, he starts to distinguish between a "war of position" and a "war of movement" as two different

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political strategies.

Gramsci states categorically in 1930 that there is no such thing as spontaneity and that to formulate the basic problems of socialist revolution in terms of the duality spontaneity-consciousness is inadequate. Rather, spontaneity is really "popular wisdom" (*senso comune*), against which view of the world can be observed more elaborate and systematic views which seek to educate it, as the *ordinovisti* had done. (I, p. 330) The "ideas of the ruling class" which are dominant, consist of an elaboration and deviation of "popular wisdom" through multiple institutions like the Church school and press into consensus. Against this system of "trenches" a massive socialist ideological labor would have to be counterposed starting with "an exact awareness of the field to be emptied of its human mass element" (I, p. 333). Gramsci infers that the prime point to be grasped is that all citizens are part of the State (I, p. 340) in one sense, and this is the result of no deceit since our ideologies of commitment have real bases in reality. Thus a fight against dominant ideologies has simultaneously to be a fight against the reality on which they are based and from which they emerge.

These "practical" concerns lead him on to his first extensive theoretical notes, (probably in 1931) in which ask the theoretical question—or "philosophical" question since for Gramsci Marxism is a philosophy—: what are the implications for Marxism of the coexistence of the two modes of capitalist rule: force and consensus? It is important to note that he entitled these notes "Notes on Philosophy I;" that they were mostly deleted and written in later notebooks and that all the substantial long pieces of argument in the notebooks after 1930, are "Notes on Philosophy II," "Notes on Philosophy III," "The philosophy of Benedetto Croce," and "Introduction to the Study of Philosophy." The extended entries on the Risorgimento, on the intellectuals, and on the nature of the party in history, are much briefer and do not recur. We cannot avoid thinking that Gramsci was writing theory quite deliberately and that his ideas had gone beyond the "practical state," in his notebooks. This emphasis on philosophy casts serious doubts on the PCI belief that what is all-important in his notes are those on the party through which all the others should be read.[6] It suggests rather that the all-important Gramsci is in *Materialismo storico* which contains the "theoretical" notes.

In this first set of philosophical ruminatons Gramsci emphasizes the centrality of the theses on Feuerbach for Marxism. The emphasis implies a critique of the degenerate Marxism of the Second International period with its economic determinist and "scientistic" emphasis and its fatalism. Gramsci affirms quite directly that "sciences" belong in the superstructure and thus cannot provide a basis for historical materialism, which must rather contain its own philosophy (I, p. 430). In Gramsci, Marxism is not a science in the positivist sense. But neither is it a theory of Man, or human nature (*ibid*). Marxism cannot therefore be reduced to an "essential part" then to be found in other philosophies, even if Hegelianism is the most important "originating" system. Marx is a "historicist." What, however is to be understood by this? Certainly not the reduction of Gramsci made by Louis Althusser. Gramsci makes clear in an analysis of the exact meaning of structure and superstructure in Marx that these can only be understood as determining and determined in one and the same instance: "There are superstructures which have a 'material structure;' but their character remains that of superstructures; their development is not 'immanent' in their particular 'material structure' but in the 'material structure' of society" (I, p.

6. See G. Amendola, "Rileggendo Gramsci," *Quaderni di Critica Marxista*, 3.

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433). And in lines reminiscent of the "always already given whole" he writes: "Logically and even chronologically we have: social structure-superstructure-material structure of the superstructure" (I, p. 434). These views are further developed and clarified in later drafts.

It is only because Gramsci sees Marxism's social object as a "structured whole" that he can stress that in Marxism ideologies are an "objective an operating reality" and not to be treated as epiphenomena of the structure: they are like skin and skeleton. How did Marxism think that relationship? Obviously it had to use the old terminology: "When we pass from one conception to another, the preceding language remains" (I, p. 438). This had to be taken into account when reading Marx but despite his terminology Marx obviously did not think in terms of a "last cause" like the "instrument of labor" (I, p. 441) or "matter." Rather his object was the "human relation" of specific historical periods. Even the material forces of production could only be understood in activity as dominated by men. The relationship between structure and superstructure is mediated by practices. Marxism is a philosophy of the "impure, that is real..." act (I, p. 455). What is this practice relating "social being and consciousness" in its specific determinations? To answer this question Gramsci breaks Marxism as historical materialism down into three levels. 1) First, there is the level of "social forces tightly tied to the structure," the level of the material forces of production and their consequent class formations. Contradictions here provide the possibilities in the second level. 2) This is the level of politics and ideologies. In this level we find consciousness of both a primitive sort based on common professional economic interests and class consciousness of an economic and political sort. We also find the "political" consciousness that corporative interests transcend those of ones own class and should become the interests of other subordinate classes. Only with the transition to this "political" consciousness do we pass from structure to superstructure. 3) The third level is that of the relationship of military forces which is decisive in deciding whether a new social order will be ushered in. However, this third level should not be considered too one-sidedly. Rather, it involved disaffecting the military forces of the dominant class as much as assaulting them, and was often "politico-military."

From this scheme Gramsci infers that the making of an ideology takes place in the transition from "structure" to superstructure, that is, within the realm of ideology, and the defeat of existing ideology comes through the elaboration of a new one. The question is: how do people move from crude self-interest to that of collective social consciousness? The answer depended on what ideology is for Gramsci. He starts from the status he accords to science. Science does not prove "the objectivity of the real" but studies regularities, coordinations and causalities to reach the most economic description of reality. It is thus no more than what all men can agree upon, given their observation of the scientific conditons of ascertaining these matters. In sum, science is man-made, constituted by its specific practices and, as he develops the notion in a later draft, no more than the "universal subjective" (I, p. 473), II, p. 1048). It is an ideology, but on the other hand it is also the sum of its "practico-experimental activity." Thus ideology for Gramsci equals a specific set of practices which are in no sense deliberate. Thus the ideologies which exist in society are thought of by Gramsci as the specific structure of the practices of this or that group. Political ideologies are the complex organizational and connective practices of society: their order in two realms of civil society and the State. Particularly important are the organization of education and leadership.

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These first notes were deleted by Gramsci and transcribed into later notebooks in the second and third series and the other notes on philosophy. I have not found any revisions in volumes II or III of the Critical Edition. On the other hand, in the second volume of the Critical edition containing notes to 1933, the proportion devoted to elaborating on the theme in the first notes on philosophy is overwhelming, although Gramsci was still collecting material and there is much "miscellanea." By this stage even the "miscellanea" seems to have an order. In these he makes clear that his object is always political, that is, that the recognition of the modalities of hegemony does not mean that nothing is to be done (II, p. 762). Rather, there are always two hegemonies contesting the issue. This does not lead him to an overemphasis on leadership (II, p. 796). Instead, with the recognition that the war of movement is over for the West, the virtues he calls for are patience and the spirit of inventiveness (II, p. 802). In this circumstance the problem is to know how "to go to the people," how, "to educate the educator," that is how to free the will so that it can work for certain ends (II, p. 855).

"The scientific basis for a morality of historical materialism is to be sought, it seems to me, in the affirmation that society does not set itself tasks to solve for which there do not already exist the conditions for the solution" (II, p. 855 (paraphrased from the *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*). Thus while men might exist only as a series, as individuals living for themselves, in the world of work there exists the potential of "collective man" which cannot, however, be aroused by a "hero-figure" (II, p. 862). Gramsci already had quite firmly established that "popular wisdom" was historically necessary and in no way arbitrary, but, as we have seen, the real organization of life in its thought form.

Returning to history or practice to solve the riddle of how "to go to the people" Gramsci first works out how the existing hegemony is organized, again referring in particular to Croce whom he regards as the key figure in Italy after the Pope, because his views are so widespread. He also looks at the Renaissance and the Reformation. Obviously the world views apparently dispensed by elites cannot be explained detached from the great masses whom they educate in some structured way. For example, the transition from Renaissance to Reformation and in particular the cult of humanism seem to Gramsci to show the importance of the elaboration of two languages or cultures, one for the elite and the other for the masses. This segregation fixes Italy in its most backward economic corporative stage between feudalism and capitalism. *Per contra* he sees Machiavelli as the key figure of a man reuniting understanding and feeling through use of the vulgar tongue. The *Prince* is an appeal to the rising class of the bourgeoisie to take power through the alliance with the peasantry (II, p. 953).

From this historical observation Gramsci concludes that the separated theory and practice must be reunited because the separation is what maintains bourgeois hegemony today. The starting point for this task, as he points out in his third series of notes on philosophy, must be the implicit theory in the working class practice which is more important than that which inherits from the past as "popular wisdom." The task involves starting a historical process which is not without its ups and downs as it goes through the various stages of distinction, detachment and independence from the ruling hegemony. Eventually, this progress will lead to self-consciousness, which presumably corresponds with the third stage in the second level discussed in the first notes on philosophy (see above p. 7). "Self-consciousness means historically the creation of a vanguard of intellectuals: a mass does not distinguish itself or become independent without organizing itself, and there is no organization without

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intellectuals, that is, without organizers and leaders" (II, p. 1042). This organization can only be in a party, which will seek initially to break the basis of the rival hegemony through "...reorganizing the structure and real relations between men and the economic world or world of production" (II, p. 1053).

This proposition is particularly important, (and difficult to discern in the earlier Einaudi edition,) since it makes clear the continuity from the political Gramsci of 1919-27 to the theoretical Gramsci of 1929-35. By way of personal self-criticism it is important to note here that the "Crocian-Marxist" thesis apparently vindicated by the emphasis on self-consciousness in notes on philosophy does not hold. The way to bourgeois hegemony proceeds by a separation of theory and practice and thus through the didactic institutions which in their concrete organizations (complex of practices) achieved this separation: Church, school, media, etc. But the way back to a reunification of theory and practice does not mirror the bourgeois form, replacing it with different content. Rather it has a different form. It is in changing the world consciously that men may know it. Any cultural plan must therefore conform to the real changes in the world of production and not precede them. To believe that intellectual work is a form of revolutionary practice is idealism (II, p. 106). The philosophy of an epoch is never an individual matter but a combination in a specific structure of all individual philosophies plus religion plus popular wisdom. In no way does this emphasis on "revolutionary practice" by Gramsci mean an endorsement of the "race to practice" condemned by Schelling: "popular wisdom" and bourgeois hegemony rests on the mode of proof by the rush to practice. Croce was the living example of "popular wisdom writ large" (II, p. 1216, p. 1400). Rather, with each succeeding phase of the change in the real conditions of life a more elaborate socialist understanding would be produced "...reality in movement and the concept of the reality...must be conceived of historicaly as an inseparable unity" (II, p. 1241).

As if foreseeing that one of his critics would assert, at least initially, that theory should be relative autonomous of such murk as practice, Gramsci wrote: "Frenchmen do not have dialectical or concretely revolutionary mentalities even when they operate as revolutionaries; their intention is always conservative because their intention is to give perfect and stable form to the innovations they are making. While innovating they are already thinking of conserving, of embalming the innovation in a code" (II, p. 1257).

This edition does not enable us to take a new look at Gramsci in the way originally intended: as a resolution to the Leninist v. Crocian Gramsci debate. The structuralist Marxist (structuralists for convenience sake—I know nobody admits to the denomination) led by Louis Althusser finally convinced reluctant "Marxist" diehards that Gramsci was an idealist in theory after all. Thus the thesis that he was a "Leninist," in its various formulations, was quietly laid to rest several years ago, even for the left. Significantly, the well-argued and researched cases of the Italians who argued for the interpretation that Gramsci was an idealist because a humanist were disregarded in favor of an ill-informed French version which ignored its own methodological canons in reading Gramsci, especially those which argued that the reading should cobine the presences with the absences. Perhaps the poverty of the official French Communist translation of Gramsci partly explained the straw-man which his French critics set up to demolish. Gramsci was, however, even in Althusser's original critique, accorded a position of being something more than the arch-humanists like Lukács and the unmentionable Sartre (indeed, the latter went

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unmentioned). The Italian Marxist was regarded as a good Marxist in practice but someone who did not really go far enough in theory and thus *malgre lui* slipped into the error of denying the autonomy of philosophy or the Theory of theoretical practice. This review cannot dwell too much on the effect of this Critical Edition on the structuralist school, which, in any case started to reinstate Gramsci somewhat when it started writing on the State,[7] thus acknowledging that the maitre had made somewhat hasty judgments in his reading of what was explicit in Gramsci. But it needs to be intimated here that Gramsci may well have gone beyond the structuralists. Already we have suggested that Gramsci was not guilty of adopting a theory of human nature. It can also be argued on the basis of this Critical Edition the most of the concepts so dear to the structuralists down to an analysis of language and use of terms like conjuncture are in his work. It may be cavalier of Althusser and Maurice Godelier to suggest that Gramsci had thought up their whole system before they did and rejected it for its "conservative qualities," but this edition at least half suggests that this is so.

The problem with the "Frenchmen" as Gramsci pointed out, and an Ranciere has done in his recent *Leçon d'Althusser*, is that in not thinking their practices politically, but positivistically, they fall into idealist and reactionary positions. As Gramsci points out, it is not a matter of establishing the autonomy of Marxism as a theoretical practice or as something quite distinct from the intellectual biography of the author and thus incapable of being reduced to the history of philosophy (II, p. 1273) but rather that the formulations produced by one set of complex practices working on their structured object, must be critical and polemical and not "scientific" if they are to be revolutionary (II, p. 1286). By definition the "scientific" product must therefore by thought as a weapon against what in its own definition are the "ideological" prime materials with which it worked. Ranciere has shown us already that the internal mechanism of Althusser's Marxism is such that this cannot be done. The "structuralists" seem to be caught with the problem of answering this assertion: "An intellectual prejudice is to measure historical and political movements by the rod of intellectualism, originality, genius, that is by the complete literary expression and by great brilliant people and not by historical necessity and political science, that is the concrete and actual capacity to make the means conform to the end" (II, p. 1301).

If Gramsci ends up arguing that philosophy must be the history of philosophy and so on (II, p. 1378), this is not because of a residual idealism in his work but because the meaning of a philosophy is to be established politicaly, perhaps even by observing the political practice of its authors or subscribers. Indeed Marxism must be a criticism of the philosophy of intellectuals, especially gifted individuals, since intellectual philosophy marks precisely the apogee of popular wisdom. Gramsci concludes "methodical anti-historicism is nothing but metaphysics" (II, p. 1417). His choice in favor of what the structuralists regard as idealist error seems to be a political choice in favor of creating the Modern Prince because "God Professors" and intellectual hubris are precisely the obverse of 'senso comune.'

Alastair Davidson

7. The most notable recent "revision," after Althusser and Poulantzas is C. Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci et l'Etat* (Fayard, Paris, 1975).

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Santiago Carrillo, *Dialogue on Spain*. With Regis Debray and Max Gallo. Translated from the French by A.M. Elliott. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976. 222 pages.

By the time this review appears, Spain will have held its first popular national elections since 1936—after four politically brutal decades of fascist dictatorship and less than two years after Franco's death. There is much talk of an emergent "new Spain," economically maturing and on the verge of democratization, rising out of the darkness of traditionalism and isolation and prepared once again to assume its rightful place in the European community of nations. The very *fact* of the elections, in the context of a turbulent Spain and a rapidly-changing political landscape over the entire Mediterranean region, carries an historical importance far beyond the casual outcome of the balloting. For, no matter how much the Juan Carlos-Adolfo Suarez regime wants to carry out its "liberalization" and social reforms within the existing power structure and class relations, the elections will inevitably give new expression to a whole range of political forces that have barely survived a harsh underground existence since the end of the Civil War. Among the most pivotal of these oppositional forces is the recently-legalized Communist Party (PCE), which may find itself in a position to determine how far a *ruptura* with Francoist institutions can ultimately go. Though much smaller than the French and Italian Communist parties, the PCE will play a central role in post-Franco Spainish politics for several reasons: its experienced leadership and durable organization that has survived decades of repression; its hegemonic position within the labor movement; a mystique stemming from the Civil War and underground struggle; and its more recent identification with Euro-communism. The historical value of Santiago Carrillo's *Dialogue on Spain* is that it furnishes a clear picture of the PCE's long-term political strategy and a glimpse of its leader's political style—despite a theoretical shallowness and an annoying ambiguity on certain questions.[1]

What is the context of PCE politics today? Above all, there is now undeniable evidence that the fascist system constructed by Franco has been eroding for some time, and that this dynamic has accelerated since the Generalissimo's death in 1975. On one level, the authoritarian (or "Prussian) model of industrialization adopted by Spain has generated an entirely new economic infrastructure and an expanded urban, secularized culture that can no longer be contained by the old forms. As the Spanish bourgeoisie looks for new space to maneuvre, certain important traditional groups (the Falange, landholders, the Church) that propped up the Franco regime have suffered decline and are now in disarray; the Prussian model has brought into being social forces that will ultimately lead to its own unraveling. The dominant interests in Spain today seek "modernity" and respectability on European terms—one crucial measure of which would be membership in NATO and the Common Market. On yet another level, popular movements of resistance have grown remarkably in the last

1. The volume originally appeared in 1974 under the title *Demain l'Espagne* (Paris), the culmination of a series of interviews with Carrillo initiated by Debray and Gallo. In the preface, Carrillo, who since 1939 has resided mainly in Paris, mentions that he agreed to the interviews very reluctantly, having been won over by the personal enthusiasm and political vitality of the two men. Whatever the case, this is one of the rare interviews with the PCE general secretary. Sharp political differences produce some lively exchanges, the result being a more personal and less rhetorical statement than one normally finds in the standard CP literature. While the book does include Carrillo's reminiscences of Franco, the Civil War, and the early days of the PCE, this review will focus on questions of strategy.

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several years, to the degree that repression no longer seems to be an effective means for preserving the authoritarian state. The upsurge of strikes, demonstrations, and violent street battles is not receding. Opposition parties, including the PCE and the Socialists' Workers' Party, are gaining popular support; the previously-illegal Workers' Commissions, which emerged as a challenge to the state-controlled *sindacato*, have become the largest proletarian organizations in the country; the various movements for national autonomy (especially the Basques) have renewed their assault on centrism; and the intellectual and cultural life of Spain, long dormant, is experiencing a dramatic revival.[2]

Francoism is thus under siege from above and from below; the system is facing an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy, with the old-guard *franquistas* in fearful but not yet humiliated retreat. The Juan Carlos monarchy has had little choice but to streamline and "liberalize" the outmoded repressive structures lest they precipitate greater economic crises and broader political radicalization. This is the thankless and delicate mission assigned to Premier Suarez: hence the electoral reforms, the legalization of opposition forces with the exception of those to the left of the PCE, the amnesties, the relaxation of press censorship, etc. The Suarez regime wants to facilitate change, but only of the sort that can be managed and manipulated by a ruling stratum committed to retaining the old order in new trappings. In "Europeanizing" Spain, it seeks to give the Prussian model a "liberal" image that would bring it respectability, open up new channels of participation, and blunt the edges of popular discontent. Both Juan Carlos and Suarez are too intimately tied to the past, too stepped in the bureaucratic culture of authoritarian politics, to ever preside over a genuine process of democratization. Yet their attempt to manipulate change will inevitably run into obstacles. "Democratization" could easily get out of hand, perhaps either deepening mass involvement to the extent that the monarchy and fascist institutions are completely overthrown or (more likely) provoking a Chilean-style reaction by the extreme right. Even with the erosion of traditional forces and the partial dismemberment of Franco's old *movimento*, the right maintains an entrenched position in the army, the national police apparatus, and the state bureaucracy.[3] A number of independent commando groups also exist. Each move toward liberalization incenses and mobilizes the fascist sectors. For several months preceding the elections Spain has witnessed increasing rightist terrorism on the part of groups like the Warriors of Christ the King and the Apostolic Anti-Communist Alliance. The right was particularly angered by the legalization of the PCE—several members of the Cortes (Franco's old "parliament") resigned, Navy minister Pita da Viega quit his post, the country's 18 miliatary commanders petitioned against the move, and other government resignations were threatened. There have even been vague rumblings of a *coup*. Meanwhile, the path toward liberalization has been strewn

2. Recent oppositional developments are analyzed by Temma Kaplan in "Turmoil in Spain: the Communist Party and the Mass Movement," *Radical America* (March-April, 1977). For a more general, but somewhat more dated, treatment of anti-Franco movements, see Ronald Fraser, "Spain on the Brink," *New Left Review* (March-April, 1976). On the recent intellectual and cultural ferment, see Jose E. Rodriguez-Ibanez, "The Cultural Thaw in Spain," *Telos*, 30 (Winter 1976-77).

3. It is important to remember that the Spanish army, nearly 300,000 strong, is more powerful and has a more unified and dedicated rightist leadership than either the Chilean or Portuguese army, for example. The military was always close to Franco. There are few senior officers in the Spanish army today who did not fight in the Civil War.

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with even more corpses as government repression of the left has actually intensified at the very moment a new era of political "toleration" was being proclaimed.

Whether reforms of the political sphere alone can retard this polarization of social forces and stabilize the system is doubtful, given the severe difficulties of Spanish capitalism and the decline of traditional ideological hegemony. If the project of modernizing and democratizing the old structures does in fact succeed, it will probably depend in great measure upon the moderating and collaborative role of the PCE, which has been industriously building an image of pragmatic restraint, respect for tradition, and organizational efficiency that is the defining character of all Eurocommunist parties. Whereas the revolutionary left in Spain (notably the various Maoist and Trotskyist groups) is immobilized by splintering the fragmentation, the PCE has structural cohesion and a sense of direction. After long years of underground struggle, the party leadership is still intact; 34 of the 35 Executive Committee members have been in Spain preparing strategy and tactics during the past two years (the exception being "*La Pasionara*," Dolores Ibarurri, who has lived in Moscow.) With the exception of a brief period of detention last December, Carrillo himself has been free to move about and do political work in Madrid. The PCE has strengthened its presence in the working class mainly through its powerful role in the Workers' Commissions, which in some areas (especially Catalonia) have already developed contractual bargaining relationships with management. Rapid expansion of the industrial workforce will further reinforce the party's status in Spanish politics—and make it indispensable to the stability of any future regime. Predictably, PCE membership has grown after Franco's death, once it became clear the regime had little choice but to legalize the party: estimates of present strength vary from 90,000 to 300,000 (compared with about 10,000 for the more popular PSOE).[4] Though strategic differences have existed within the leadership, and purges have not been uncommon, the stature of Carrillo and Ibarurri has helped to restrain centrifugal tendencies.[5]

Afte nearly four decades of clandestine activity, the PCE is anxious to abandon its "outlaw" role and pursue change through legal means. The isolation of underground politics took its toll on Spanish Communism, not only physicaly but ideologically: the party became more and more insulated, detached from social reality. Especially in the period before 1956, the PCE's Stalinism was accompanied by a rigid attachment to the Bolshevik model of insurrection and a passive subservience to the CPSU line and to Soviet foreign policy. All of this was overturned, at first gradually and then—in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechslovakia in 1968—quite dramatically. Among CP leaders, Carrillo was one of the most vehemently critical of the Soviet intervention; he was also perhaps the most impatient to jettison the Leninist concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the outmoded vanguardist strategy that went along with it. At the present time, in its move toward pragmatic adaptability, the PCE leadership condemns and avoids all forms of leftism (i.e., insurrectionary movements) as if they were cancerous growths, while clinging uncertainly to what Carrillo refers to as the "spirit of Leninism." The PCE vigorously holds up the banner of

4. These figures do not include membership of the large Catalan CP (the PSUC), which is organizationally autonomous but politically linked to the PCE. Its membership is probably around 60,000.

5. Internal divisions within the PCE are discussed by Fernando Claudin, "The Split in the Spanish C.P.," *New Left Review* (November-December, 1971). Claudin, a veteran of the Civil War and a former member of the PCE Political Bureau, was himself purged by Carrillo in 1965.

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Eurocommunism—meaning, above all, a strategic commitment to a peaceful, electoral road to socialism—which it displayed again during a meeting of PCI, PCF, and PCE delegations in Madrid recently.

What distinguishes the situation of the PCE from that of the PCI and PCF, of course, is that bourgeois political institutions have not yet been created in Spain; the imperatives of anti-fascist struggle still weigh heavily on the Spanish left. This reality permeates almost every exchange in *Dialogue on Spain*. It profoundly shapes the two-state strategy of transition advanced by Carrillo: first destroy the remnants of fascism and secure bourgeois democracy, *then* begin the struggle for socialist transformation. Thus: "The great thing today is to smash the forced integration constituted by fascism. In order to do this, what is needed is a coalition government which will restore liberties. Tomorrow the problem of an advance to socialism will be posed" (p. 15). There is to be no "storming of the Winter Palace." Reflecting the influence of Palmiro Togliatti's theory of "structural reforms," Carrillo stresses a gradual transition from bourgeois democarcy to socialist democracy through a process of "deepening and extending freedom and democracy" (p. 195). This task is made easier by the decomposition of the fascist regime—a stagnation that imperceptibly set in years ago and became more visible following Franco's death. Today, according to Carrillo, the Spanish state is more "complex" and allows for the entry of "diverse currents" (presumably including some, but not all, of the leftist forces). "It is no longer the fascist apparatus of the past. With some retouching, it might almost suit a bourgeois democratic state" (p. 12). In the "democratic" stage, Carrillo foresees a multiparty system fashioned along Western European lines, with universal suffrage, legalized political opposition, right of assembly and demonstration, and freedom of the press. The PCE, as part of a government of "national reconciliation" based upon a broad alliance of parties (similar to the more famous "*compromesso storico*" introduced by the PCE), would press for an overall program aimed at curtailing the power of the monopolies, destroying the landed estates, favoring the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, and implementing a more progressive welfare and tax structure. This would complete the struggle against fascism and lay the foundations for a popular socialist movement

The intermediate struggle to carry out the political side of the bourgeois revolution that Carrillo envisages depends upon a fairly elaborate alliance strategy. Despite its organizational strength, the PCE has only limited mass support and was not expected to win more than 10 percent of the vote in the first national elections (in this respect it closely resembles the Portuguese CP). Carrillo argues that for the party to advance its goals it will have to arrive at a convergence with the dynamic bourgeoisie who see fascism as an "obstacle to the development of modern capitalism in Spain. . . It is this that is bringing about an objective convergence between the revolutionary forces and this sector of Spanish capitalism. They need certain liberties in order to develop their system, to enter Europe, and we need them in order to develop democracy in Spain. It is a question, then, of a momentary convergence, and it is clear that after this stage we are going to diverge" (p. 169). In Catalonia, which is the most industrialized region of Spain, the presence of a strongly class-conscious bourgeoisie alongside a large CP has generated such a frontist convergence—though whether it will be "momentary" remains to be seen. Within the regional Catalan assembly, for example, the PSUC has allied itself with the Christian Democrats and actively pursues the kind of coalition

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policy favored by Carrillo.[6]

For the long run, however, the PCE is presumably looking toward a broad coalition of popular forces that would "radicalize" this process and build anit-fascist struggle into the second stage of "advanced democracy." Carrillo is interested not only in mobilizing significant non-proletarian support for the PCE itself—that is, in building the familiar "multi-class" bloc—but in aligning the party with other "progressive forces: Socialists, Christian Democrats, Nationalists (Basques, Catalans, Galicians), Carlists, etc. Unity would be constructed around a general "democratic platform" that could crystallize the leftist opposition, transform it from an anti-fascist to an anti-*capitalist* movement, and enable it to forcefully enter the political life of the country. The party most indispensable to the success of this strategy is the PSOE, which lacks the large membership of the PCE but has more than twice its popular appeal (polls give the PSOE about 25 percent of the vote). But the very amorphousness of the PSOE, along with the persistance of uncompromising anti-Communist sentiments in its ranks, reduces the immediate prospects for such an alliance. In this respect the Spanish left resembles that of Portugal in 1975-1976: polarization between a small but organizationally-cohesive CP, with deep roots in the working-class movement, and a "catch-all" Socialist Party deeply suspicious of the Communists. Faced with this predicament, the PCP chose to abandon the possibility of alliances; instead, it sought to achieve political hegemony by extending its control over the trade union movement and by colonizing the state apparatus, which in the end backfired.

Even if a PCE-PSOE coalition could be realized, however, new problems would stand in the way of Carrillo's scenario. The preponderant electoral strength of the PSOE would mean a vastly unequal partnership that would sharply restrict the PCE's leverage. No doubt the PCE would have to yield even more of its flexibility (and perhaps autonomy) than the much stronger PCF must do in cementing the Common Program alliance with the socialists in France. (Political conditions in Italy, where the PCI now commands more than one-third of the vote, are still more favorable but infinitely more complicated, since the PCI's very strength has created a bipolar situation in which the Socialists are much less desirable as allies than the Christian Democrats). The PCE may therefore be compelled to turn away from a *national* alliance strategy and commit its resources to local politics, with the aim of building municipal and regional coalitions in areas (for example, Catalonia) where it (or its PSUC affiliate) commands more popular support. This approach has been utilized very effectively by the PCI since the late 1940s—although the PCI had already established a certain national presence during the Resistance. Aside from Catalonia, the PCE has no substantial local base of power. The task of developing such a base will be complicated by the presence of strong national autonomist movements that will probably be antagonistic to the PCE, especially so long as it maintains its present stance of ambiguity toward these movements. (Interestingly, *Dialogue on Spain* reveals nothing about the PCE's relationship to nationality struggles, although the tension between such struggles and the central government in Madrid has grown dramatically in recent years. Beyond Carrillo's mild gesture of "support" for the autonomist groups, there is no analysis of the political situation, no formulation of strategy, and not the vaguest hint of what demands and goals the PCE is willing to help advance).

6. See Fraser, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-7.

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Judging from Carrillo's preoccupations, and from the long history of PCE political practice, the Spanish variant of Eurocommunism has a less frontist definition of alliance strategy than its Italian or French counterparts. The PCE is presently more attuned to movements for popular self-management, to organizing at the point of production (the legacy of anarchism and syndicalism in Spain), and to direct and even violent forms of mass activity. Carrillo does not understand the process of coalition-building as elite manipulation, or as electoral alliances molded strictly for the purpose of winning votes and entering government. The electoral dimension is of course emphasized, but it is only one part of a strategy designed to create a "revolutionary historical bloc" (Gramsci's influence) through diverse modes of political involvement: general strikes, mass demonstrations, neighborhood associations, feminist groups, local proletarian organization. The PCE's greater sensitivity to the dynamics of ongoing political struggles, however, may have less to do with any self-conscious theoretical elaborations than with actual historical conditions: Spain is still fascist, while Italy and France are not. Indeed, as Kaplan notes, the PCE is often forced into taking up direct action politics in the context of state repression and rightist terrorism, as essentialy *defensive* measures.[7] Carrillo's respect for grassroots politics, moreover, is never theoretically or strategically outlined in *Dialogue on Spain*; it appears as a *tactical* adaptation rather than as an integrated conception of socialist democracy that would embody new forms of authority.[8]

What does emerge clearly from these interviews is a passionate attachment to pluralist democracy—understandable after years of fascist authoritarianism, terror, and exile. It is no mere frontist scheme, still less a tactical ploy; it is an obsession. In an earlier book, *A New Look at Present Day Problems* (published in 1968), Carrillo had already begun to question to Leninist formula of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as incompatible with the objectives of socialist democracy. This critique is deepened and given new emphasis in the present volume: without elections, civil liberties, and a multi-party system, socialism is unthinkable. The single-party regime of the Soviet and East European type is rejected on principle. There must be a diversity of political forces, toleration of dissent, and an open confrontation of ideas (pp. 204-5). The formal rights that evolved out of the bourgeois revolution, far from being "meaningless" as some Marxist are prone to argue, must be extended and carried forward under socialism. Though its politics might be more "advanced" than other current in Spain, the PCE must accept its status as one of many parties and be willing to relinquish power if it loses an election—just as in any other parliamentary democracy. Carrillo says that he can "easily imagine a socialist regime governed jointly or even alternatively by Communists, Socialists, and Christians who are in favor of socialism: a socialist state with a plurality of parties" (p. 198).[9] This is simply the other side of the theory of "structural reforms;" to the extent that the state is no longer

7. Kaplan, *op.cit.*, p. 62.

8. Carrillo does praise the Yugoslav system for its commitment to direct democracy and self-management, but he argues that in practice the structures of workers' control have degenerated into a "technocracy" (pp. 202-203).

9. In a recent interview on the role of the PCE in Spain, Carrillo was more explicit: "We are ready to get out if we lose elections—just like any other party. When I speak of democracy I mean Western democracy. I consider universal suffrage to be the criterion. I said this in front of Brezhnev. We don't want power by force. I am a Spaniard, not a Russian. I certainly don't want to be another Franco but it would be impossible for me to be a Lenin. I believe in the ultimate goal of convergence in ideologies. The West must become more socialist but the East must become more democratic." *New York Times*, August 6, 1976.

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viewed as an instrument of class domination, its "neutrality" permits it to be used as an arena for open political contestation and for establishing one or another hegemony—within limits, however, that are never clearly defined.

Carrillo's strategic commitment to pluralism and "democratization" led him to identify closely with the "Prague spring" in 1968 and to break sharply with the CPSU over the Soviet military intervention in Czechslovakia—a break that would permanently transform the PCE's relationship with the USSR. The PCE's outspoken support for the "Czech model" and for political reforms elsewhere in Eastern Europe, its antagonism toward Soviet efforts to achieve firm hegemony over the international Communist movement, and even its openness to *gauchisme* in Western Europe, have the same common motivation: an instinctive hostility to bureaucratic methods of leadership deeply internalized through years of experience with fascism. In Dubcek's liberalization initiatives Carrillo saw the first systematic attempt of any Eastern European regime to implement authentic democratic forms responsive to the masses. And the PCE leadership, which in 1956 had denounced the Hungarian uprising as a "counterrevolutionary outbreak," reacted quickly and angrily in 1968, arguing that the use of military force might destroy the world Communist movement. Carrillo and Dolores Ibarurri, who were in Moscow on the even of the Soviet action, told the CPSU leaders: "If you attack Czechoslovakia, for the first time in the history of our relations we are going to condemn you publicly. It would be better if you helped the Czechoslovak leaders. Let them carry out their experiment" (p. 140). The Soviets tried vigorously to dissuade the two from taking their stand, but in vain.

What Carrillo characterizes as a certain "blind confidence" in the Soviet leadership had actualy begun to erode will before the Czech events, in the early 1960s. He cites three factors—a rigid conception of "peaceful coexistence" that favored great-power politics, Muscovite chauvinism and centralism *vis-à-vis* other parties, and bureaucratization within the USSR itself. Yet, much as Carrillo hammers away at the theme of independence from Moscow, his critique of the Soviet system is amazingly shallow. Thus, while the CPSU leadership has been known to commit "mistakes" and should not necessarily be supported on every policy or action, the Soviet Union has after all "established socialism" and commands the respect and support of all revolutionaries for its unique role in furthering world socialist transformation (pp. 146-7). There are limitations, of course, imposed by the continuation of capitalism on a world scale: "The ruling classes [in Russia] are abolished and the exploited classes are liberated, but while this should signify a liberation of the whole of society and of man, socialism hasn't yet reached that point" (p. 151). Criticism of countries like the USSR, according to Carrillo, should be directed toward enhancing their level of "socialist" development—in other words, any fundamental analysis (Marxist or otherwise) of Soviet Union that reveals the barrenness of its "socialism" can only be the expression of "class enemies." 'Hence any systematic critique will not be found in *Dialogue on Spain*: the origins of bureaucratic centralism, the legacy of Stalinism, the problem of state capitalism would all appear to be taboo as objects of historical analysis. Scathing though many of his attacks are, Carrillo ultimately falls back on the old CP myth that a critical understanding of Communist countries "from afar" is impossible because we lack a full grasp of indigenous conditions. Carrillo's lapse on this point would not be so devastating if it were not blatantly inconsistent with his general principled concern for "democratization" in Spain, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere.

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This merely illustrates that much of Spanish Communism still remains bound to the past. In fact, the entire theoretical and strategic edifice of the PCE—and of Eurocommunism as a whole—has been common currency in one form or another for a long time, dating back to the Second and Third Internationals. Neither Carrillo nor Berlinguer (nor Togliatti) invented the "parliamentary road," alliance strategy, or the two-stage conception of the transition to socialism. Nor are the concrete political demands and goals being stressed by the PCE (or the PCI or PCF) particularly radical; on the contrary, they are perfectly compatible with the further development of domestic and international capitalism. The "democratic platform" forged by Carrillo embraces minimalist objectives that even the "modern" sectors of the Spanish bourgeoisie can be expected to support. For example, the PCE prefers a republican system but is willing to accept a constitutional monarchy (which is the present arrangement); it seeks "full political democracy" and civil liberties, elimination of bureaucratic corruption, revamping of the tax structure, expanded aid to small businesses, and nationalization of most large-scale industry; and it favors the entry of Spain into the Common Market and even NATO, while insisting that American military bases in Spain should not be removed so long as the Soviet military remains in Eastern Europe.[10] Like the other Eurocommunist parties, the PCE is not anxious to provoke confrontations or challenge U.S. hegemony if it means taking political risks.

The strategic underpinnings of this minimalist pragmatism are quite obvious: the PCE is still committed to the anti-fascist stage of political struggle. Its entire outlook is shaped by its historical relationship to the unfolding bourgeois revolution and by its obsession with transcending the remnants of Stalinism. For the PCE leadership today the goal of "socialism" lies far beyond the present—a remote and unarticulated vision that the functionaries have not really integrated into their politics. One of the distressing things about *Dialogue on Spain* is that Carrillo never actually gets around to the topic of socialism; there are endless passages about bourgeois democracy, but virtually nothing about *socialist* democracy. This preoccupation with the bourgeois phase of transition accounts not only for the PCE's programmatic moderation but also for its frustratingly vague approach to a range of crucial issues: the nationalist movements, the character of socialist authority structures, the nature of the Soviet system.

The ultimate question, then, comes down to whether Spanish Communism can devote full energies to the lengthy "first-stage" process of bourgeois tranformation without becoming trapped in it, unable to penetrate beyond the logic of bourgeois structures and values when the moment for advancing the "second stage" finally arrives. Will electoral-parliamentary commitments reduce the PCE apparatus to an institutionalized opposition and instill in its popular base the "illusion of democracy?" Can political collaboration with the bourgeoisie (what the PCE leaders call the "alliance with the devil") be sustained over time and then abruptly terminated without undermining the party's identity and strategic position in Spanish politics? Will the PCE's program simply wind up helping to legitimate welfare state capitalism in Spain, thereby putting a brake on further revolutionary momentum? Understandably, these and other related questions are not confronted by Carrillo. Perhaps it is too early to pose such problems. Yet the experiences of the PCI and PCF—parties much more advanced along the Eurocommunist path than the PCE—suggest that the strategy of "structural reforms" is beset with many serious contradictions. At the same time, the

10. From an interview with Carrillo in the *New York Times*, January 6, 1977.

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uniquely explosive crisis of Mediterranean capitalism has generated such an unpredictable political climate that routine governance seems impossible; under these circumstances, a changing, revitalized left (including no doubt the Eurocommunist parties) will inevitably assume a dominant role in those countries. As for the PSE: it is not on the verge of entering the national government, as the PCI and PCF appear to be, but it will surely constitute a dynamic force behind the "democratization" of Spain. The question is, on what terms?

Carl Boggs

Martin Clark, *Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution That Failed.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977.

In the past decade, Gramsci studies have emerged as a special concern of many leftist thinkers and activists on both sides of the Atlantic. These efforts, in turn, have spawned a flood of Gramsci anthologies, biographies, commentaries, critiques, and histories which has piled up a substantial reserve of critical insights useful for political action in advanced industrial societies. Plainly, Martin Clark's new work represents the latest and one of the more sophisticated products of this recent revival of Gramsci's political and social thinking. In addition to recording many of the nuances in Gramsci's unique political philosophy, Clark presents an admirably detailed, scrupulously researched and fairly balanced history of Italy's *Biennio Rosso* following World War I.

Although it possesses certain strengths, Clark's analysis, at the same time, is not without considerable flaws. While making his historical journey through the *Biennio Rosso*, he seems to be navigating with some curiously modern ideological charts. Instead of fully explicating the outlines of Gramsci's *Ordine Nuovo*, Clark tends to present Gramsci as the original philosopher of the *Via Italiana*. That is, Clark has attempted to excavate a "productivist" and "social democratic" meaning from the "revolution that failed" instead of sticking to Gramsci's actual popular revolutionary intentions. Of course, his study of Gramsci's *Ordine Nuovo* period clearly surpasses those adduced by Anderson, Hoare, Spriano and Williams inasmuch as he transcends their efforts to "Bordighize" or "Leninize" Gramsci."[1] These authors have labored to draw a Leninist lesson from the "revolution that failed" as they try to illustrate that the factory occupations of 1920 failed because Gramsci did not subscribe to Bordiga's "vanguardist" notion of the party. Yet, Clark deftly indicates how and why Bordiga's recipes of electoral abstentionism, party vanguardism, and party domination of the workers' councils mixed an even more disastrous political pudding.[2] Still, in putting

1. Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," *New Left Review*, 100 (November 1976-January 1977); Quintin Hoare, ed., Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings 1910-1920* (London, 1977); Paolo Spriano, *The Occupation of the Factories: Italy 1920* (London, 1975); Gwyn A. Williams, *Proletarian Order: Antonio Gramsci, Factory Councils and the Origins of Communism in Italy, 1911-1921* (London, 1975).

2. With respect to Gramsci's eventual rapprochement with Bordiga was the abstentionist faction of the PSI, Clark correctly observes that it was merely a marriage of convenience in which Gramsci gained free rein in Piedmont in exchange for his acceptance of Bordiga's pre-eminence outside of the heavily industrialized northern province. Ultimately, he saw the

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this interpretation into its proper place, Clark invokes the other suspicious spectre known to bedevil Gramsci studies—not the Gramsci of the Comintern but rather the Gramsci of the post-WW II PCI. That is, Clark's historical narrative conjures up, or at least abets, the "Togliattization" of Gramsci. The subtle influence of this perspective is most manifest in his appraisal of Gramsci's positions on cultural hegemony, productivism, and revolutionary politics.

On the question of cultural hegemony, Clark seems to interpret the cultural perpetuation of the bourgeois ethico-political moment in merely instrumental terms; cultural hegemony equals "how the ruling classes control the media and education" (p. 2). To control the means of education and indoctrination allows a class—either the bourgeoisie or potentially the proletariat—to establish and maintain its hegemonic position; hence, for Clark, "Gramsci's life-long efforts to 'educate' the working class away from 'militancy' and to train a new working class elite" (p. 6) constitutes counter-hegemonic struggle. The Gramscian "philosophy of praxis" in this scheme is reduced to the inculcation of bourgeois managerial and technical skills in the working classes. Instead of forging a new creative consciousness for popular political emancipation, counter-hegemonic strategies are seen as *accommodating* the workers to the rigors of bourgeois culture.

Gramsci, we are told, "did not despise 'bourgeois' culture; on the contrary, he sought to diffuse it" (p. 53). To be sure, Gramsci did encourage the diffusion of bourgeois culture to discipline and to educate the workers. He did so, however, to encourage their special elaboration of a *new* autonomous cultural project which could direct and fulfill their collective political liberation. Education in bourgeois culture was intended to smash the proletarian's "inner imprisonment" by providing him with the discipline, knowledge, and values to build "the mentality of a creator of history."[3] Yet, Clark's treatment portrays counter-hegemonic education as creating the "mentality" of bourgeois managers or technocrats. His Gramsci "educates" the workers to wield their powers "reasonably" (p. 6), because "they needed to develop technical and managerial skills, they needed to be better educated generally, above all they needed self-confidence and ability to take a broader, long-term view of their own interests" (p. 6). Such judgments clearly sound more like recent PCI policy than the revolutionary project of the *Biennio Rosso*. In Clark's analysis, proletarian self-emancipation becomes the ability "to absorb and 'dominate' bourgeois culture," while cultural hegemony is instrumentalized as "the knowledge and self-confidence needed to run society" (p. 223). His account does not convey the richness of Gramsci's designs for transcending bourgeois culture in order to create an unprecedented autonomous working class culture; cultural hegemony and its imposition in the name of the proletariat simply become replacing the bourgeoisie in their bourgeois institutions. Clark maintains that "the working class could not take over unless it produced its own technicians, experts, managers and leaders. Communists must be serious, skilled, disciplined, responsible men, men who could inspire confidence in their ability to manage the economy successfully" (p. 223). Here a Communist in Clark's analysis appears to be a "historically compromised" PCI bureacrat rather than the

formation of the PCI under Bordiga's leadership and its subsequent failure to attract many of the PSI's working class members as a tremendous disaster for working class organization in Italy. Indeed, the Livorno split was seen by Gramsci as the "greatest triumph of reaction." Clark, p. 209.

3. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings*, p. 101.

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revolutionary organic intellectual that Gramsci saw as propounding a new, proletarian cultural hegemony.

In writing his history, Clark consistently evaluates Gramsci as an ardent "productivist." At many junctures, one may rightly wonder whether Clark is discussing Antonio Gramsci or Gino Olivetti, the Secretary-General of the General Confederation of Industry.[4] As "Americanism and Fordism" openly demonstrates, Gramsci saw benefits in Taylorism and scientific management as *means* for attaining his ultimate ethical and political goals. Clark, however, fails to draw this crucial distinction in Gramsci's gingerly-explored acceptance of Taylorism. Instead, Gramsci is seen as adopting scientific management as an *end* which serves the political and managerial interests of the *Ordine Nuovo* circle's "true" constituency, i.e., the "skilled engineering workers—the labor aristocracy of the time" (p. 7). Even though Gramsci's interest in workers' councils had "moral grounds—it rescues men from serfdom," for Clark, Gramsci mainly backed the councils out of "productivist" motives or on "economic grounds—it alone can produce a sober, disciplined, industrious skilled labor force" (pp. 11-12).

Still, as he made clear later in the *Notebooks*, Gramsci did not simply accept Taylorism to realize his "productivist" dreams. Admittedly he welcomed the disciplinary rhythms of Taylorism, but only inasmuch as it promised to lead to a new social psychology, or in his own words, a new "psycho-physical nexus."[5] Taylorism, for Gramsci, appeared as "the biggest collective effort to date to create, with unprecedented speed, and with a consciousness of purpose unmatched in history, a new type of worker and of man."[6] Although he undoubtedly was wrong on this point, Gramsci considered Taylorism as a revolutionary means for creating and preserving an autonomous proletarian culture rooted in the totality of the work process. This new social psychology imposed by the workers themselves would "simply have the purpose of preserving, outside of work, a certain psycho-physical equilibrium which prevents the physiological collapse of the worker, exhausted by the new method of production."[7] When employed by existing forms of capitalism to control the working classes, "this equilibrium can only be something purely external and mechanical"; yet, Gramsci believed that in the hands of a working class movement, scientific management could become an emancipatory force. He asserts, "it can become internalized if it is proposed by the worker himself, and not imposed from the outside, if it is proposed by a new form of society, with appropriate and original methods."[8] To be sure, Gramsci failed to elaborate upon which "methods" would be the *most* appropriate and original, but the critical point is that Taylorism was embraced not as a management goal but rather as a means for creating a new kind of social individual.

Clark's discussion fails to mark this important dimension in Gramsci's thinking. Consequently, Gramsci is depicted as a committed "productivist" who saw the politics of the workers' councils not as an emancipation of consciousness but rather as the modern *rational* organization of labor. Clark claims that "Gramsci's theories cannot be understood unless this aspect is stressed. Taylorism and the Factory Councils were linked. Rational factory organization would promote a sense of participation in collective effort, and the Factory Councils themselves could be defined as an attempt

4. Cf. Frank Adler, "Factory Councils, Gramsci and the Industrialists," *Telos* 31 (Spring 1977).
5. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, p. 302.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
8. *Ibid.*

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to make 'subjective' what was given 'objectively,' to make workers fully aware of the complexities of industrial production and factory organization" (p. 70). The workers' "awareness," in turn, of the "complexities" involved in modern production should lead them to "advocate and incarnate hard work, skills, discipline—the traditional 'worker-aristocratic' virtues; and they were designed to overcome the useless insurrectionism, the mindless rioting and striking, which were in Gramsci's view characteristic of the Italian Left, and which would inevitably lead to defeat" (p. 70). Taylorism and Marxism, in Clark's opinion, are nothing more than a late-industrial Methodism in Gramsci's political calculations for "through them, Italian workers would abandon their facile, spontaneous revolts and their traditional 'subversivism', and learn to take a broader, more 'modern' view" (p. 71).

Clark reduces Gramsci's *political imagination* to mere PCI *administrative blueprints*. Overcoming "useless" insurrectionism, abandoning traditional "subversivism," forsaking "mindless" striking, adopting "worker-aristocratic" virtues, and learning to take a "modern" view all point toward the policies of the post-WW II PCI. Clark's ideas about Gramsci's "productivism" lead him to introjecting an orthodox Taylorism into Gramsci's philosophy of praxis. This interpretation fits the Gramsci of the present-day Italian Communist party; however, it ignores Gramsci's own vision of Communist politics, or Taylorism, for that matter, which should reveal "among the masses a capacity, the beginnings of a new life, the aspiration to create new institutions and the historical drive to renew human society from the roots upwards."[9] Such an aspiration often requires insurrectionism, subversivism, and spontaneism and these practices do not "inevitably lead to defeat" (p. 70). The workers' councils, by the same token, were not backed by Gramsci out of *productivist* motives—to train better workers or discipline the shopfloor or raise productivity.[10] The councils to Gramsci, either before the factory occupations or after his rise to the PCI leadership, were *to be ethico-political* mediations of a new collective individuality—raising industrial output levels and individual productivity would merely be the *by-product*, not the overarching *goal*, of council communism.

Clark's assessment of Gramsci's revolutionary politics also reflects this instrumental conception of politics. Of course, Gramsci's own writings suggest that revolution represents an opportunity for working class ethical freedom and political consciousness to constitute a dominant social bloc capable of enacting a proletarian culture. Yet, Clark asserts, "Gramsci therefore regarded successful revolution as being an essentially institutional question (and not, for example, a military one). The right kind of institutions had to be set up, and made to generate the right kind of consensus" (p. 60). Obviously, this notion of revolution is one of the PCI's "war of position" against a liberal-democratic state which proves "touchy" about Communism unless it conforms to the "right" kind of institutionalized consensus-building. Gramsci's vision of revolution as historical essence being transformed into popular practice is lost in Clark's crude reflection of everyday parliamentary political immediacy. Clark's Gramscian revolution involves the rationalization of bureaucratic and electoral immediacy to insure that the "Communists" can "manage the economy successfully"

9. Gramsci, *Selections from Political Writings*, p. 172.

10. See Sergio Bologna, "Class Composition and the Theory of the Party at the Origin of the Workers Council Movement," *Telos* 13 (Fall 1972). Bologna reviews how German workers councils served as the reserve of highly skilled workers who harbored "productivist" visions for their council activities.

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(p. 223). Somehow this version fails to capture Gramsci's "historical drive to renew human society from the roots upwards" through revolutionary politics.

Nonetheless, Clark's survey of the "revolution that failed" displays several strong points which have been notably lacking in other earlier attempts to cover the same historical ground. As they progress, his chapters adequately detail the impact of World War I on everyday life in Italy, especially in the industrial cities of the North. Clark discusses how and why the *commissioni interne* emerged in Italy's factories as well as how Gramsci developed their concept into a comprehensive social theory. The historical narrative also treats the exceptional qualities of Turin, and to a lesser extent, Milan, as industrial centers whose qualities made them the focus of many political groups struggling for political power—the council communists, Bordiga's abstentionists, the PSI's maximalists, the CGL reformists, the USI (Italian Syndicalist Union), and the anarchists. The spate of city-wide and regional strikes that led up to the factory occupations and the events of the occupation itself likewise receive a great deal of investigative attention in Clark's study. The volume concludes with a discussion of the *Ordine Nuovo's* splintering and how this internal division leads to the Livorno split between the PSI and the abstentionist-Bordigan PCI. The significance of *Ordinovista* politics for the factory council movement garners extensive consideration which correctly affirms that Gramsci's activities in *Ordine Nuovo* and the factory council movement were an extension and enactment of his Crocean "philosophy of praxis." [11]

Along with this basically sound history, Clark largely proves equal to the task of recounting the essential thrust of Gramsci's political and social theory. The Crocean and Hegelian heritage, the emphasis on education and cultural activity, the belief in workers' councils, and the commitment to the party as a disciplined agency for changing popular consciousness through cultural education, at least, are duly recorded yet imperfectly fitted into the drift of Gramsci's *Ordinovista* activities. With regard to the political project of *Ordine Nuovo*, Clark sees that "Gramsci's emphasis on 'consciousness' and his conception of culture as a revolutionary force gave the review an educational, even a moral, character" (p. 72). His analysis also notes the direct link binding *Ordine Nuovo's* critical education to the political practice of the factory councils. Consequently, Clark underscores this important point, which has been ignored by Spriano and Williams, that Gramsci's critical Marxist theory finds a *practical* embodiment in *Ordine Nuovo* and Turinese factory councils. Moreover, the popular journal, the workers' councils and later, the Communist Party are depicted by Clark as Gramsci's mediations of the working class's cultural revitalization, collective individuality, and political education rather than as the political instruments of an aloof vanguard party.

Another strength of Clark's discussion arises with his exploration of why the Turinese revolution failed. The factory occupations are not painted as some world-historic opportunity which was fumbled due to Gramsci's soft-headed Hegelian imagination. Rather, the events following the spring 1920 strikes in and around Turin are seen as building up to a conjuncture in the autumn which allowed the workers to use "obstructionist" tactics. In pursuing an ordinary trade union dispute over wage and time questions, the workers under the direction of the *Ordinovista* circle fell back

11. Whatever shortcomings that Clark might suffer in explicating Gramsci's theoretical positions, he easily surpasses Gwyn Williams' assessment that Gramsci's political theories were at best "distinctly mythic, grandiose, and semi-utopian," in Williams, *Proletarian Order,* p. 91.

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upon extraordinary militant action. Clark accurately discerns that a momentary crisis allowed the Turinese workers to act, but with no guarantee of success and a high chance of total failure. Brilliant leadership, vanguard organization, and ironclad party science are not invoked as sure-fire techniques for political success.

Thus, the dismal catastrophe of the factory councils movement is not attributed solely to Gramsci and the *Ordine Nuovo* circle. Such "subjective" factors, Clark argues, had their serious theoretical and practical failings, but they did not cause the failure. To the contrary, Clark demonstrates why the "objective" conditions—Turin's exceptional industrial development, sectarian struggles within the PSI, inadequate working class training, and "factory egoism"—are the more likely culprits behind the factory councils' eventual collapse. That the *Ordine Nuovo* figures did not effectively "organize and discipline shop-floor militancy" (p. 211) is quite true, as is the fact that the circle itself, as Tasca's defection to the Trade Unionist cause and the anti-fascist front indicates, often was at desperate odds with itself; hence its members and followers "could be easily diverted into 'reformist' channels" (p. 211). This analysis greatly improves upon claims attributing failure to the lack of a disciplined vanguard party capable of springing into action to seize the day for the Italian proletariat.

Clark's well-documented history, perhaps more completely than any previous account, records the richness of Gramsci's theoretical project in relation to the social and political upheavals which struck Italy during the decade after its belated entry into World War I. Still, he falls short of appreciating the full import of Gramsci's Marxism, "the one that never dies, the continuation of Italian and German idealist thought" (p. 51). Instead of a Leninized Gramsci wending his way from Hegelian error toward an eventual acknowledgement of Bordiga, Clark introduces a Togliattian Gramsci—one who backs councils as the "right" kind of institutionalized consensus-building, who renounces "useless" insurrectionism, who plans the managerial training of workers through self-management, and who smugly embraces Gino Olivetti's "productivist" future. Instead of using Taylorism to extend the autonomous project of the philosophy of praxis as part of a new "psycho-physical nexus," Clark's Gramsci reduces the philosophy of praxis to efficient but proletarian scientific management. And instead of reading the lessons of the Comintern period back into the *Biennio Rosso*, Clark projects the teachings of the *Via Italiana* back into the *Ordinovista* Gramsci. This new generation of Gramscian criticism pictures the Sardinian as a structural reformist who would spread bourgeois expertise instead of as a Jacobin vanguardist who should build the Party. Perhaps this shift in emphasis represents some form of progressive evolution; yet, it also appears to be an unlikely position for asserting that Gramsci's revolution was one that failed.

Tim Luke

Jane Loevinger, *Ego Development: Conceptions and Theories.* With the assistance of Augusto Blasi. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1976.

Loevinger's empirical psychology has sought to construct an instrument to measure "ego development"—that consistency of personality providing and integrating the diverse parts of the person into a holistic "self." Loevinger is looking for general psychological principles that govern neurosis, therapy and ego development. Her work

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combines a variant of ego psychology with functionalist and structural-developmental psychology. While her uniquely eclectic orientation raises fresh possibilities and provocative juxtapositions, her latent theory appears to borrow not only the concepts but also the inherent difficulties of functionalist psychology. In addition, Loevinger takes a clearly positivist stance in giving only "operational" definitions, in stressing measurement at the expense of theory and in eschewing political and philosophical considerations. As a result, the promise of a dynamic empirical approach to the transformations of personality is offset by a loss of potential for a critical orientation to science, society and history. Yet, a critical social theory needs a developmental psychology if it is not to fall into a mechanistic and reductionistic account of "socialization." Furthermore, as Habermas points out,[1] this developmental theory must be thoroughly empirical.

Loevinger views the "ego" as the "synthetic function" and defines "ego development" naturalistically in terms of her empirical observations of an age-related sequence of measurable, internally consistent "stages." The stages comprise structural descriptions of general personality styles, encompassing moral, social, cognitive and self-concept domains. In this respect her approach stands over against the theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, for whom cognitive development proceeds differently in different psychological domains. Loevinger's stages of ego development are worldviews that give significance to the individual's various goal-directed activities.

While using the "stage" perspective developed by Baldwin, Piaget and Kohlberg, Loevinger views ego development as a "dimension of individual differences." She sees different individuals stabilizing at different rungs of the developmental ladder, and so the stages represent a typology of personalities within any same-age group, as well as a developmental sequence over different age groups. The stages-types codify patterns of regularities observed among responses to a battery of projective test items. These are various incomplete sentence stems, such as 'When I am criticized. . . ,' with the subject being required to fill in the blank. The stages progress from pre-conventionality through a conventional orientation (the norm) to post-conventionality, passing in order through "Presocial," "Symbiotic," "Impulsive," "Self-protective," "Conformist," "Conscientious," "Individualistic," "Autonomous," and finally culminating in the "Integrated" stage. At each level, contents in four categories are unified: a) impulse control and character development, b) interpersonal style, c) cognitive style, and d) conscious preoccupations.[2]

Subjects' test protocols are scored according to a complex, systematic coding manual, which comprises a pragmatically oriented set of interrelated categories and criteria for interpreting the sentence completions. The manual was constructed on the basis of protocols obtained in the early 1960s from demographically varied samples totaling nearly 1500 women, aged 12 years and up. Although empirical clustering tended to overshadow logical consistency as a criterion in the construction of this manual, one must concur with Hauser[3] that the test has been very carefully constructed and standardized, and the scoring procedures made explicit in an exemplary way.

1. Jürgen Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," *Telos*, 24 (Summer 1975), pp. 41-55.

2. Cf. Table 1 in Dick Howard, "Moral Development and Ego Identity: A Clarification," *Telos*, 27 (Spring 1976), pp. 176-182.

3. S. Hauser, "Loevinger's Model and Measure of Ego Development: A Critical Review," *Psychological Bulletin*, 83:5, pp. 928-955.

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To give a brief impression of the global transformation involved in the stage sequence, we can contrast, for instance, the Self-protective with the Autonomous stage. At the former (preadolescent) stage, a person is hedonistic, manipulative and opportunistic, externalizes blame, and thinks in stereotypes.[4] By the Autonomous stage, however, this unsocialized brat has become tolerant, objective and self-aware, is able to formulate his or her own standards of self-realization, can deal with the complexity of conflicting inner needs or with external ambiguity, and respects both autonomy and inter-dependence. In response to the stem, 'When people are helpless. . . ,' a Self-protective answer might be 'I don't like to be bothered with them,' while an Autonomous answer would be 'I pity them and admire those who try to change their situation.' In general, the movement in development is away from passivity, narcissism, selfishness, simple-minded confusion and sexual-aggressive impulsivity, toward activity, altruism, self-awareness, individuality, discrimination, complexity, flexibility, self-control and self-motivation.

While these trends hold as general descriptions, Loevinger departs from tradition in personality measurement by seeing ego development as composed of "milestones" (stages) rather than traits or "polar variables" showing monotonic increase or decrease with age. For instance, where a "polar" view of conformity-non-conformity lumps together at the non-conformist end those who are not yet able to conform *and* those who have outgrown the need to, a milestone approach differentiates these as qualitatively different kinds of non-conformity. The milestone conception is therefore compatible with the distinction of form from content, such that the same values can have different meanings at different stages, while individuals at the same stage may hold opposing values. There can be radical reasons for complying with a legal system; conversely there can be conformist, opportunistic or primitively aggressive reasons for "radical" activities.[5] Also, "radicals" and "non-radicals" may use the same form of reasoning to arrive at opposing conclusions.

Loevinger's measurement instrument is not always able to sustain this differentiation, but leads to a consideration of reasoning processes underlying attitudes, and so not only supersedes the doctrinaire and class-culture relative testing approach that we are used to, but also provides an account that can illuminate the psychological bases of communication and agreement. The approach also aspires to an elucidation of the "internal logic" of the stages—their consistencies and contradictions—and the logic of their sequential progression. Loevinger's approach falls short of this second goal, and even the internal logic has yet to be clearly spelled out. Furthermore, the lack of a transformational component to the stages leaves them looking more like static ideal types, lacking history as well as logical structure.

Loevinger's reluctance to pursue these issues is tied in with her ambivalence about theory. Measurement is touted as the sole source of truth in earlier work.[6] The present

4. Cf. R. Hold, review of *Measuring Ego Development*, in the *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, 158:4, pp. 310-316.

5. D. Candee, "Ego Developmental Aspects of New Let Ideology," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 30 (1974), pp. 620-630; N. Haan, M.B. Smith, J. Block, "Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political Social Behavior, Family Background, and Personality Correlates," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 10 (1968), pp. 183-201. N. Haan, J. Stroud and C.B. Holstein, "Moral and Ego Stages in Relation to Ego Processes: A Study of Hippies," *Journal of Personality*, 41 (1973), pp. 596-612.

6. J. Loevinger, "The Meaning and Measurement of Ego Development," *American Psychologist*, 21:3 (1966); J. Loevinger and R. Wessler, *Measuring Ego Development* (San Francisco, 1970).

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volume is intended to compensate for the heavy metric empiricism of the previous researches. However, the book does not manage to develop a theoretical matrix as much as it simply brings together multiple historical and methodological strands in an eclectic attempt to show that different writers happily converge on the same ideas and to lend an impression of "construct validity" to her test. Unfortunately, Loevinger does not always distinguish her measurement instrument from her *theory* of ego development. It is not clear that she sees theorizing and measuring as distinct processes. If she does, she must have confidence that the theory will develop along with the progressive sophistication of the measurement instrument. However, without explicit connection to an independently validated theory, such an instrument lacks construct validity. This means that we cannot be certain *what* the instrument is measuring, or that it tapes the development of the same thing at each stage. The failure to distinguish theory from instrument and then show how they are related makes for unnecessary vulnerability. For example, if theory and instrument remain undistinguished, any shortcomings detected undermine the whole theory of ego development.

While it might be tempting to reject Loevinger as just another a-theoretical American empiricist, a closer look at her work[7] reveals a complex and often compelling metatheory. In accordance with Freud, and departing from Hartmann, Rapaport, White, *et al.*, Loevinger founds ego development on the aggressive instincts.[8] However, she borrows White's notion of effectance motivation, the "mastery of experience," and construes mastery as a general form of aggression. Experience is typified by interpersonal conflict and the frustration of impulses. Thus, mastery is the mastery of *instincts*, and does not implicate functioning of the "conflict-free sphere" of the ego as Hartmann proposed. In particular, Loevinger parsimoniously explains the origin of aggression as "mastery through reversal of voice, that one must do what one has suffered... What my parent has done to me, my ego must do to my id." In this way, "interpersonal schemes become interpersonal schemes with the frustration of interpersonal impulses (sex and aggression) as impetus."[10] Thus, ego development is simply the changing from a passive to an active role, as impulses lead to and are implicated in their own control. This idea draws on Freud's original notion of a mechanism of self-punishment—repetition compulsion—that, "beyond the pleasure principle," led to his postulating the death instinct in opposition to the forces of Eros. The mastery concept includes a notion of internalization not unlike what Freud describes in "Mourning and Melancholia." Ego development is thus interpreted by Loevinger as the mastery of painful experience through repetition and internalization of external control. Progress is achieved through what is originally a defensive maneuver, a process that is perhaps intended as parallel to the therapeutic experience.

In her antipathy to ego psychology, what Loevinger overlooks is that the ego cannot survive on renunciations alone. The ego also thrives on gratification and pleasure, a process that was ensured in Hartmann's conceptualization of the "conflict-free sphere" of ego functioning and White's original interpretation of effectance motivation.

7. J. Loevinger, "Three Principles for a Psychoanalytic Psychology," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 71 (1966), pp. 432-443.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 433: "Ego development as the analogue within the sphere of aggression, broadly conceived, of psychosexual development in the sphere of the libido."

9. R.W. White, "Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence," *Psychological Review*, 66 (1959), pp. 297-333. J. Loevinger, "Theories of Ego Development," in L. Breger, ed., *Clinical-Cognitive Psychology: Models and Integrations* (New York, 1969), p. 85.

10. Loevinger, "Three Principles...," *op.cit.*, pp. 433-437.

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Loevinger refutes these notions as too "positive," unequivocally locating ego development in the conflict sphere.[11] This is opposed to what ego psychologists generally claim as a major contribution to the understanding of the ego's adaptability: the conceptualization of ego functioning as a continuous interplay between conflict and conflict-free spheres, through which the latter assisted the mastery of conflictual material in the former, so that conflicts were released as well as contained.

Loevinger's basic metatheoretical principle amounts to the assumption that "interpersonal impulses" socialize themselves through the defensive internalization of their frustration and repression. This internalization concept is very compatible with behaviorist views in which moral conduct is conditioned through conflictual experiences.[12] Yet, having dispensed with the materialist notion of "drives," Loevinger has the ego stages represent different *wishes* (interpretations of what needs to be mastered and what is to count as effective mastery). Progress through the stages results in higher levels of self-control, i.e., "activity." It is the subjective meanings imposed by the subject that determine the forms of socialization, not socializing agents or drives.

Loevinger's approach is reminiscent of G.H. Mead's "social behaviorism." The reversal of voice is much like the notion of role-taking, which is central to Mead's work, and from which Kohlberg's theory of moral development and the nascent field of "social cognition" derive.[13] The symbolic interactionist view of personality formation through the shifting or coordination of perspectives cannot account for how development could proceed beyond a conventional level. Similarly, reversal or internalization, like role-taking, cannot distinguish true from false consciousness. The coordination of perspectives does not lead to the uncovering of repressions. Perspectives (like any part or self or society) can attain a consistency, consensus or wholeness bearing no relation at all to objective reality. We also know that reality actually lacks that wholeness insofar as reality comprises a constant contradiction and a dynamic interpenetretion of opposites that is the source of its self-transformation.

To a great extent, Loevinger's attempt to insert sociality into the primary process via her stress on "interpersonal impulses" parallels H.S. Sullivan and others influenced by symbolic interactionism. The net effect is that individualism is reinforced, and truth and maturity of personality take on a conventional cast. This may be why there are no radical transformations envisaged in ego development after the internalization of norms of conscience (p. 25). As Marcuse pointed out in *Eros and Civilization*, it is precisely the *limits* on interpersonal relations that have been historically inculcated in the id. Personality development must therefore be seen as the de-alienation of false consciousness rather than as socialization of natural "primitive" impulses. To stress the curbing of irrational desire is to ignore Piaget's demonstration that primitive thought is not entirely a product of motivational forces.[14]

11. Loevinger, "The Meaning. . .," *op.cit.*, p. 205: "At its highest estate ego embraces the conflict itself; thus the conflict-free ego sphere is not the sphere of ego development."

12. J. Aronfreed, "The Concept of Internalization," in D. Goslin, ed., *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research* (Chicago, 1969). For a critique, see L. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," in D. Goslin, *op.cit.*

13. M. Feffer, "Developmental Analysis of Interpersonal Behavior," *Psychological Review*, 77:3 (1970), pp. 197-214. M.J. Chandler, "Social Cognition and Lifespan Approaches to the Study of Child Development," in H. Reese, ed., *Advances in Child Development and Behavior*, 11 (New York, 1977). W. Edelstein, "Educational Applications of Theories of Social Cognitive Development," in C.F.M. van Lieshout and J. Ingram, eds., *Social Development in School* (Lisse, 1977).

14. C. Odier, *Anxiety and Magical Thinking* (New York, 1956). L. Kohlberg, "A Cognitive-

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A parallel problem arises in uniting the defenses with ego development, since the defenses serve the master of individual adaptation and functional expediency rather than objectivity. When functional or "organismic" psychology roots itself in the individual's striving for organizational integrity through organism-environment interaction, "active" control and coping may be gained through reversal, internalization, or even role-taking, without any access to truth and without any potential for criticism of convention. It is, of course, the very integrity of conventional organization that can make critical praxis impotent.

From the viewpoint of ego-id relations, there are comparable anomalies. Loevinger's basic principle of "reversal of voice" does not allower her to account for post-Oedipal growth. The Conformist stage coincides with the end of the Oedipal period around age 7, and for the majority of people remains a lifelong mode of functioning. Post-conformist development in Loevinger's theory looks very different in quality, appearing to outline the process of therapeutic growth. It is almost as if psychoanalysis were reified as development, with the climax of enlightened self-awareness representing the fully analyzed person. The principle of internalization of interpersonal schemas does not lead to individuation and autonomy. For Loevinger, post-conformist growth is marked by the emergence of the self, as a parallel to the process of successful psychoanalysis (p. 393): "Where it [id] was, there shall I [ego] be." The ego seems to become synonymous with the self, and its autonomy becomes confounded with the freedom of the person. The differences between "person," "self," "I," and "ego" are merely "fine distinctions" appropriate only to "philosophical discussions [which] are not pertinent."[15] Whereas at times Loevinger does toy with subjectivity (describing the sense of "I" as "immediate, not a remote or abstract inference," and therefore not as problematic as knowledge of the ego—p. 393), the predominant tone is to eschew the distinction between knower and known (transcendental and empirical self) as "not germane," or to defer to potential empirical investigations (p. 393).

In Loevinger's book, as in Haan's,[16] wishes and defenses receive a "constructivist" gloss, serving the same purposes of adaptation and organization as any other cognitive process, but with special focus on the integrity of the self (or self-concept—it is never quite clear which). Such a gloss puts a cognitive-structural light on defenses. It also opens up the possibility that cognitive psychology will at last have to make a long overdue effort to deal with processes of self-deception, although as we have just seen, there is something about the functionalist framework which currently defeats that purpose.

It is important to see the latent project behind the Loevinger-Haan endeavor. This reflects the significant lesson learned empirically by psychology during the last 50 years —though previously worked out non-empirically by philosophy much earlier—that reason and desire implicate each other and that radical dualisms of "instinct vs. learning," "impulse vs. reflection" and "innate vs. acquired" have no grounds. "Ego" has come to represent the negation of these dualisms. Metaphorically conceived as a logical intersect, the ego exists as the "interaction" between thought and feeling, as it is the interaction between organism and environment, or assimilation and accommodation.

Developmental Analysis of Children's Sex-role Development," in E. Maccoby, ed., *The Development of Sex Differences* (Stanford, 1966).

15. Loevinger, "Theories of Ego Development," *op.cit.*, p. 85.
16. N. Haan, *Coping and Defending* (New York, 1976).

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However, thought and feeling are not opposites to be reconciled eclectically. They do not interact; they *interpenetrate*. In order to obtain some rapprochement, one must launch a double attack. First, one must pre-empt the conciliatory attitude, going back to the Cartesian split to effect a radical historical solution that rejects the very reasons for creating a dualism at that point. Second, one must at the same time rise above the level of divided cognition and affect in order to do justice to their relation.

One of the reasons that the Haan-Loevinger functionalist interactionism must fail is that it attempts a reconciliation *within* the Cartesian private world of inner events. The inner world cannot be a copy, map or model of reality, since even if we could account for the processes by which reality could be so internalized, the testing of such models could only reduce to matching them to yet further models, in an infinite subjective regress. Choices among the models could only be made pragmatically. By definition, such a procedure could only occur within individuals and intersubjectivity would therefore be reduced to the shared subjective meanings of isolated monads.[17] Thus it behooves developmental theorists to make clear what cognitive structures are if they are not just purely subjective constructions. For example, are Loevinger's ego stages simply patterns of internal attitudes, or do they comprise intersubjective meanings imbedded in collective practices? If so, then (as Habermas has suggested) it would be necessary to know about the "empirical conditions under which this logic is transmitted into concrete life histories."[18]

The logical extension of cognitive-affective interactionism in Loevinger's work is her description of ego as the "synthetic function" or principle of consistency. This is what holds the four categories together throughout the course of development. While Loevinger makes good use of the term, there are several problems which this standard concept from ego psychology brings with it. First, the notion of self is often used by functionalist psychology in preference to the "reified" notion of *the* self, or *the* ego. However, one might ask whether it is not equally a reification to talk about *the* synthetic function, when a good nominalist would be content with talking about organizational consistence, or even organization *tout court*, and leave it at that. In fact, Loevinger does take this option at several junctures. As she realizes, to reify consistency as a function only offers the appearance of an explanation of that consistency, whereas in fact we are left with no account of how synthesis actually occurs.

Second, it seems that the notion of the synthetic function implicitly assumes elementarism—that the psyche is essentially fragmented into discrete mental atoms (bits of information, roles, etc.), which require "glue" to keep them all together.[19] Third, the idea of a *post hoc* synthesis seems to pre-empt the possibility of consistency due to logically necessary relations of inclusion or identity by definition. Fourth, the same synthesis appears to account for the unity of consciousness itself, and through this the integrity and self-identity of the self. However, this begs the question of what it is that is responsible for the integrity of the synthetic function and how it is that the latter is not experienced as an ego-alien control. In more general terms this is the problem of how the synthetic function "knows" what to include in the self, and what to exclude as

17. C. Taylor, "Hermeneutics and Politics," in P. Connerton, ed., *Critical Sociology* (New York, 1976). The comments on intersubjectivity are derived from Taylor's article.

18. Habermas, *op.cit.*, p. 46. See also E. Oestereicher, "Toward a Sociology of Cognitive Structures," *Social Research*, 39:1 (1972), pp. 134-154.

19. B. Kaplan, "Meditations on Genesis," *Human Development*, 10 (1967), pp. 65-87. For parallel arguments in sociology, see A. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York, 1970).

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not-self. Subject-object relations inherently resist reduction to the language of control systems. Subject and object, like conscious and unconscious, cannot be accounted for as merely different levels in a hierarchy of complexity.[20] It is only because functionalist psychology is elementarist that it needs such a notion of complexity. Such complexity is, by definition, inert, and only force can then explain qualitative difference or transformation. Thus it is no coincidence that the essence of the ego is defined as the striving to "master" experience. Once this definition is assumed, the whole question of how one experiences, and knows that experience to be one's own, is supplanted by a technical issue of how to master and control the experiential elements. There is even a Newtonian flavor of action and reaction to Loevinger's idea of reversal of voice, as she perceptively notes.[21] However, the Newtonian universe excludes the "I," and so the synthetic function must exclude subjectivity. It is ironic that a chapter by Blasi, which Loevinger wisely included in this volume, points out this very danger.

Loevinger's metatheory therefore leaves a variety of conceptual quandaries that further empirical studies and improved measurement will not resolve. In short, the theory of ego development as currently formulated appears to lack a notion of either "self" or "society." Much as "passivity" does not imply reification (the "it"), "activity" does not imply de-reification (the "I") and does not preclude the possibility of alienation or self-deception. Somewhere along the line, the critical content of concepts has been lost, and this is a general problem in the history of psychology to which Loevinger is heir.

Nevertheless, social theory is under pressing need of an empirically oriented conceptualization of personality development. Thus, Loevinger's intentions have to be taken seriously, and theoretical and empirical improvements developed to advance them. Perhaps if the theory is distinguished from the measurement instrument, it will be more likely to receive the attention it deserves, at a conceptual level as well as an empirical one.

John Broughton, Marta Zahaykevich

20. A. Blasi and E.C. Hoeffel, "Adolescence and Formal Operations," *Human Development*, 17 (1974), pp. 344-363. On the link between liberal psychology and the concept of complexity, see R.M. Unger, *Knowledge and Politics* (New York, 1975) and J. Habermas, "On Social Identity," *Telos*, 19 (Spring 1974), p. 101.

21. Loevinger, "Three Principles...," *op.cit.*, p. 440.

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SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS: *

ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES, 2:2-3 (June 1976)

54, blvd. Raspail, 75270 Paris, 80 francs per year. Issue theme: "Symbolic Domination and Political Struggle." Pierre Bourdieu, the journal's editor, is committed to publishing highly documented research accompanied by reflection on structuralist methodologies and Marxist interpretive frameworks. The integration of structuralist tools of analysis into a critical interpretive schema is accomplished in part by ongoing criticism of the ideological bases of social scientific disciplines, both American and French, but primarily those operating within the traditions of French structuralism and positivism. This effort finds original expression in the format of the journal itself, whose creative use of photo-montage, comic strips, and varied typefaces communicates the journal's position regarding the significance of academic discourse in general, and the generation of content out of formal innovation not only in supposedly literary discourse but particularly in the metalanguages of philosophy and the social sciences. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LUC BOLTANSKI, *"La production de l'idéologie dominante."* Several modes of analysis employed by the current dominant ideologues of France—including gems from Giscard and Servan-Schreiber, are exploited to describe the philosophical and political discourse of dominant political groups. The authors conclude that in the finite political space of liberalism, delimited by the convergence of fascism and communism in Stalinism, there is currently no room for true revolution. ANNIE VERGER, *"Note sur une utopie artistique."* Verger's analysis of Vasarely's writings on aesthetics aims at relating the dominant class's sanction of artistic trends toward geometric abstraction and large-scale urban projects to that class's political project of rationalizing the future by appealing to permanence. JEAN-CLAUDE CHAMBERDON, *"La restauration de la mort: objets scientifiques et phantasmes sociaux."* Examines the substitution of rational investigation by topical and ideological discourse in recent French literature on death. PIERRE BOURDIEU, *"Le champ scientifique."* Describes the functioning of laws and structural invariants in the system of "scientific capital" so as to view the official images of science projected by traditional sociology of science as conditioned by competition on the academic market place. Bourdieu lambasts the tradition of philosophy of science as a derivative of positivism and liberal optimism which systematically ignores social conditions and the ideological strategies couched in its own epistemological premises, with a view to outlining the possibility of a sociology of sociology and of intellectual disciplines in general. MICHAEL POLLAK, *"La planification des sciences sociales."* In examining the effects of French governmental politics on social scientific institutions as of 1958, Pollak explains internal conflicts in French sociology between those who seek to do social criticism and those who aim to transform sociology into an arm of the government. PIERRE BOURDIEU, *"Les modes de domination."* Explains modes of domination by the degree of "objectivation" of the accumulation of "social capital" in cultural, social, as well as economic domains, so as to construct a polar model of domination in which immediate interpersonal interaction and mediated institutionalized domination are the two extremes. Parallels between Kabylian and modern capitalist cultures are shown to have implications for a critical understanding of mechanisms of modern cultural exchange and domination. EDWARD P. THOMPSON, *"Modes de domination et révolutions en Angleterre."* Notes from a seminar on the creation of a Marxist history of domination in 18th and 19th century England given at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1974-75. JEANNINE VERDES-LEROUX, *"Pouvoir et assistance: cinquante ans de service social."* Studies French social welfare institutions' representations of the working class in light of the evolution of class structure, the syndicalist movement and international socialism. JEAN BOLLACK, *"Notes sur l'episode des Planctes."* This second installment of a critique of the Homeric philological tradition limits itself to a defense of structuralist methodology devoid of any measure of hermeneutic understanding as a necessity for discovering a text's "literal meaning" and thereby adopts a position seemingly inconsistent with those of other contributors to the journal. —DJG

CINEASTE, VII:2

333 Sixth Ave., New York, NY 10014. $4 per year (4 issues). GINA BLUMENFELD, *"The (Next to) Last Word on Lina Wertmuller."* A discussion of the stormy reactions to Wertmuller's films. In contrast to the 'anti-spectacle' approach to cinema, Wertmuller is committed to creating radical films for mass audiences. Whether she will succeed or not depends largely upon her

*This section was compiled by John Fekete, Dorothy Gehrke, John Keane, Ray Morrow, Diane Moukhtar, Peter Murphy, Greg Renault, Will Ross, Brian Singer, Susan Wheeler, and Nancy Wood.

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ability to clarify the ambiguities that have characterized her aesthetic and political approaches thus far. Though her films challenge utilitarian logic, Wertmuller has not been able to transform this critique into an alternative vision which transcends the anarchist or individualist solutions. *"You Cannot Make the Revolution on Film."* An interview with Wertmuller. PETER BISKIND, *"Ripping off Zapata, Revolution Hollywood Style." Viva Zapata!*, a collective effort by Elia Kazan and John Steinbeck, is seen as revealing a Cold-War liberalism barely concealed beneath progressive rhetoric. DAN GEORGAKAS, *"Still Good After All These Years."* After stating that films work primarily upon the emotions and not the intellect, Georgakas proceeds to praise *Viva Zapata!* for "hammering" home its strong emotional statement. A nostalgic but unconvincing argument. JANES MONACO, *"The Costa-Gavras Syndrome."* As a director of 'narrative political cinema,' Costa-Gavras must resolve the relationship between revolutionary form and content. While often accused of 'sugar-coating' the form (Shaw), this tactic of the political filmmaker is defended as one means to get the desired audience into the theater. Once in, the audience should face a Brechtian dialectic which demands that they be separated enough from the film to confront it intellectually and critically. Whether Costa-Gavras himself succeeds in effecting this Shavian-Brechtian schema is discussed with reference to his films—*State of Seige, Special Section* and *The Confession*. A tentative typology of the relationship of cinema and politics is proposed. *"The Future of the Cinema Belongs to Poets."* An interview with surrealist filmmaker Fernando Arrabal. ERIC BREITBART, *"Point of Production, Films about Work and Workers." "Soviet Cinema Today."* An interview with three Soviet film personalities—Innokenti Smoktunovsky, Adriana Shengelaia and Sergei Komarov. *"Union Films, An Interview with Carl Marzani."* Short film reviews, book reviews.

CULTURAL CORRESPONDENCE, 3

care of Dorrwar Bookstore, 224 Thayer St., Providence, RI 02906. DAVE WAGNER, *"Getting a Handle on the Crank."* Brief survey of the history of crank literature that urges us to participate in the wild-eyed dreams of the stars while at the same time realizing the potential for creating reactionary and stupid replications of the worst science fiction. JOE EYER, *"Addiction and Western Culture."* This historical narrative on addiction stresses the urgency of disseminating medical expertise and maximizing a general consciousness on health. Three of Eyer's published works are reviewed in the hope that wide-ranging experiments and studies related to the popular culture of food will be suggested. HOWARD BERLINER, *"Ideology and Medicine."* Since there has already been good left criticism and demystification of the medical profession and medical delivery and financing, the concentration here is on medicine as a social science subject to all the weaknesses and biases of the other social sciences. Examples are cited indicating some of the ways in which bourgeois ideology is replicated in medicine and how medicine is responsive to and reinforces such ideology. BARBARA MELOSH, *"Nursing Illusions."* Explores nurses in American fiction from around 1920-1950, a period which saw tremendous expansion of medical science and technology, and the rise of hospitals. The nurses' ambivalent status in medicine as well as in the dominant culture makes nursing a significant means for understanding the cultural ideology of health. —PFM

GREEN MOUNTAIN QUARTERLY, 5 (February 1977)

462 N. Main St., Oshkosh, WI 54901. $3 for 4 issues. BOIS D'ARC PATRIOTS, *"Organizing in Dallas."* CHARLIE YOUNG, *"The Coming of the Second American Revolution: Monopolies and Mass Institutions, or Property Worth vs. Human Growth."* BOIS D'ARC PATRIOTS, *"Analysis of Class Relations Among Neighborhood and Out-of-Neighborhood Elements."* Compared with other inner-city organizing projects (e.g., ACORN, the SDS-revival, Saul-Alinsky type approaches) which emphasize government responsiveness to the needs of the people, the Patriots are concerned with raising consciousness about socio-economic classes and the struggle of classes. It is this knowledge of the role of classes in U.S. cities which dominates the organization's work and prevents them from having any illusions about the nature and limits of government, whether in its liberal or punitive phase. As activists, the East Dallas Patriots do not dwell on talk, constantly integrating discussion with tactics and moves. —PFM

HECATE, A WOMAN'S INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL, III;1 (Feb. 1977)

P.O. Box 99, St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia 4067. US$4 per year. EDITORIAL on the role of the mass media in upholding the ideological structures that confront oppressed groups in their daily lives. PIP PORTER, *"Dorothy Hewitt: An Interview."* Hewitt is a dramatist. SUSAN

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GARDNER, AMANDA THYER, *"From Bondage Toward Liberation: Notes on Women of China, 1976."* A China travelogue significant for its authors' refusal to engage in single-minded comparison of present-day China to its pre-revolutionary past tragedies and their insistence on the possibilities of the present and future. They raise the problem of the Chinese version of equality (which seems to mean treating women like men, not taking account of or compensating for women's childbearing role), which ends up obscuring women's continued obligations in the domestic sphere. CLAUDE FRANCIS, *"On Simone de Beauvoir."* Interview with a person who wrote the biography-bibliography, *Les Ecrits de Simone de Beauvoir*. ANNEMARIE AUSTIN, *"Under the Steam."* BARBARA CAINE, *"Woman's 'Natural State': Marriage and the 19th Century Feminists."* BRISBANE WOMEN'S MEDIA GROUP, *"Did Homogenized Radio Turn Sour?"* —SW

HECATE, A WOMAN'S INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL, II:2 (July 1976)

P.O. Box 99, St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia 4067. US$4 per year. CARMEL SHUTE, *"Blood Votes and the 'Bestial Boche': A Case Study in Propaganda."* The utilization of women both as tools and objects of propaganda is here examined through the political battle over the question of conscription in Australia during World War I. Both the leftist, anti-conscription forces led by the Australian Labour Party, and the pro-conscription forces inside and outside the government appealed to women through their maternal role either to save their sons and husbands from possible death on the battlefield or to sacrifice them in the name of patriotic duty, as "mothers of a nation of heroes." ROSALIND INNES, *"What She Needs Is a Good Fuck: Rape and Femininity."* The author draws on Susan Brownmiller and Juliet Mitchell to describe rape as part of a specific socio-sexual relationship between men and women, located within a distinct social formation and subject to economic, political and ideological conditions. SUSAN HIGGINS, *"The Suffragettes in Fiction."* CAROLE FERRIER, *"The Death of the Family in Some Novels by Women of the Forties and Fifties."* The novel as an accessible medium for increasing consciousness about the role the family played in perpetuating women's oppression in this period. Plus fiction, poetry, book reviews. —SW

JUMP CUT, Nos. 1-4 (July-December 1974)

P.O. Box 865, Berkeley, CA 94701. $4 per year (6 issues). *Jump Cut* is devoted to the development of radical film criticism. A sampling of articles from early issues follows: From 1: JUDITH HESS, *"Genre Films and the Status Quo."* Discussion of the durability and success of 'genre' films—the western, sci-fi, horror and gangster films. These preserve the status quo since they present social conflicts and resolutions in a manner that encourages simplicity, reaction and passivity. JOHN HESS* *"La Politique des auteurs."* The 'auteur' theory of film criticism is presented as an attempt, couched in aesthetic terms, to remove cinema from the social and political arena. This argument is elaborated with reference to the cultural and political context from which auteur criticism arose, and the aesthetic principles adhered to by auteur critics. From 2: CHUCK KLEINHANS, *"Contemporary Working Class Film Heroes."* Recognizing the mediative role of film in shaping social consciousness, this article explores the filmic treatment of the 'success myth" in *Evel Knievel* and *The Last American Hero*. While positively portraying the rejection of forms of working class oppression, these films remain ideological in positing the myth of individual solutions within the existing order. The importance of audience self-validation must also be considered by radical cineastes. CHARLES ECKERT, *"Shirley Temple and the House of Rockefeller."* The phenomenal success of Shirley Temple is shown to relate to the social and economic climate of the mid-depression years. Her films served an ideological function by deflecting criticism away from the real roots of misery, focusing instead on "the transformative power of love." From 3: JAMES KAVANAGH, *"Other Places, Other Times." Chinatown's* limitation is typical of even the most progressive bourgeois art. While skillfully depicting capitalist corruption and bourgeois collusion, the film suggests that opposing forces have no alternative but to defer to this alleged superiority. FRED KAPLAN, *"Political Paranoia."* A critical look at the politics of the 'Conspiracy craze' and the films it has fostered. While conspiracy theories have previously tended to serve apolitical ends, their consequences, in a period of mass insecurity, have more reactionary implications. WILLIAM VAN WERT, *"Phillip Marlowe: Hardboiled to Softboiled to Poached."* Discussion of another genre—film noir—as seen through the evolution of its chief protagonist, the "hardboiled" detective. From 4: E. ANN KAPLAN, *"The Importance and Ultimate Failure of* Last Tango in Paris." Bertolucci attempts, but is only marginally successful, in using the sexual relationships in *Last Tango* simultaneously

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to parody American post-war and New Wave film styles and sensibilities. MARTIN WALSH, *"Political Formations in the Cinema of Jean-Marie Straub."* Discussion of Straub within the context of a radical semiological approach to art which seeks to "deconstruct" traditional forms of cinematic expression. Since form itself is ideologically determined, it is not sufficient simply to inject new content into old structures. Though Straub has been accused of making 'difficult' films, he is defended on the basis of his commitment to make films politically (rather than making political films), and his attempt to engage his audience critically as he does so. CHUCK KLEINHANS, *"From Tear-jerkers to Thought-provokers."* A critical consideration of audience response to films. A distinction is made between the self-reflective film (one which questions its filmic form) and the self-critical film (one which challenges both its form and content). —NW

KURSBUCH, 44 (July 1976)

Potsdamerstr. 98, 1 Berlin 30. 8 DM. Issue theme: "Our Underworld." *"Lutz, Klaus, Volker, Monika: Wir da unten, die da oben."* Interviews in the Frankfurt criminal underworld. RALF THENIOR, *"Die schnelle Mark auf St. Pauli."* Notes on the Hamburg "redlight" district. WERNER MATHES, *"Unterwelt en miniature."* The underground in the small town of Fulda. *"Kur der Eierdieb: Eine Karriere."* A petty thief tells his story. ANDREAS HEUER, *"Zock in Deutschland."* On the organization of illegal gambling. *"Homo-Strich: Zwei Interviews."* Interviews with two male homosexual prostitutes. JENNY LIEBREICH, *"Ein bissen über dem Strich."* Fascinating story of a girl who tried free-lance prostitution as a way to build her ego and make easy money. KNUT ENGELHARDT, *"Die Logik der Kriminalisierung: Bemerkungen zur Dialektik von Konformität und Kriminalität."* As the unifying theoretical statement of this issue, a useful overview of the current state of West German legal theory and criminal sociology. HARALD WIESER, *"Oberwelt als Unterwelt."* The remarkable story of the career of a corrupt businessman with friends in high places. WOLFGANG GABEL, *"Der Boss."* A case of commercial fraud. PETER-PAUL ZAHL, *"Die Zerstörung der Mitmenschlichkeit: Lumpen in Schliessfach."* A writer in prison tells his story. FALCO WERTENTIN, *"Jenseits der Kriminalstatistik."* On forms of crime not covered by the legal system. —RM

LEVIATHAN, 4:1 (1976)

Claus Koch, Mommsenstrasse 66, D 1000 Berlin 12, West Germany. *"Schwerpunkt: Politische Psychologie."* Some editorial themes on the problem of political psychology. HANS BOSSE, KARL-HEINRICH RUDERSDORF, *"Erziehung und Abhängigkeit."* An examination of the problem of cultural dependence and disintegration within the underdeveloped periphery via the example of West German educational transfer to Egypt, Tanzania, India and Brazil. These educational transfers are concerned primarily with the needs and occupational aspirations of white- and blue-collar workers: the "no-collar workers" who make up the majority of the peripheral population are forgotten. JOHANN AUGUST SCHUELEIN, *"Das neue Interesse an der Subjektivität."* A hand-me-down version of Watzlawick, Horn, Marcuse *et al.* on the new fascination with the problem of subjectivity. DORIT KRAMER *et al.*, *"Sozialtechnologie und soziale Bewegungne."* An attempt to analyze the impact and consequences of the 'identity crisis' of mainstream social science in the late 1960s, and the emergence of objectivist attempts at explaining political socialization and political unrest, which are seen to reproduce the 'glassy, background ideology' of science and technology (Habermas). STEPHAN LEIBFRIED, *"Die Verwaltung der etatistischen Reserve."* The failures of recent American attempts at administrative reform are seen to result from a dilemma of the late capitalist state's activities: the *political* task of broadly guaranteeing social reproduction through a bureaucracy is in contradiction with the necessity to do this in a *depoliticized* manner. This is a version of what Offe has called 'the political dilemma of technocracy,' namely, the dilemma consists in the definite assumption of responsibility by political bureaucracies for social 'problem-solving,' while the whole structure of the late capitalist state is oriented more passively toward 'problem control.' HARTMUT ELSENHANS, *"Oekonomie der Rohstoffproduktion."* Insisting on the concepts of differential and consumer rent, some new economic arguments are made for the possibility of increasing prices of raw material exports from the peripheral world without serious consumer abstention. —JK

LIBERATION, 20:3 (March-April 1977)

186 Hampshire St., Cambridge, MA 02139. $10 for 10 issues. EDITORS, *"On Poetry."* EDITORS, *"On Pornography."* JEFF COHEN, DONALD FREED, *"Fidel on the Grassy Knoll."*

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Who killed JFK? Two long-time assassination researchers take a long look at the most popular theories and their proponents. JULIA KRISTEVA, *"Chinese Women: The Mother at the Center."* Excerpt from her forthcoming book, *About Chinese Women*. Provides a framework for understanding the role of women in Chinese society based on the survival of matrilinear and matrilocal aspects of a matriarchy within the transformation to the patriarchal mode about 1000 A.D. on account of the advanced development of matriarchal institutions and a feudal order that was more agrarian than pastoral, more sedentary than nomadic, dependent on pre-existing forms with new content. Kristeva sees Chinese society during that period as organized around the coincidence of sexual, economic and territorial groups, created by confrontation with the *other*. Chinese materialism cannot be imagined outside a sexual and social economy where a woman, a mother, would assume a role as *other* in a positive and unrepressed genitality. Kristeva contrasts Taoism (associated with matriarchy and the confrontation of the *other* as a model of sexual interaction) with Western monotheism, Tantric Buddhism (associated with hermaphroditic fusion) and Confucianism (which subordinated eroticism to procreation and became an embittered puritanism). The Taoist notion of sexuality is based on the idea that the sexual relationship is not a relationship of identification, absorption of the one by the other, negation of differences, in contrast to the Western medieval concept of love. Kristeva sees Taoist influences in present-day China, claiming that women are the center around which the society of men revolves without ever speaking of it. Plus fiction and reviews of books and films.

LINKS: SOZIALISTISCHE ZEITUNG, 85 (February 1977)

Verlag 2000 GmbH, Postfach 591, 6050 Offenbach 4, West Germany. 5 DM. Special issue documenting a conference held in spring of 1976 by the Sozialistisches Büro in Offenbach, the most important communications center of the independent Left. Concerned with the campaign against political repression, the current economic crisis and future organizational strategies, this collection includes a wide range of materials ranging from opening speeches (Oskar Negt, Helmut Gollwitzer, Heinz Brandt, Rudi Dutschke, etc.) through a series of reports from work groups (unions, public service, youth, schools, higher education, women, media, citizen initiatives, etc.). —RM

NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, 10 (Winter 1977)

German Department, Box 413, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI 53201. $6 per year (3 issues). EDITORIAL, *"Wolf Biermann's Lyric I."* Introduces the special section on this poet and songwriter, discussing his cultural politics, intellectual dissent in the GDR and the manner in which content and style both emphasize anti-bureaucratic themes in his work. WOLF BIERMANN, *"Ruthless Cursing."* Poem reasserting the value of the private sphere in the face of the false collective. DOCUMENTATION, *"Facts About Wolf Biermann."* Brief biographical sketch, followed by a chronicle of events surrounding the expulsion of Biermann from the GDR in November 1976. WOLF BIERMANN, *"The Crows."* Poem criticizing mindless mass behavior. WOLF BIERMANN, *"Two Interviews."* January 1977 interview with *Konkret* focuses on Biermann's criticisms of both East and West German politics; February 1977 interview discusses Euro-communism. WOLF BIERMANN, *"Take Heart."* Inspirational poem. PETER UWE HOHENDAHL, *"Introduction to Reception Aesthetics."* Poorly organized but often provocative, emphasizing the importance of appropriation in the constitution of meaning. Discusses the limits of empirical, formalist and Marxist methods, aesthetics of reception and the crisis of literary history, the development and current state of reception aesthetics, representational vs. reception aesthetics (with a critique of Lukács), Benjamin's and Sartre's treatment of literature as a dialectic of production and consumption. KAREL KOSIK, *"Historism and Historicism."* Chapter from *Dialectic of the Concrete* on continuity and discontinuity in history. Culture as a constitutive element transcends social determinism: the life of a work follows from mutual interaction with society. Rather than merely relative or eternally ahistorical, "dialectics considers history to be a unity of the absolute in the relative and of the relative in the absolute"—the totality of man's creative appropriation (constitution) of the world. A clear, articulate formulation of a non-identitarian notion of historical continuity. ARTHUR MITZMAN, *"Anarchism, Expressionism and Psychoanalysis."* Straightforward discussion of the expressionist circle formed around psychiatrist Otto Gross and of its connections with German anarchism and Berlin Dada. OTTO GROSS, *"Protest and Morality in the Unconscious."* 1919 article affirms (against Freud) the basically healthy nature of the instinctual substratum, redefines the sex drive in terms of Kropotkin's mutual help instinct and argues that present conditions now permit a

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revolution based on instinctual celebration which could realize human fulfillment. SILVIA BOVENSCHEN, *"Is There a Feminine Aesthetic?"* This article opens *New German Critique*'s feminist discussion with a comment on women's artistic production, "feminine nature," the irony of feminine beauty, aesthetic and feminist public spheres, and women's artistic exclusion in pre-aesthetic realms. Tends to be rambling at points, though. FERENC FEHER, *"The Last Phase of Romantic Anti-Capitalism: Lukács' Response to the War."* Centers on Lukács' turn to Hegel during the expressionist debates of World War I; argues that this shift in thought is first noticeable in notes for a book on Dostoevsky begun in 1915. It situates the alliance between Lukács and Paul Ernst in their mutual hostility toward German naturalism, stemming from political issues of the war and treats the early Bloch-Lukács discussion as a mutual project of avantgarde ideologists separated respectively by democratic and aristocratic orientations. RUSSELL BERMAN, *"Lukács' Critique of Bredel and Ottwalt: A Political Account of an Aesthetic Debate of 1931-32."* Excellent demonstration of Lukács's critical method as ultimately a political attempt to subordinate revolutionary cultural consciousness from below into Party structure from above. Analysis of Bredel and Ottwalt's novels is followed by an examination of Lukács's critique which shows that he upholds a bourgeois aesthetics of contemplation and attempts to exclude leftist political content. Lukács's use of dialectics depoliticizes social reality while affirming authoritarian relations of critic to author, Party to class, Party leader to Party, theory to practice and reality to an abstract ideal that is in itself the extension of Soviet bureaucracy. Theoretical problems discussed include Lukács's art-science dichotomy, his general a-historicism, and his problematic conception of the totality. A devastating criticism of the ideological implications of Soviet cultural policy. —GR

NEW LEFT REVIEW, 100 (November 1976-December 1977)

7 Carlisle Street, London, England W1V 6NL. $16 per year. Special 100th issue. PERRY ANDERSON, *"The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci."* Anderson applauds *New Left Review*'s "deliberate and systematic use of Gramsci's theoretical canon" as one of the journal's contributions to Western Marxism in the 1960s; he then turns toward a critical reconsideration of Gramsci's concept of hegemony. In the course of applying a functional-scientific framework of interpretation, he confuses Gramsci's notion of the dialectical relationship between state and civil society (an element of the work that propelled it beyond the confines of orthodox Marxism): he fails to see Gramsci's contribution to the development of the state and, as a result, he continues in the dualistic tradition to conceptualize the state as an "objective other," poised against the "working class." "Capital" is also objectified. Anderson's concern with the primacy of the economic constraints of "exploited classes" reveals his uncritical analytical conception of the structural dichotomy in Marxist analysis, whereas his utilitarian interpretation of the *Prison Notebooks* illustrates the difficulty in following Gramsci's political conceptualizations as abstracted from examples of military science: Anderson's dependence on standard Marxist notions of crisis and inherent revolutionary violence predetermine his most crucial error, i.e., his view of Gramsci's concept of hegemony in advanced capitalism as ultimately (and strictly) consensual in its definitive character. In actuality, hegemony in Gramsci's work broadens the notion of the state rather than confining it, a theoretically necessary perspective in order to adequately examine the truly radical nature of Gramsci's reconstruction of the state concept. In contrast to Anderson's interpretation, it is clear from both the *Letters from Prison* and the *Prison Notebooks* that hegemony depends on and maintains an *equilibrium* between consent and coercion, the nature of power in advanced capitalism that made it necessary to redevelop the state concept and the contribution to radical analysis which is one of the outstanding features of Gramsci's work (and which surpassed analyses which continued to view power in advanced capitalistic states in terms of the Leninist model of revolution). Further, the equilibrium between consent and coercion in the modern state (as Gramsci understood it) was the basis of the concept "historical bloc," which is incomprehensible without an understanding of Gramsci's view of totality, a view that clearly illuminates the inadequacy of Anderson's dualistic perspective. Here we find the central dilemma—Anderson's attempt to evaluate Gramsci's concept of hegemony without an adequate perspective of Gramsci's notion of totality (which is in turn rests on an understanding of his 'historical bloc'). RAYMOND WILLIAMS, *"Notes on British Marxism since the War."* An important and interesting contribution to the controversy over the nature of Marxist theoretical developments in post-war Britain, combining, with rare quality, perspectives from lived experiences, descriptive aspects of personal reflection and consciousness, and analysis of social situation. ERNEST MANDEL, *"Revolutionary Strategy in Europe: A Political*

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Interview." A confident rehashing of standard Marxist categories in terms of revolutionary models, strategies, and prospects for Western industrialized capitalism, cast into the abstract future of the conceptual revolutionary situation with a stress on the theoretical necessities of revolutionary leadership and a revised perspective of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Mandel's visions rely on the model of dual power and tactics of the united front. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, *"Socialism in One Country."* Excerpted from the second volume of *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. A lucid, uncompromising "regressive investigation" of the development and consequences of the concept "socialism in one country" and its significance for the Soviet Union. Sartre illustrates the contradictions of its universalization by the historical circumstances of Soviet socialism. FRED HALLIDAY, *"Marxist Analysis and Post-revolutionary China."* Review of Livio Maitan's *Party, Army and Masses in China* that maintains the specificity of Chinese experience. —WR

POSSIBLES, 1 (Autumn 1976)

Post Box 114, Succursale Côte-des-neiges, Montreal, P.Q., Canada. $3 per issue. At the end of the 1940s, a period of political and cultural conservatism based on the conservation of pre-industrial and Catholic traditions was superseded by a movement in which certain sectors sought to "catch-up" with the liberal and industrial values of the rest of North America. Three important events indicate the character of this period: the Asbestos Strike, which marked the emergence of the workers' movement; the foundation of the journal *Cité Libre* around which the Catholic, liberal and incipient socialist intelligentsia consolidated; and the publication of a manifesto by the painter P.E. Bourdas, "Réfus Global," which represented a sort of cultural self-critique of Quebec society. The "Quiet Revolution" that began after the death of Premier Maurice Duplessis in the late 1950s marked the full industrialization of Quebec. At this point the earlier self-critique gave way to a period of self-affirmation as witnessed by the consolidation and radicalization of the union movement, and after a few false starts, the formation of the *Party Québéçois* in 1968. During this period three left-nationalist journals appeared, all now defunct: *Parti Pris, Révolution Québéçoise*, and *Socialisme*, the latter two being Marxist-Leninist while the former focused more on culture. The recent electoral victory of the *Parti Québéçois* indicates the beginning of a new stage, one marked not only by the urgency of the national question, but also sharing in condensed form the contradictions and mutations of contemporary western societies. It is in this context that *Possibles* must be situated. Leaning on the more unorthodox moments of leftist theory, the journal seeks to probe the social reality of Quebec in search of potentially emancipatory practices. It should also be noted that the journal places a heavy emphasis on poetry and other cultural manifestations, both suggesting its debt to *Party Pris* and reflecting the general importance of cultural forms in Quebec revolutionary nationalism. (Two other leftist journals exist at present, *Chroniques* and *Stratégies*—both of which are more orthodox).

The first issue, while containing articles of a more general nature, is centered around the most successful attempt at self-management to date in Quebec—that of a textile firm (Tricofil) in the small town of St. Jerome. The analysis explores its impact on the everyday life of the community and its symbolic resonance within the larger project of a socialist Quebec. Articles are: MARCEL RIOUX, *"Les possibles dans une periode de transition."* MARCEL SIMARD, *"L'autogestion à Tricofil: lutte sans avenir ou avenir d'une lutte."* MURIEL GARON-AUDRY, ROBERT LAPLANTE, *"Sens du travail et auto-gestion."* GABRIEL GAGNON, *"L'exception ou la règle."* MARCEL FOURNIER, *"Sciences sociales, idéologie et pouvoir."* —DM

POSSIBLES, 2 (Winter 1976-77)

The second issue focuses on problems of health care—industrial accidents, psychiatric care, the anti-female bias of doctors, etc. The Local Centers for Communisty Services (CLSC) is regarded with an eye to its innovative possibilities. The issue also contains a number of articles on the recent elections. MARCEL FOURNIER, *"La question nationale: Les enjeux."* GERALD GODIN, *"Journal d'une compagne électorale."* MARC RENAUD, *"Crise de la médecine et politique de santé: les leçons de l'histoire."* JACQUES GODBOUT, *"Un possible de la réforme: les Centres Locaux de Services Communautaires et la participation des usagers."* DOMINIQUE GAUCHER, LOUISE HELENE TROTTIER, FRANCINE GUILBAULT, *"Les femmes: mone cheri du bistouri."* MURIL GARON-AUDY, *"Santé et travail: parler du ciel, quand on est en enfer."* JEAN-YVES ROY, *"Les psychiatries contemporaines et leur choix de conscience."* —DM

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QUEST, A FEMINIST QUARTERLY, III:3 (Winter 1976-77)

P.O. Box 8843, Washington, DC 20003. $9 per year (4 issues). NANCY HARTSOCK, *"Staying Alive."* A feminist recycling of Marxist political-economic categories (estranged labor and creative work, the separation of mental and manual work), combined with academic sociological notions of power (as energy, or currency to be traded on). Hartsock concludes with a critique of current forms of collective work and the statement that the structure and organization of work in feminist groups should combine self-expression and self-development. The analysis fails to penetrate beyond the purely formal and functional structures of work and fails to address any possibilities of a more fundamental transformation of teleological human activity. DEIRDRE SILVERMAN, *"Sexual Harassment: Working Woman's Dilemma."* The sexual harassment of women workers is traced to a prostitute-client model of female-male interaction, with the qualification that women have little choice whether or not to hustle. Silverman can't explain the appearance of sexual harassment as a feminist issue, though she does take pains to attribute any resistance to this analysis to "male-identified" and-or "middle class" women. This unfortunate preoccupation with victim-villain models of male-female relations (as in the case of rape, for example) has less to do with some kind of "ripening" of ideas—which don't simply "emerge" on their own accord—than with the general decline of affirmative, emancipatory discourse in the women's movement. MARILYN FRYE, *"Who Wants a Piece of the Pie?"* The moral problem posed at the beginning of this article—how to live?—is finally answered at the end: catch as catch can. Unfortunately, in between lie several pages of guilt-ridden hand-wringing as well as three different reasons why privilege (associated with well-paid professional jobs) is really okay: refusal of privilege is itself a privilege, refusal of a professional job would sustain white-male power, and access to resources makes them more readily accessible by other women. This article indicates how guilt and resentment replace political questions with moral ones, turning non-issues into issues. EDITORS, *"We Work, They Profit."* Excerpts from articles on various aspects of women's work. BLANCHARD, REVILLE, HARTSOCK, HOCK, *"Doing Factory Time."* Interview with a woman worker. ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, *"Beyond 'Beyond Either-Or Feminist Options'."* Commentary and criticism of an article by Charlotte Bunch. Eisenstein argues that Bunch's commitment to an autonomous women's movement with an independent (of the Left) political base does not address the factionalism in the women's movement. Eisenstein argues for a coalition of radical feminists, lesbian feminists and socialist feminists. LEXI FREEMAN, JACKIE MACMILLAN, *"The Feminist Workplace."* Interview with Nancy MacDonald, former administrator of the Washington, D.C. Rape Crisis Center. Plus fiction. —SW

RADICAL AMERICA, 10:6 (November-December 1976)

P.O. Box BN, Cambridge, MA 02104. $8 for four issues. ELLEN CANTAROW, *"Abortion and Feminism in Italy: Women Against Church and State."* Whether or not men in the left parties can respond to the demands and criticisms of this mass women's movement is examined at length. Emphasis is on the potential of anti-clericalism as a radicalizing force. CARL BOGGS, *"The Historic Compromise: The Communist Party and Working Class Politics in Italy."* Events surrounding the recent Italian elections and crucial problems facing both the PCI and the revolutionary left are discussed. Consistently moving to the right, the PCI has given the revolutionary left the opportunity to work in the space opened up between them and the working class. Boggs also points to some of the problems of the revolutionary left itself, and makes it clear that there is no guarantee that today's left will be able to rise to the opportunity. TOM WAYMAN, *"The Country of Everyday: Workplace; Routines; The Country of Everyday: 12; Things that Won't Work; A Cursing Poem."* Poetry by a Canadian socialist poet, one of the few in North America who writes about the working class experience. IAN BIRCHALL, *Labour vs. Labor: Keeping the Working Class Down in Britain."* Outlines the experience of the first two and a half years of the Labor government and examines the nature of its hold on the British working class. The continuation of working class resistance despite the powerful grip of reformism is also described. —PFM

RADICAL PHILOSOPHY, 16 (Spring 1977)

40 Langdon Park Road, London N6 5QG, England. COLIN GORDON, JONATHAN BEE, *"The Philosopher in the Classroom: A Report from France."* Surveys the activities of the Groupe de Recherches sur l'Enseignement Philosophique within the French academic and political situation. Includes an interview of a GREPH representative and a report on a recently published collective study of philosophy essays in secondary schools. J.J. BROCHIER, *"Prison Talk: An*

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Interview with Michel Foucault." Dates from June 1975, when Foucault published *Surveiller et Punir*, which can be seen as the completion of a trilogy with his *Madness and Civilization* and *Birth of the Clinic*. Each work traces the genealogy of an institution and of the human science symbiotically linked to it. PHILIP CONFORD, *"John Macmurray: A Neglected Philosopher."* A concern with existential themes and his recognition of philosophy's historical basis are cited as reasons why Macmurray has been neglected by academic philosophers. One of a small number of philosophers to write autibiographically, his work is examined in light of his personal history. BRIAN MILLER, *"Media and Images."* Outline of the evolution of Western "image-specifics" from those contained in medieval art to those of the present-day. Demonstrates how Western art is linked with the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the values of individualism. The function of the image is to confirm individual self-identity by yielding to the viewer's preferences, even when this yielding incorporates any necessary apparent abrasiveness. ROGER WATERHOUSE, *"Husserl and Phenomenology."* An attempt to give some guidance of what to read and how to untangle the jargon, turgid prose, and widely different stances adopted by writers calling themselves phenomenologists. The ways in which Husserl's thinking changed during his life and how that evolution was responsible for the major trends which subsequently developed within the phenomenological movement are stressed. A helpful annotated bibliography of both primary and secondary sources is included. —PFM

REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, 6 (May-August 1976)

RICHARD JOSEPH, *"The Gaullist Legacy: Patterns of French Neo-Colonialism."* Founded on military force, France has maintained an economic and cultural stranglehold on its former colonies. Despite 'decolonization,' the French entrenchment is seen to have increased in the post-independence era. HANK CHASE, *"The Zanzibar Treason Trial."* Brief summary of the development of the Zanzibari social formation through the colonial period leading up to Karume's assassination, and a critical evaluation of the subsequent mass treason trial which left more than 40 people under sentence of death. KERSTIN LEITNER, *"The Situation of Agricultural Workers in Kenya."* An ironic outcome of the unionization of agricultural workers (the wages and conditions of this labor force, especially women, remain below subsistence) is probed. HENRY BERNSTEIN, *"Underdevelopment and the Law of Value: A Critique of Kay."* Discusses Kay's *Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis*. Also contains "Briefings" (on the POLISARIO Front, mercenaries in South Africa, neo-colonial maneuverings, in Zimbabwe, recent events in Ethiopia), debates, reviews, and bibliography. —JK

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, 41 (Spring 1977)

Room 4331, John Jay College, CUNY, 445 W. 59th St., New York, NY 10019. $8 per year (4 issues). Special issue: "Toward a Marxist Understanding of Shakespeare: A Symposium." Papers from a seminar held at an International Shakespeare Association Conference, April 1976. This collection is remarkable in its intellectual character: it is no longer virulently crude as was the literary Marxism of the 1930s and, except for *de regeur* lip service to what 'Marxists' should or should not do, its act and vocabulary have been cleaned up. On the other hand, the work now lacks all real distinction: it is fluent but narrow in scope, trivial, banal; moderate CP criticism is virtually indistinguishable from third-rate mainstream criticism. The method is closest to mediocre Lukács with a touch of Brecht—concerned with reflection (mimesis) and social function, as well as with form as a vehicle for the first two. All these papers are variations in literary history and assimilate the works of art to social context as both product (reflection theory) and producer (reception theory); but the edge of the dialectic is not now called 'determination' but 'correlation.' Hamburger's article is the least Lukácsian and the only one of substantial interest, but the bias of all of this Marxist criticism remains to ground the literary sign system in the purposive flow of extra-literary utility, without exploring it as an aesthetic-erotic communicative system that is itself the ground for expressive play freeing the symbolic imagination. ROBERT WEIMANN, *"Shakespeare and Marxist Methodology."* Articulate summary and synthesis of the positions taken in the subsequent papers. Via the language of production, Shakespearean creativity is examined as both product and producer of Elizabethan society and its culture. Methodologically, Marxian criticism claims to contribute to seeing the civilizing function of the structure of Shakespearean art by working toward "a dialectical sense of unity of history and criticism by which both the past significance and the present meaning of Shakespeare's theatre can be defined through the structural quality and social function of his dramatic art, while that art is similarly defined through his theatre." The summary does not

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suggest the nature of the *telos* governing the definitions that are being sought. Dramatic speech is to be comprehended as both a process and a vision of society. Base-superstructure frame is here shifted toward a dialectical reciprocity of correlation, but the dualistic reflection-constitution discourse remains insensitive to the texture and parameters of ideological value codifications and hence to aesthetic-erotic character and structure of feeling. In general, the summary promises more—even as far as it goes—than the papers deliver. MARGOT HEINEMANN, *"Shakespearean Contradictions and Social Change."* Seeks to correlate "doubleness' and ambivalence in Shakespeare's life and writings with contradictory historical pressures and values. Brief notes about social environment, theatre, audiences, censorship, and patrons. THOMAS METSCHER, *"Shakespeare in the Context of Renaissance Europe."* Contends that Shakespearean drama is both national and transnational, i.e., reflects the conditions of both England and Europe and embodies conflicting values. Commentary on *Hamlet*. Argues that Shakespeare's plays explore the quality of crisis that arose from the conflict of social classes and the distinct cultures (feudal, royal, bourgeois, Puritan, folk) that corresponded to them. In consequence, Shakespeare's work is characterized by a search for (and a failure to constitute) a humanist utopia, and the *problem of solution* becomes the central issue of the late plays, posed, moreover, in historical dimensions. ANNETTE T. RUBINSTEIN, *"Bourgeois Equality in Shakespeare."* Argues that Shakespeare expresses "one of the basic tenets of the bourgeois revolution," the ethical axiom that maintains the potential equality of members of all groups and the consequent possibility of social mobility between classes. Glances at examples drawn from the plays, especially *Othello*. MICHAEL P. HAMBURGER, *"Gestus and the Popular Theatre."* Intelligent examination of the *Gestus* of dramatic speech, arguing that Shakespeare's theatrical effectiveness follows partly from his proximity to popular dramatic expression with its rich, full-blown physical quality. Plebeian influence thus enters the *Gestus* of Shakespeare's dramatic text through both the *material* of colloquial language and also the *form*, the physicality of human verbal expression and communication. Shakespeare is able to absorb all strata of language in contrast with subsequent periods when a dissociation from plebeian influences in the drama was bound up with the general rejection of theatre as an art. The argument is advanced through comparisons with Schlegel's translation of *Hamlet*. BRUCE ERLICH, *"Shakespeare's Colonial Metaphor: On the Social Function of Theatre in* The Tempest." Argues that Shakespeare's romance is a work of profound social realism whose historical insight (if not sympathies) embraces not only the decline of feudalism but anticipates as well the next major phase of national development, colonial expansion under nascent capitalism. GEORG LUKACS, *"An Unpublished Letter to Jan Knott* [sic], *1964."* Lukács praises Kott, but disagrees with his historical pessimism in Kott's *Shakespeare Our Contemporary* and notes that the new ethic and new image of man in the Renaissance is missing from Kott's analysis. LINDA NYDEN, *"Black Miners in Western Pennsylvania, 1925-1931. The National Miners Union and the United Mine Workers of America."* Enthusiastic CP labor history describes the NMU's fight for militant non-racist and class-struggle trade unionism and its impact on the UMW and the CIO approach to black workers. Examines and endorses the role of the CP in the coalfields. COMMUNICATIONS. Uncritical, poor quality 'Marxist' book reviews by Aptheker, DeGrood, Cunningham, and others.

—JAF

LES TEMPS MODERNES, 366 (January 1977)

26, rue de Conde, Paris 5. 14 Francs. ANDRE GRANOU, *"L'hypothèse fasciste et la gauche."* The author perceives the emergence of J. Chirac and the reorganization of certain sectors of the middle classes as laying the foundation for an authoritarian state coupled with corporatist structures should the left win in the national elections. JOSE GIL, *"La Corse et les impasses du pouvoir."* More on the separatist struggles in Corsica. MICHELINE LUCCIONI, *"L'intégration des jeunes intellectueles urbaines à la campagne."* A generally Maoist analysis, prefaced by a warning that suggests its obsolescence. JOHN T. EDSALL* *"La toxicité du plutonium et de quelques autres actinides."* DOMINIQUE PIGNON, *"Le nucléaire dans tous ses états."* These articles provide a critical overview of the usage of nuclear power. —BS

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